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crushed them. Held, that defendants were liable only if they knew, or might, by the use of ordinary care, have discovered, that the roof was unsafe. Moulton v. Phillips, 10 R. I. 218.
See AGENT; BANKRUPTCY, 2; CORPORATION, 5; DECEIT; EXECUTOR, 3; MONEY PAID, 1, 2; NUISANCE; PARENT; PARTY-WALL; PROXIMATE CAUSE, 1, 3.
ADMINISTRATION. - See EXECUTOR.
ADVERSE POSSESSION. 1. Land was conveyed, in 1765, to the use of the inhabitants of a town and their successors, for a parsonage, and the use and support of ministers of the gospel. The consideration was paid by the town. From 1810 the town took the rents and profits of the land to its own use. There was but one religious society in the town at the time of the conveyance, and from that time to about 1870 [as it seems, the report being defective in this particular]. At the latter date, the society, which had always had notice of the town's use of the land, filed a bill against the town for an account of rents and profits. Held, that even if the town was a trustee for the society (and semble that it was), it had gained a title by adverse possession. - Congregational Society in Newington v. Newington, 53 N. H. 595.
2. By vote of a town, land was laid out for a training-ground and burial place. Held, not a dedication to the whole public, but a gift to a limited part of the public, for a charitable use, and therefore that a private person might acquire title to the land by adverse possession. — Mowry v. Providence, 10 R. I. 52.
AGENT. A station-agent and conductor of a railroad employed a physician to attend a brakeman, who had been injured by the cars. Held, that the physician could not sue the railroad company for his fees. Tucker v. St. Louis, Kansas City, & Northern Railway Co., 54 Mo. 177.
See ATTORNEY, 1; CORPORATION, 5; INSURANCE (FIRE), 1; MONEY PAID, 1.
ALTERATION OF INSTRUMENTS. See INDORSER.
AMENDMENT. An action was brought against the V. Company, “a corporation duly organized and doing business in the State of Nevada.” Service was made on a California company of that name, doing business in Nevada. That company did not appear; but a Nevada company of the same name appeared and defended the action. At the trial the plaintiff moved to amend his pleadings so as to charge the California company. Held, that the amendment was not allowable. — Little v. Virginia & Gold Hill Water Co., 9 Nev. 317. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, STATE, 7.
ANIMAL. — See GAME; LARCENY, 1; SLANDER.
ANNUITY. See DEVISE, 3.
APPORTIONMENT. - See Tax.
ARSON. - See EVIDENCE, 5.
See DAMAGES, 1.
ASSUMPSIT. — See MONEY PAID.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE, 2; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 3.
ATTORNEY AND COUNSEL. 1. An attorney at law has authority, by virtue of his employment as such, to release before judgment an attachment of real estate. Moulton v. Bowker, 115 Mass. 36.
2. Two prisoners tried together were defended by different counsel, and on different grounds. Held, that both counsel were entitled to cross-examine witnesses, notwithstanding a rule of court that only one counsel on each side should cross-examine. State v. Bryant, 55 Mo. 75.
AUTREFOIS ACQUIT. 1. The prisoner was tried on an indictment charging both burglary and larceny. He was found guilty of burglary. The judgment was reversed on error, and a new trial was bad on the same indictment, when the jury found a verdict of guilty of larceny, and were discharged. Held, (1) that the first verdict was an acquittal of larceny; (2) that the second was therefore a nullity; (3) that the second jury ought to have found a verdict as to the burglary; (4) that their discharge without doing so operated as an acquittal of burglary. — Bell v. The State, 48 Ala. 684.
2. The prisoner was tried on an indictment for “robbery in the first degree (there being no degrees of robbery known to the law), which was a sufficient indictment for larceny. The jury found him guilty of “robbery in the second degree." Held, (1) that he was acquitted of robbery, and therefore (2) that he could not be tried for the same offence, as for larceny. — State v. Brannon, 55 Mo. 63.
BAIL. See INFANT.
BANKRUPTCY. 1. To a plea of a discharge in bankruptcy, pleaded in an action brought in a state court, there was a replication that defendant had fraudulently withheld property from his schedule. Held, bad, the state court having no jurisdiction to impeach a discharge. Stevens v. Bowen, 49 Miss. 597.
2. Proving a debt in bankruptcy, and receiving a dividend on it, does not extinguish the right of action to recover the balance, after the bankrupt's discharge, if the debt was one created by fraud. Stokes v. Mason, 10 R. I. 261.
BASTARDY. - See EVIDENCE, 3. BILLS AND NOTES. — See CONFEDERATE MONEY; CONSIDERATION; INDORSER;
INTEREST, 1; RATIFICATION; REPEAL; WITNESS, 2,
BILL OF LADING. The owner of goods borrowed money, and gave to the lender as security a carrier's receipt for the goods, intending to transfer the property in them. Held, that the lender bad a right of property in the goods sufficient to maintain replevin against an officer who afterwards attached them as the borrower's property. – National Bank of Green Bay v. Dearborn, 115 Mass. 219; and see the four following cases in the same volume, as to the effect of the transfer of a bill of lading.
BONA FIDE PURCHASER. See MISTAKE.
BURDEN OF PROOF. Action against a husband to recover for necessaries sold to his wife after she had separated from him. Held, that the burden was on the plaintiff to prove that there was justifiable cause for such separation. — Harttmann v. Tegart, 12 Kans. 177.
BURGLARY. See AUTREFOIS Acquit, 1; INDICTMENT, 1.
BURIAL. The owner of a lot in a cemetery was buried there, with the assent of his widow and of his heir-at-law. Afterwards the widow, against the heir's protest, removed the body to another part of the cemetery. Held, that the heir might maintain a bill in equity against the widow, and the proprietors of the cemetery, to compel a replacement of the body. — Pierce v. Swan Point Cemetery, 10 R. I. 227.
CAPITAL AND INCOME. - See CORPORATION, 1, 2.
CARRIER. 1. A carrier received goods for transportation, destined to a point beyond his own line. Held, that, in the absence of express agreement, he was bound to deliver them to the consignee. — East Tenn. & Va. R.R. Co. v. Rogers, 6 Heisk. 143; Western & Atl. R.R. Co. v. McElwee, ib. 208; Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Campbell, 7 Heisk. 253.
2. Goods were delivered to a carrier for transportation, under a bill of lading containing an exception of losses by fire. The carrier negligently detained the goods after they ought to have been forwarded; and they were destroyed by fire while in his custody. Held, that he was not liable. - Hoadley v. Northern Transp. Co., 115 Mass. 301.
3. A man travelling by rail with his dog, being told by servants of the railway company that the dog was not allowed in the passenger car, put him in charge of the baggage-master, and paid the latter for his transportation. By the rules of the company, which were posted up in the station, but of which the traveller had no actual notice, live animals were “ allowed as baggage-men's perquisites.” The dog was lost in transitu. Held, that the company was liable. — Cantling v. Hannibal & St. Joseph R.R. Co., 5+ Mo. 385.
4. Goods were sent by a carrier from New York in April, 1861, to Rome, Ga. They were detained at Savannab by a customs officer of the Confederate government, and afterwards sold for non-payment of duties, the consignee,
after notice, having failed to pay them. Held, that the goods were lost by the act of a public enemy, and therefore that the carrier was not liable. — Hubbard v. Harnden Express Co., 10 R. I. 244.
See DAMAGES, 3 ; PROXIMATE CAUSE, 3.
CHARITY. A testator, who died in Tennessee in 1863, bequeathed property to the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in the Confederate States of America, for the benefit of such Bible and tract societies as had been, or might be, established by such church; and if no such societies should be established, then the legacy to be used by said Assembly for the " promotion of the Bible and tract cause in such manner as to said Assembly may seem best.” There were like gifts to the same body for “ domestic and foreign missions," and for the “ Board of Education and Publication.” The will further provided that, if any of these gifts should be adjudged illegal, the property should go “to my executors in their own right, trusting nevertheless, and believing that, under a proper sense of obligation to their own consciences and accountability to God, they will pay over and contribute the same to charitable objects and purposes, as nearly as they can in conformity with what I have herein indicated.” The Assembly named was incorporated by an act of the legislature of Tennessee while the state was in rebellion. Held, (1) that the incorporation was valid, and therefore that the Assembly, or its successor under another name, was a trustee competent to take; (2) that the bequests were all good charitable gifts. Semble, that, if they had failed, the executors would have held the estate free of any trust. — Frierson v. General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, 7 Heisk. 683. See ADVERSE POSSESSION, 1, 2.
CHARTER. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3.
CHECK. See MONEY PAID, 2.
CONDITIONAL SALE. See SALE,
CONFEDERATE MONEY. Action on a promissory note for $1140, made in Mississippi in 1862, payable in 1864, “ in such currency as will be generally received for debts in this country at maturity of this note.” Held, that the measure of damages was the value of $1140, Confederate money, at the date of the note, and not at its maturity. Darcey v. Shotwell, 49 Miss. 631.
See DURESS; RATIFICATION.
CONFESSION. 1. Defendant was indicted for the murder of J. S. His own confession, made out of court, that he killed J. S., was given in evidence; but there was no other evidence that J. S. was dead. Held, that there was not sufficient evidence to warrant a conviction. State v. German, 54 Mo. 526.
2. The prisoner, being arrested on suspicion of murder, was told that B. had made a confession implicating himself and the prisoner. Held, that a confession thereupon made by the prisoner was admissible in evidence against him, and that
whether the statement as to the conduct of B. was true or false was not material. - Stałe v. Jones, 5+ Mo. 578.
See EVIDENCE, 7.
CONFLICT OF LAWS. 1. A citizen of Louisiana died seised of land in Mississippi, leaving a will which made no mention of that land, but directed that his debts should be paid, and gave his property in Louisiana to his wife. By statute of Mississippi, a devise or bequest to a wife is to be taken in lieu of dower, unless the widow elects to renounce the will and take dower. The law of Louisiana gives no such right of election. Held, that the widow could not exercise the right of election in Mississippi, that therefore the statute did not apply, and that she was entitled to her dower. - Wilson v. Cox, 49 Miss. 538.
2. Bonds, not bearing interest, were made in New York, where both obligor and obligee resided, and were secured by mortgage of real estate in Rbode Island. The bonds being unpaid, a bill was filed in Rhode Island to foreclose the mortgage. Held, that interest on the bonds was to be allowed, as damages, according to the legal rate in New York. — Kavanaugh v. Day, 10 R. I. 393.
CONSIDERATION. A promissory note, which bore usurious interest, falling due, the bolder agreed, in consideration that the maker would continue to pay the same interest, to give him time for the payment of the principal, “ until the summer," and afterwards “ until the fall.” Held, (1) that this was a promise to forbear for a definite time, to wit, till June 1 and September 1, but (2) (overruling former decisions) that there was no sufficient consideration for such promise, and therefore (3) that sureties on the note were not discharged, though the promise was made without their knowledge. — Abel v. Alexander, 45 Ind. 523.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. 1. A state statute making the intermarriage of whites and negroes a criminal offence, held, unconstitutional. Burns v. The State, 48 Ala. 195.
2. A state statute providing for a stay of execution on all judgments rendered, held, unconstitutional (overruling former decisions). — Webster v. Rose, 6 Heisk. 93.
3. A corporation was empowered by its charter to make and sell malt liquors. Held, that a subsequent general statute restraining the manufacture and sale of malt liquors was constitutional, and binding on the corporation. — Commonwealth v. Intox. Liquors, 115 Mass. 153.
4. The officials in charge of a state penitentiary made a contract for letting out the labor of the convicts. Afterward the legislature passed an act disposing of the labor otherwise, and interfering with the execution of the contract. Held, constitutional. — Hancock v. Ewing, 55 Mo. 101.
5. A state statute requiring a license to be taken out and paid for by pedlers of goods not the produce or manufacture of the state; held, constitutional. – State v. Welton, 55 Mo. 288.