claimed would be reduced proportionately to the number of passengers carried or on the basis that the wife of the inspector accompanied him, a prorating of the total mileage allowance of 5 cents per mile is not required in these cases.

Referring to the blanket advance authorization contained in paragraph 1 of Bulletin No. 7 to use privately owned automobiles on official business and to claim reimbursement at the rate of 5 cents per mile, I deem it pertinent to invite your attention to decision of October 15, 1931, 11 Comp. Gen. 134, holding as follows (quoting from the syllabus):

An administrative determination in advance, in accordance with paragraph 12 (a) of the Standardized Government Travel Regulations, that travel by an employee in his own automobile on a mileage basis, as permitted by the act of February 14, 1931, 46 Stat. 1103, would be more advantageous and economical, will not ordinarily be questioned by the accounting officers.

A general order authorizing employees to use their privately owned automobiles, at not to exceed certain rates of mileage within their respective inspection groups or territories whenever the cost is more economical and advantageous to the United States, is not a determination that the use of the automobile at the prescribed rate of mileage is more advantageous and economical to the United States. Before payment or credit for such mileage is authorized under such an order, there must be presented with or be attached to each voucher covering payment on a mileage basis, facts showing that the use of the automobile and the payment on a mileage basis were more advantageous and economical to the United States.

Also, when travel is performed upon the basis of a general order, there is for application the last sentence of paragraph 12 (a) of the Government Standardized Travel Regulations, as follows:

When by general order officers and employees engaged in necessary travel on official business, away from their designated post of duty or official station, are authorized to use their own motorcycles or automobiles, at not to exceed certain rates of mileage within their respective limited territories whenever the cost thereof is more economical and advantageous to the United States, there must be attached to the vouchers covering payment of such mileage a statement of fact showing that the use of the motorcycle or automobile and the payment on a mileage basis were more advantageous and economical to the United States. (See pars. 3, 5-7, 83 (e).) (Gasoline-tax exemption must not be claimed when traveling on mileage basis.)

See, also, 11 Comp. Gen. 155; 15 id. 153; 16 id. 620.

Accordingly, under Bulletin No. 7 the general advance authorization to use privately owned automobiles and to claim reimbursement at the rate of 5 cents per mile is subject to a determination of the question of economy and advantage to the United States as to the use of such mode of transportation as required by the terms of the Standardized Government Travel Regulations contained in the bulletin. A showing has been made with each of the vouchers presented to this office regarding saving in time by reason of the use of a privately owned automobile instead of common carrier. The vouchers will be reaudited by this office in the light of this showing and on the basis of the terms and conditions of the Standardized Government Travel Regulations, in which audit no prorating will be required on account of

the fact that the wives accompanied the inspectors engaged upon official travel.

(B-23320)

OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES-COMPENSATION FOR PERIODS OF

SUSPENSION

The authority under section 6 of the act of June 28, 1940, to summarily remove employees of the War and Navy Departments and of the Coast Guard upon suspicion of espionage or other subversive activities and to compensate them for the period of removal after investigation and reinstatement includes, also, the authority to suspend employees pending investigation of suspected subversive activity and to compensate them for the period of suspension after investigation and restoration to active duty, without charging any portion of the period to annual leave. Decisions holding that compensation may not be paid for a period of suspension in the absence of specific statutory authority therefor, distinguished.

Comptroller General Warren to the Secretary of War, January 29, 1942:

I have your letter of January 23, 1942, as follows:

Your attention is invited to that portion of section 6 of the act approved June 28, 1940 (Public Law No. 671, 76th Congress), reading as follows:

* Provided further, That during the national emergency declared by the President on September 8, 1939, to exist, the provisions of section 6 of the act of August 24, 1912 (37 Stat. 555; U. S. C., title 5, sec. 652), shall not apply to any civil-service employee of the War or Navy Departments or of the Coast Guard, or their field services, whose immediate removal is, in the opinion of the Secretary concerned warranted by the demands of national security, but nothing herein shall be construed to repeal, modify, or suspend the proviso in that section. Those persons summarily removed under the authority of this section may, if in the opinion of the Secretary concerned, subsequent investigation so warrants, be reinstated, and if so reinstated shall be allowed compensation for the period of such removal at the rate they were receiving on the date of removal:

In view of the above-quoted section, we present for your consideration the following hypothetical case:

A civilian employee of the War Department is cuspected of subversive activities and his immediate removal is deemed necessary in the interests of national security. As a result the employee is immediately suspended by the commanding officer of the post, pending removal by the Secretary of War under the authority contained in the above-quoted provision. Upon consideration and investigation, the charges are found to be unsubstantiated and the Secretary of War orders the reinstatement of the employee. During the period of investigation the employee is on the War Department rolls as "suspended pending action taken on recommendation for removal under Section 6 of the Act approved June 28, 1940 (Public Law No. 671, 76th Congress)." He is, for all practical purposes, "removed." Under the provisions of Section 6 of the above-quoted act, any employee who has been removed under this authority may, if subsequent investigation so warrants, be reinstated, and if so reinstated he shall be allowed compensation for the period of such removal at the rate he was receiving on the date of removal. Congressional intent, as evidenced by the reports of the Committees which considered the question, was to allow the summary removal of certain employees, subject to subsequent investigation. In the event such subsequent investigation disclosed the fact that the employee was innocent of all charges and an injustice had been done, Congress provided for such cases by directing "compensation for the period of such removal at the rate they were receiving on the date of removal." Civil-service rules allow an immediate suspension from duty, but in the event of reinstatement no compensation may be paid for the period of such suspension, except for such period of time as is covered by accumulated or accrued annual leave to the credit of the employee.

In view of the above Congressional intent and provisions, and a long line of decisions holding that the right to remove necessarily includes the privilege of temporarily suspending an employee, this office is of the opinion that an

employee who has been suspended pending action taken on recommendation for removal under section 6 of the act approved June 28, 1940 (Public Law No. 671, 76th Congress), and who is subsequently reinstated, is entitled to compensation for the period of such suspension.

Your early consideration and decision is requested as to whether compensation may be paid to an employee who has been suspended from duty (as distinguished from "removed") pending "removal" under section 6 of the act approved June 28, 1940 (Public Law No. 671, 76th Congress), and is subsequently reinstated as a result of complete investigation.

This office has been advised informally that actual cases involving the question presented are now pending before the War Department and that other cases will arise in the future. Hence, it is understood that the case presented is illustrative rather than hypothetical, as stated in your letter.

The act of August 24, 1912, 37 Stat. 555, provides in pertinent part, as follows:

SEC. 6. That no person in the classified civil service of the United States shall be removed therefrom except for such cause as will promote the efficiency of said service and for reasons given in writing, and the person whose removal is sought shall have notice of the same and of any charges preferred against him, and be furnished with a copy thereof, and also be allowed a reasonable time for personally answering the same in writing; and affidavits in support thereof; but no examination of witnesses nor any trial or hearing shall be required except in the discretion of the officer making the removal; and copies of charges, notice of hearing, answer, reasons for removal, and of the order of removal shall be made a part of the records of the proper department or office, as shall also the reasons for reduction in rank or compensation; and copies of the same shall be furnished to the person affected upon request. and the Civil Service Commission also shall, upon request, be furnished copies of the same

The usual procedure under that statute is: First, to suspend an employee from active duty pending investigation of the charges of official misconduct, and second, either to restore the employee to active duty if the charges cannot be sustained, or to remove him from the service if the charges are sustained. As you state, it is the settled rule that-in the absence of specific statutory provision therefor compensation may not be paid for the period of suspension during which no duty is performed, whether the employee is or is not restored to duty, except to the extent of annual leave that may be substituted for a period of unjustified suspension. See 4 Comp. Gen. 849; 6 id. 534; 9 id. 284; 19 id. 424. As to the substitution of annual leave for the period of suspension, see 17 Comp. Gen. 199; 18 id. 136.

The purpose of the portion of the act of June 28, 1940, 54 Stat. 679, quoted in your letter, is stated in Senate Report No. 1863 on bill H. R. 9822, Seventy-sixth Congress, third session (which became the statute here involved), as follows:

Section 6 of the House bill contained a proviso which vested in the Secretary of the Navy unlimited authority to waive the provisions of section 6 of the La Follette Act of 1912, which act granted to employees of the Government certain rights, inter alia, the right to answer charges, the right to organize, and the right to petition Congress. This unlimited power could be exercised arbitrarily and unwisely, and can hardly be justified so long as the national

defense can be fully protected without jeopardizing the rights of loyal and faithful employees. To this end, the committee has rewritten the proviso, and extended it to the employees of the War Department and Coast Guard. As reported to the Senate, it permits the immediate removal of any employee whose removal is, in the opinion of the Secretary concerned, warranted by the demands of national defense. This is necessary for the prevention of espionage, sabotage, and other subversive activity which may tend to destroy the national defense. However, in providing for the immediate removal of an employee, whose retention is deemed inimical to national defense, the committee has protected the employee by

(1) Insuring to the employee a hearing and an opportunity to show cause why he should not have been removed;

(2) By providing for reinstatement of the employee if subsequent investigation so warrants; and

(3) In the event of such reinstatement, granting to the employee compensa tion for the period of removal.

While the act of June 28, 1940, authorizes, and apparently contemplates, the summary removal of an employee upon suspicion of espionage or other subversive activities, without the preliminary step of suspension from active duty-the statute fully protecting the rights of innocent employees to reinstatement and to compensation for the period the employee is out of the service-nevertheless the statute does not preclude administrative action in first suspending an employee from active duty pending investigation of the charges. It would appear that a suspension from active duty as effectively prevents an employee from continuing subversive activities as would an immediate and complete separation from the service by removal. In effect, suspension from active duty pending investigation of subversive activities is included in and constitutes a part of a removal. Stated conversely, the final action of "removal" includes the lesser action of suspension looking to the same result.

The act of June 28, 1940, specifically authorizes the payment of compensation "for the period of such removal" which is herein regarded as including periods of suspension from active duty, thereby making an express exception to the general rule stated in the decisions of this office hereinbefore cited. Hence, an employee who is restored to active duty after a period of suspension under the terms of said statute may be paid the compensation he would have earned during the period of suspension at the rate received on the date of suspension, without the necessity of charging the employee annual leave for any portion of such period of suspension.

(B-22885)

STATE AND LOCAL SALES TAXES INCLUSION IN PURCHASE PRICE; VOUCHER AND INVOICE CERTIFICATIONS

While a State or local sales tax, the legal incidence of which is upon the vendee, is not applicable to a transaction by which the United States procures supplies for its governmental purposes, where a bid for furnishing supplies to United States is accepted and a contract awarded on the basis that the

purchase price includes all State and local sales taxes imposed directly on the sale and that the contractor will not accept a tax-exemption certificate in lieu of the payment of the amount of such taxes, payment must be made in accordance with the terms of the contract without the deduction of any amounts representing the taxes. Where a contract for supplies is awarded on the basis of including State and local sales taxes in the purchase price without the deduction of an amount representing such taxes, the general certificate for vouchers and invoices prescribed by circular letter of this office A-51607, A-49009, August 15, 1941. 21 Comp. Gen. 1160, may be modified by eliminating therefrom the phrase "and that State or local sales taxes are not included in the amounts billed." provided that, in all cases where the legal incidence of such taxes is upon the vendee, appropriate steps be taken to obtain appropriate certificates from the dealers in accordance with General Regulations No. 86-Revised. Comptroller General Warren to the Secretary of War, January 30, 1942: I have your letter of December 31, 1941, as follows:

Reference is made to Opinions A-51607 and A-49009 of the Comptroller General's Office under date of August 15, 1941. It is noted that the above opinions require vouchers and invoices to bear the following certificate:

"I certify that the above bill is correct and just; that payment therefor has not been received; that all statutory requirements as to American production and labor standards, and all conditions of purchase applicable to the transactions have been complied with; and that State or local sales taxes are not included in the amounts billed." [Italics supplied.]

In decision A-91844, 17 Comptroller General 615, the Comptroller General ruled that there appears no legal authority to require bidders to list items in their bids, by item number or otherwise, which are subject to Federal, State, or local tax. It has been further held that the statute and the regulations relating to excise taxes leave a bidder free to submit prices either inclusive or exclusive of the taxes, and if inclusive, to consent or not consent to its deduction from the amount of the bid (15 Comp. Gen. 588).

When a similar question to that stated above arose again, the Comptroller General, in a letter to the Secretary of Interior (17 Comp. Gen. 992), reaffirmed his earlier decisions and stated that invitations for bids may not require bidders to submit tax-free prices but should leave them free to submit prices either inclusive or exclusive of all taxes.

Based upon the above rulings of the Comptroller General, invitations for bids issued by purchasing offices of this Department contain the following provisions: "State or local taxes.-For the furnishing of all supplies, bidder will indicate which one of the following statements is applicable to his bid:

"(1) Prices herein do not include any State or local taxes imposed directly on the sale of the supplies.

"(2) Prices herein include all State and local taxes imposed directly on the sale of the supplies, but consent is hereby given to the deduction of said taxes and the acceptance of a tax-exemption certificate in lieu thereof.

"(3) Prices herein include all State and local taxes imposed directly on the sale of the supplies, but no deduction of said taxes will be permitted nor will a tax-exemption certificate be accepted in lieu thereof.

"Whether State or local taxes charged directly on the sale of goods are included or are not included the amount of such taxes should be shown in detail."

Decision is requested as to whether the prescribed voucher certificate may be modified by eliminating the phrase "and that State or local sales taxes are not included in the amounts billed" in those cases where the bidder has bid on a tax-inclusive basis and has not consented to the deduction of said taxes.

The assurance that the noninclusion phrase may be omitted and that the amount of included tax may be required to be set forth in cases where such steps are deemed desirable by the War Department, will be a considerable convenience to the administration of the procurement program.

In view of the well-established constitutional principle that a State, or a political subdivision thereof, may not interfere with the powers granted to the Federal Government or, in the absence of specific statutory authority therefor, impose by taxation a direct burden upon.