lading to the bank, and that the bank was entitled to the goods. — The Chartered Bank of India, Australia, and China v. Henderson, L. R. 5 P. C. 501. See CHARTER-PARTY, 1.

BILLS AND NOTES.

1. A. drew bills in Brazil on B., in England, and sold the drafts to the plaintiff, and then sent remittances to B. to cover the bills. B. refused to accept the bills, and the plaintiff thereupon filed a bill praying that said remittances should be applied to discharging said bills. Bill dismissed. liday, L. R. 9 Ch. 561.

66

Vaughan v. Hal

2. The holder of a bill protested for non-payment by the acceptor, notified the drawer that the bill had been duly presented for payment and returned dishonored," but did not state that the bill had been protested by a notary. Held, that the notice of dishonor was sufficient. — In re Lowenthal, L. R. 9 Ch. 591.

Goods were sent by the defendants' railway under a special contract, which described them as being carried "at owner's risk." Part of the goods were delayed on the journey and damaged in consequence of the negligence of the defendants' servants. Held, that the defendants were liable for said damage. D'Arc v. London and Northwestern Railway Co., L. R. 9 C. P. 325.

CHARITABLE GIFT.-See LEGACY, 1.

CHARTER-PARTY.

1. The plaintiff, a master of a vessel, agreed with L. to carry four hundred and seven tons of iron on a certain voyage at 7s. 3d. per ton, to be paid on signing the bills of lading, L., the next day, chartered said vessel to the defendant to carry the same quantity of iron on the same voyage at 8s. per ton. Each charter-party contained a clause giving a lien for freight, and the charter to the defendant stated, "the brokerage of five per cent is due on the execution of this charter to L., by whom the vessel is to be entered and cleared at the port of loading. L. had no authority to act as broker for the plaintiff, or to effect said charter or to receive freight. The iron was shipped and bills of lading signed by the master, making the cargo deliverable on the defendant or his assigns paying freight as per charter-party; but the iron was delivered without the lien being insisted upon, and L. obtained payment of the Ss. per ton from the defendant, but stopped payment before he had paid the 7s. 3d. to the plaintiff. Held, that the plaintiff could not recover freight from the defendant. The parties were never ad idem.. Smidt v. Tiden, L. R. 9 Q. B. 446.

2. By charter-party the master of a vessel agreed to receive a cargo of coal at a certain port, "to be loaded with the usual despatch of the port, or if longer detained to be paid 40s. per day demurrage," and the defendants engaged to load the vessel on the above terms at the B. docks. By the dock regulations no coal agent was allowed to have more than three vessels loading at the

B. docks at one time. The defendants, at the date of the charter-party, had three vessels in the B. docks, and had ten charters in their books which took precedence over that above mentioned; in consequence whereof said vessel could not go into dock until after thirty days from the time she was ready so to do. Held, that the charterers were bound to load with the usual despatch, and that they had broken their contract. - Ashcroft v. Crow Orchard Colliery Co., L. R. 9 Q. B. 540.

See INSURANCE, 3.

CHECK.

A. drew a check in London on a bank at Jersey, payable to B. B. received the check in the afternoon of Jan. 27, 1873, and the next day paid it to his account at his banker's in London, who, having no agent at Jersey, forwarded the check to the Jersey bank demanding payment. In due course of post the check would arrive at Jersey Jan. 29, and the London bank would receive a remittance on Jan. 31. On Feb. 7, the check was returned unpaid, with the words, "Refer to drawer." The Jersey bank stopped payment Feb. 4, at which time A. had sufficient funds in the bank to pay the check. By custom of London bankers, foreign checks are sent direct to the banker upon whom it is drawn if the London banker has no agent at the place where the check is payable. Checks drawn on bankers at Jersey are considered foreign checks. Held, that there had been no such laches on the part of B. as to make the check his own. - Heywood v. Pickering, L. R. 9 Q. B. 428.

COMPANY.

COMMON CARRIER.- See CARRIER.

See MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY; PRIORITY.
CONDITION. See VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 2.

A testator devised an estate in trust for his niece for life, remainder to the use of her first and other sons successively in tail male, with a proviso that so soon as any person should become entitled in possession after the death of said niece, such person should forthwith take the testator's name and arms; and in case of neglect so to do for twelve months, then such person's estate should cease, and the testator's estate should go to the person next entitled in remainder under the will. A tenant in tail remained in possession over twenty years without taking the testator's name and arms, and on his death the next remainder-man failed to comply with said requirements through ignorance of his rights under the will. Held, that the remainder-man's estate was forfeited; also that the tenant in tail had not acquired title by adverse possession under 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 27, § 4. Astley v. Earl of Essex, L. R. 18 Eq. 290.

CONSTRUCTION. - See CHARTER-PARTY, 2; EASEMENT; INSURANCE, 1; LANDLORD AND TENANT; LEGACY; VENDOR AND PURCHASER; WILL, 6.

CONTRACT.

The defendant agreed to sell the plaintiff, at a certain price per ton, two hundred tons of potatoes grown on the defendant's land. The defendant planted land

amply sufficient to grow more than the two hundred tons in an average year, but the blight appeared, and the defendant could deliver but eighty tons. The plaintiff brought an action for non-delivery of one hundred and twenty tons of the potatoes. IIeld, that as the contract was to deliver a specific crop of potatoes from a specific piece of land, there was an implied condition that if delivery became impossible owing to the potatoes perishing without the defendant's fault, the defendant should be excused. Judgment for defendant. Howell v. Coupland, L. R. 9 Q. B. 462.

See BILL OF LADING, 1; CHECK; INSURANCE, 6.

CONVERSION OF REALTY INTO PERSONALTY.

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Trustees held certain real estate in trust for two persons, one an infant, as tenants in common in tail, with cross remainders between them. A suit was instituted by the trustees against the cestuis que trust for administration of the trusts, and a decree made with consent of the adult defendant that the estate should be sold. Sale was accordingly made, the purchase-money paid into court, and half of the money subsequently paid to the adult. The infant died without issue. The adult then barred his estate tail, and claimed to be entitled absolutely to both moieties of the fund. Held, that the moiety of the fund in court went to the legal representative of the infant. Steed v. Preece, L. R. 18 Eq. 192.

COPYRIGHT.

H. wrote and published a novel, which he afterward dramatized. H. assigned the drama to the plaintiff, but it was never published or represented on the stage. G. also dramatized the novel in ignorance of H.'s dramatization, and assigned his drama to the defendant, who represented it on the stage. Held, that the defendant was not liable for representing G.'s drama. Two parties may dramatize the same novel. Toole v. Young, L. R. 9 Q. B. 523. COVENANT. - See EASEMENT; LANDLORD AND TENANT.

CRIMINAL LAW.-See MALICIOUS INJURY.

CUSTOM.See BILL OF LADING, 1; CHECK; Insurance, 6.

DAMAGES.

The plaintiffs contracted to furnish a Russian railway company 1000 wagons by a certain day, with a penalty of two roubles per wagon for each day's delay in delivering them. The defendants contracted to furnish the plaintiffs wheels according to tracings, and were informed that the wheels were wanted to complete wagons which the plaintiffs were bound to deliver a Russian company under penalties, but neither the amount of the penalties nor the day of delivery were mentioned. The wheels were not delivered, and the penalties were incurred, but the company remitted one-half the penalties, and the plaintiffs forfeited £100. The jury found the damages at £100. Held, that the jury might reasonably assess the damages at the above sum. It seems that the penalties incurred by the plaintiffs could not be recovered as such from the defendants. · Elbinger Actien-Gesellschafft v. Armstrong, L. R. 9 Q. B. 473.

DEFAMATION.

An untrue statement disparaging a man's goods, published without lawful occasion and causing him special damage, is actionable. Western Counties Manure Co. v. Lawes Chemical Manure Co., L. R. 9 Ex. 218.

DEVISE. See ADVERSE POSSESSION; INTEREST; LEGACY; WILL, 6. DISSEISIN. See ADVERSE POSSESSION; CONDITIONAL LIMITATION.

DISTRESS.

Two tenants in common mortgaged an estate which they held as tenants in common, to secure a debt which they jointly and severally covenanted to pay, and they separately attorned to the mortgagee a portion of the estate jointly occupied by them as partners. Held, that the mortgagee could not distrain upon the partnership property for rent due from the portion of said estate jointly occupied by the partners. — Ex parte Parke. In re Potter, L. R. 18 Eq. 381. See COPYRIGHT.

DRAMA.

EASEMENT.

A mortgagor and mortgagee (the defendant) united in a conveyance of the mortgaged land to the plaintiff. The deed included the right to pass with or without horses and carriages along the roads delineated on the plan. The defendant covenanted that he had not done, or been party or privy to, any thing whereby the premises were or might be impeached, affected, or incumbered in title, estate, or otherwise. The defendant and the mortgagor had united in a previous deed, wherein the latter covenanted to make the above road of a width of not less than forty feet throughout its entire length; and the proviso followed that it should be lawful for the grantee to erect and maintain a porte-cochère or projection extending over the foot-pavement of the above road, provided the plan thereof be submitted to said mortgagor and approved of by him. A portecochère was built encroaching two feet beyond the curb-stone into the road, leaving a clear space of 24 feet 8 inches of carriage-way. Held, that the defendant was party to the last-mentioned deed, but that there was no interference with the easement granted to the plaintiff.—Clifford v. Hoare, L. R. 9 C. P. 362. ELECTION. See LIBEL.

ELEGIT.

A judgment creditor sued out an elegit, but was unable to obtain execution, as the legal estate was in trustees, and the defendants' interest was subject to several mortgages, under one of which a mortgagee was in possession. The court declared that the creditor was not bound to redeem the prior incumbrances; that he was not entitled to foreclosure; but that he was entitled to equitable execution, and consequently to have the property sold and a receiver appointed without prejudice to the rights of prior incumbrancers, and that the receiver must not interfere with any prior incumbrancer in possession. — Wells v. Kilpin, L. R. 18 Eq. 298.

EQUITABLE EXECUTION. - See ELEGIT.

1. The prisoner attempted to obtain an advance of money on a ring which he falsely represented to be a diamond ring. Evidence was admitted that the prisoner had previously obtained money on the pledge of a chain which he had falsely represented to be gold, and had endeavored to obtain money upon the pledge of a cluster ring which he falsely had represented to be a diamond ring. The cluster ring was not produced. Held, that the evidence was properly aumitted. The Queen v. Francis, L. R. 2 C. C. 128.

2. In an action against a railway company, it was proved that on the 17th of July the plaintiff sent a sum of money from one station on the railway to the U. station on the same, directed to a clerk of the plaintiff; that the money was not delivered, and that on said day a porter in the company's service at the U. station disappeared. H., a superintendent of police, was then called on behalf of the plaintiff, and testified, under objection by the company, that in consequence of a communication he went to the station-master at U. on the 20th of July, and that the station-master told him that the parcel porter had absconded from the service, that a money parcel was missing, and that he, the station-master, suspected the porter had taken it; and that the station-master requested him, the superintendent, to make inquiries about the porter. Held, that as it was within the scope of the station-master's authority to employ the police to arrest said porter, the above evidence was admissible. · Kirkstall Brewery Co. v. Furness Railway Co., L. R. 9 Q. B. 469..

See NEGLIGENCE; NUISANCE.

FALSE REPRESENTATION. - See DEFAMATION; EVIDENCE, 1.

FOREIGN CONTRACT. See JURISDICTION.

FORFEITURE. See CONDITIONAL LIMITATION.

-See EVIDENCE, 1; MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY; PRINCIPAL AND
AGENT, 3.

FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.

1. An agreement for the sale of a vessel was drawn up and presented to the plaintiff, who made certain interlineations therein, and then signed it. The interlineations were subsequently struck out at the suggestion of the owners' broker, who then forwarded the agreement to the owners. The owners made further interlineations, to which the plaintiff assented, and then the owners signed the agreement. Held, that evidence that the plaintiff had assented to the striking out of his interlineations and the insertion of the owners' interlineations after his signature, was admissible, notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds, as said evidence was not offered to alter an agreement already made between the parties, but merely to show what the condition of the document was when it became an agreement between them. Stewart v. Eddowes, L. R. 9 C. P. 311.

2. L. was the chairman of a board of health, which had constructed a sewer, and given notice to the owners of houses near the sewer to connect their drains