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PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS. See DOCUMENTS, INSPECTION OF.

PROOF. See BANKRUPTCY, 1.
PROVISO. See BANKRUPTCY, 2.

RAILWAY. The plaintiff took a ticket of the defendant railway from A. to C. On the back of the ticket was printed, “This ticket is issued subject to the conditions stated in the company's time-tables." The time-tables stated that the company did not hold itself responsible for loss arising “ off its lines." Said railway extended to B., and from B. the journey was continued on the L. railway to C. The station at B. belonged to the L. railway, but the defendant was entitled to the use of the station and the services of the porters. On the plaintiff's arrival at B., his luggage was removed by a porter across the station in the direction of the platform from which the L. train was to start; but it was not seen by any one in the L. train. After this the luggage was not seen again. Held, that it did not appear that the luggage was lost off the defendant's line, and that the plaintiff was therefore entitled to recover for the loss. Quære, whether the plaintiff was bound by said condition on his ticket. Kent v. Midland Railway Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. 1. See DAMAGES ; DOCUMENTS, INSPECTION OF; NEGLIGENCE.

REMAINDER-MAN. See DIVIDEND; Trust, 3.

RENTS. See Trust, 3.

REPAIRS. See COVENANT.

REPRESENTATION. See DEVISE,
RESCISSION. See COMPANY, 2; CONTRACT.

RESTRAINT OF TRADE. - See BOND, 1.

RETAINER. The administrator of an insolvent trustee who has misapplied the trust fund may retain a sum of money coming into his hands as administrator for the purpose of satisfying the debt due to him as trustee from the deceased trustee. Sander v. Heathfield, L. R. 19 Eq. 21.

REVIEW. An infant petitioning for leave to file a bill of review will not be required to give evidence that the knowledge of the facts relied upon could not have been previously obtained by reasonable diligence. In Hoghton, L. R. 18 Eq. 573. RIGHT, PETITION OF. See PETITION OF RIGHT.

RIVER. — See CANAL.
SALE. See CONTRACT; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

SATISFACTION. — See ELECTION, 1.

SCIENTER. See EVIDENCE.
SEAWORTHINESS. — See INSURANCE, 1, 3.

SECURITY. - See BANKRUPTCY, 1.

SEPARATION. - See Divorce, 1.
SERVICE. — See JURISDICTION.

SETTLEMENT. 1. A widow was entitled to a life interest in personal estate and to a moiety of the capital, subject to her own life estate. The widow married again, and executed a settlement of her life interest; and she and her intended husband covenanted to settle property to which she or he in her right should become entitled during the coverture. Held, that the husband's interest in said moiety of said property was subject to said covenant. — In re Viant's Settlement Trusts, L. R. 18 Eq. 436.

2. By a marriage settlement the wife's real and personal estate was assigned to trustees on' trust to pay the income to the husband for life, remainder to the wise for life, remainder as she should appoint, and in default of appointment to her personal representatives. The wife died making no appointment, and without issue. The husband died, and his executors took out administration of the wife's estate. Held, that they were entitled to said estate. — In re Best's Settlement Trusts, L. R. 18 Eq. 686. See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.

SHAREHOLDER. See COMPANY, 2, 4; JURISDICTION.
SHIP. See BILL OF LADING; COLLISION; CARRIER, 1; INSURANCE.

SHORT-HAND Notes. See PRACTICE.

SLANDER. See NEW TRIAL.
SOLICITOR. See PARTNERSHIP.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. The defendants agreed to sell certain freehold property, and to make out a good marketable title. The defendants' title turned out to be good as to one-half of the property only. Held, that the purchaser was entitled to specific performance to the extent of one-half of the freehold, with an abatement of one-half the purchase money.

Hooper v. Smart, L. R. 18 Eq. 683.
See EQUITY.

STATUTE. See EMINENT DOMAIN.
STATUTE OF DISTRIBUTIONS. See ELECTION, 2.

STOCK DIVIDEND. See DIVIDEND.
TENANT FOR LIFE See DIVIDEND; Trust, 3.

THEFT. See BILL OF LADING.

TRESPASS. 1. A highway board ordered their surveyor to remove the locks from certain gates placed across a way which the board believed to be a public way, but which was in fact the plaintiff's private way, and the surveyor removed the same accordingly. The surveyor was obliged by statute to obey the board in the execution of his duties. The plaintiff brought trespass against the members of the board and the surveyor in the same action. Held (by Pigott and CLEASBY, BB.), that the action was maintainable. By KELLY, C. B., dissenting, that the action

should have been brought against the board in its corporate character; and that the surveyor was not liable, as he was obliged to obey the orders of the board. Mill v. Hawker, L. R. 9 Ex. 309.

2. The defendant's quiet-tempered stallion and the plaintiff's mare got close together on either side of a wire fence separating the defendant’s and plaintiff's land, and the stallion bit and kicked the mare through the fence without crossing it. Held, that the stallion was guilty of a trespass for which the defendant was liable. Ellis v. Loftus Iron Co., L. R. 10 C. P. 10.

TRUST. 1. A testator gave all property whatsoever that he might die possessed of to his wife, for her sole use and benefit, in full confidence that she would bestow it on her decease on his children in a just, true, and equitable spirit, and in such manner and way as she felt would meet with his approval. Held, that the wife took a life estate only, with power of bestowing amongst the children. What interest the children took, not determined. — Le Marchant v. LeMarchant, L. R. 18 Eq. 414.

2. A testator gave his residuary estate to trustees in trust for his wife for life, remainder over, and empowered the trustees to continue invested any of his government stocks or real securities. Pield, that certain long annuities for eighty years should have been sold by the trustees, and that the wife's estate was liable after her death for the amount for which such annuities would have sold. Tickner v. Old, L. R. 18 Eq. 422.

3. A testator devised real estate to trustees upon trust for his son for life, remainder to his grandson for life, remainder to the grandson's sons in tail, and upon trust to pay the testator's debts on mortgage, bond, or otherwise, including £8000 charged upon said estate; and the testator directed the trustees to apply the rents in liquidation of his said debts until they should all be paid off, and that no person to whom any estate for life or in tail was limited should be entitled to the rents and profits of said estate until such estate was disincumbered and free from debt, and that the trustees should invest the moneys which might come to their hands until the same should be applied in any payment to be made under the will. A receiver had been appointed, and all the debts had been paid except said £8000, and there was an accumulated fund in court sufficient to pay this charge. Held, that the receiver must be discharged, and the tenant for life let into' possession of said estate. — Tewart v. Lawson, L. R. 18 Eq. 490.

4. A testator gave his real and personal estate to trustees upon certain trusts for his wife and children. One of the trustees died. The court appointed a niece of the testator, aged twenty-seven, trustee, it appearing that no other suitable person could be found willing to undertake the office. — In re Berkley, L. R. 9 Ch. 720.

5. A testator gave freehold property to trustees in trust for his son for life, with a gift over if his son should charge or incumber the same. The trustees filed a bill against certain parties, alleging that the latter held a portion of said property by virtue of a charge upon the same effected by the son, and the trustees interrogated said parties concerning all charges in their favor upon said property. The defendants replied that they held a portion of said property under a mortgage from S., who held a lease of the same from the testator's son at a rack-rent.

The trustees excepted to the defendant's answer for not setting forth the date of
the lease to S. under which the defendants claimed. Exceptions allowed. -
Hurst v. Hurst, L. R. 9 Ch. 762.
See APPOINTMENT, 2; GIFT; POWER; RETAINER.

Tug. See COLLISION.
ULTRA VIRES. See COMPANY, 2.
UNDUE INFLUENCE. — See BOND, 2.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER. Upon a contract for the sale of real estate, where the vendor without his fault is unable to make a good title, the purchaser is not by law entitled to recover damages for the loss of his bargain, whether the vendor has actual possession of the property or not. — Bain v. Fothergill, L. R. 7 H. L. 158. See MORTGAGE, 1; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.

WARRANTY. - See INSURANCE, 1.

WATERCOURSE. See CANAL.
Way. — See DEED, 2; HIGHWAY.

WILL. A soldier in active military service made a will which was unattested. In the body of the will were found alterations. The testator left the service before he died. Held, that said alterations must be presumed to have been made by the testator when in active military service. - In the Goods of Tweedale, L. R. 3 P. & D. 204.

See ADEMPTION, 2; ANNUITY; DEVISE; ELECTION; LEGACY; Trust. ,

WORDS.

Damage.See BILL OF LADING.

Nephews and Nieces.". See LEGACY, 1.
Personal Representatives.” See SETTLEMENT, 2..

Property.” — See EASEMENT.
Thieves." - See BILL OF LADING.

WRIT. - See JURISDICTION.

SELECTED DIGEST OF STATE REPORTS.

[For the present number of the Digest, selections have been made from the following volumes of State Reports : 40 Connecticut ; 14 Florida ; 48 and 49 Georgia ; 63 Illinois ;*44 Indiana; 36 Iowa; 39 Maryland ; 110 Massachusetts ; 28 Michigan ; 53 Missouri ; 71 North Carolina ; 74 Pennsylvania State ; 38 Texas; 46 Vermont ; and 33 Wisconsin; also from 19 Wallace (Supreme Court of the United States). ]

ACCESSORY. An accessory was tried before the principal, as authorized by statute, and was found guilty; afterwards, and before judgment, the principal was tried and acquitted. Held, that the accessory was thereupon entitled to be discharged on motion. — McCarty v. The State, 44 Ind. 214.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT. The acknowledgment of a deed of trust was taken by the trustee. Held, that, as he was entitled to commissions for administering the trust, his interest was such as to disqualify him from taking the acknowledgment. - Brown v. Moore, 38 Tex. 645. ACTION. - See BREACH OF PROMISE ; FRAUD, 2; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 2;

LORD's Day; MASTER AND SERVANT; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 1, 3, 4; PARTIES, 1 ; PENAL ACTION; WATERCOURSE.

ADMINISTRATION. See EXECUTOR; PARTNERSHIP; Will, 1.

ADMISSION. At the trial of an action, the facts that defendants were a corporation, and that certain persons were their officers at a certain time, were admitted by their counsel. At a second trial, the admission having been withdrawn, plaintiffs notified defendants to produce their records, which they failed to do, whereupon plaintiffs offered evidence of the admission at the former trial. Held, that the evidence was competent, but not conclusive. — Perry v. Simpson Waterproof Manufacturing Co., 40 Conn. 313.

See LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 2.

AGENT. Plaintiff employed defendant, by parol, as agent to buy land for him. Defendant bought the land in his own name, gave his own note for the purchasemoney, and claimed to hold the land. to his own use. Held, that he might do so, and that there was no resulting trust which equity would enforce in plaintiff's favor. Burden v. Sheridan, 36 Iowa, 125.

See CORPORATION, 3; FALSE REPRESENTATIONS; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 3; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 1, 3, 4; OFFICER; POWER; SURETY, 2.

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