1958" and that those rates of pay shall "be the rates of pay for each position and class concerned as if those rates had been set by statute and such rates of pay shall supersede and render inapplicable those corresponding rates of pay set prior to the effective date of the rates of pay set under this section." As discussed above, section 422 (3) of the Self-Government Act restricts the authority of the District of Columbia Council to enact pay legislation for its employees pending adoption of a District government merit system. As yet a merit system has not been adopted. However, with respect to the pay of officers and members of its police and fire departments, the District of Columbia considers the restriction of section 422(3) lifted by the pay negotiation procedures contained in the 1974 Amendment. While it predicates its authority to enact pay legislation for District police and firemen on the 1974 Amendment, section 4 of the bill is clearly inconsistent with the pay negotiation procedures of that Act. However, it is not necessary to consider the issues raised by section 4 of the bill. For this reason, our decision is restricted in its application to pay increases granted under section 2 of bill No. 1-235 as approved by the Council of the District of Columbia. [B-182979] General Accounting Office-Decisions-Reconsideration-Prior Recommendation-Withdrawn On reconsideration, General Accounting Office (GAO) decision 55 Comp. Gen. 201-which sustained protest against award of negotiated turnkey housing procurement and recommended remedy involving renewal of competition among offerors and possible termination for convenience of existing contract-is modified in part. After considering points raised in requests for reconsideration by contracting agency, contractor and protester, recommendation in prior decision is withdrawn, and in all other respects decision is affirmed. General Accounting Office-Decisions-Reconsideration-New Contentions v. Errors in Law or Fact Contentions made by contracting agency-to effect that turnkey housing request for proposals (RFP) did not require specific responses in proposals, that deviations from requirements in successful proposal were minor, that blanket offer covered all requirements, that price of successful proposal was "reasonable" within provisions of Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR) 3-805 and, generally, that all offerors were fairly treated-do not convincingly demonstrate errors of fact or law in prior GAO decision. Decision is affirmed that award to proposal which substantially varied from RFP requirements was improper in light of provisions of 10 U.S.C. 2304(g) and ASPR 3-805. Contracts-Negotiation-Late Proposals and Quotations-Modification of Proposal-Price Increase Contracting agency's position that late price increase submitted by successful offeror upon extending its proposal did not involve late modification to proposal or any unequal treatment to other offerors is without merit. Decision is affirmed that General Accounting Office-Recommendations-Contracts-Prior GAO recommendation made to Navy in prior decision sustaining protest—which Contracts-Performance-Ability To Perform-Administrative GAO will not consider protester's request that termination for default of turnkey General Accounting Office-Recommendations-Contracts- In the matter of Corbetta Construction Company of Illinois, Inc., TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TOWNE I. RECONSIDERATION OF TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF The Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC), Towne 232-098 O-77-64 tect & Associates, Inc., a joint venture (Towne), and Corbetta Construction Company of Illinois, Inc., and Joseph Legat Architects (Corbetta) have each requested reconsideration of our decision in the matter of Corbetta Construction Company of Illinois, Inc., 55 Comp. Gen. 201 (1975), 75-2 CPD 144. The September 12, 1975, decision sustained Corbetta's protest against NAVFAC's award of a contract to Towne for the design and construction of 210 family housing units at the Naval Training Center, Great Lakes, Illinois. The decision recommended certain corrective actions to the Navy involving reinstatement and amendment of the request for proposals; renewed competition with the offerors through written or oral discussions; and the award of a new contract under this procedure with termination for convenience of Towne's contract (or modification of Towne's contract pursuant to its final proposal in the event that it remained the successful offeror). Upon reconsideration, it is our conclusion that the September 12, 1975, decision must be modified in part. The "Recommendation" contained in that decision is now withdrawn. In all other respects that decision is affirmed. Also, today's decision makes further recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy, which are described infra. Towne's request for reconsideration is directed essentially at the recommendation in our prior decision. Towne's October 8, 1975, submission to our Office contends that the extent of construction already accomplished, plus the additional construction work which would be ongoing while our decision's recommendation is being implemented, renders the recommended remedy impracticable-because it would not be economically feasible for the Navy to terminate the Towne contract should this be necessary at the close of the recompetition. Towne supports its request with extensive evidence documenting the progress of construction. Towne requests, in short, that we withdraw the recommendation in our prior decision. NAVFAC's request for reconsideration takes the same position as Towne in regard to our recommendation. NAVFAC has stated that construction work already in place as of September 16, 1975, amounted to at least $1.5 million, and that termination for convenience of the Towne contract, if required, would likely cost $4 million. Like Towne, NAVFAC has submitted a substantial amount of documentary evidence detailing the progress of the construction. In addition, NAVFAC's request goes beyond our decision's recommendation and challenges the correctness of our decision on the merits. The principal points raised are that the offerors were in fact properly treated in the procurement, and that our decision's holding concerning a late modification to Towne's proposal was incorrect. In contrast to Towne's and NAVFAC's requests, which essentially allege that our decision was in error on various points, Corbetta's request departs to some extent from issues strictly related to a request for reconsideration, and instead attempts to relitigate issues which were presented and resolved in our earlier decision. This observation is also true, to some extent, as to NAVFAC's submission responding to Corbetta's allegations. The objective of our Office in considering requests that one of our decisions be reconsidered is not to conduct a de novo review of the issues which were involved in the original controversy. Rather, it is to determine whether and to what extent our decision was erroneous. See B-168673, October 26, 1970, where we stated: While this Office will reconsider its decisions when it is alleged that they are based upon error of fact or law, such allegations must be supported by evidence, in the form of documentation or citations to controlling administrative or judicial precedent, which will convincingly illustrate how and why our conclusions are wrong. This is the standard to be applied in this matter, and we will consider the parties' contentions accordingly. Also, as in our prior decision, we intend to concentrate upon those issues which we believe to be dispositive of the matter. RECONSIDERATION OF TECHNICAL EVALUATION OF PROPOSAL REQUIREMENT TO CONDUCT TOWNE DISCUSSIONS Our earlier decision held essentially that NAVFAC's acceptance of Towne's proposal was improper because NAVFAC failed to meet the obligation to conduct written or oral discussions with all of the offerors within the competitive range. Because Towne's proposal varied substantially from certain specific request for proposals (RFP) requirements, NAVFAC's acceptance of it waived those requirements for the purposes of the competition among Towne, Corbetta, and the other offerors. This action violated Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR) § 3–805.4 (1974 ed.). Also, we held that the existence of substantial technical uncertainties in initial proposals precluded any award on the basis of the initial proposals under 10 U.S. Code § 2304 (g) (1970). NAVFAC's request for reconsideration raises several points which bear upon these issues. One of the principal contentions is that the deficiencies in the Towne proposal which were discussed in our decision, as well as additional deficiencies cited by the protester, were in fact corrected after award of the contract during the process of final design review. This, we believe, is not in point. As our earlier decision explained, the pertinent issue is not whether Towne conforms to the requirements during contract performance, but whether the requirements of competitive negotiation procedures were complied with in the procurement prior to award. Conformance with the requirements after award-whether fortuitous, or the result of efficient contract administration by NAVFAC-is irrelevant to the issue raised in Corbetta's protest and decided in our decision. NAVFAC's request also raises additional points involving the nature of requirements stated in the RFP specifications, the responses to these requirements made in the proposals, and the effect in terms of evaluation of the proposals and the requirement to conduct written or oral discussions. For example, NAVFAC maintains that matters such as off-street parking, ponding, water system sectional control valves, absences of lights and hose bibs, etc., are considered by expert technical evaluators to be minor, insignificant details. NAVFAC contends that Towne's blanket offer of compliance with the RFP requirements should cover such items. In this regard, the difficulty with a blanket offer of compliance is that there is no certainty what it is intended to cover. A blanket offer might be submitted by an offeror which has carefully examined all of the RFP requirements and fully intends to comply with them, but a blanket offer could also be submitted by an offeror which has misunderstood, overlooked or ignored RFP requirements and thus has no intent to comply with them. The effect, in terms of the statutory and regulatory requirements, on competition among the offerors, as well as the deleterious consequences to the Government which may ensue from improvident acceptance of a blanket offer without discussions, is adequately described in our earlier decision. We see nothing in NAVFAC's contentions to cause us to modify our holding on this point. As for NAVFAC's assertion that some of the omissions in the Towne proposal are merely minor details, we believe our earlier decision sufficiently explained why the cumulative effect of a large number of relatively minor items could amount to a substantial impact on the proposal. NAVFAC's contentions do not demonstrate errors of fact or law on this point. NAVFAC again points out that turnkey proposals are not expected to contain complete plans and specifications, and that to insist on proposals showing satisfaction of every detailed requirement would discourage offerors from submitting proposals due to the cost and time involved in proposal preparation. NAVFAC also invites our attention to the RFP clause which cautions offerors not to submit unnecessarily |