perils of the sea which would not have destroyed her if she had been seaworthy. — Dudgeon v. Pembroke, L. R. 9 Q. B. 581.

See DAMAGES.

INTEREST.

See MORTGAGE, 2.

INTERROGATORIES.

Action by executors upon a joint and several promissory note made by the defendants payable to the testator. Plea, payment as to part, and payment into court of the residue. The plaintiffs were allowed to interrogate the defendants as to where, to whom, by whom, and in what manner said part-payment was made. -Hills v. Wates, L. R. 9 C. P. 688.

In an action in England upon a judgment obtained in France the plaintiff's declaration and replication set forth that the defendant was the member of a French company within the jurisdiction of a certain court, and that he was bound by the stipulations in the articles of association, one of which was that every member must elect a domicile at Paris, and that in default thereof election should be made at the office of the procurator of the civil tribunal of the department in which the company's office was situated, and that all process should be validly served at such domicile; that a contest arose wherein the plaintiff, as assignee of the company, caused a summons directed to the defendant to be delivered for the defendant at the office of said procurator, which by the law of France was the defendant's domicile of election for that purpose; that said service was regular, &c., and that judgment was recovered against the defendant by default.

Similar replication, but omitting all reference to the articles of association under which the defendant subjected himself to the jurisdiction of the French court. Held, that the first replication was good (by AMPHLETT and PIGOTT, BB., - KELLY, C. B., dissenting); that the second replication was bad. Copin v. Adamson. Copin v. Strachan, L. R. 9 Ex. 345.

A. leased certain lands of the owner with a covenant not to underlet without the owner's consent. Subsequently A., with the owner's consent, agreed to underlet a portion of the lands to B., agreeing that the underlease should contain the like provisions, conditions, and stipulations, in all respects, as were contained in the lease to A. Held, that the under-lease should contain a covenant against underletting without the consent of A. — Williamson v. Williamson, L. R. 9 Ch. 729; s. c. L. R. 17 Eq. 549.

See COVENANT; NOTICE TO QUIT.

LEGACY.

1. A testatrix gave a specific bequest to "my niece A.," and she gave the residue of her personal property "unto all my nephews and nieces." The testatrix left nephews and nieces surviving her, and also nephews and nieces of her husband, of whom A. was one. Held, that A. was not entitled to a share of the - Wells v. Wells, L. R. 18 Eq. 504.

residue.

2. A testator gave his real and personal estate to A., and the heirs male of his body begotten, for ever; but, in the case of the death of the said A. without heirs male of his body lawfully begotten, then to B. in the same manner, and after him to C. The testator subsequently made a codicil in which he stated, “In my will I directed that, in the event of the death of A. without leaving issue male him surviving, the residue of my real and personal estate should go to B." He then revoked the bequest to B., and, in the event of the death of A. without leaving male issue him surviving, gave his residuary estate to the eldest daughter of A. Held, that the gifts to B. and C. were void as to the testator's personal estate, being gifts over on an indefinite failure of issue; and that A. took an absolute interest in the personalty, subject to an executory bequest to his eldest daughter, if he should die without leaving issue male him surviving. — Dawson v. Small, L. R. 9 Ch. 651.

See ADEMPTION; ANNUITY; CONDITION; DEVISE; TRUST.

1. A. and B., trustees, lent trust money to C. on the security of a mortgage from C. C. desired to sell a portion of the mortgaged premises; and A. represented to him that as C. was abroad it would be difficult to obtain a reconveyance from A. and B. to C., and that it would be better to say nothing about the mortgage. C. sold accordingly, and handed the purchase-money to A. in part repayment of the money lent to C. A. appropriated the money, but continued to pay the cestui que trust interest upon the whole amount lent to C. Ten years afterwards C. desired to sell another portion of the mortgaged premises; and A. thereupon represented to B. that C. desired to sell his land, including the land already conveyed without the knowledge of B.; and he requested B. to join with him in a reconveyance to C., which B. did. C. then conveyed the second portion of the premises, and handed the purchase-money to A., who took it and absconded. B. filed a bill to have the reconveyance from A. and B. to C. delivered up to be cancelled; that it might be declared that said two sums received and appropriated by A. were still a charge upon said premises; and that the second portion of the mortgaged premises sold as aforesaid might be declared to be still subject to said mortgage. Held, that said reconveyance must be cancelled, and that the purchasers from C. had obtained an equity of redemption only. Foreclosure ordered in default of payment. Order that said

purchasers give up their deeds upon foreclosure, refused. — Heath v. Crealock, L. R. 10 Ch. 22; s. c. L. R. 18 Eq. 215.

2. G., a member of a company, mortgaged certain property to secure an advance from the company. By the mortgage G. was to repay the advance in seven years by monthly payments of principal and interest, and in case of default in payment the company could sell the property, and from the proceeds retain all sums of money and payments which should be then due, or which should afterwards become due during the remainder of said seven years, it being agreed that all moneys which would at any time afterwards become due should be considered as then immediately due and payable, and should pay the residue to G. G. made default, and the company sold said property. Held, that the company was not entitled to interest for the remainder of said seven years after the principal had been repaid. — Ex parte Osborne. In re Goldsmith, L. R. 10 Ch. 41. See BANKRUPTcy, 3; Notice; Power.

NEGLIGENCE.

B., who was fifty-two years of age and very near-sighted, was a passenger to H. on the defendants' railway, and occupied the rear carriage. The train stopped at H., leaving the two rear cars within a tunnel, which was dark, and leaving the last car opposite a heap of rubbish. A passenger in the last carriage but one heard the name of the station called out in the usual way, and got out onto a narrow platform which was a continuation of the main platform. The passenger heard a groan and found B. lying with his legs across the rails and between the wheels of the carriage, and his body on the rubbish. He then heard the warning "Keep your seats," after which the train moved on. Held, that there was evidence of negligence on the part of the defendants to go to the jury. — Bridges v. Directors of North London Railway, L. R. 7. H. L. 213; s. c. L. R. 6 Q. B. 377.

See RAILWAY; TRESPASS.

NEW TRIAL.

In an action for slander the jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, with one farthing damages. A new trial was ordered, on the ground that the damages showed that the jury had made a compromise. Falvey v. Stanford, L. R. 10 Q. B. 54.

NOTICE.

A. agreed to lease certain land and build houses on it. B. agreed verbally to sub-lease from A. a portion of the land, together with the building to be erected upon it by A. After this the owner of the land executed a lease to A., who then, without the knowledge of B., deposited the lease with C. as a security for a loan. At the time of making the loan, B., who had originally been let into possession, had gone away, so that the house on the land was vacant, and C. had no notice, actual or constructive, of the agreement with B. Subsequently the house was let by B. to other parties, who entered into possession, after which A. assigned the legal estate in the house to C. Held, that, as the legal estate in said house was not assigned until after tenants had entered under B., C. had con

structive notice of this tenancy, and therefore notice of B.'s title, and that B.

was entitled to a decree of specific performance of A.'s agreement for an underlease. Mumford v. Stohwasser, L. R. 18 Eq. 556.

NOTICE TO QUIT.

The plaintiff, a lessee, underlet to the defendant from year to year, beginning at Michaelmas. At midsummer, 1866, the plaintiff's term ended, and a new lease was granted to him. The defendant remained in possession, and paid a sum equal to a quarter's rent at Michaelmas, 1866. The defendant continued in possession, paying an advanced rent, until Christmas, 1872, when the plaintiff gave him notice to quit at midsummer, 1873. Held, that it must be assumed that the tenancy continued according to the terms of the original underlease, being from Michaelmas to Michaelmas, and that the notice to quit was therefore insufficient. - Kelly v. Patterrson, L. R. 9 Q. B. 681.

1. J. and his son W. were in partnership as solicitors. In 1859 the plaintiff gave to J. and W., who were carrying out the purchase of an advowson for another client, the sum of £1300 to be used in said purchase, on the security of a written agreement by J. and W. to execute a mortgage of the advowson to the plaintiff as soon as the purchase was completed. The plaintiff subsequently lent £1700 to W. on his representation that it would be invested in a mortgage of certain lands. In 1862 J. retired from the partnership, and in 1865 he died in ignorance of said second transaction. In 1865 W. induced the plaintiff to execute a deed empowering W. to invest both of said sums as he should think fit, and to hold the same upon trust to pay the income to the plaintiff. No mortgage securing the first sum was ever made to the plaintiff, and it was in fact paid to W. upon the authority of the deed of 1865. W. paid interest to the plaintiff regularly on both said sums, until his (W.'s) death in 1872, when the plaintiff first learned that W. had appropriated both of said sums to his own purposes, and that his estate was utterly insolvent. Held, that J.'s estate was liable for said first sum, and that, considering the regular payment of interest thereon, the plaintiff had not been guilty of laches; that J.'s estate was not liable for the second sum, as he was ignorant of the transaction, and it is not part of the regular business of solicitors to borrow money.

C. was a partner with J. and W., but was not liable for the above transactions. Held, that all or any of the parties might be sued without joining the remainder, and that C. was not necessarily a party. Plumer v. Gregory, L. R. 18 Eq. 621.

2. By articles of partnership between A. and B., the partnership property belonged to A. A. died, and B., his executor, carried on the business in accordance with directions in A.'s will, but he committed a devastavit by misapplying A.'s separate property. A.'s estate was declared insolvent, and a receiver was appointed; and B.'s estate was being wound up under a liquidation by arrangement. Held, that a claim in respect of the derastavit could be proved against the separate estate of B., notwithstanding the rule that a partner cannot prove

against his copartner's separate estate until all the partnership debts have been paid. — Ex parte Westcott. In re White, L. R. 9 Ch. 626.

See BILLS AND NOTES; PRINCIPAL AND Agent, 1.

PER CAPITA. See DEVISE.

PER STIRPES. See DEVISE.

PETITION Of Right.

A petition of right will lie for breach of contract where the damages are unliquidated. — Thomas v. The Queen, L. R. 10 Q. B. 31.

POWER.

A power in trustees to raise a certain sum by mortgage implies a power to raise also the incidental costs of the mortgage. · Armstrong v. Armstrong, L. R.

18 Eq. 541.

See APPOINTMENT, 2, 3.

PRACTICE.

When the notes of a judge are produced before a Court of Appeal, and they purport to contain a full record of what took place at the trial, they must be taken as the sole materials on which the Court of Appeal can proceed; and shorthand notes will not be admitted, unless by agreement of parties. — Ex parte Gillebrand. In re Sidebotham, L. R. 10 Ch. 52.

See JURISDICTION; PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; REVIEW.

1. By agreement between a London firm and a Rangoon firm, the former was to purchase goods, charge two per cent commission, and send the goods to the Rangoon firm. The outward business to the Rangoon firm was to be on joint account. The plaintiff, in ignorance of the agreement between the two firms, furnished goods to the London firm, which were exported to the Rangoon firm in pursuance of said agreement. Held, that the Rangoon firm was not liable to the plaintiff for the price of said goods, as there was no joint interest in the goods when purchased, but only when the business outward from London began.. - Hutton v. Bulloch, L. R. 9 Q. B 573; s. c. L. R. 8 Q. B. 331; 8 Am. Law Rev. 300.

2. B. purchased goods of the plaintiffs on behalf of undisclosed principals. After the plaintiffs had discovered the principals, they filed an affidavit of proof against B.'s estate, which was in liquidation. Held, that the plaintiffs were not precluded from maintaining an action against the principals. — Curtis v. Williamson, L. R. 10 Q. B. 57.

See INSURANCE, 2; TRESPASS, 1.

PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS.

Certain opinions of counsel on matters which afterward became the subject of litigation, the production of which was objected to on the ground that “ they were written in anticipation of and in relation to the litigation," were ordered to be produced. Smith v. Daniell, L. R. 18 Eq. 649.

See DOCUMENTS, INSPECTION Of.