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2. The defendants, in performance of a contract with the Secretary of State for War, manufactured and delivered to the secretary certain rifles which were infringements of the plaintiff's patent. Held, that as the defendants did not manufacture the rifles as servants to the Crown, they were liable for the infringement. - Dixon v. London Small Arm Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. 130. PERILS OF THE SEA. See INSURANCE, 2; SEAWORTHINESS.
PERSONALTY. - See CONVERSION, 2.
Pilot. A boat upon a vessel fell upon a pilot and injured him, in consequence of its having been negligently slung by the seamen who were in the defendants' employ. Held, that the defendants were liable for the damage, as there is no implied contract between owners and the pilot whom they are compelled to employ that the pilot shall take the risk of injury from the owner's servants. - Smith v. Steele, L. R. 10 Q. B. 125.
PLACE. The tenant of a house together with a piece of enclosed ground adjoining used for cricket, foot-racing, and other games and sports, permitted betting to go on on said ground. Held, that said enclosed ground was a “place” within a statute forbidding keeping a “house, office, room, or other place,” for betting.
- Haigh v. Town Council of Sheffield, L. R. 10 Q. B. 102.
PLEADING. Declaration on a check. Plea, that the defendant was induced to sign by the fraud of the plaintiff. Issue. The jury found that the defendant had not disaffirmed the contract. The defendant urged that the plaintiff should have filed a replication, if he relied on the defendant's having affirmed the contract. Held, that the defendant's plea must be looked upon as an allegation of fraud, and that the defendant in consequence determined the contract; and that in such case a replication was unnecessary. Dawes v. Harness, L. R. 10 C. P. 166. See BILL IN EQUITY, 2; ESTOPPEL. POSSESSION. See FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 1; SALE.
POWER. See ADVANCEMENT.
PREFERENCE. See ADVANCEMENT. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT. — See BROKER; MASTER AND SERVANT; NEGLIGENCE,
PROBATE. See INJUNCTION, 1.
PROPERTY. - See LIEN.
REALTY.-See CONVERSION, 2.
RECEIVER. A debtor who had mortgaged his brewery, fixtures, and stock in trade filed a petition for liquidation and a receiver and manager of his property and business. The mortgagee was ordered not to interfere with the debtor's assets, and the receiver and the debtor gave an undertaking to pay any damages the court should be of opinion that the mortgagee had sustained, and the debtor or receiver ought to pay. The brewery, &c., were subsequently declared to be the property of the mortgagee. Held, that the receiver was not the agent of the mortgagee; and that he must pay the damages sustained by the mortgagee from deterioration of the property, and a fair rent for use and occupation of the fixtures and stock in trade. Ex parte Warren. In re Joyce, L. R. 10 Ch. 222.
RENT. See ANNUITY.
RESIDUE. Bequest in the following words: “I give and bequeath to my niece H., subject to all legacies and bequests, the residue of my estate up to the end of the year 1855. I give and bequeath all accumulations from that date in equal shares to tļie sons of my late niece G.” H. died before the testatrix. Held, that the gift to the sons of the niece G. was a pecuniary legacy, and not a gift of residue, and the residuary gift to H. was liable for all debts and expenses.
Gowan v. Broughton, L. R. 19 Eq. 77.
RESULTING TRUST. — See Trust, 2.
RIPARIAN Rights. See EASEMENT.
RIVER. - See EASEMENT.
A vendor contracted to sell to the plaintiffs twenty tons of potatoes " deliverable free on board” of a ship at Dunkirk, payment to be by cash against bill of lading. The plaintiffs made a part payment, and the potatoes were shipped in sacks supplied by the plaintiffs, under a bill of lading making them deliverable to the vendor's order. The vendor indorsed the bill of lading to the defendant, with instructions to present to the plaintiffs a draft for the balance of the purchase money against the bill of lading. On the arrival of the potatoes at London, the plaintiffs erroneously supposed the shipment to be sixteen sacks short, and therefore declined to accept said draft, but offered either to pay the purchasemoney due after deducting the value of the sixteen sacks, or to wait until the vessel was discharged, and then, if there should prove to be a full cargo, to immediately accept said draft. The defendant insisted upon immediate acceptance of the draft, and, the plaintiffs not accepting, sold the potatoes forth with. The plaintiffs brought trover. Held, that the right of property and possession had passed to the plaintiffs, and that they could maintain the action. – Ogg v. Shuter, L. R. 10 C. P. 159.
See BANKRUPTCY, 1; CONVERSION; FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 3; INSURANCE, 1; VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
SEAWORTHINESS: The sinking of a vessel in smooth water while at anchor would, if unexplained, be evidence from which the jury would be directed to find the vessel unseaworthy. But if other evidence is offered as to the condition of the ship, or the cause of the loss, then such sinking becomes one of several facts, all of which must be left to the jury, from all of which the jury may find that the vessel was seaworthy, and lost by a peril of the sea. - Anderson v. Morice, L. R. 10 C. P. 58.
SETTLEMENT. 1. The word “survivor” may be read “other” in a clause in a settlement, although in other clauses it must be read “survivor.” — In re Palmer's Settlement Trusts, L. R. 19 Eq. 320.
2. An Ottoman subject domiciled in Turkey married a woman in England under the inducement of his promise to reside permanently in England, and a settlement was executed before the marriage. The husband returned to Turkey, and there obtained a divorce. By Turkish law a divorce deprived a wife of her rights under a settlement. Held, that said settlement must be governed by English law; and said Turkish law was disregarded. - Colliss v. Hector, L. R. 19
SHARES. See LEGACY, 3; Trust, 1.
SPECIFIC GIFT. - See MARSHALLING ASSETS.
STATUTE. See FABRICATING VOTES; PLACE.
STOCKS. See LEGACY, 3; Trust, 1.
TENANT FOR LIFE. — See TRUST, 1.
Tow. - See COLLISION.
TRUST. A tenant for life under a settlement made advances to the trustees for the purpose of paying calls upon shares held by them. The trustees might have raised money to pay the calls in other ways. Held, that the tenant for life had a lien
upon the shares for the repayment of her advances with interest thereon. - Todd v. Moorhouse, L. R. 19 Eq. 69.
2. A lady transferred stock from her own name to the joint names of herself, her daughter, and her son-in-law. The daughter died, and afterward the mother. The son-in-law managed the property during the last seven years of the mother's life, and paid her the whole of the income. Held, that there was no resulting trust for the residuary legatees of the mother's will, and that the son-in-law was entitled to the stock. - Batstone v. Salter, L. R. 19 Eq. 250.
3. Trustees who were directed by a testator to convert all bis real and personal estate and distribute in a certain manner, built a villa on a part of the real estate in the belief that they could thereby improve the value of the rest. The
trustees were allowed to take the villa themselves, repaying the amount they had expended upon it. Vyse v. Foster, L. R. 7 H. L. 318; 8. c. L. R. 8 Ch. 308; 7 Am. Law Rev. 686.
See ADVANCEMENT; BANK; LEGACY, 4.
Trust, DECLARATION OF. What will amount to a declaration of trust, see Heartley v. Nicholson, L. R. 19 Eq. 233. UNSEAWORTHINESS.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER. Letter to the defendant from the agents of the plaintiff who held the lease of a house: “Nov. 13, 1873. We have been requested by Mrs. D. to find her a lodging-house in this neighborhood; and we forward for your approval particulars of two which we think most likely to suit.” Enclosed were particulars of the plaintiff's house, the terms of which were stated to be premium 250 guineas, rent 801. On November 14 the defendant wrote to the plaintiff's agents as follows: “I have decided on taking (said house) and have spoken to my agent C., who will arrange matters with you, if you will put yourselves in communication with him. I leave town this afternoon; so, if you have occasion to write to me, please address, as before, to Cirencester.” Held, that the letters did not constitute a binding agreement. Stanley v. Dowdeswell, L. R. 10 C. P. 102. See BROKER; SALE.
VESTED INTEREST. A testator directed his trustees to divide a certain fund equally among the children of F. when they should respectively attain the age of twenty-five, applying from time to time the income of the presumptive share of each child, or so much thereof respectively as the trustees might think proper, for his or her maintenance until such share should become payable; but, if the children should all die before attaining twenty-five, then to pay said fund over. Held, that the children of F. took a vested interest. — Fox v. Fox, L. R. 19 Eq. 286. See LEGACY, 4.
VOTE. See FABRICATING VOTES.
WATERCOURSE. See EASEMENT.
“ Place." — See PLACE.
SELECTED DIGEST OF STATE REPORTS.
[For the present number of the Digest, selections have been made from the following volumes of State Reports : 48 Alabama ; 5, 6, and 7 Heiskell (Tennessee); 45 and 46 Indiana; 11 and 12 Kansas ; 62 Maine ; 115 Massachusetts ; 49 Mississippi ; 54 and 55 Missouri; 3 Nebraska; 9 Nevada; 53 New Hampsbire; 56 New York; 10 Rhode Island; and 39 Texas.]
ACCESSION. A. and B. were partners in the business of fruit-growing, A. furnishing the land and money, and B. the labor. By the terms of a submission to arbitration between them, to wind up the partnership, A. was to be charged with the value of all permanent improvements made by the firm. Held, that he was not chargeable with the increase, by reason of growth during the continuance of the partnership, in the value of vines which were growing on the land when the partnership was formed. — Squires v. Anderson, 54 Mo. 193.
ACTION. 1. Action on the case, for that defendant, owning slaves of thievish and mischievous habits, and having notice thereof, suffered them to go at large, whereby they damaged and stole plaintiff's property [with the knowledge, permission, and instigation of defendant]. Held, that a count omitting the words in brackets disclosed no cause of action, but that a count containing them was good. Sweat v. Rogers, 6 Heisk. 117.
2. Declaration, for that defendants undertook, as surgeons, to heal plaintiff's arm, which was broken, and so negligently conducted themselves in attempting so to do that plaintiff lost the use of his arm. Held, that the cause of action was ex contractu, and not ex delicto. Staley v. Jameson, 46 Ind. 159.
3. Defendant owned a building with a roof so built that snow and ice collected on it from natural causes were liable to fall into the adjoining highway. He let the whole building to a tenant who covenanted to make all repairs, external and internal. Plaintiff, while travelling on the highway with due care, was injured by a fall of snow from the roof of the building. Held, that defendant was not liable. — Leonard v. Storer, 115 Mass. 86.
4. Defendant's horses, while driven by him with due care on a highway near a railroad, were frightened by a locomotive, became unmanageable, ran away on to plaintiff's land, and broke a post there. Held, that defendant was not liable. Brown v. Collins, 53 N. H. 412.
5. A. contracted to repair B.'s building, any staging needed for that purpose to be put up free of cost to A. B. put up a staging so negligently that it fell, and injured C., a servant of A., at work on it. Held, that B. was liable to C.Coughtry v.,Globe Woollen Co., 56 N. Y. 124.
6. Defendants agreed, for hire, to store plaintiff's carriages. The carriages were put in a barn, the roof of which, being overloaded with snow, fell in and