1. An injunction was granted to restrain proceedings by the heir-at-law and next of kin for obtaining administration and opposing probate to a draft will, the dispositions in which the defendants had by deed confirmed. --Wilcocks v. Carter, L. R. 19 Eq. 327.

2. The plaintiff brought a bill against her copartners, alleging that they had formed a scheme for transferring the business so as to injure the plaintiff; and praying for a sale and accounts, &c. Shortly afterward the plaintiff obtained a summons from a police court against the same.parties for conspiring to defraud her of her just share in the partnership business. Motion to dismiss proceedings on the summons refused. Saull v. Browne, L. R. 10 Ch. 64.

1. The plaintiff contracted for the purchase of rice from A. in the following terms: Feb. 2, 1871. Bought for account of (the plaintiff), of A., the cargo of Rangoon rice per Sunbeam, 707 tons register, at 9s. 14d. per cwt., cost and freight, expected to be March shipment; but contract to be void should vessel not arrive at Rangoon before April, 1871. Payment by sellers' draft on purchasers at six months' sight, with documents attached." The Sunbeam was chartered by the sellers' agents. On Feb. 3, 1871, the plaintiff effected insurance with the defendants" at and from Rangoon to any port, &c., by the Sunbeam, warranted to sail from Rangoon on or before the 1st of April, on rice, as interest may appear: amount of invoice to be deemed value: average payable on every 500 bags: the said merchandises, &c., are and shall be valued at £5500, part of £6000." On the 30th March there were 8878 bags of rice on board, and 400 more in lighters alongside would have completed the cargo; but the ship sunk at her anchors, and was totally lost with her cargo on this day. After the loss of ship and cargo, and in order to enable the plaintiff to claim on his policy, the captain signed bills of lading for the cargo which had been shipped; and A., the seller, drew bills of exchange for the price of such cargo, which were accepted and met by the plaintiff. The bills of lading were indorsed to the plaintiff. All this was made known to the defendants when the claim was made for insurance. Held, that the plaintiff had the option of electing to treat said quantity of rice on the Sunbeam as a cargo; and that after the loss he had the same option as before; and that having so elected, the property in the rice passed to him from the moment it was put on board, and the rice was at his risk. Also that the plaintiff had an insurable interest in the rice even if the property did not pass, because he had an existing contract with regard to it from the time of its being on board, by virtue of which he had an expectancy of advantage depending on the safe arrival of the rice. Also, that the policy was a valued policy, the valuation being the amount of the proper invoice, according to contract between the plaintiff and A. Anderson v. Rice, L. R. 10 C. P. 58.

2. On the 22d November, 1871, the plaintiff entered into a charter-party with R., by which the vessel was to proceed from Liverpool to Newport, and there ship a cargo of iron rails for San Francisco, ordinary perils excepted, &c. On the 9th December, the plaintiff effected insurance with the defendants "on chartered freight valued at £2900, at and from Liverpool to Newport in tow, while there, and thence to San Francisco," &c. The ship sailed Jan. 2, 1872; and on Jan. 4 took the rocks before arriving at Newport. On Feb. 18, she was got into a place of safety, and was got off the rocks March 21. The time necessary for the completion of repairs extended to the end of August. Due notice of abandonment was given, but was not accepted. On the 16th February, 1872, R., without the consent of the plaintiff, chartered another vessel by which he forwarded the rails to San Francisco. The jury found that the time necessary for getting the ship off and repairing her was so long as to make it unreasonable for the charterers to supply the agreed cargo at the end of such time; and that such time was so long as to put an end, in a commercial sense, to the commercial speculation entered upon by the ship-owner and charterer. Held (by BRAMWELL, B., BLACKBURN, MELLOR, and LUSH, JJ., and AMPHLETT, B.; CLEASBY, B., dissenting), that the charterer was absolved from his contract, and that there was, therefore, a loss of the chartered freight by perils of the sea. -Jackson v. Union Marine Insurance Co., L. R. 10 C. P. (Ex. Ch.) 125; s. c. L. R. 8 C. P. 572; 8 Am. Law Rev. 288.

3. A proposal for insurance on a vessel was accepted by an insurance company on March 11. On March 17, the plaintiffs learned that the vessel was lost, and the same day sent to the company for a policy in pursuance of the terms of said proposal. The company then for the first time asked the amount of insurance, and inserted in the policy which was accepted by the plaintiffs the warranty, "Hull warranted not insured for more than £2700 after the 20th March." The vessel was then insured for an additional £500 in an insurance club, by the rules of which ships belonging to members were insured from the 20th March one year to the 20th March the next year, and so on from year to year, unless ten days' notice to the contrary be given;" and in the absence of notice the managers of the club were to renew each policy on its expiration. Held, that the warranty was complied with; and also that the plaintiffs were not bound to communicate information received after March 11th. - Lishman v. Northern Maritime Insurance Co., L. R. 10 C. P. (Ex. Ch.) 179; s. c. L. R. 8 C. P. 216; 8 Am. Law Rev. 101.

See SEAWORTHINESS.

"all

1. A testatrix, who had money at her banker's on deposit notes which stated that the money was "received to account for on demand," bequeathed bonds, promissory notes, and other securities for money in my hands at the time

of my decease, and all moneys due thereon." Held, that the money at the banker's did not pass under the bequest. — Hopkins v. Abbott, L. R. 19 Eq. 222.

2. Testator bequeathed an annuity to "my housekeeper M. R., whether living in my service at the time of my death or not." Some years prior to his death, and for a considerable period, M. R. was the testator's housekeeper; but she quitted his service in 1867, and married in 1871. E. R., the sister of M. R., was, at the dates of the testator's will and death, in his service as his housekeeper, having entered it in 1870. Held, that E. R. was entitled to the annuity. — In re Nunn's Trusts, L. R. 19 Eq. 331.

3. A testator who owned stock in the public funds, and stock and partly paid up shares in a railway company, bequeathed "all such stocks in the public funds or shares in any railway" of which he might die possessed. Held, that the railway stock passed under the bequest. Morrice v. Aylmer, L. R. 10 Ch. 148.

4. The lessee of a house held upon ground rent bequeathed the rental of the house to his wife for life to be paid to her monthly and after her decease gave the house to his son R. subject to the lease, but directed that R. should have no power to sell the same, and that the rents should be received by, and that all matters appertaining to the property should be under the management of the testator's executors. The testator further directed that upon the death of R. without issue, his share should be divided between the surviving children of M. The executors paid the rents to the widow during her life, and after her death to R. for life. R. died without issue. Held, that the assent of the executors to the life estates in the rents bequeathed to the widow and R. was assent to the bequest in remainder, and that the legal estate in the leasehold vested in the executors as trustees, but that upon the death of R. without issue their trust ceased, and the legal estate vested in the surviving children of M. — Stevenson v. Mayor of Liverpool, L. R. 10 Q. B. 81.

See ADVANCEMENT; RESIDUE; VESTED INTEREST.

LETTERS. See FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 3.

LIBEL.

The Court of Chancery has no jurisdiction to restrain the publication of a libel, even though it will injure property.— Prudential Assurance Co. v. Knott, L. R. 10 Ch. 142.

LICENSE.

A license from a highway board to a gas company to open the road to lay gas-pipes is not a license to commit a nuisance: and an agreement by the gas company to restore the road to its original condition, and pay 1s. per yard of road opened, is a contract upon good consideration. Edgeware Highway Board v. Harrow Gas Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. 92.

-

A marriage may be established upon the preponderance of repute, although

there is repute against the reputed marriage as well as for it. — Lyle v. Ellwood, L. R. 19 Eq. 98.

See SETTLEMENT.

MARSHALLING ASSETS.

Specific devisees of real estate must contribute rateably with a residuary devisee, if the personalty is insufficient for payment of the testator's debts. Lancefield v. Iggulden, L. R. 10 Ch. 136.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

The owners of a mine appointed a manager of their mine, as required by statute. From the negligence of the manager an explosion occurred, and a miner was killed. Held, that the manager, although appointed in pursuance of a statute, was a fellow-servant of the miner, and that the owners were therefore not responsible for the miner's death. Howells v. Landore Steel Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. 62.

See NEGLIGENCE, 1; PILOT.

Bill praying an injunction to restrain the working of a mine which, it was alleged, could not be worked without letting a river and flooding the defendant's mine and through that the plaintiff's mine. Demurrer overruled.

v. Lea, L. R. 19 Eq. 115.

See MASTER AND SERVANT.

-Crompton

1. The plaintiff, one of the travelling inspectors of the carriage and wagon department on the A. railway, while travelling under a pass from the A. railway, was injured while the train was passing over the road of the B. railway, over which the A. railway had running powers. The injury was caused by the negligence of the A. railway, with, it seems, some contributory negligence on the part of the B. railway. Held, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. Armstrong v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Co., L. R. 10 Ex. 47.

2. The plaintiff was travelling on the defendants' railway in a car containing its full complement of passengers. On the arrival of the train at a station other passengers got in, notwithstanding the plaintiff's remonstrance, and to his great inconvenience. On the train's arrival at another station several more passengers attempted to get in, but were prevented by the plaintiff and the other passengers, and the carriage door was opened by some one after the train was in motion. A porter closed the door hastily just as the carriage was entering the tunnel, and the plaintiff in the struggle going on got his thumb crushed in the door. The jury found for the plaintiff, and found that the accident was caused by the presence of the three cxtra persons in the carriage, and that they were there through the default of the company's servants. Held, that there was evidence to go to the jury of negligence on the part of the railway company which was the

cause of the injury to the plaintiff. —Jackson v. Metropolitan Railway Co., L. R. 10 C. P. 49.

3. A cab driver obtained from a cab proprietor a cab and horse, upon the terms that the driver was to pay the owner 18s. per day and retain earnings above that sum; that the owner was to supply food for the horse; and that the driver was not to be under the owner's control. The horse overturned the cab, and injured the driver. The jury found that the horse was not reasonably fit to be driven in a cab; that the owner did not take reasonable precautions to supply a reasonably fit horse; that the driver did not take upon himself the risk of the horse being reasonably fit to be driven in a cab; and that the horse and cab were intrusted to the driver as bailee, and not as servant. A verdict was directed for the driver. Held, that as the second finding of the jury amounted to a finding of negligence, a rule for a new trial must be discharged. - Fowler v. Lock, L. R. 10 C. P. 90.

See DAMAGES, 2; MASTER AND SERVANT.

NOTICE TO TREAT.

A railway company served the plaintiffs with notice to treat for a portion of their lands. The plaintiffs served the company with a counter notice to treat for the whole of their land. The company then gave the plaintiffs notice of their intention to apply to the Board of Trade for a surveyor to determine the value of the whole of the plaintiffs' land. The plaintiffs filed a bill praying an injunction to restrain the company from using part of their land without taking the whole. The company gave the plaintiffs notice that it withdrew its notice to treat, and offered to pay costs; and then filed an answer to said bill, insisting on its right to withdraw its notice to treat. The plaintiffs amended their bill and prayed a declaration that the company was bound to take the whole of their land. · GrierHeld, that the company had not contracted to take the plaintiffs' land. son v. Cheshire Lines' Committee, L. R. 19 Eq. 83.

By partnership articles it was provided that upon the death of a partner his share should be taken by the surviving partners according to its value at the last stock-taking, and the amount found due paid to his executors by fourteen instalments, with interest until payment. A partner died, and his executors allowed his share to remain in the business. Six years afterward the surviving partners filed a liquidation petition. The executors claimed to prove for the value of their testator's share. There were still unpaid some debts contracted by the firm when the deceased partner was a member of it. Held, that the executors were not entitled to prove. - In re Dixon. Ex parte Gordon, L. R. 10 Ch. 160. See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS, 2, 3.

PARTIES. See BILL IN EQUITY, 2.

PATENT.

1. Inspection of the defendants' machinery in a patent suit will not be granted unless it is necessary to enable the plaintiff to make out his case. - Batley v. Kynock, L. R. 19 Eq. 90.