same time, of lightening "the labors of the practitioner in referring to the text." It is not intended to be used as a distinct book, but as a supplementary volume in connection with the original work. Mr. Dickson has taken the subject of each lecture, divided it into heads, and again subdivided once or more times each head until he has reached the ultimate propositions or principles of the subject, which are given generally in Kent's language, though sometimes a definition has been borrowed from some other authority, or has been condensed by the author from the general description in the text. Our readers will perhaps best understand his method from an illustration. Lecture XLIV., for example, is analyzed thus:

1. DEFINED AS·

NEGOTIABLE PAPER.

A written order, request, or promise, for a certain sum of money, made payable to the payee or to his order, or assigns, or to bearer, whereby it may be transferred or negotiated so as to enable the assignee to sue upon it in his own name [77].

2. KINDS.-1. A Bill of Exchange. A written order or request by one person to another for the payment of money at a specified time absolutely, and at all events [74].

2. A Promissory Note. A written promise by one person to another, for the payment of money at a specified time absolutely, and at all events [74].

3. A Check. A written order for a certain sum of money,

drawn upon a bank or banker, payable to bearer, or to a particular party only by name, or to him or his order, on presentment, without days of grace; and it is never presented for mere acceptance, but only for payment [104, n. (c)].

3. ESSENTIAL QUALITIES.

4. TRANSFER.

5. ACCEPTANCE.

6. PAYMENT.

7. PROTEST.

8. NOTICE.

9. DISCHARGE.

10. MEASURE OF DAMAGES.
11. GUARANTY.

On subsequent pages each sub-head, as "Protest," is taken and again subdivided on the same plan, a reference being always made to the proper page of the Commentaries. Each alternate page is left blank for manuscript notes, or such memoranda in amplification of the author's outline as the student may think necessary.

Whether this work will be very useful to the practising lawyer, we very much doubt. If he wishes to consult Kent on any point, it will be easier to examine the index of the work itself, and refer directly to Kent's discussion of the subject, than to consult this digest of it. In practice, Mr. Dickson's volume would only be useful as a sort of index; and a good index to the original work should answer the same purpose.

To the student, however, we can see that the book will be of great value. It is a succinct statement of all the law to be found in Kent, arranged logically, so that a general grasp of each topic can be obtained easily, and the

student prepared to follow understandingly the full discussion of the subject in the pages of the original work; and we cordially recommend it to the attention of all who are engaged in teaching law. In our judgment the true plan for thorough and scientific legal education is, in the first instance, to impress firmly upon the student the principle, and then to make him understand it thoroughly by giving him the leading cases under it as illustrations, and teaching him to apply it for himself to each state of facts. To give a student a collection of cases, and expect him from them to extract the principle for himself, is like teaching science by compelling the learner to find each law for himself by repeating the experiments of its original discoverer. So many of cur text-books are mere collections of cases arranged chronologically rather than logically, that a scientific statement of principles is a refreshing contrast; and the reader of Mr. Dickson's volume may well be satisfied that the law is not such an absolutely trackless sea as it may well seem to him when he rises from the perusal of one of these ill-digested collections.

So far as we can judge from our examination of the volume, the author has stated the contents of the main work with accuracy, and his digest is reliable. Even the errors of the original are faithfully reproduced. Thus, on page 155, we find the proposition that a contract of sale is made valid under the Statute of Frauds "by delivery or tender of it, or payment or tender of payment." This proposition certainly is stated in Kent's own words, but we think our author would have been justified in amending it; but, as it could hardly have been the result of original research, it affords the most satisfactory evidence of the author's fidelity in carrying out his task.

The volume itself is handsome, the paper, print, and binding being alike excellent.

Massachusetts Reports, CXI. Cases argued and determined in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. November, 1872-March, 1873. Reported by ALBERT G. BROWNE, Jr., and JOHN C. GRAY, Jr. Boston: H. O. Houghton & Co., corner Beacon and Somerset Streets. 1875.

THE prompt publication of the 111th volume of the Massachusetts Reports by Mr. Gray encourages the hope that the hiatus now existing in the decisions of the Supreme Court, as published, may speedily be filled.

This volume, however, will not, as we believe, be found specially interesting to the profession, as compared with some of its immediate predecessors; for it contains rather more than its fair proportion of cases which are sui generis, and which are not likely to be often cited as precedents.

In Earle v. Rice, p. 17, the court give another application of the equitable doctrine which allows oral evidence to be introduced for the purpose of controlling a written instrument; an executory written contract between husband and wife being set aside upon the expressed ground of a precedent oral declaration by the parties, that the papers should have only a moral obligation, but no binding effect in law. The case carries out the views before so elaborately explained by Wells, J., in Glass v. Hulbert, 102 Mass. 24, and Campbell v. Dearborn, 109 Mass. 130.

In Potter v. Jacobs, p. 32, a party who had entered upon real estate in pursuance of an oral contract for its purchase, who had put up a house upon it,

and had paid part of the purchase-money, is held entitled to specific performance of the original oral contract, the owner having tendered him a deed at an increased price. The case is put upon the ground that the part performance would avoid the Statute of Frauds; and no opinion is expressed upon the point raised by the plaintiff that the undelivered deed, tendered by the owner, might serve as a sufficient memorandum to satisfy the statute. The part performance is held to have placed the parties in such position that they could not be restored to their rights if the contract were abandoned.

Hashell v. Varina, p. 84, is a decision of great public importance with respect to titles depending upon levies on execution; the land, in this case, having been seized, and the proceedings having then been suspended by reason of a prior attachment, it is held, that an unexplained neglect in resuming the proceedings on the part of the officer or creditor, during more than thirty days after the dissolution of the prior attachment, will vitiate the levy.

This seems at first sight rather harsh and arbitrary, especially as the decision would seem inevitably to throw a cloud upon many titles which have hitherto been passed without question; but an examination of the authorities upon which the judgment is based will show that its ultimate effect will be to make a certain and definite rule, which can be safely followed, while the conclusion upon the precedents will be found to be irresistible.

The opinion, moreover, indicates that the officer's return must actually give reason and explanation for a longer delay than thirty days, although there is no direct intimation as to what explanation or reason would be sufficient. The import of the court's language would seem to be that a mere statement of the officer that an adjournment was necessary would not be enough without an explanation on his part, and it would then be left to the court to say in each case whether such explanation was satisfactory.

In Thwing v. Great Western Insurance Co., p. 94, the court, in construing an insurance policy upon a vessel, affirms its previous decision that a warranty "not to load more than her registered tonnage " is not broken by carrying as freight, in addition to coal and other cargo, a certain amount of coal as dunnage, instead of following the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in Great Western Insurance Co. v. Thwing, 13 Wall. 672, as rendered by a divided court.

In Eastern Railroad Co. v. Boston & Maine Railroad Co., p. 125, the court considers the constitutionality of a statute authorizing one railroad corporation to take for its own use, for railway purposes, land previously taken and occupied by a similar corporation under general laws, although the effect of the taking might be to deprive the latter, not only of the land in question, but also of a part of its business, and to injure its franchise.

This question is one which has of late attracted much attention and interest in the legislature and elsewhere; but the opinion upholds the right of the legislature in the fullest extent to provide by statute for the transfer and change of the nature of property acquired by corporations for public purposes, by virtue of the right of eminent domain.

An interesting question arises under the decision as to the general railroad law, first enacted by St. 1872, c. 53, and now in force, which provide for the organization of railroad corporations without special charters; viz., whether

such corporations can locate their railroads over land previously appropriated to public purposes.

In Gregg v. Massachusetts Medical Society, p. 191, a bill in equity, seeking an injunction against a corporation created by a statute authorizing it to expel its members, to restrain it from proceeding with an investigation of charges against certain members which were claimed to be reasons for their expulsion from the corporation, a demurrer to the bill is sustained upon the ground that the court has no jurisdiction in equity.

The decision is not founded explicitly upon the want of jurisdiction in this court arising from the peculiarity of the Massachusetts statute clothing it with chancery jurisdiction, but upon the broader principle that courts of general equity powers, like the High Court of Chancery in England, have refused to interfere in similar cases, or, in the language of the opinion, that “injunctions issue against parties, and not against courts."

Thus it would seem that the equitable power of the court, under the statute extended to all cases where there is no plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law, is in no respect enlarged by the language used, beyond those of courts not trammelled by statute, although, as we have lately seen in Jones v. Newhall and Suter v. Matthews, in the 115th Massachusetts, it is much limited by it.

It is true, however, that in Gregg v. Massachusetts Medical Society, it may be inferred that the final decision of the corporation might be reviewed upon a mandamus.

In Harvard College v. Head, p. 209, it was held that the defendant, John A. Head, having an annuity charged upon property held in trust by the plaintiffs, and having, in 1860, in contemplation of his marriage with the other defendant, Charlotte E. Head, assigned all his right in the same to her "during the continuance of the marriage," was entitled to hold the same, after she had obtained a divorce from him in Vermont, from a court having jurisdiction of the parties, by a decree making specific provision for her alimony, but not dealing with the annuity.

Connihan v. Thompson, p. 270, decides that a bill for specific performance of a contract concerning lands, and an action at law for damage for breach of the same, are not so far inconsistent that the commencement of one will operate as a waiver, by election, of the other; and the principles applicable to the subject are stated with the greatest precision and clearness by Mr. Justice Wells. We have seen it suggested in a review of this volume, that this case intimates an opinion upon the vexed question among conveyancers, whether the finding of a contract for sale recorded in the registry of deeds is in itself a notice to a purchaser, and so binding in equity. No such suggestion is made. The court merely state the familiar rule, that actual notice, however obtained, is binding; but whether the knowledge of an unauthorized copy upon the books of the registry has any legal effect is a very different question, still likely to perplex searchers of the record.

Jenkins v. Bacon, p. 373, is an interesting case, in which the court (MORTON, J., dissenting) hold a party liable for the loss of a government bond, which he had received from one starting upon a long voyage, to keep as a bailee, without hire, he having sent it by mail to the wife of the owner with

out his or her request. The bailee was to cut off the coupons from time to time and send them to the depositor's wife, and the case is placed upon the ground that the commission was in the nature of a trust, which the bailee, having once accepted, could not lawfully terminate as he attempted to.

The criminal cases of the volume, pp. 392 to 445, are not of especial interest to the profession.

Commonwealth v. McElhaney, p. 439, holds that the court may grant a motion for a new trial in a capital case, within one year, even after sentence and the issuing of a warrant for the execution of the prisoner.

West's Case, p. 443, interprets the St. 1867, c. 301, § 2, allowing pardons, on condition that the prisoner should, upon a subsequent conviction, serve out the unexpired part of his original sentence, to refer only to such part of the actual term of time for which he was first sentenced as might remain unexpired when he should be subsequently convicted.

In Thorndike v. Burrage, p. 531, the court decide per curiam that the leaving of nine cart-loads of rubbish by a tenant on quitting the demised premises is no breach of a covenant to leave the premises in good tenantable repair.

Massachusetts Reports, CXVI. Cases argued and determined in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. September, 1874-January, 1875.

JOHN LATHROP, Reporter. Boston: H. O. Houghton & Co. 1875. MR. LATHROP brings out this his second volume with a promptness that will, if continued, endear him to the profession; and the cases are reported with the accuracy, neatness, and good taste that mark the work of an accomplished lawyer. The table of the cases cited by the court inserted in this volume, as in the former one, will be of great convenience in tracing out the history of any case or series of cases, and in seeking for any comments that may have been made upon decisions of this and other courts.

The cases reported in the volume are not themselves of great general interest. The questions involved, though often important and discussed with an acuteness and ability worthy the high reputation of the court, are mostly of local procedure, and the interpretation of local statutes. A few of them are worthy of special reference.

In Commonwealth v. Barry, p. 1, the court decide that the State courts have jurisdiction of a larceny committed by the teller of a national bauk, of the property of the bank, notwithstanding that he may also be subject to punishment for embezzlement under the United States statute of 1864, c. 106, § 55.

In Du Vivier v. Hopkins, p. 125, it was held that a claim against the insolvent estate of a deceased person pending in the Superior Court on appeal from the decision of commissioners of insolvency, appointed by the Probate Court under the Gen. Sts. of Massachusetts, c. 99, cannot be removed to the United States courts by the appellants, citizens of another state under the United States Statute of 1867, c. 196.

In Boston Seamen's Friend Society v. Mayor, &c., of Boston, p. 181, the court held, in an elaborate and able opinion, that the exemption of the real estate of charitable institutions from taxation, under the Gen. Sts. c. 11, § 5, only extends to taxation for general purposes, and does not include assess

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