As to practice in criminal cases, see ASSAULT,
1; CRIMINAL LAW, 1, 2, 4, 8, 9; FALSE
PRETENCES; FORGERY; LARCENY, 3; MUR-
DER, 1.

As to practice in different classes of cases,
see those titles, as ATTACHMENT, 3, 6, 10,
11; COMMON CARRIERS, 2; CONTRACT, 1-3;
DIVORCE; FALSE IMPRISONMENT, 3; IN-
SURANCE COMPANIES, 2; LIBEL, 6; LIFE
INSURANCE, 2, 5; NEGLIGENCE. 8, 9. 13, 18,
20, 25, 27, 31; NEGOTIABLE PAPER, 6;
PARTNERSHIP, 4; SURROGATES, 1, 8-10.

See also, ARREST, 1; BROKERS, 3; CHARTER
PARTY, 1; Costs, 6, 8, 12, 16-18; CRIMI-
NAL LAW, 11; DiscoVERY, 3; ESTOPPEL,
6; FRAUD, 1; INJUNCTION, 7; JURY; MAS-
TER AND SERVANT, 1, 3; MUNICIPAL COR-
PORATIONS, 3: PARTIES, 1; PLEADING, 10-
12; RAILROADS, 4; RECEIVERS, 6,7, 11-13;
REFERENCE, 9; SHERIFFS, 2, 5, 8, 9; TOWN
BONDS, 2; VENUE, 2, 4; VILLAGES, 2;
WILLS, 15, 28-30, 40.

PREFERENCE.

See BANKS, 1, 3; LIEN, 2; RECORD, 1.

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

See AGENCY.

PRINCIPAL AND SURETY.

See SURETYSHIP.

PROBATE.

See WILLS, 4, 7-9, 13, 18, 25, 27-30, 34, 35,
40, 44.

PROMISE.

See CONTRACT, 11; EXECUTORS, &c., 6.

PROMISSORY NOTE.

See CONTRACT, 3; EVIDENCE, 25, 26; LIMI-
TATION, 6, 7; NEGOTIABLE PAPER, 1-6, 7,
10; PARTNERSHIP, 9; SURETYSHIP, 8.

PROTEST.

See EVIDENCE, 23.

PUBLICATION.

See SERVICE, 1, 2, 5, 6.

RAILROADS.

1. In an action against a railroad company
for personal injuries, the fact that the en-
gineer neglected to look in the direction in
which he was backing his engine, when by
so doing he could have seen the plaintiff
and might have avoided the accident, war-
rants a finding of negligence on defendant's

part.-Pakalinsky v. The N. Y. C. & H. R.
RR. Co., 44.

2. The statute requiring certain signals to be
given by the engine at road or street cross-
ings is intended for the protection of per-
sons crossing the track while traveling on
a street or road which is both travelled and
public.-Byrne v. The N. Y. C. & H. R.
RR. Co., 75.

3. An alley which is only used at one end by
teams which turn before reaching the track
is not a travelled street within the meaning
of the statute.-Id.

4. Plaintiff, a brakeman, was injured by the
breaking of a brakewheel. He testified
that there was a new brakewheel that was
of a different shape, but failed to show
which kind was least liable to break or that
the old shape was not strong enough for its
purpose. He also introduced a rim which
he claimed to belong to the wheel which
broke, but failed to prove that it belonged
to that wheel or that it was found near the
scene of the accident; he could only say it
was of the same pattern. Held, That a non-
suit should have been granted; that there
was a total failure to show any negligence
of defendant growing out of the kind or
pattern of the wheel.-Disher v. The N. Y.
C. & H. R. RR. Co., 103.

5. The consent of abutting owners, required
by 18, Art. 3, of the State Constitution,
to the construction of a street railroad,
need not be under seal and need not con-
vey to the railroad company any fee or

easement in the street.-In re The Cortland
& Homer Horse RR. Co. v. The Syr., B. &
N. Y. RR. Co., 163.

6. Defendant covenanted with plaintiff that
it would pave the streets in and about its
rails in a permanent manner, and keep the
same in repair to the entire satisfaction of
the Street Commissioner. Held, That de-
fendant's covenant required it to keep the
pavement in repair between the rails.-
The Mayor, &c., of N. Y. v. The Second
Ave. RR. Co., 203.

7. Upon failure on the part of defendant after
demand to repair the pavement plaintiff,
having done the work, can recover the
amount actually and in good faith expended
in the ordinary way in repairing the pave-
ment between the tracks, although defend-
ant might have procured the work done
for less. Id.

8. To establish the time expended in doing
the work it is competent evidence to permit
the general foreman to state from a memo-
randum the times given by the foreman of
each gang twice each day to him, and then
to show by the foreman of each gang that
he reported the time correctly to the gen-
eral foreman.—Id.

9. The liability of a railroad company for,
damages to cattle, etc., resulting from de-
fective fences is not limited to injuries
caused by its agents or engines, but attaches
to all cases where cattle, etc., escape on the
track through a defective fence, irrespec-
tive of the manner in which they receive
injury.-Knight v. The N. Y., L. E. & W.
RR. Co., 214.

10. An agreement by a railroad company to
check baggage by a specified through route
includes an agreement to deliver it at the
end of its road to the next succeeding car-
rier on such route, and for a misdelivery
to a different carrier it remains liable as in-
surer for an injury or loss occurring on the
route to which it was diverted.-Isaacson
v. The N. Y. C. & H. R. RR. Co., 282.

11. It is within the apparent scope of a bag-
gage-master's employment, when asked by
a passenger if the company checks over a
route indicated by his ticket, to answer the
question and bind the company by his an-
swer, and the passenger may rely upon
such answer without examining his check.
-Id.

12. A baggage check does not embody the
contract of carriage, but is only a voucher
or token to enable the holder to identify
and claim his baggage at the end of the
route.-Id.

13. A railroad company must take reasona-
ble care to know or ascertain the safety of
the design and construction of its bridges,
whether they are built by it or purchased,
and is chargeable with knowledge of de-
fects which a competent examination would
have disclosed. -Vosburgh v. The L. S. &
M. S. RR. Co., 300.

14. Railroad companies are invested with dis-
cretion as to the mode of exercising their
franchise, and so long as their operations
are not suspended or their duties unper-
formed courts will not interfere to regulate
the exercise of such discretion, especially
on the application of a private individual.
-The People ex rel. Wheeler v. The L. 1.
RR. Co.,466.

15. A railroad cannot be termed a nuisance
when managed without negligence or wil
ful misconduct.-Briesen v. The L. I. RR.
Co., 467.

16. So long as the operation of a railroad is
kept within the scope of the powers grant-
ed to it it is protected from all legal pro-
ceedings, provided the resulting injury
arises as a natural result of the exercise of
the statutory authority.—Id.

17. Where travelling on the cars to and from
his work constitutes a part of the contract
of service of a railroad employee the com-
pany is not responsible for an injury re-

ceived by him while so travelling. - Vick v.
The N. Y. C. & H. R. RR. Co., 505.

18. Plaintiff's intestate, who lived in Roches-
ter, was employed by defendant as foreman
of its tinshop at Buffalo, defendant agree-
ing to pass him to and from his work. Held,
That his conveyance to and from his work
was part of the contract of employment and
that during such conveyance he was not a
passenger but an employee of the com-
pany.-Id.

See EMINENT DOMAIN, 1-9; EVIDENCE, 28;
LEASE, 7; MASTER AND SERVANT, 6; NEG-
LIGENCE, 2, 3, 8, 9, 15, 20, 26, 27, 29, 30.

REAL ESTATE.

See CONTRACT, 6, 8; INSURANCE COMPA-
NIES, 1.

RECEIPT.

1. Receipts given by plaintiff, a Government
director of The Union Pacific RR. Co., for
salary and expenses for the years 1874 to
1877, were not releases nor receipts given
in settlement or compromise of a contro-
verted claim, and are susceptible of ex-
planation, and though in full may be shown
to have been given under a misapprehen-
sion of his rights, and will not preclude
him from recovering the balance due him.
-Brewer v. The Union Pacific RR. Co., 426.

RECEIVERS.

1. The statutes of this State restricting the
compensation of receivers of moneyed cor-
porations to that of executors and adminis-
trators, and providing also that the compen-
sation of such receivers shall not exceed
$10,000 per annum, do not apply to receiv-
ers of insolvent insurance companies.-In
re The Security Life Ins. Co., 154.

2. Chapter 378, Laws of 1883, fixing compen-
sation of receivers, etc., does not apply to
receivers who had rendered services and
acquired the right to compensation therefor
prior to the passage of said Act.-Id.

3. Executors, trustees and receivers selling
property subject to incumbrances are not
entitled to commissions upon the amount
of incumbrances. But where the receiver
pays off the incumbrances personally and
reimburses himself, such course being
necessary to effect a sale of the corporate
real estate, he will be entitled to commis-
sions upon the amount of such incum-
brance.-Id.

4. Section 13 of Chap. 902, Laws of 1869,
rendering the compensation of clerks and
actuaries employed by receivers subject to
the approval of the Superintendent of the
Insurance Department, applies to and in-
cludes only receivers appointed under that
Act.-Id.

5. A receiver will not be allowed in the set-
tlement of his accounts for moneys actually
paid an employee whose services were un-
necessary to the proper management of the
trust and might and should have been dis-
pensed with.-Id.

6. A receiver cannot properly be removed
without notice of the application for re-
moval and an opportunity to be heard in
opposition.-Bruns v. The Stewart Mfg. Co.,

331.

7. There is nothing to prevent the parties to
an action from naming suitable persons
from whom a selection of a receiver of the
property of defendant may be made, and
the bare fact that a party has nominated the
the person appointed by the court is not
sufficient of itself to justify the court in
subsequently removing him of its own mo-
tion when no party to the suit objects to
his performing the functions of the office
and no charges are made against him.-Id.

8. Chap. 378, Laws of 1883, so far as it fixes
the compensation of receivers, is prospect-
ive and does not apply to receivers who
were appointed and entered upon the dis-
charge of their duties before its passage.
The People ex rel. Newcomb v. McCall, 361.
9. The power of the court to appoint a re-
ceiver of rents and profits in foreclosure
cases was not abrogated by § 713, Code Civ.
Proc., but still exists.-Hollenbeck et al. v.
Donell, 365.

10. Where only a portion of the mortgage
debt is due and premises consist of a farm
divided into equal parts which can be sold
separately, a receiver of the whole farm
should not be appointed.-Id.

11. Section 4 of Chap. 378, Laws of 1883,
only requires that the accounts of receivers
of insurance, banking or railroad corpora-
tions or of trust companies shall be filed in
the court, and does not call upon the court
to pass upon their correctness, or to deter-
mine whether or not they should be approv-
ed. Their correctness must be determined
under the former practice.-The People v.
The Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co., 492.

12. Said statute requires the approval of the
General Term, and not of the Special Term,
of the costs, fees and allowances of attor-
neys or counsel before payment of the same
by the receiver, and, consequently, all such
accounts must be presented to the General
Term in the first instance.-The People v.
The Globe Mut. Ins. Co., 492.

13. When a bill of attorney and counsel's
fees, presented for the approval of the Gen-
eral Term under the statute, is without
verification and contains a very large num-
ber of items the correctness of which the
court has no means of ascertaining except
by a reference, a reference will be ordered,
for that purpose on notice to the receiver

and the Attorney General and on which all
parties interested in the funds of the receiv-
ership may be heard.-The People v. The
Knickerbocker Life Ins. Co., 492.

14. A receiver in supplementary proceedings
is not justified by the order of appointment
in taking forcible possession of property in
the possession of a third person who claims
to own it.-Dewey et al. v. Finn, 558.

15. The third person, not a party to the pro-
ceeding, and without notice thereof, whose
property is thus seized and carried away is
entitled to the usual remedies given by com-
mon law and is not punishable for con-
tempt where he sues the receiver for the
trespass without leave of court.-Id.

See CORPORATIONS, 1; INSURANCE COMPA-
NIES, 3, 4; PARTNERSHIP, 10; SALE, 2.

RECORD.

1. The mortgage in suit was assigned after
being recorded by S., the mortgagee, to
plaintiff's assignor, but the assignments
were not recorded, and S. thereafter execu-
ted and delivered a satisfaction picce, which
was recorded. Subsequently a mortgage on
the same premises was given to R. et al.,
who had knowledge of the prior mortgage,
and they assigned the same for value to
defendants, who took without notice and
recorded their assignment, Held, That de-
fendants were entitled to preference under
the recording act.-Clark v. Mackin et al.,
250.

2. The assignment to defendants contained a
guaranty of payment. Held, That defend-
ants could not be compelled to resort to the
guaranty, and that while plaintiff, on pay-
ment of the amount due, might compel an
assignment of the mortgage, he could not
be subrogated to defendants' rights under
the guaranty.—Id.

REDEMPTION.

1. The premises were sold under execution
on a judgment against W., who allowed
the time of redemption to pass. Defendant,
a subsequent judgment creditor, redeemed
and obtained a deed from the sheriff. Held,
That W. could not maintain an action to
redeem; and that defendant's title having
been acquired under the law a court of
equity could not divest him of it.-Weed
et al. v. Root, 316.

2. A tenant in common in possession is not en-
titled to compensation for his improvments
from his co-tenants who have not assented
to his making them.-Ford et al. v. Knapp
et al., 471.

3. A holder of a sheriff's certificate is not au-
thorized to make repairs or improvements
as against or at the expense of judgment
creditors having a right to redeem.-Id.

REFEREE.

1. Under § 3331, Code of Civil Procedure, a
referee who commenced the performance
of his services as such before § 3296
went into effect is entitled to only $3 per
day as compensation, there being no writ-
ten agreement, etc., notwithstanding the
fact that judgement was not entered and the
fees taxed until after § 3296, fixing his
compensation at $6 per day, went into
effect.-Green v. The Nassau Bank, 58.

2. A referee is not obliged to deliver his report
until his fees are paid, and, having deliv-
ered it, he takes the consequences of that
act, and must seek payment from the party
in whose favor the report was made if the
order confirming his report is ultimately
reversed on appeal.-The Att'y Gen. v. The
Continental Life Ins. Co., 260.

1. In an action by an attorney for services, in-
volving a long account, it is discretionary
with the Court to order a reference.-Steb-
bins v. Cowles, 152.

2. A referee has co-extensive power with the
court to allow amendments of a pleading.
-Knapp v. Fowler, 230.

3. An action brought against the heirs or de-
visees of a decedent to recover demands
owing by said decedent in his lifetime, on
the ground that the personal estate is insuf-
ficient to pay such debts, and that defend-
ants have become vested with real estate
owned by the decedent in his lifetime, can-
not be referred for the reason that said de-
mands consist of long accounts without the
consent of all parties.-Read v. Lozier et
al., 310.

4. It is only actions in which the immediate
object of the party is to recover the account
relied upon that can be referred without
the consent of all parties.-Id.

5. The right to appeal from an order denying
a motion to vacate an order of reference is
not waived by participating in the trial of
the action before the referee if the appellant
objected to such trial proceeding before the
referee on the ground that the reference
was unauthorized, and only went on with
the trial after such objection was overruled
by the referee.-Id.

6. In an action to recover money alleged to
have been deposited with defendants as
bankers, the answer alleging that it was left
with defendants as brokers as margin with
which to operate in stocks, and setting out
as a counterclaim a long account showing
a balance due defendants from losses aris-
ing therefrom, the Court has power to
order a reference, though it appears that

plaintiff's liability depends on her husband's
authority to act as her agent.-Day v.
Jameson et al., 374.

7. It is within the discretion of the court to
deny the motion if a stipulation that will
render an accounting before a jury unneces-
sary be given-e. g., that if the husband's
agency be found, the account will not be
disputed.-Id.

8. The liability of a guardian to account to
his ward is a personal claim against him dur-
ing his life and against his estate after his
death, and is referable under the statute.
-Skidmore v. Post, 472.

9. On such a reference the burden of showing
the guardian's dealings with the estate rests
upon the executor.-Id.

See APPEAL, 14; COSTS, 12; PRACTICE, 3-7;
RECEIVERS, 13; SURROGATE, 10; TRUSTS, 1.

REFORMATION.

See LIFE INSURANCE, 3, 4.

RELEASE.

1. A release from liability for false imprison-
ment executed without consideration by
one in actual custody under a void process
is void for duress.-Guilleaume v. Rowe
et al., 196.

See CONTRACT, 14.

RELIGIOUS SOCIETIES.
See DEEDS, 4.
REMOVAL.

1. A letter written by the head of a depart-
ment to the head of a bureau proposing to
remove him for dereliction of duty, stating
the facts out of which such a cause is al-
leged to have arisen, and which, if true, are
sufficient to authorize his removal, and de-
signating a time and place for explanation,
is sufficient to answer the requirements of
28 of the Charter of 1873. It is not neces-
sary that the cause for removal should be
established by proof taken before the su-
perior officer; it is sufficient that cause is
assigned and an opportunity for explanation
afforded, and after that the question of re-
moval rests in the discretion of the superior
officer. The People ex rel. Keech v. Thomp-
son, 320.

2. Section 3, Art. 10, of the Constitution,
which, in cases not there provided for or
declared by law, limits the duration of of-
fice to the pleasure of the authority mak-
ing the appointment," applies only where
the authority is continuous.-Bergen v.
Powell, 344.

3. The power of appointment delegated by
Chap. 305, Laws of 1878, to certain officers

of the town of New Lots, embraced a single
act only and was exhausted with its per-
formance, and therefore such officers have
no authority to remove an officer appointed
by them by virtue of said act.-Id.

REPLEVIN.

1. Defendant sold L. a machine upon an
agreement that it should remain the prop-
erty of the vendor until full payment. L.
sold the same to plaintiff. In an action by
plaintiff to recover the machine, which had
been retaken by defendant for non-pay-
ment of the price, plaintiff, who was a wit-
ness, gave no evidence that he was a
purchaser without notice and for value be-
yond producing a bill of sale of the machine
to him, signed by L., which stated that L.
had received full payment. Held, That
plaintiff could not recover.-Hughes v. Bax-
ter, 91.

2. A complaint which contained the usual al-
legations in replevin, also stated that the
goods in question had been sold on a cer-
tain day to the vendees, and that plaintiffs
were induced to make the sale through
false representations. It appeared that
there had been dealings between the parties
for more than a year previous. Held, That
plaintiffs might show, under such a com-
plaint, that from the beginning of the deal-
ings down to the sale defendants had made
to plaintiffs false statements of their re-
sources; that such evidence was competent
under the allegation of ownership in plain-
tiffs and would tend to show that the title
never passed to the vendees.-Coffin et al. v.
Hollister, 129.

3. A lease is not of itself a subject of replevin.
-Nichols v. Mase, 277.

See PLEADING, 15.

RES JUDICATA.

1. An order was made, on notice, substituting
the assignee of the cause of action as plain-
tiff, without directing an amendment of the
pleadings. Held, That the order was a con
clusive adjudication as to the ownership
and title of the substituted plaintiff and left
only the issues originally framed to be ex-
amined.-Smith v. Zalinski, 282.

See BAR, 6.

RIPARIAN OWNERS.
See DEEDS, 12; TRESPASS, 2.
SALARY.

1. On the resignation of the police justice of
the village in April, 1882, the trustees
passed a resolution reducing the salary and
appointed relator to fill the vacancy until
the election in December, when he was
elected to the office. Held, That although

he was elected to fill a vacancy his term
commenced January 1, 1883. and that the
resolution having been passed more than
two months prior thereto the salary was di-
minished as to him pursuant to statute.—
The People ex rel. Smith v. Trustees of blush-
ing, 190.

See CORPORATIONS, 20, 21.

SALE.

1. A judicial sale is subject to the supervisory
power of the court, which can, in the ex-
ercise of a just discretion, sanction or dis-
approve of it.-In re Atty. Gen. v. The Con-
tinental Life Ins. Co., 172.

2. Where the receiver of a corporation, in
selling stocks belonging to it under a decree
of the court, acted in ignorance of a mater-
ial fact known to the purchaser, the court is
not bound to order a transfer of the shares
to the purchaser if in its judgment the sale
was inequitable, although the purchaser
was under no legal duty to disclose his in-
formation and the receiver omitted to ex-
ercise the diligence which is expected of a
prudent officer.-Id.

See CONTRACT. 6, 8, 16, 19, 24; DEFENSE, 1;
EVIDENCE, 7-9; FRAUD, 14, 16; LUNATICS,

1.

SCHOOLS.

1. The school authorities of Brooklyn have
the right to classify the pupils, putting
scholars of different races in separate schools
and to determine the persons who may or
may not attend such schools.-The People
ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 104.

2. The act authorizing the establishment of
separate schools for colored people was not
repealed by the civil rights act, and is not
within the inhibition of the 14th amend-
ment of the Federal Constitution.-Id.

SERVICE.

1. To constitute a valid service by publication
on an infant it is not necessary that the
papers should also be served on the father,
mother or guardian.—The Home Ins. Co. v.
Head, 229.

2. When a party who has an apparent lien
upon premises being foreclosed is served
by publication of the summons upon an
affidavit simply stating that such party is
a resident of the State of Connecticut, the
court acquires no jurisdiction over such
party, and proof given in the case that such
lien was paid will not bind such party and
the court will not compel the purchaser to
take title therein.-Argall v. Bachrach, 267.
3. In an action against an unincorporated
association under § 1919 of the Code, the
service of the summons is properly made if
made personally upon the president or