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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, STATE. 1. Where the constitution required the consent of two-thirds of the qualified voters of a district for erecting such district into a new county, held, that an affirmative vote of two-thirds of those who were entitled to vote, and not merely of those who did actually vote, was required. Cocke v. Gooch, 5 Heisk. 294.
2. Where the constitution forbade the passage of special laws in cases where a general law could be made applicable, held, that the legislature was the sole judge whether such application was possible. (BUSKIRK, J., dissenting.) State v. Tucker, 46 Ind. 355.
3. A statute empowering the state land agent to seize and sell, without legal process, the teams and other property used by trespassers in cutting and hauling, without right, timber growing on public lands, held, unconstitutional. Dunn v. Burleigh, 62 Me. 24.
4. A general statute authorizing towns to exempt certain kinds of property from taxation, held, unconstitutional. — Brewer Brick Co. v. Brewer, 62 Me. 62.
5. An act of the legislature declaring an infant to be of lawful age, and legally competent to transact his own business, held, constitutional, on the ground of uniform and undisputed practice in the State. - Shipp v. Klinger, 54 Mo. 238.
6. By the Constitution of Missouri, the governor, or either house of the legislature, may require the opinion of the judges of the Supreme Court “on important questions of constitutional law and on solemn occasions." The House of Representatives propounded a question as to the effect of a proposed private act concerning a railroad company on the existing liabilities of the company to the State. The judges declined to answer the question. — Opinion of the Judges, 55 Mo. 497.1
7. A statute allowing writs to be amended by striking out the names of some of the plaintiffs, cannot be constitutionally applied to an action pending at the time of its passage to recover a penalty given by statute to any person who will sue for the same. - Kent v. Gray, 53 N. H. 576.
8. A statute authorizing towns to take stock in railroads, and to levy a tax to pay for it, held, constitutional. - Harcourt v. Good, 39 Tex. 455, See STATUTE, 1.
CONTEMPT. It is no contempt to induce a person to abscond in order to avoid service of a summons to appear before the grand jury, if no summons has actually issued.
McConnell v. The State, 46 Ind. 298. CONTRACT. - See Action, 2, 5, 6; BILL OF LADING; CARRIER ; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 4; CORPORATION, 6 ; DURESS; FRAUDS, STATUTE OF ;
ILLEGAL CONTRACT; INFANT; INTEREST; LORD's Day; MONEY PAID; PARTNERSHIP; PARTY-WALL; RATIFICATION; REPEAL; SALE; STAMP; SURETY.
CONTRIBUTION. See Tax.
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE. In an action against a street railway company for negligence, it appeared that the plaintiff, a boy seventeen years old, jumped from the car while in rapid motion, and was injured. Held, that this was not negligence per se, but that the question was for the jury. – Wyatt v. Citizens Ry. Co., 55 Mo. 485.
CORPORATION. 1. A corporation voted to increase its capital stock, and commanded its directors to do whatever the law required for that purpose. The directors on the same day voted that a dividend in cash should be paid to each stockholder at the time within which he was allowed by the vote of the corporation to take his new shares, and should be applied by him in payment for those shares; and directed the treasurer to issue such shares to old stockholders only. Each stockholder received his dividend in the shape of a check, which was immediately exchanged by him for a certificate of his proportion of the new stock, and was then dostroyed, and not presented at the bank. Held, that these transactions constituted a stock dividend, and that when a trust fund was invested in the old stock, the new stock belonged to the capital and not to the income of the fund. - Rand v. Hubbell, 115 Mass. 461.
2. A trust fund was invested in stock of a corporation which, having sold its franchises and property, and being about to wind up its affairs and dissolve, voted to pay a dividend in cash to its shareholders on surrender of their certificates. Its assets at the time of said distribution consisted in part of undivided earnings. Held, that the whole amount received by the trustee was capital, and not income,
Gifford v. Thompson, 115 Mass. 478. 3. Action on a bond issued by a county in aid of a railroad company. Held, that the defendants could not question the lawful existence of the company. Smith v. Clark County, 54 Mo. 58.
4. In ejectment, one party claimed under a deed from a corporation, not a party to the suit, which was authorized to hold land for certain purposes. Held, that the right of the corporation to take and hold the land in dispute could not be inquired into. - Shewalter v. Pirner, 55 Mo. 218.
5. A railroad corporation is not liable for a malicious prosecution instituted by one of its officers against another for embezzlement of its funds. (ADAMS,
dissenting.) – Gillett v. Missouri lley R.R. Co., 55 Mo. 315.
6. Stock in a corporation was sold on August 11, reserving to the seller “all profits and dividends of and upon such stock,” up to January 1. No dividend was declared till April, when one was declared. In an action to recover it, brought by the seller against the purchaser, it was found as a fact that a certain part of the dividend was derived from an increase in value of the company's assets between August 11 and January 1. Held, that the purchaser was nevertheless entitled to the whole dividend. (CHURCH, C.J., dissenting.) – Hyatt v. Allen, 56 N. Y. 553.
7. Statutory action to charge a stockholder with debts of the corporation. Held, that the defendant was estopped to object that the corporation was never lawfully organized. Slocum v. Providence Steam & Gas Pipe Co., 10 R. I. 112. Slocum v. Warren, ib. 116.
See AMENDMENT; CHARITY; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3; LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.
COUNTY. - See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, STATE, 1; STATUTE, 2.
See EASEMENT, 1; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
CRIMINAL Law. - See ATTORNEY, 2; AUTREFOIS ACQUIT ; CONFESSION ; Con
STITUTIONAL Law, 1; EVIDENCE, 5, 7; INDICTMENT; INFANT; JUDGMENT, 2; LARCENY; SLANDER.
DAMAGES. 1. Action by a parent for an assault and battery on his child, per quod servitium amisit. Held, that exemplary damages were recoverable. - Klingman v. Holmes, 54 Mo. 304.
2. In an action for a tort, which is also punishable criminally, exemplary damages are not recoverable. - Fay v. Parker, 53 N. H. 342.
3. Action against a railroad company to recover damages for the act of a conductor who put plaintiff off the train, because he refused to show a ticket or pay fare. Held, that even if the plaintiff was justified in his refusal, he could not recover exemplary damages. Townsend & New York Central R.R. Co., 56 N. Y. 295.
See CONFEDERATE MONEY; CONFLICT OF LAWS, 2; EVIDENCE, 6; NEW TRIAL.
DECEIT. Declaration, for that defendants fraudulently stated to plaintiff that the stock of a certain company was worth eighty per cent of its par value, which statement plaintiff believed, and, relying thereon, bought of defendants some of the stock; whereas in truth the stock was worth but forty per cent, as defendants well knew. Held, that plaintiff had no cause of action. (CHURCH, C.J., and ANDREWS, J., dissenting.) - Ellis v. Andrews, 56 N. Y. 83.
DEDICATION. See ADVERSE POSSESSION, 2.
DELIVERY. See CARRIER, 1.
DETINUE.- See SLAVE.
DEVISE AND LEGACY. 1. Devise in trust “ for the benefit of my daughter S., and to her children if she should have any; and, should she die without any child or children, then the property to be equally divided among my children.” S. was unmarried at the time of the testator's death. Held, that she took only an estate for life. Turner v. Ivie, 5 Heisk. 222.
2. A testator gave several legacies of stock, amounting in all to more stock than he owned. Held, that the legatees were entitled to receive the value in money, at the end of a year after the testator's death, of the stocks bequeathed. Pearce v. Billings, 10 R. I. 102.
3. Testator bequeathed to his wife, dum sola, “ the dividends or income” of certain stock. Held, that this was not an annuity, but a gift of income, and therefore that the legatee was bound to pay the taxes on the stock. - Pearson v. Chase, 10-R. I. 455. See CHARITY.
DISCHARGE. See BANKRUPTCY, 1.
Dog. - See LARCENY, 1; SLANDER.
DOMICIL. -See HOMESTEAD.
DOWER. 1. Where by statute a widow is entitled to dower only in lands of which her husband died seised, held, that a widow was not dowable of land sold on execution against her husband in his life-time, but of which no deed was made before bis death to the purchaser. (Overtuling former decisions.) — Rose v. Rose, 6 Heisk. 533.
2. By statute of Mississippi a widow is dowable of all lands whereof her husband dies “seised and possessed." Held, that these two words were used synonymously, and therefore that a widow was dowable of lands let for a term of years at the time of her husband's death, the fee being in him. - Sykes v. Sykes, 49 Miss. 190.
3. A wife joined, to release dower, in a conveyance by her husband, which was afterwards set aside as in fraud of his creditors. Held, that the right of dower revived. - Richardson v. Wyman, 62 Me. 280. See CONFLICT OF Laws, 1.
DRUNKENXESS. See EVIDENCE, 6.
DURESS. A. agreed to sell land to B. for a certain price, at any time within three years. Both parties lived in Texas, where within two years the war broke out, and the Confederate military authorities issued an order requiring all persons to take Confederate money in payment of debts, and imprisoned some persons for refusing to take it. B. tendered to A. the agreed price, in Confederate money, and received a conveyance of the land. Held, that A. might avoid the conveyance as made under duress, though B. made no threats to compel the acceptance of the money. — Olivari v. Menger, 39 Tex. 76.
EASEMENT. 1. A., owning land on both sides of a passage, conveyed that on one side to B., with this provision : “I do covenant and bind myself, my heirs and representatives, to leave open forever, for the public convenience and the use of the adjoining lots,” the said passage. A. afterwards sold to C. the land on the other side of the passage. Held, that B. might have an injunction against C. to restrain thie erection of a balcony and stairway projecting into the passage. — Brew v. Van Deman, 6 Heisk. 433.
2. Defendant conveyed to plaintiff land, with a house on it, which had windows overlooking adjoining land of defendant. Held, that there was no implied grant of an easement of light and air, and that defendant might lawfully build on his own land so as to obstruct plaintiff's windows. – Keats v. Hugo, 115 Mass. 204.
ELECTION. - See CONFLICT OF Laws, 1.
EMANCIPATION. See SLAVE. EQUITY. - See BURIAL; EASEMENT, 1; FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE, 2; ILLE
GAL CONTRACT, 2; RELIGIOUS SOCIETY ; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
ESTOPPEL. In ejectment for an undivided fourth part of a certain close, the defendant pleaded not guilty, and also title in himself, both of which issues were found against him, and the plaintiff bad judgment. In a subsequent action for partition of the close, brought by the same plaintiff against the same defendant, held, that the defendant was not estopped to plead non-tenure. - Young v. Smith, 10 R. I. 372.
See CORPORATION, 3, 7; PARTITION.
EVIDENCE. 1. In an action for libel, evidence of a publication by defendant, after action brought, and not explaining or confessing the former publication, held, inadmissible. — Saunders v. Baxter, 6 Heisk. 369.
2. Action for malicious prosecution. Held, that evidence of plaintiff's good character and reputation, and defendant's knowledge thereof, at the time of the prosecution, was admissible to show a want of probable cause. - Blizzard v. Hays, 46 Ind. 166.
3. In a bastardy proceeding, the record of a judgment in an action by the prosecutrix against the defendant for seduction is not admissible to prove sexual intercourse. Glenn v. The State, 46 Ind. 368.
4. Action for slander by words imputing an indictable offence. Plea, that the words were true. Held, that the defendant was bound to prove this averment beyond a reasonable doubt. (SHERWOOD, J., dissenting.) – Polston v. See, 54 Mo. 291. 8. P. Tucker v. Call, 45 Ind. 31.
5. On a trial for arson, the fact that the prisoner had insured his own goods, destroyed by the fire, beyond their true value, is admissible in evidence; and may be shown by parol, without producing the policies of insurance. Cohn, 9 Nev. 179.
6. Action against a railroad company for negligence of its servant, causing damage to plaintiff. Held, that evidence that the servant was drunk at the time, and was of intemperate habits, which was known to the company's agent authorized to employ and discharge such servants, was admissible in aggravation of damages. — Cleghorn v. N. Y. Central & Hudson River R.R. Co., 56 N. Y. 44.
7. On an indictment for forgery, evidence was offered that the prisoner had confessed the commission of other forgeries. Held, inadmissible. — People v. Corbin, 56 N. Y. 363.
8. Land was claimed by virtue of a levy and sale on execution. The officer's return on the execution failed to show that all the requisites of law had been complied with. Held, that the defect could not be supplied by parol evidence, and therefore that the levy was void. (POTTER, J., dissenting.) - Wilcox v. Emerson, 10 R. I. 270.
See BURDEN OF PROOF; CONFESSION; FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 5; MalicroUS PROSECUTION, 1; STAMP; STATUTE, 1; WITNESS.
EXECUTION. - See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2; DoWER, 1; EVIDENCE, 8.
EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR. 1. Action by the administrator de bonis non of W. against the executor of the former administrator of W. to recover property belonging to W.'s estate. Held, that though defendant's testator was an express trustee for the estate of W., de