acquaintance, and with whom he would not venture to enter into conversation on any subject whatever. Perhaps, however, he mentions those with whom he may sometimes be seen talking. The trick is an easy one; because if the bill has any plausibility whatever, there is at least a certain chance that some one or more of the members whom he has named will vote for it. If any of them vote for it, his engagement is to that extent redeemed. If some or even all of them do not, he has only to say, "I am very sorry, I did my best to persuade," even if he does not choose to add the lie that "the rascal promised me his vote, but probably they over-bribed him on the other side." A good many years ago, in one of the numerous attempts for the passage of the French Spoliation Bill, there was a concerted movement among the lobbyists to assure the members who were specially interested in behalf of their constituents in the passage of the bill, that it would certainly fail unless a large sum of money were subscribed, but that if that were forthcoming, the passage of the bill would be assured. The members thus approached determined to canvass the whole House, and, by dividing the list of members among themselves, ascertained informally that there was a large majority in favor of the bill, and that its passage was certain in any event. In accordance with their advice, accordingly, nothing was subscribed or paid to the lobby, and the bill passed in due course. There is little doubt that the lobby had first ascertained the same fact with regard to the chances of the bill in the same way.

What is most necessary, however, to prevent the abuses of lobbying, is the contrivance of some method for lessening the number of claims that come before Congress. The number is, in fact, so enormous, that it is out of the question to expect that every member can make himself acquainted with the merits of Members must seek information from every separate claim. some source, and from this necessity it will inevitably result, in some cases, that information from unworthy sources is accepted. Few persons are aware of the mass of business that is thrust upon Congress. At the third session of the forty-second Congress, which lasted three months and two days, the number of bills introduced in the Senate was 1652; of joint resolutions, 15: in the House, bills introduced, 4073; joint resolutions, 203. These numbers include some that remained on the calen

dars from previous sessions. The grand total was 5943. Of these, there were passed only 475 acts and 8 joint resolutions, less than ten per cent of the whole number.

At the first session of the forty-third Congress, which lasted six months and twenty-three days, there were introduced or reported in the Senate 962 bills and 10 joint resolutions; in the House, 3817 bills and 118 joint resolutions; making an aggregate of 4907. Of these, 535 bills and 17 joint resolutions became laws, a little more than ten per cent of the whole number. Those that became laws are classified as follows in the publication made by the congressional printer: public, 255 acts, 16 joint resolutions; private, 280 acts, 1 joint resolution.

If we take these two sessions together as representing the term of a single Congress, it appears that the aggregate number of measures introduced during two sessions, lasting together about ten months, was 10,850, of which 1035 became laws. This gives a rough average of a thousand measures for consideration in a month, and a hundred perfected into laws, or about four for each working day. More than half of the whole number are what are called private bills.

It is scarcely necessary to say that of the immense number of bills which fail to become laws, very few are rejected by positive votes; they are simply not acted upon; never reached in their order, and not taken up out of their order.

In point of fact, a very large proportion of the private bills which are introduced cannot properly be styled measures for consideration, for they are never considered, and it is never expected and scarcely desired that they should be. It is many years since the House of Representatives disembarrassed itself of the tediousness of listening to the introduction of petitions and their reference to committees, by providing a standing rule for entering all petitions with the clerk, and their reference, as a matter of course, to the committees designated by the members presenting them. They are all included in the report printed formerly in the Congressional Globe, and now in the Congressional Record; but they are not, however, generally noticed in the reports transmitted to the newspapers by telegraph. This lack of notoriety does not satisfy members or their constituents, and has led to a practice which has grown insidiously upon Congress to such an extent as to demand attention. We will suppose a member A.

receives a petition from his constituent X., asking for a pension, or perhaps for an increase of the pension he already receives. X. no doubt served in the war, is a good fellow, and A. would be glad to oblige him. At any rate A. desires to have the reputation of doing his best in behalf of the worthy soldier. Now the granting of pensions is regulated in the first place by standing laws of exceeding liberality; and it is a matter which obviously should be regulated by uniform laws, for there should be no invidious distinctions among those having the same claims. Nevertheless, a great many special pension acts are passed, because a great many cases occur which are found to be exceptional instances. Even these exceptional instances are classified by certain rules which the committees have fixed, to which they find it absolutely necessary to adhere, and from which it is idle for members to attempt to swerve the committee; nor is it worth while to attempt to persuade the House to act against the report of the committee. We will suppose that our member A. sees at a glance that the petition of X. presents an impossible case. Does he sit down and write him a letter to say this in the kindest terms he can contrive? By no means. He prepares a "bill" granting the pension as asked for. This gives him literally no trouble except to write the name in lieu of another on one of many thousands of similar bills already introduced and printed, which are lying under his desk. He rises, asks and obtains leave to introduce his bill, which is forth with "read twice," as a matter of course, and probably is referred to a committee of the whole. The bill is never heard of again in Congress, although it is printed and adds one more to the bulky file. We say it is never heard of in Congress; but its title, with the name of the member introducing it, gets into the newspapers, and as soon as the printed copies are ready, the member can easily inclose a dozen copies to the constituent (one copy is found sufficient since the franking privilege has been abolished), with a letter: —

"MY DEAR FRIEND, You see I lost no time in acting upon the matter of your petition. I at once asked leave to introduce a bill in your favor; no objection was made from any part of the House, and the bill at once received two of the three readings which are required by the rules. When it next comes up, it will be read a third time as a matter of course, and it will only be necessary to take a vote on the passage of the bill. I inclose a copy, that you may see whether it is satisfactory in all respects; you may also like to show it to your friends."

Perhaps the member adds the same advice which Mr. Child gives, about writing to one's friends, and that even a page may gain a vote; and leaves the constituent to enjoy the luxury of hope until news come that Congress has adjourned, and later he learns that among the mass of " unfinished business" was the bill to grant his petition. It is not necessary that such a letter as we have imagined should be actually written; the mere sending of a printed copy of the bill tells the greater part of the story, and the constituent will easily guess the rest.

The establishment of the Court of Claims has had but a slight effect in reducing the number of private claims pressing upon the attention of Congress. Indeed, if we take absolute figures, it has had no effect, as the growth of the country alone would in any case have caused an increase large enough to absorb the gain arising from the establishment of the court, in the numerous classes of claims which cannot possibly be made subject to the jurisdiction of any similar tribunal. But the War of the Rebellion has given rise to several distinct fields of private claims, each of enormous extent. The bill for the relief of Mr. Trist came, as we have seen, from the Committee on Foreign Relations. That committee, and nearly every other standing committee, will have occasion, under the existing order of things, to report some private bills of a similar character. But the material they furnish for the consideration of Congress bears but a very small proportion to that poured out by several of the standing committees established for the special purpose. In the House of Representatives there are separate standing committees on claims, on war claims, on private land claims, on revolutionary pensions and the war of 1812, not to mention the committee on patents, and several others whose business is analogous. Some of the reports of the Court of Claims require the action of Congress, as do also, we believe, all of those of the Commission on Claims in the Southern States.

It would appear to be absolutely necessary that some means should be found to relieve Congress from the great mass of this business, in order that the residue may receive proper attention. This could be effected in some degree by the passage of standing laws which should cover considerable classes of cases, together with the establishment of rules, by which, if adhered to, Congress would refuse to enter upon the consideration of special cases not

coming within the purview of the standing laws. The right of petition, of course, could not be abridged; but the right to petition by no means implies the right to a favorable answer. In point of fact, for a humble claimant, who has not means to go himself to Washington and reside there the whole period of a session, or perhaps several sessions, there is generally no means of obtaining relief from government in the case of any ordinary claim, however honest, unless perhaps it presents some exceptional features of a character to command sympathy. It is by no means certain that it would not be the greater kindness on the whole to say to everybody what is the truth, that the pressure of the public business is too heavy to allow exceptional cases to be investigated; and that, after making provision by standing laws for large classes of cases, claimants whose cases fall outside of the general provisions must accept the negative result, which, under the existing order of things, a large number are forced to accept without making an effort for relief; and which others are forced to accept by the failure of their bills, even when they wear out their patience in the best efforts to obtain their passage. Nothing of this sort, however, is likely to be tolerated.

Among the measures, however, which we think might command the public approval would be the adoption of some sort of a statute of limitations to prevent the forcing of stale claims upon the government, and also the establishment of rules to prevent the renewal of claims already once, or perhaps it would be better to say twice, decided adversely. No doubt, strong theoretical objections may be alleged against such measures; but we think they would be justified by the absolute necessity of reducing the bulk of this sort of business, in order to make it possible to attend to any of it properly.

Another measure which might be adopted would be to increase the power and responsibility of the executive departments with reference to private claims. This claim of Mr. Trist, for instance, would appear to be one quite within the scope of the Department of State; and it would be a natural and regular order of proceedings, if a standing law required such claims to be presented to the department, with power in the department to adjust them. Under the existing order of things, it is impossible to tell when a claim comes before Congress, whether that tribunal is approached in the way of appeal from an adverse decision of the department,