sess, the gentlemen who thus met at Ghent in September, 1873, are not weighed down by an excessive burden of modesty. The association aims to be the self-constituted expounder and interpreter of the International Law, the self-appointed arbiter and judge of international controversies, the acknowledged source from which shall issue the practical rules that somehow or other must be accepted by nations for their own guidance. In fact, these gentlemen seek to constitute themselves and their associates an extra-national or supra-national government, to whose mandates, although enforced by a moral sanction only, the territorial governments of the civilized world will yield obedience. It will be noticed that the Institute is not a commission sitting to codify the law, nor to suggest and procure the adoption of any particular amendments thereto, based upon any principles of which its members are the special and acknowledged champions; it is not a society established to promote any peculiar reforms announced to the world at the outset. In this respect it differs widely from the Association organized at Brussels during the same autumn, and soon to be described. Collecting its members from different countries, and avowedly embracing all schools, its ultimate aim is to reach the position of a supreme tribunal of all nations, whose utterances shall be regarded as declaring, if not indeed establishing, the law as a finality, and will, in the progress of time, collectively form a complete and harmonious code, both of fundamental principles and of practical rules. The active members are nearly all private jurists or advocates, and the professional element very largely predominates. It is a noteworthy fact, explaining the character of the public manifesto from which we have quoted, that, with the single exception of M. Drouyn de Lhuys, there is not one of them to whom the term statesman, or hardly even practical politician, can with any correctness be applied. How far it may be possible to carry out these lofty designs of the Institute is a question which we postpone to a subsequent portion of this article.

II. The Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations.

After it was determined by the Treaty of Washington that the disputes between Great Britain and this country should be settled by arbitration, the Rev. Dr. James B. Miles, of Boston, Secretary of the American Peace Society, visited the principal European

states, and laid before the leading jurists and statesmen of each a plan for a voluntary congress, which should attempt the codification of the International Law in the interests of a general peace, and which should to that end introduce arbitration as a recognized and even compulsory feature thereof, and as an ordinary and even necessary means of adjusting differences between nations. Meeting with much encouragement, especially from the continental publicists, he returned to the United States in the spring of 1873, and on the 15th of May in that year, at the house of David Dudley Field in New York, met a number of gentlemen -jurists and philanthropists - who had been invited to hear a statement of his proceedings abroad. After his report the assembly unanimously adopted resolutions approving his project, calling a conference to be held at Brussels in the succeeding October, and appointing Messrs. Field, Theodore D. Woolsey, Emory Washburn, William Beach Lawrence, and James B. Miles as the American delegates thereto. Armed with these credentials, Dr. Miles again visited Europe, and labored most earnestly to awaken an interest in the projected conference. His endeavors were crowned with a remarkable success; and on the 10th of October, 1873, a very considerable number of jurists, publicists, active politicians or statesmen, and philanthropists met at Brussels in pursuance of the call above mentioned, so that the convention was everywhere recognized and spoken of in Europe as having an origin entirely American.1 The municipal authorities welcomed the delegates, at a public reception and banquet, with congratulatory addresses, expressing the hopes for and confidence in the success of their enterprise. At the business meeting the convention resolved itself into a permanent society, adopting as its name" The Association for the Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations." It consists of all those persons who were then present taking a part in the proceedings, and of all who on their application are or shall be admitted by a conference or by the

1 The gentlemen in actual attendance were, from the United States, David Dudley Field and Rev. Dr. Miles; from England, Professor Sheldon Amos, Professor Montague Bernard, Henry D. Jencken, Henry Richard, M. P., Thomas Webster, Q. C., and Sir Travers Twiss; from France, MM. Cauchy, Massé, and Passy; from Holland, Ph. J. Bachiene and Dr. Bredius; from Belgium, Count Goblet d'Alviella and MM. Prins, Laveleye, and Rolin-Jacquemyns; from Spain, Signor Marccartu; from Italy, Professors Mancini and Pierantoni; from Germany, Professor Bluntschli; from South America, Carlos Calvo; and several others from different states of Europe.

council. The officers are an Honorary President, a President, two Vice-Presidents, chosen from each nation, a Council of twelve to which all the details of administration are intrusted, a General Secretary, and some other minor officials.1 The objects are declared in the most general terms to be "The Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations." It is plain at a glance that there are points of strong contrast between this Association and the "Institute." Its membership is unlimited in number, and is not confined to any class of persons whatsoever; no knowledge even of International Law is demanded as a prerequisite to admission; indeed, its active originator and General Secretary, Rev. Dr. Miles, is confessedly as ignorant of jurisprudence as are the great body of the American clergy. The Association is based upon two fundamental notions; namely, (1) the Codification, and (2) the Reform of the International Law; and the mode of its origin, and the business upon which it immediately entered, show that with many of its founders the reform chiefly contemplated is the introduction of arbitration as an ordinary, regular, and in fact necessary means of settling international disputes in the place of war. We do not mean that other reforms will not probably be suggested and recommended in the course of its deliberations; but the notion of universal arbitration was plainly uppermost in the minds of those who brought about the first convocation and arranged its preliminary business.

With these differences of form and design, there are at the same

1 The names of the officers elected at the last conference at Geneva in September, 1874, are as follows: Honorary President, Count Sclopis, Turin; President, David Dudley Field, New York: Vice-Presidents, Austria, Baron von Kubeck, Dr. Neumann, Vienna; Belgium, Charles Faider, Aug. Couvreur, Brussels; England, Montague Bernard, Sir Travers Twiss; France, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, M. Eugène Cauchy, Paris; Germany, Baron von Holtzendorff, Munich, Professor Bluntschli, Heidelberg; Holland, Ph. J. Bachiene, Hague, Dr. Bredius, Amsterdam; Italy, Professor Mancini, Rome, Professor Pierantoni, Naples; Russia, Professor Besobrasoff, Dr. Martins, St. Petersburg; Spain, Don Emilio Castelar, S. Moret, Y. Prendegast, Madrid; Switzerland, Professor Charles G. Koenig, Berne, Professor Charles Brocher, Geneva; Sweden, Dr. Hedlund, Dr. Jonason, Gottenburg; United States, Charles Francis Adams, Reverdy Johnson : Treasurer, Isidor Gerstenberg, London; General Secretary, James B. Miles, Boston; International Secretaries, Henry D. Jencken, London, and Frederic Passy, Paris. It does not appear how many of these gentlemen have taken any active part in the proceedings of the Association. The names of most of the Vice-Presidents are not found in the published account of the first conference at Brussels; and whether they all took a part in the last conference at Geneva is not known. The list as a whole certainly reflects great credit upon the Association.

time close relations between the two societies. Most of the members of the Institute are also members of the Association, and thus the same opinions will find an expression in each. While the Institute was not founded for the single object of codifying the law and of introducing arbitration and other projected reforms, it recognizes codification in its first official publication as an end to be attained by means of its expository labors, and it selected arbitration as the first subject for its study and discussion. These intimate relations between the two bodies were officially admitted and provided for by each. A delegation was appointed at Ghent to attend the conference at Brussels, and the latter in its very constitution confirms the bond of union. It may fairly be asked, What necessity is there for these two permanent societies? If the Association shall ever attempt to draw up a code, or shall essay to propose amendments to the accepted rules of the International Law, all this must be the work of those of its members who are experts in the science of jurisprudence; and all these gentlemen are, or naturally will be, members active or auxiliary of the Institute. However much the professional philanthropists, like Rev. Dr. Miles, and other such most estimable persons, may desire to abolish war as the dread sanction of the Law of Nations, and to substitute arbitration in its stead, they must give way to the skilled jurists-the Bernards, the Lorimers, the Bluntschlis, the Calvos, and the Fields where the work of formulating their notions is to be undertaken. In fact, if these two societies continue in existence side by side, and if the scheme in which they are both interested is ever carried out, the function of the Association as the popular body will be to stimulate and arouse public opinion, to awaken a general interest, and thus to reach the ordinary legislators of the various countries, and to bring a pressure of enlightened sentiment and conviction to bear upon the cabinets and governments which, when left to themselves, are inevitably sluggish in promoting or accepting great reforms. The function of the Institute, on the other hand, will be to labor exclusively within the domain of juridical science, to ascertain and establish the underlying principles, and to deduce therefrom the practical rules which shall embody and express these notions of abstract right and justice. To it, therefore, we must doubtless look for all the results which may be attained in changing either the external form or the substantial doctrines of the International Law.

To return from this digression to the proceedings of the Association in its inaugural conference at Brussels. A difference of opinion among the members in respect to the most important matter which called them together showed itself at the outset, and this difference can never be wholly removed; there is an absolute antagonism between the sentimental school represented by such theorists as Mancini and Pierantoni, and the practical or statesman-like school represented by Montague Bernard and Vernon Harcourt. At the first business session, Mr. H. D. Jencken, a profound student and able writer on the Roman Law, offered the following resolutions:

“ "(1) That an international code, defining with as much precision as possible the rights and duties of nations and of their respective members, is most desirable for the peace, harmony, and convenience of nations, and that all practicable means should be used to promote the preparation and adoption of such a code. (2) That for the purpose of aiding in such a task the conference will appoint a committee to prepare projects to be submitted to a future conference. (3) That a committee of five be nominated to report to the congress on these questions, and generally to report on the practicability of framing a code of public and private International Law and arbitration."

These resolutions, harmless as they seem to be, and not committing the Association to any theory or scheme, gave rise to a long discussion, and were finally withdrawn. Professor Bluntschli acceded generally to the plan which was thus indicated, but with reservations. Referring to arbitration as a mode of deciding international disputes, he contended that paramount interests affecting the existence of a nation could not be determined by its means. His views were supported by Montague Bernard, Rolin-Jacquemyns, and some others, and were controverted by Sir Travers Twiss, Mr. Webster, Mr. Richard, MM. Passy, Bredius, and others. The exact point at issue between these speakers seems to have been simply whether arbitration was adapted to all matters of controversy between nations, or whether there are certain subjects to which it cannot be applied; a difference purely speculative, for, as long as nations retain even the semblance of independence and sovereignty, the question whether a particular state will submit its interests to arbitration must always be determined by its own government, upon considerations which cannot be brought within the sphere of com