Costs.

Two executors gave a joint retainer to a firm of solicitors. One executor died insolvent. Held, that the surviving executor was entitled to be allowed for all the costs, as he was liable to the solicitor for the whole. Watson v. Row, L. R. 18 Eq. 680.

See POWER.

COVENANT.

The plaintiffs were the lessees of a certain estate, covenanting in their lease to repair and yield up in repair, and also to repair after three months' notice. They underleased to the defendants with similar covenants, except that the notice was to be of two months. In September the lessor gave notice to the plaintiffs to repair, and the plaintiffs gave a similar notice to the defendant. Being threatened with proceedings in ejectment, the plaintiffs did the repairs themselves, and then sued the defendants before the expiration of two months from the time of the plaintiffs' notice to the defendants. Held, that the action could not be maintained on the general covenant to repair, as there were no damages to the reversion, and that the action had been brought too soon to be maintained on the covenant to repair on two months' notice. The notice to the plaintiffs in September was not notice to the defendant. - Williams v. Williams, L. R. 9 C. P. 659.

See LEASE; SETTLEMENT, 1.

Action for damages for injuries sustained by the plaintiff through the defendants' negligence while he was travelling on their line. The plaintiff had received a sum from an insurance company which had insured him against accidents. Held, that the damages recovered from the defendants were not to be reduced by the sum received by the plaintiff from the insurance company. Bradburn v. Great Western Railway Co., L. R. 10 Ex. 1.

See ANCIENT LIGHT; BILL OF LADING; CANAL; EMINENT DOMAIN; VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

1. A conveyance was made to the defendant of all that messuage and dwellinghouse then in the occupation of the defendant, and of all the buildings and easements whatsoever to the said messuage reputed to belong or appertain. The pillar of the portico, string-course, and pediment were in front of the plaintiff's house and overlapped the party-wall dividing the plaintiff's house from the defendant's, but they were built as parts of and ornaments to the defendant's house. Held, that said projections were part of the defendant's house. - Fox v. Clarke, L. R. 9 Q. B. 565; s. c., L. R. 7 Q. B. 748.

2. A conveyance of a lot of land described the land as adjoining a road, and as being the lot indicated by a plan on the deed, wherein the site of the lot was colored pink. The lot marked out on the plan included no part of the road.

Held, that no part of the road passed under the conveyance. - - Plumstead Board of Works v. British Land Co., L. R. 10 Q. B. 16.

A testator gave the residue of his real and personal estate to his five children by name, "and to the children born of the body of E., deceased, and to the children born of the body of L., deceased, to be divided amongst them in equal shares and proportions." E. and L., the testator's deceased daughters, left respectively five and two children. Held, that the residue must be divided in twelve equal parts between the testator's five children and the seven children of E. and L. Payne v. Webb, L. R. 19 Eq. 27.

See ADEMPTION, 2; ANNUITY; ELECTION, 2; LEGACY; TRUST.

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66

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A holder of shares in a life office and in a fire office bequeathed his personal property to trustees in trust to permit his wife to receive the dividends, interest, and income during life, remainder over. By the deed of settlement of the life office it was provided that a certain sum should be set apart as a separate fund," and that the residue and all accumulations should form a surplus fund;" and dividends at certain intervals were authorized on said "surplus fund." The life office declared an "extraordinary dividend" for the preceding five years; and it appears that this was a dividend on the " surplus fund." The fire office also declared “a special extra dividend paid out of the profits of the business." Held, that both these dividends were income and belonged to the widow. In re Hopkins' Trust, L. R. 18 Eq. 696.

DIVORCE.

1. A husband petitioned the court in July, 1874, for dissolution of marriage on the ground of the wife's adultery; the wife denied the adultery, and alleged acts of cruelty by her husband in May, 1872, and asked for a judicial separation. In June, 1872, the husband and wife had executed a deed of separation, wherein an allowance was secured to the wife and the custody of her daughters, and access to her son allowed her. The jury found that the wife had not been guilty of adultery, but that the husband had been guilty of cruelty. Held, that the wife was entitled to a decree of judicial separation. — Brown v. Brown, L. R. 3 P. & D. 202.

2. Insanity of a wife is not a bar to proceedings of the husband against her for divorce on account of her adultery. Adultery is not a crime by the law of England. - Mordaunt v. Moncreiffe, L. R. 2 H. L. 374.

DOCUMENTS, INSPECTION OF.

1. Where an accident happens on a railway, and the officials of the company in the course of their ordinary duty, whether before or after action brought,

make a report to the company, that report is subject to inspection; but where a claim has been made, and the company seek to inform themselves by a medical examination as to the condition of the person making the claim, inspection of that report is not granted. - BRAMWELL, B., in Skinner v. Great Northern Railway Co., L. R. 9 Ex. 298. See Malden v. Great Northern Railway Co., L. R. 9 Ex. 300.

2. A foreign government employed A. as agent in London to bring out a loan, and to issue scrip certificates to subscribers, and to exchange the certificates for bonds when the amount subscribed was paid up. The government employed B. as their banker, with power to receive from A. the sums subscribed. Subsequently bonds in the hands of A. were pledged by the president of the government to B., but the validity of the pledge was disputed by the government. The government filed a bill against A. and B. for accounts of the dealings connected with the loan. The court ordered the scrip certificates and the scrip book in which the certificates were entered, and which were called for on cross-examination of A., should be produced; but not the bonds. — Republic of Costa Rica v. Erlanger, L. R. 19 Eq. 33.

See PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS.

DOG.- See EVIDENCE.

DONATIO CAUSA MORTIS. - See GIFT.

EASEMENT.

A suit wherein a mandatory injunction is granted against the further erection of a wall, is not a suit in which property is recovered or preserved. — Foxon v. Gascoigne, L. R. 9 Ch. 654.

See ANCIENT LIGHT.

ELECTION.

1. A. covenanted in a deed of separation to pay £52 to his wife annually. Subsequently by will A. gave his wife £52, payable upon the same days as the sum settled upon her in the deed of separation. Held, that the widow must elect between the sums payable under the will and the deed. Atkinson v. Littlewood, L. R. 18 Eq. 595.

2. A testator devised an estate to trustees in trust for his widow for life, and after her death to sell the same and hold the proceeds in trust for his sons in such manner, as his widow should, before a certain period, appoint. The widow duly appointed by deed equally among the testator's three sons, A., B., and C., reserving a power of revocation. She subsequently made a will by which she gave said estate to A., and made certain provisions for B. and C., and the children of B. B. died intestate, and the widow died after the above period. It was held in a suit in equity that the will not having come into operation until the death of the testatrix, said estate belonged to A., C., and the children of B., in accordance with the testatrix's appointment by deed. A. filed a bill to compel C. and the children of B. to elect between the benefits under the deed and those under the will. C. submitted to elect, but the children of B. resisted. Held, that though the children derived their rights under the deed by the Statute of Distributions from B., those rights were the same as those of C., and that they must elect; and that they must elect between all the benefits received under the will, including the provisions made to

them specifically, and the benefits under the deed. - Cooper v. Cooper, L. R. 7 H. L. 53.

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT, 2.

EMINENT DOMAIN.

The plaintiff occupied a house in close proximity to a public dock which opened into the Thames. The plaintiff had no right to the dock other than as one of the public, but by reason of the proximity of the dock the plaintiff's premises were rendered more valuable to sell or occupy with reference to the uses to which any owner might put them. Under the Thames Embankment Acts the dock was permanently stopped up. Held, that the plaintiff was "injuriously affected," and entitled to compensation under the Land Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845. — Metropolitan Board of Works v. McCarthy, L. R. 7 H. L. 243. EQUITY.

INTERROGATORIES ;

See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS;
MORTGAGE, 1; NOTICE; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
ESTATE TAIL. See LEGACY, 2.

ESTOPPEL.

B. sued A. in a county court for rent alleged to be due for weekly tenancy at 1s. per week. Judgment was given for A. affirming the tenancy to be yearly. A. brought an action in the Common Pleas Court against B. to recover damages for eviction. Held, that B. was estopped by the judgment of the county court from asserting that the tenancy was weekly. — Flitters v. Allfrey, L. R. 10

C. P. 29.

EVIDENCE.

Action against the owner of a dog who had bitten the plaintiff. One witness who had been bitten by the dog, testified that he entered the bar of the defendant's house, and told two men, who were there serving customers, that the dog had attempted to bite him. A second witness, who had been also bitten, testified that he stated that he had been bitten to a man at the defendant's bar, and to a woman who had entered the room saying that the master was not at home and that the witness had better call when he was. Held, that there was evidence to go to the jury that the defendant had knowledge of the dog's ferocity. - Applebee v. Percy,

L. R. 9 C. P. 647.

See NEGLIGENCE; PRACTICE; WILL.

EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS.

An executor, who was husband of a legatee, was indebted to the testator and was unable to discharge his indebtedness. Held, that the wife had no equity to a settlement, as her equity attached only to such property as her husband was entitled to receive in his marital right. — Knight v. Knight, L. R. 18 Eq. 487. See COSTS; INTERROGATORIES; PARTNERSHIP, 2; RETAINER; SETTLE

MENT, 2.

FOREIGN JUDGMENT.

- See JURISDICTION.

FOREIGN LAW. - See BANKRUPTCY, 3.
FRAUD. See BOND, 2; MORTGAGE, 1.

GIFT.

A husband while on his death-bed handed his wife certain scrip certificates and a deposit note, saying, "These are yours." Held, that the gift of the certificates was incomplete, and that there was not a declaration of trust; but that there was a valid donatio causâ mortis of the deposit note. - Moore v. Moore, L. R. 18 Eq. 474.

HIGHWAY.

A road was set out as a private road in 1789 under an enclosure act, and the adjoining land owners or occupiers were ordered by the award ever after to keep the road in repair. There was evidence of user by the public sufficient to support the presumption of dedication. Held, that the award did not prevent the road becoming a highway repairable by the inhabitants at large. — Queen v. In-habitants of the Township of Bradfield, L. R. 9 Q. B. 552.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

See EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; SETTLE-
MENT, 1.

IMPLIED CONTRACT.— See INSURANCE, 1.

INCOME. See DIVIDEND.

INFANT.-See REVIEW.

1. Insurance was effected on wine in casks on or under deck. The wine was jettisoned in bad weather by staving in the casks, but the rest of the cargo arrived safely. Held, that there was an implied warranty that the vessel was seaworthy for the voyage she was about to undertake, loaded as she was with said cargo; and that in considering her seaworthiness the jury should consider the nature of the cargo; and that, if the vessel could only be made seaworthy by the destruction of said cargo, she was unseaworthy, no matter how easily the cargo might be destroyed. ·Daniels v. Harris, L. R. 10 C. P. 1.

2. The plaintiffs requested an insurance broker to effect insurance on a cargo at a premium not to exceed 30s. a ton. The broker obtained insurance at 35s. a ton, and a slip was initialed subject to the plaintiffs' approval, and the plaintiffs subsequently approved of the insurance. Between the time of initialing the slip and signing the policy the plaintiff's heard of the loss of the vessel containing the cargo, but did not inform the insurer thereof. By the custom of Lloyd's an underwriter who agrees to take a risk at a premium exceeding the limit authorized, subject to approval, binds himself to take it under all circumstances, provided the principal ratifies. Held, that the plaintiffs were not bound to communicate their knowledge of said loss to the insurer, and that the insurer was liable. Cory v. Patton, L. R. 9 Q. B. 577.

3. Where a vessel is insured by an owner who is ignorant of her unseaworthiness, the insured is entitled to recover, although the vessel is lost from