Assuming, as has been done for the purpose of this decision, that the regular hours of work on the holiday were administratively changed due to an emergency, the employees have been correctly paid a total of 651⁄2 hours' compensation for the week in question, although some of the individual items in your computation are incorrect. Referring to your questions numbered (1) to (4), if an employee does not work or is not otherwise in a pay status during authorized leave or on a holiday during all of the 40 hours of his regular tour of duty, compensation for any work performed outside of his regular tour of duty to make up for the time lost during his regular tour of duty is payable only at his regular rate. In question (1) the employee would be entitled to compensation for 1 hour at his regular rate and to compensation for 7 hours at the overtime rate of time and one-half for overtime work on Saturday which was not a holiday. The same would be true in respect of the employee in question (2) except it is understood that under the regulations of The Panama Canal overtime compensation for the 7 hours' overtime worked on the holiday would be at the rate of 214 times the regular rate. The 40-hour-week statute fixes only a minimum overtime rate at time and one-half and does not preclude the fixing of a higher rate for overtime on Sundays and holidays. The fact that the 1 hour lost during the employee's regular tour of duty was made up on a holiday would not entitle him to more than his regular rate of compensation for that hour. Referring to question (3), it is assumed that the 8 hours were worked on the holiday during the regular tour of duty of the employee whether such hours were those regularly worked or hours to which the regular tour of duty had been changed administratively due to an emergency. If so, the employee involved in question (3) would be entitled to only his regular rate of compensation for Friday, the holiday. It has been held that an employee is entitled to only his regular rate of compensation for a holiday occurring within his regular tour of duty whether or not he is required to work on the holiday. 18 Comp. Gen. 191; id. 575. Contrary to the views expressed in your letter, it is the view of this office that this rule is not inequitable, the purpose of the holiday statute having been to equalize the rights to holiday pay of per diem, per hour, and piecework employees with the rights to holiday pay of employees paid on an annual basis who have never been entitled to overtime or gratuity pay for work on a holiday occurring within their regular tour of duty. Question (4) is not entirely clear. In the first part of the question it is stated that the employee worked 7 hours on 5 days, Monday to Friday, the last-mentioned day being a holiday, a total of 35 hours. In the last part of the question it is stated that the employee worked 13 straight hours on Friday, the holiday. Whether this time included the regular tour of duty on the holiday is not stated. However, it will be assumed for the purpose of answering this question that the 7 hours mentioned in the first part of the question were worked only from Monday through Thursday, inclusive, which is otherwise indicated as the meaning. It will be asumed, also, that the 13 hours worked on the holiday included 8 hours during the regular tour of duty of employee. On this basis the employee involved in question (4) would be entitled to his regular rate of compensation for 12 hours worked on Friday, the holiday, including the 4 hours lost on Monday through Thursday, and 8 hours regular tour of duty on the holiday, and to 1 hour's overtime compensation at the rate of 214 times his regular rate of compensation. (B-20372) TRAVELING EXPENSES-TRANSFERS TRAVEL FROM PLACE OF LEAVE If an employee's official station is changed while he is in a leave status, and, instead of returning to his old station, he elects to report directly to the new station, he must bear the expense thereof equivalent to the cost of returning to his old station, and this is so even though the employee travels no greater distance from the place of leave to his new station than would be required should he travel from the old to the new station. Acting Comptroller General Elliott to Col. W. M. Dixon, United States Army, September 16, 1941: There has been considered your letter of August 8, 1941, requesting review of the action of this office in suspending credit in the amount of $27.20 in your February 1940 accounts, voucher No. 2277, covering reimbursement for travel expenses incurred by Theodore G. Waale, assistant engineer, on transfer of official station while absent on leave. The record discloses that while the employee was on leave at Jacksonville, Fla., orders were issued under dates of January 3 and 8, 1940, changing his official station from Vicksburg, Miss., to Washington, D. C. Instead of returning to Vicksburg, his old official station, he went directly to Washington, his new official station, from Jacksonville, the place where he was on leave. The claimant performed the travel in his personally owned automobile and claimed reimbursement therefor on a mileage basis in accordance with authorization contained in the transfer orders. Your contentions in letter dated August 8, 1941, that the decisions cited in Notices of Exception, Forms 1100, 7 Comp. Dec. 78; 11 Comp. Gen. 336; and 16 id. 164, 481, are not applicable to the instant voucher for the reason that the cases considered in those decisions involved a return to official headquarters rather than a transfer from official station while absent on leave, and that the employee is entitled to the payment as made for the reason that the distance from Jacksonville, point at which the employee was on leave of absence and at which place he received his orders directing change of station to Washington, is not in excess of that from his old station, Vicksburg, to his new station, Washington, are without merit. The rule that the transfer of the official station of an employee on leave and away from his official station does not operate to relieve such employee from bearing so much of the cost of reporting to the new station as he would have been required to bear in returning to the old station is of long standing. 8 Comp. Dec. 190; also 11 Comp. Gen. 336; 16 id. 481. In decision dated November 9, 1939, B-6444, it was stated in part: It is well settled that when a person absents himself from his headquarters on a leave of absence, it is incumbent upon him to return to his headquarters at his own expense at the expiration of such leave; and if his regular station is changed while he is in a leave status and, instead of returning to his old station before the expiration of his leave, he elects to report directly to the new station he must bear the expense thereof not to exceed what it would have cost him to return to the official station from which he went on leave. See A-45433, November 15, 1932; A-46199, January 4, 1933; and B-57, January 16, 1939. Furthermore, there appears no sound basis for the view that because an employee traveled at Government expense a shorter distance from the place he was on leave to his new official station than would have been required had he been ordered to return to his old official station prior to being ordered to his new station, he should be relieved of the portion of the expense incurred equivalent to the cost of returning to his former station or that such expense should be assumed by the Government. See A-59457, September 3, 1935, and B-6444, June 20, 1940. Therefore, the fact that the employee in the case here under consideration traveled no greater distance from the place where he was on leave to his new official station than would have been required had he traveled from the old official station to the new station cannot operate to relieve him of that portion of the expense incurred equivalent to the cost of returning to his former station. Accordingly, the action taken in the audit in withholding credit for $27.20 paid on the voucher here in question was correct and is hereby sustained. (B-15985) PHILIPPINE ISLANDS-APPLICABILITY OF EXPORT TAX TO The sovereignty of the United States with respect to the Philippine Islands has not as yet been withdrawn under the Philippine Independence Act of March 24, 1934, as amended, and, therefore, the Philippine Government may not decide, as against the United States Government, whether it has been authorized to lay an export tax on property of the United States, and where the use of appropriated funds is involved, this office is authorized and required to decide whether the funds are available for the payment of such a tax. Authority to administer the provisions of a statute does not carry with it the power finally to determine disputed questions of law as to the construction of the statute being administerd. Appropriated funds may not be used to pay an export tax on property of the United States shipped from the Philippines sought to be imposed pursuant to the authority granted in the Philippine Independence Act of March 24, 1934, as amended by the act of August 7, 1939, to lay an export tax on "every Philippine article shipped from the Philippines to the United States." Comptroller General Warren to the Secretary of the Navy, September 18, 1941: Reference is made to your letter of April 4, 1941, concerning the export tax sought to be imposed by the government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines on certain ship fenders belonging to the United States Government shipped from the Navy Yard, Cavite, P. I., to the Navy Yard, Mare Island, Calif. Your letter is as follows: The act of Congress of August 7, 1939 (48 U. S. C., Supp., 1236), which amended the "Act to provide for the complete independence of the Philippine Islands, to provide for the adoption of a Constitution and a form of Government for the Philippine Islands, and for other purposes,” provides in part as follows: "(a) On and after January 1, 1941, the Philippine government shall impose and collect an export tax on every Philippine article shipped from the Philippines to the United States, except as otherwise specifically provided in this section. Said tax shall be computed in the manner hereinafter set forth in this subsection and in subsection (c) of this section. During the period January 1, 1941, through December 31, 1941, the export tax on every such article shall be 5 per centum of the United States duty; on each succeeding January 1 thereafter the export tax shall be increased progressively by an additional 5 per centum of the United States duty, except that during the period January 1, 1946, through July 3, 1946, the export tax shall remain at 25 per centum of the United States duty." No specific exception with respect to activities of the United States Government is contained in the law. Under date of January 13, 1941, there were shipped from the Navy Yard, Cavite, P. I., via the S. S. President Taft of the American President Lines, Ltd.. to the Navy Yard, Mare Island, California, 270 ship cane woven fenders valued at approximately $3,300, which had been manufactured at the Navy Yard, Cavite. Because of doubt on the part of the disbursing officer at the Navy Yard, Cavite, as to the availability of appropriated funds for the payment of an export tax, an agreement was reached locally under which the shipment was made without the payment of the export tax and in the event the U. S. Customs authorities should require payment of the tax upon arrival of the shipment in San Francisco, payment would then be made by the disbursing officer at the Navy Yard, Cavite. The Navy Department has been informed that the United States Customs Service are requiring an export certificate as provided for in section 1 (h) of the act of August 7, 1939, supra, showing that the export tax has been paid on the shipment of cane fenders. In view of the general rule applied in the construction of statutes, imposing taxes that except where specifically so provided the Government does not contemplate the taxation of its own activities (Dugan v. United States, 34 Ct. Cls. 458, 468), a question is raised as to whether appropriated funds provided for the Navy Department are available for the payment of the export tax imposed by the act of August 7, 1939, on account of the above-mentioned ship cane fenders. A decision in the premises is respectfully requested. In view of the statement in your letter that the United States Customs Service was requiring an export tax certificate under section 1 (6) (h) of the act, showing that the export tax had been paid on the shipment of cane fenders, the Secretary of the Treasury was requested to furnish a report as to this phase of the matter. The reply to this request, under date of August 1, 1941, is in part as follows: Section 6 (a) of the act of March 24, 1934, as amended, supra, provides that on and after January 1, 1941, the Philippine government shall impose and collect an export tax on every Philippine article shipped from the Philippines to the United States, except as otherwise specifically provided. The act does not specifically provide any exemption for Philippine articles shipped to the United States Government. Section 18 (a) (6) of the act of March 24, 1934, as added by section 5 of the act of August 7, 1939, 53 Stat. 1232 (U. S. C., sup. V, title 48, sec. 1247 (a) (6)), provides that "The term 'Philippine article' means an article the growth, produce, or manufacture of the Philippines, in the production of which no materials of other than Philippine or United States origin valued in excess of 20 per centum of the total value of such article was used and which is brought into the United States from the Philippines." Section 6 (h), supra, provides that no article shipped from the Philippines to the United States on and after January 1, 1941, subject to the export tax provided for in the section, shall be admitted to entry in the United States until the importer of such articles shall present to the United States collector of customs a certificate, signed by a competent authority of the Philippine government, setting forth the value and quantity of the article and the rate and amount of the export tax paid, or shall give a bond for the production of such certificate within six months from the date of entry. This section is the authority of law under which the collectors of customs require the presentation of export certificates. It will be noted that the administration of the export tax provisions of the Philippine Independence Act, as amended, is under the jurisdiction of the Philippine government. The Department is of the opinion that United States customs officers must comply with section 6 (h) unless it is decided by the Philippine customs authorities that the tax is not applicable, and it is believed that the question in this regard should be referred for decision by the Philippine government. Careful consideration has been given the suggestion that the question as to whether the export tax is applicable should be referred for decision by the Philippine government, but I have grave doubts whether that is a proper or permissible course. That is, I doubt whether power has been conferred on the Philippine government to decide, as against the United States Government, that it, the Philippine government, has been authorized to lay an export tax on property of the United States. In Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U. S. 308, 314, 319, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed the constitutionality of a statute imposing a tax on the first domestic processing of cocoanut oil with a provision that all such taxes collected with respect to cocoanut oil wholly of Philippine production should be paid to the |