Before the sailing-vessel sunk, the B. ranged up and slightly injured her. The A. was to blame for the collision. Held, that the B. was not also to blame, as she was not, in intendment of law, one vessel with the A. Union Steamship Co. v. Owners of the Aracan. The American, and The Syria, L. R. 6 P. C. 127; s. c. L. R. 4 Ad. & Ec. 226; 9 Am. Law Rev. 473.

CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES.-See DAMAGES.

CONSTRUCTION. See ADVANCEMENT; INSURANCE, 1; LEGACY; RESIDUE; SALE; SETTLEMENT, 1.

CONTRACT.

Certain trucks in the possession of the plaintiffs were claimed by the K. P. Company and the defendant. The defendant demanded the trucks, and the plaintiffs wrote to the defendant asking for an indemnity if they gave them up. The defendant replied giving no answer as to the indemnity, and demanding the trucks forthwith. The plaintiffs then sent them to the defendant. The K. P. Company brought trover against the plaintiffs, and recovered. Held, that there was evidence of an implied promise by the defendant to indemnify the plaintiffs. - Dugdale v. Lovering, L. R. 10 C. P. 196.

See DAMAGES, 3; FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 3; FREIGHT; INSURANCE, 1; LICENSE; NEGLIGENCE, 3; NOTICE TO TREAT; PLEADING; SALE; VENDOK AND PURCHASER; VESTED INTEREST.

CONTRIBUTION. See MARSHALLING ASSETS.

CONVERSION.

1. In an administration suit wherein partition was asked, a sale was ordered. After the decree, but before the sale, one of the parties entitled to a share of the real estate died. Held, that the real estate had been converted into personal, and passed to the personal representatives of said deceased beneficiary. — Arnold v. Dixon, 19 Eq. 113.

2. A., B., and C. were tenants in common of land. C. became of unsound mind, but was not found so by inquisition. A. and B. leased a portion of the land, and sold another portion, with covenants that C. should convey her share, and for quiet enjoyment; and with a proviso that they would stand possessed of one-fourth of the rent and purchase-money in trust for C. B. became of unsound mind, and A. leased and conveyed other portions of said land on like terms with the above. C. died, and afterward B. died. The leases and sales were subsequently confirmed under the Lunacy Regulation Act. Held, that the proceeds of the lease and sale effected after B. became of unsound mind were real estate as between B.'s real and personal representatives, and that the proceeds of the sale and lease in which B. concurred were, so far as B. and C.'s shares were concerned, personalty. — In re Mary Smith, L. R. 10 Ch. 79.

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COPYRIGHT.

The plaintiffs purchased the copyright in "Beeton's Annual," and Beeton agreed to give his whole time to the plaintiffs' bookselling business, and not to engage any other enterprise without their consent, and the plaintiffs were to

in

have the use of Beeton's name for present or future publications, and Beeton was not to use his name in any publication without the plaintiffs' consent. Beeton was restrained from advertising a notice that he had no connection with the annual published by the plaintiffs, and called "Beeton's Annual," and that he had devised his usual annual for the coming season, to be issued by a firm other than the plaintiff's. - Ward v. Beeton, L. R. 19 Eq. 207.

CORPORATION. See BANK.

COSTS.

The costs of a suit for administration of the trusts of the testator's will, which concerned real and personal estate, must be borne first by the residuary personal estate; and the specifically bequeathed personalty and realty and the residuary devised realty must contribute rateably to make up the deficiency.— Jackson v. Pease, L. R. 19 Eq. 96.

See DAMAGES, 1.

CRIMINAL INTENT. See FABRICATING VOTES.

DAMAGES.

1. H. employed the plaintiffs, common carriers, to carry his pictures. The plaintiffs employed the defendants to carry them part of the way. The pictures were damaged by the defendants' negligence, and H. sued the plaintiffs and recovered damages with costs. The defendants refused to defend the above action. Held, that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover the amount of damages which H. had recovered of them, but not the costs they had paid H. Baxendale v. London, Chatham, & Dover Railway Co., L. R. 10 Ex. (Ex. Ch.) 35.

2. A passenger on a railway was injured by an accident, and died in consequence. His executrix brought an action for expenses of medical attendance, and the loss occasioned to his estate from his being unable to attend to his business previous to his death. Held, that the executrix was entitled to recover for expenses and loss to business. Bradshaw v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Rail

way Co., L. R. 10 C. P. 189.

3. The plaintiff took tickets for himself, his wife, and two children aged respectively five and seven years, to go by the midnight train on the defendants' railway from A. to B. The train did not go to B., and the plaintiff and his family were obliged to get out at C. and walk to B., a distance of five miles. It was a wet night, and the plaintiff's wife caught cold and was unable to assist her husband in his business for some time in consequence, and expenses were incurred for medical attendance. The jury found a verdict of £8 damages for the plaintiff's inconvenience in being obliged to walk home, and £20 in respect of the wife's illness and its consequence. Held, that the verdict for the £8 must stand; but the damages compensated by the £20 were too remote, and that the verdict must be reduced by this sum. COCKBURN, C. J.: "I think that the nearest approach to any thing like a fixed rule is this: that to entitle a person to damages by reason of a breach of contract, the injury for which compensation is asked should be one that may be fairly taken to have been contemplated by the parties as the possible result of the breach of contract."- Hobbs v. London & Southwestern Railway Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. 111.

See NEGLIGENCE, 1; PILOT.

See ADVANCEMENT; CONSTRUCTION; LEGACY; RESIDUE; VESTED

Petition for winding up the Emma Mining Company. The secretary filed an affidavit denying the allegations in the petition; and he was cross-examined upon the affidavit, and served with a notice to produce the books of the company, which he refused to do. Held, that the petitioner was entitled to the production of the books for the purpose of testing the secretary's memory. - In re Emma Silver Mining Co., L. R. 10 Ch. 194.

A stream was divided immemorially, but by artificial means, into two branches at E., one branch flowing on into the river Irwell, and the second branch to a farm, where it supplied a trough, the overflow percolating by no defined course into said river. In 1847, W., who owned said farm and thence to the Irwell, collected said overflow and carried it by a drain to a mill on the banks of the Irwell. In 1865, W. purchased the land through which said second branch flowed from E. to said farm. In 1867, W. sold said mill with all water rights to the plaintiff. Held, that the plaintiff could maintain an action against a riparian owner above E. for obstructing the flow of the water. - Holker v. Porritt, L. R. 10 Ex. 59; s. c. 8 Ex. 107; 7 Am. Law Rev. 684.

See INSURANCE, 1.

EMINENT DOMAIN.

In August, 1864, the plaintiffs were served by a railway company with notice to treat. In November, 1864, the company entered into possession of the plaintiffs' land. On the 20th of August, 1869, the verdict of a jury assessed the plaintiffs' compensation at £2000. Held, that the company must pay the plaintiffs interest on said £2000 from November, 1864, when the company took possession. Rhys v. Dare Valley Railway Co., L. R. 19 Eq. 93.

See NOTICE TO TREAT.

EQUITY. - See BILL IN EQUITY; Bond; Frauds, Statute of, 1; LIBEL; MINE; NOTICE TO TREAT.

ESTOPPEL.

Declaration by indorsee of a bill of exchange against the acceptor. Plea by way of estoppel, setting out the proceedings in a former action by the plaintiff, wherein the defendant had pleaded a composition deed to which the plaintiff was a party, whereby the defendant was to be discharged from his debts, including

said bill, on payment of a composition in two instalments, in default of payment the deed to be void; the plaintiff had replied non-payment of the first instalment, and the defendant had rejoined a mistake in non-payment on the proper day, and a subsequent tender; whereupon the plaintiff confessed the plea and paid costs. To this plea the plaintiff replied that another instalment had become payable, and that the defendant had made default whereby the composition deed became void. Demurrer. Held, that the replication was good. — Hall v. Levy, L. R. 10 C. P. 154.

EVIDENCE.

--

- See BANKRUPTCY, 2; CHECK, 2; Documents, Production of; MARRIAGE; NEGLIGENCE, 2; SEAWORTHINESS.

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.

1. An administrator of C. obtained judgment in Calcutta against N., who subsequently died in England. Held, that the administrator was entitled to receive payment of his claim without taking out administration to C. in England. In re Macnichol, L. R. 19 Eq. 81.

It

2. A testator appointed his partner and another person his executors. was held that the partner executor had a right to retain in his hands a sum of money in satisfaction of a balance due from the testator to the firm, although the amount of such balance had not been determined, and the partnership accounts had not been taken. - In re Morris's Estate. Morris v. Morris, L. R. 10 Ch. 68.

3. A testator was a partner in a firm under an agreement whereby on the death of a partner his share was to be determined and taken from the firm in two years. The testator's will directed that his personal estate should be sold and divided among his children on their arriving at the age of twenty-five; and he appointed three executors, of whom one was his partner. The testator's share was not withdrawn after his death, but interest was allowed upon it. All the legatees to whom such share belonged acquiesced in this arrangement, except the plaintiff, who filed a bill demanding an account and a share in the profits which had arisen from the employment of said share in the business. Held, that the bill must be dismissed.— Vyse v. Foster, L. R. 7 H. L. 318; s. c. L. R. 8 Ch. 308; 7 Am. Law Rev. 677.

See COSTS; LEGACY, 4; PARTNERSHIP.

66

FABRICATING VOTES.

Fabricating" a vote means an act done with criminal intention, mens rea. -Aberdare Local Board v. Hammett, L. R. 10 Q. B. 162.

1. C. promised the plaintiff to give her a leasehold house for use as a lodginghouse during her life if she would pay ground rent and taxes; and on the faith of C.'s promise the plaintiff gave up entering into business and entered into possession of the house, where she supported herself by letting lodgings. C. died,

and her sole legatee and executor brought ejectment against the plaintiff, who thereupon filed a bill in equity to restrain the action and for a declaration that she was entitled to the house for her life. Held, that the Statute of Frauds was not a bar to the bill; and the declaration and injunction prayed were granted. — Coles v. Pilkington, L. R. 19 Eq. 174.

2. A. requested B. to join in a promissory note with C., and promised to indemnify B. if he would do so. Held, that A.'s promise was not within the Statute of Frauds; and that B., who became A.'s executor, was entitled to retain the amount he had been obliged to pay on said note. —Wildes v. Dudlow, L. R. 19 Eq. 198.

3. The defendant's son H. ordered verbally three cases of leather cloth of the plaintiffs in London. H. was then informed that Rotterdam was blockaded, and the plaintiffs asked how the cloth was to be sent. H. directed them to send it through G. at Ostend. Before the order could be executed Rotterdam was open, and G. had ceased to receive goods to forward to Rotterdam. The plaintiffs thereupon forwarded the cloth by the customary route to Rotterdam, and wrote the defendant a letter enclosing an invoice and stating the above facts. A few days later the ship containing the cloth was stranded, and the cloth spoiled. About four months later the plaintiffs wrote another letter, requesting payment of a balance, including therein the value of the cloth. The defendant replied, "In looking over your statement I find that you have charged me for the goods which have been entirely lost by the sunk ship, being sent via Rotterdam. You state in your letter that H. instructed you to send the goods through G. via Ostend; but, on account of G.'s having given up the Ostend route, you sent, without any instruction, the goods via Rotterdam. . I learn that G. would not have refused the goods. . . . I expected you would have informed H. of it, and asked him how you were to send it in that case.” During said four months the defendant had given further orders, which were executed by the plaintiffs, and the goods sent via Rotterdam. The jury found that the defendant had assented to the change of route from Ostend to Rotterdam before the loss of the cloth. Held, that said letters contained a sufficient memorandum in writing to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. - Leather Cloth Co. v. Hieronimus, L. R. 10 Q. B. 140. See VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

...

FREIGHT.

The Kathleen, without fault of her own, was run into and abandoned; and she was afterwards brought into an intermediate port by salvors. At the request of its owners, the cargo was sold reserving all questions of freight. Before the sale the ship-owners offered to carry the cargo to its place of destination. The ship-owners requested payment of full freight from the proceeds of the cargo after payment of salvage. Held, that by the abandonment the contract between the ship-owners and the shippers was determined, and that the ship-owners were not entitled to freight. The Kathleen, L. R. 4 Ad. & Ec. 269.

See INSURANCE, 2.

GIFT. See TRUST, DECLARATION OF.

HIGHWAY. See LICENSE.

IMPLIED CONTRACT.

See CONTRACT.