might derive from any other source, and should not be taken into account in regard to any other income. The income of the testator's estate was insufficient to pay said annuity. Held, that, in determining the deficit to be charged on the principal of the testator's estate, said annuity of £200 was not to be included in the widow's income. ·In re Hedges' Trust Estate, L. R. 18 Eq. 419.

See BANKRUPTCY, 2; ELECTION, 1; TRUST, 2.

APPLICATION OF SECURITIES. -See BANKRUPTCY, 1.

APPOINTMENT.

1. A testator devised his estate in trust for his daughter for life, remainder as she should by deed or will appoint, and in default of her appointment to her children equally. One of her children married D., a Frenchman, domiciled in France. He died, and after his death the testator's daughter appointed certain property in favor of Mrs. D. By French law, Mrs. D.'s daughter was entitled to half the property acquired by her mother during marriage. Held, that Mrs. D. acquired said property on the date of the appointment, and that it therefore was not subject to said law of France. — De Serre v. Clarke, L. R. 18 Eq. 587. 2. Bequest of personalty to trustees in trust for the testator's daughter for life, and after her death to her children as she should by will appoint. She appointed to trustees in trust for her children in certain proportions. The court refused to take the fund from the first trustees and hand it to the trustees appointed by the daughter. The appointment was valid.—Busk v. Aldam, L. R. 19 Eq. 16.

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3. A testator devised property in trust for A. for life, and after A.'s death in trust for A.'s children, or some of them, as A. should by deed or will appoint. A., by will, appointed a sixth of said property in trust for each of her six children living at the testator's decease for life, remainder upon such trusts and for such purposes as each child should by will appoint, with limitations over in default of appointment. Held, that A.'s power of appointment was well exercised. Slark v. Dakyns, L. R. 10 Ch. 35; s. c. L. R. 15 Eq. 307; 8 Am. Law Rev. 90..

1. The drawer, acceptor, and indorser of a bill of exchange became insolvent, and the holder realized a portion of the bill from certain securities. Before the holder had realized his security he proved for the full amount of the bill against the indorser, who was in liquidation, and received a dividend. Held, that the proof must be reduced by the amount the holder received from the security, and that any excess of dividend must be repaid to the liquidator. · In re Barned's Banking Co. Ex parte Joint Stock Discount Co., L. R. 19 Eq. 1.

2. A man went through the ceremony of marriage with his deceased wife's sister. He subsequently separated from her, and covenanted with trustees to pay her an annuity for their joint lives, with a proviso that if they should ever come together again the deed should become void. The man became bankrupt. Held, that the value of the annuity on the wife should be estimated without regard to the proviso, which was void, as the parties could not legally ever come together, and that said estimated value was provable against the bankrupt. - Ex parte Naden. In re Wood, L. R. 9 Ch. 670.

3. A., carrying on business in London and Shanghai, applied verbally, while in Prussia, to B., a merchant in Prussia, for a credit of £5000. B. agreed to open the credit on receiving a deposit of the title-deeds of A.'s house at Shanghai, and A. subsequently wrote from London accepting these terms and sending the title-deeds. B. accepted bills drawn by A.; A. neglected to have the deposit of title-deeds registered at Shanghai, and subsequently went into liquidation. B. applied for an order directing the trustee to cause A.'s house at Shanghai to be transferred to him. According to the law of Prussia A. was personally bound to pay B.'s debt before he could demand the title-deeds, but B. held no valid mortgage on the house as against other creditors of A. Held, that, whether the contract between A. and B. was to be governed by Prussian or English law, there was a contract binding upon A. which was binding upon his trustee in liquidation. Ex parte Holthausen. In re Scheibler, L. R. 9 Ch. 722.

See CONTRACT; PARTNERSHIP, 2; PRINCIPAL AND AGENT, 2.

BEQUEST.-See ADEMPTION, 2; ANNUITY; DEVISE; ELECTION, 1; LEGACY; TRUST.

BILL OF LADING.

Diamonds were shipped to be delivered, "pirates, robbers, thieves, barratry of master and mariners, pilferage," inter alia, excepted, and the ship-owner was not to be liable for damage capable of being covered by insurance. The diamonds were stolen when on board ship, either on the voyage or after her arrival in port, before the time for delivery arrived; but there was no evidence to show whether they were stolen by one of the crew or by a passenger, or, after her arrival, by some person from the shore. Held, that the "thieves" excepted did not include persons on board the vessel; that it was for the ship-owner to show that the theft came within said exceptions, and that he had not shown that the diamonds were stolen by some person not belonging to the ship, and was therefore liable for the loss. Also that the "damage" mentioned above included total destruction, but not a loss occasioned by the total bodily abstraction of the thing. — Taylor v. Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co., L. R. 9 Q. B. 546.

See BANKRUPTCY, 1.

BILLS AND NOTES.

Four firms united in a trading adventure and agreed that "the finance of the business be carried on by acceptances of the several parties interested as may from time to time be arranged." The association was known among its members as the A. company, but it was never registered, nor was the partnership known to the public. Said adventure had been carried on previously by one of the firms, and was continued in the same name. Bills were drawn by one of said firms for the purposes of the adventure, and accepted by the firm carrying on the business. Held, that said bills bound only the parties to the same, and could not be proved against the association on its winding up. - In re Adansonia Fibre Co., L. B. 9 Ch. 635.

See BANKRUPTCY, 1; CHECK; INTERROGATORIES.

BOND.

1. Where the court inferred from a bond conditioned to be void if the obligor should not practise as surgeon within certain limits, that there was an agreement by the obligee to employ the obligor so long as the obligee should see fit, it was held that there was sufficient consideration to support the bond. - Gravely v. Barnard, L. R. 18 Eq. 518.

2. A., who was in debt to the defendant, applied to his step-daughter, the plaintiff, who was twenty years of age, to become security. In consequence of A.'s importunity the plaintiff, without professional advice, signed a joint and several promissory note for said debt and a further advance to A. Shortly after the plaintiff had attained her majority, she joined, under pressure from A., as surety in a bond to the defendant for the amount of said note with interest, payable in six years, being as before without professional advice. In the same manner the plaintiff executed another bond for the principal and interest due on the first bond. Held, that as it appeared that the plaintiff was not aware of the invalidity of the first bond when she gave the second, the second bond was not a confirmation of the first; and that both bonds must be set aside.

The plaintiff did not file her bill to have the bonds set aside until an action was brought upon them in 1872. Held, that the plaintiff was not guilty of laches. Kempson v. Ashbee, L. R. 10 Ch. 15.

The defendants, who were the owners of a canal, being threatened with damage from the overflow of a neighboring river, placed planks in the sides of the canal to strengthen the sides. The river overflowed, and in consequence of the planking was banked up in the canal so that it rose into the plaintiff's premises, which were on the canal above the planking, and caused damage. Held, that the defendants were not liable for said damage. — Nield v. London & North Western Railway Co., L. R. 10 Ex. 4.

1. The defendant owned barges which he let out under the care of his own servants for carrying cargoes to or from places in the Mersey; a barge carried goods for one person only at a time, and an express agreement was always made as to each voyage or employment of a barge. Held (by BLACKBURN, MELLOR, ARCHIBALD, and GROVE, JJ.), that the defendant was a common carrier, and as such liable for loss not caused by his negligence. (By BRETT, J.) that by a recognized custom of England the defendant undertook to carry goods at his own absolute risk, the act of God and of the Queen's enemies alone excepted; but that he was not a common carrier. - Liver Alkali Co. v. Johnson, L. R. 9 Ex. 338; s. c. L. R. 7 Ex. 267.

2. The plaintiffs were under bond to the government to pay duties on all whiskey transmitted by them from one duty-free warehouse to another, unless the whiskey arrived without alteration at the second duty-free warehouse according to the terms of a permit. The plaintiffs sold some whiskey to S. & Co., and

shipped it, duties unpaid, from a duty-free warehouse, addressed to "Customs Warehouse, Limerick, for S. & Co.," by the defendant railway. S. & Co. applied for the whiskey at the railway station at Limerick, and the defendants delivered it, and S. & Co. thereby escaped paying duty. The plaintiff's were obliged to pay duty on the whiskey under their bond, and brought an action against the railway to recover said duty by way of damage for wrongful delivery of the whiskey. Held, that the defendants were not liable. Cork Distilleries Co. v. Great Southern & Western Railway Co., L. R. 7 H. L. 269. See RAILWAY.

CHARGE.-See ANNUITY, 1.

CHECK.

A request by three directors of a railway company that a bank will honor checks signed by two directors and countersigned by the secretary of the company does not make the directors personally liable. See Beattie v. Lord Ebury, L. R. 7 H. L. 102; s. c. L. R. 7 Ch. 777.

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CODICIL. See LEGACY, 2.

COLLISION.

The steamship A. towing the disabled steamship B., which belonged to the owners of the A., ran into a sailing vessel, and injured her so that she foundered. Before the sailing vessel sunk, the B. came up and slightly injured her. Held, that the B. was to blame for the collision as well as the A., as the two vessels must be considered as one.- - The American and The Syria, L. R. 4 Ad & Ec. 226.

COMMON CARRIER.-See CARRIER.

COMPANY.

1. G. attended the meeting of a company at which a prospectus was presented with G.'s name as director therein; and this prospectus was subsequently circulated for ten days. The secretary of the company afterward wrote to G. requesting his attendance at a meeting; but G. replied that, as his name had been of no assistance to the company, he begged leave to withdraw. G. never applied for or agreed to take any shares, and none were ever allotted to him, and he never acted as director. The company was wound up. Held, that G. was not liable as a director to be placed upon the list of contributories. — Green's Case, L. R. 18 Eq. 428.

2. Directors of a company passed a resolution to allot £5 shares upon payment of £1, and accordingly allotted shares to B. Being advised that the allotment was invalid, they rescinded the same after it had been registered. Held, that the rescission was valid, and that B. could not be placed upon the list of contributories in respect of the shares allotted to him.- Barnett's Case, L. R. 18 Eq. 507.

3. A company agreed to pay a shareholder to whom it was indebted by crediting his shares with a sum which made them fully paid up, and by issuing to him fully paid-up shares for the balance of his debt. After the execution of the agreement the company was wound up. Held, that said shareholder was not liable for calls.- Adamson's Case, L. R. 18 Eq. 670.

4. The directors of a company had power to buy shares from the shareholders; and also power to appoint a general manager with such duties as they should determine. A shareholder, in accordance with an agreement with the manager, transferred his shares to two directors, and the transfer was registered, but it was not executed by the two directors. Held, that the manager could not delegate the directors' power to buy shares, and that the directors had not, on the facts, ratified the transfer; and that said shareholder was liable as a contributory. — Cartmell's Case, L. R. 9 Ch. 691.

See BILLS AND NOTES; CHECK; DIVIDEND; JURISDICTION.

CONDITION.

A condition subsequent in restraint of marriage, annexed to a gift of the income of the proceeds of real and personal estate, is void. — Bellairs v. Bellairs, L. R. 18 Eq. 510.

See BOND, 1; RAILWAY.

CONSTRUCTION.

-See ADEMPTION, 2; ANNUITY; BILLS AND NOTES; COPYRIGHT; DEED; DEVISE; ELECTION; LEASE; LEGACY; MORTGAGE, 2; SETTLEMENT, 1; Trust.

CONTRACT.

The defendants contracted to deliver to the plaintiffs two hundred tons of iron at 5s. per ton, cash; twenty-five tons to be delivered monthly, the first delivery to be on April 1. On March 12 the plaintiffs informed the defendants that they were insolvent, and they filed a petition for liquidation March 16. The plaintiffs in their written statement of their affairs made no reference to the above contract, but the contract was mentioned at the meeting of creditors. No further reference was made to the contract until May 13, when the plaintiffs demanded the iron and offered to pay cash for it. The defendants replied that the contract was at an end. It was the practice of the defendants to deliver iron under contracts similar to the above without demand for delivery. The court had power to draw inferences of fact. Held, that the contract was rescinded. Morgan v. Bain, L. R. 10 C. P. 15.

See BANKRUPTCY, 3; CARRIER; COMPANY, 3; COPYRIGHT; EQUITY; INSURANCE, 1; JURISDICTION; NOTICE; PRINCIPAL AND AGENT; RAILWAY; VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

CONVERSION. See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT, 1.

An agreement between an authoress and a publisher that the latter should publish a work at his expense and pay the authoress a royalty on the copies sold, does not prevent the authoress from authorizing another publisher to bring out a second edition of her work before all the copies of the first are sold.— Warne V.. Routledge, L. R. 18 Eq. 497.