ROUTES AND ROUTING-Continued.
Specific Routing Instructions-Continued.
Although complainant tendered shipment under an erroneous impres-
sion that a rate in effect over a certain route applied also over the
route designated in the bill of lading, the carrier was not obligated
to inform complainant of the higher rate over the route selected,
since the law charges shippers with knowledge of existing rates and
imposes no duty to furnish them information presumed to be in their
possession. South Georgia Traffic Bureau v. Atlanta, B. & C. R.
Co., 472 (473).
Neither the agreement to protect a rate nor the act of forwarding a
shipment contrary to the shipper's instructions justifies charging other
than the applicable rate, and such facts do not constitute a violation
of the act or form a basis for an award of reparation. Chandler-
Davis Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 749 (751).
RULES OF PRACTICE. See ADMINISTRATIVE RULINGS (RULES OF PRACTICE).
RULES, REGULATIONS, AND PRACTICES.
Transit rules, regulations, and practices in connection with shipments of
grain and products and grain by-products originating in central, western,
and southern territories, milled in transit at Cayuga, N. Y., and shipped as
mixed feed to destinations in trunk-line and New England territories,
found unjust and unreasonable in that the charges resulting thereunder
for through transportation from points of origin to final destinations
exceeded those accruing under contemporaneous rules, regulations, and
practices in effect in central territory. Reasonable transit rules and
regulations prescribed for the future and reparation awarded. Beacon
Milling Co. v. New York Central R. Co., 635.
After inspection and test of the following train-stop or train-control system,
its installation on the following-named line found to meet requirements of
the commission's specifications and orders in Automatic Train-Control
Devices, 91 I. C. C. 426. Additional requirements with respect to certain
apparatus and operation prescribed in order that the greatest degree of
safety may be insured. Chicago, Indianapolis & Louisville, Northern
division (intermittent-induction type of the General Railway Signal
Co.), 251.
SCALE OF RATES. See DISTANCE RATES.
SECONDHAND ARTICLES. See NEW AND SECONDHAND ARTICLES.
SECTION 1.
Although the commission's jurisdiction under section 1 of the act covering
traffic from a territory such as the Philippine Islands to destinations in a
State did not, in the absence of an arrangement for a continuous through
movement, extend to transportation over a water carrier from the Philip-
pine Islands to Galveston, Tex., it did extend to traffic from that origin to
Dallas, Tex., in so far as the transportation took place within the State of
Texas. Dennery v. Houston & Texas Central R. Co., 164 (165).
While the commission has power under section 1 of the act to require estab-
lishment of transit it rarely exercises it unless to remove unjust discrimina-
tion or undue prejudice. In 155 I. C. C. 285, the commission did not
require but merely approved carriers' voluntary proposal to extend a
transit arrangement. American Hide & Fur Co. v. Chicago, M., St.
P. & P. R. Co., 481 (484-485).
Paragraph (11) of section 1 of the act makes it the duty of every carrier by
railroad subject to the act to furnish safe and adequate car service and to
establish, observe, and enforce just and reasonable rules, regulations, and
practices with respect thereto and condemns every unjust and unreason-
able rule, regulation, and practice relating to car service. Furnas Ice
Cream Co. v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 617 (619).
Section 1 (3), of the act embraces within its jurisdiction terminal facilities of
every kind used or necessary in the transportation of property designated
in the act, including all freight depots, yards, and grounds, used or neces-
sary in the transportation or delivery of any such property. Wharfage
Charges at Atlantic and Gulf Ports, 663 (682).
That portion of section 3 of the act which provides that carriers shall not
discriminate in their rates, fares, and charges between connecting lines has
application only to such connecting lines as are subject to regulation by the
commission. Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 752 (759).
SECTION 5.
While the California Western Railroad & Navigation Company had an
indirect interest in the National Steamship Company through the parent
holding company of both, since there was no effective competition between
the two carriers and the continuance of the steamship service was of
advantage to the convenience and commerce of the people, and not of a
nature to exclude, prevent, or reduce competition on the route by water
between Fort Bragg and other California ports, continuance of the service
authorized upon application under section 5 of the interstate commerce
act, as amended by section 11 of the Panama Canal Act. Application of
Union Lumber Co., 376.
The application of a central territory transit rule, which provided for lower
rates on the outbound shipments of grain products and grain by-products
than the rates accruing from the application of the official-territory transit
rule, found not violative of the statutes and regulations governing the fil-
ing of tariffs. Beacon Milling Co. v. New York Central R. Co., 635 (638).
SECTION 15.
The commission's disapproval of proposed changes under which respondent
sought to move traffic over a terminal in which it has a proprietary interest,
instead of over protestant's line, would not result in a violation of the pro-
visions of section 15 (4) of the act, since that terminal was not operated in
conjunction and under a common management or control with respondent,
within the meaning of that section. Absorption of Switching Charges,
129 (132).
Section 15 (4) of the act is a limitation only on the commission's power, under
section 15 (3), to establish through routes and joint rates, but the case in
question presented no issue under section 15 (3) and section 15 (4) imposes
no limitation on the commission's power to fix reasonable rates over exist-
ing through routes, whether those routes are open at joint rates or combi-
nation rates. See 272 U. S. 658. Idaho v. Oregon S. L. R. Co. 501,
The statute of limitations is not tolled by alleged admissions contained in
correspondence between a defendant carrier and the commission, for the
provisions of section 16 of the act are not mere statutes of limitation which
may be waived or pleaded as a matter of defense, but are jurisdictional.
Complaint, not having been filed within the statutory period, was there-
fore barred. Keeney & Son v. Oregon S. L. R. Co., 225 (226).
SECTION 25.
Section 25 of the interstate commerce act makes it the duty of common car-
riers by railroad to deliver export shipments to vessels registered under
the laws of the United States as a part of its undertaking as a common
carrier. Wharfage Charges at Atlantic and Gulf Ports, 663 (678).
SERVICE OF PROCESS.
A proposed report was served on the parties by stating it of record at the
close of the hearing. Rules for Combination Rates on Livestock, 629.
SHIPPING BOARD.
Section 8 of the merchant marine act authorizes the Shipping Board, in
cooperation with the Secretary of War, to make certain investigations as
to water terminals with the object of promoting, encouraging, and de-
veloping ports and transportation facilities in connection with water
commerce over which it has jurisdiction, and to submit findings as to
rates, charges, rules, etc., subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate
Commerce Commission to that commission for action. Wharfage Charges
at Atlantic and Gulf Ports, 663 (667-668).
SHIP-SIDE DELIVERY AND RATES.
Section 25 of the interstate commerce act makes it the duty of common car-
riers by railroad to deliver export shipments to vessels registered under
the laws of the United States as a part of its undertaking as a common
carrier. Wharfage Charges at Atlantic and Gulf Ports, 663 (678).
The fact that one shipment is lightered and another delivered direct to vessels
at the piers is not conclusive that a different charge should be made for
the services on the two shipments. Id. (680).
The publication of ship-side rates by carrier, showing the amount of the port
terminal charges absorbed merely to acquaint private operators of port
terminal facilities with the amount absorbed, would be a vain thing from
the carrier's standpoint, as it would be immaterial what charges were
named in the tariffs as port charges because they would in no instance be
assessed against the shipper. Id. (684).
Class rates between points in New England class A territory, as defined in
49 I. C. C. 421, the shortest routes between which are wholly or partly
over class B lines found unreasonable to the extent that they exceeded
rates made by the application of distance scale A rates to the shortest dis-
tances between such points computed wholly over class A lines, except
where rates so made would be higher than those which would result from
the application of distance scale B rates to the distances over the shortest
routes between such points. Reasonable rates prescribed for the future.
Concord Chamber of Commerce v. Boston & M. R., 183.
SHORT-LINE DISTANCE-Continued.
Where lower class rates were in effect over routes made up wholly of class A
lines, the class rates assessed between Concord and Manchester, N. H.,
on the one hand, and Boston, Mass., on the other, for the short-line dis-
tance involving both class A and class B lines, based on the higher distance
scale B rates which applied where part of the haul was over class A lines
and part over class B lines, were found unreasonable to the extent that
they exceeded rates made by application of the lower scale A rates to the
shortest distance between the points computed wholly over class A lines.
Reasonable rates prescribed for the future and reparation awarded. Id.
(183).
The distance scale prescribed in 88 I. C. C. 543 did not require the shortest
possible routes to be used, but in general authorized the carriers to base
their rates on distances over direct workable routes. Columbus Brick
Co. v. Columbus & G. Ry. Co., 423 (424).
As the formula for computing distance, prescribed in 107 I. C. C. 681, 113
I. C. C. 169, and modified in 156 I. C. C. 191 to read "* *
shortest
routes over which carload traffic can be moved without transfer of lading
shall be used," could be construed to authorize the application of either
the single-line or joint-line scale to the shortest distance, whether it was
over a single-line or a joint-line route, it was changed to read "* *
the shortest single-line routes
* shall be used in connection with
the single-line scale, and the shortest joint route
with the joint-line scale." Southwestern Brick Cases, 467.
As the formula requiring the use of the shortest route over which c. 1. traffic
could be moved without transfer of lading in computing distances for
application of rates prescribed in 155 I. C. C. 247 could be construed
wrongly to authorize the application of either the single-line or joint-line
scale to the shortest distance, whether over a single-line or joint-line route,
it was modified to read "*
shortest single-line routes *
shall be used in connection with the single-line scale, and the shortest
joint route
in connection with the joint-line scale." Sand,
Gravel, Crushed Stone, and Shells, 498 (499-500).
SPORADIC MOVEMENT.
Every shipper is entitled to a reasonable rate on his traffic, which should not
be denied merely because movements thereunder are infrequent, and
where he attacks the reasonableness of a rate, whether class or commodity,
that issue must be decided on its merits. Pioneer Compost Co. v. Southern
Pac. Co., 489 (491).
Less-than-carload ratings on agricultural implements are made with reference
to the classification characteristics of the individual articles, while for
carloads a common basis of ratings, thought to be appropriate for agricul-
tural implements as a whole, both hand and horse drawn, is maintained
on account of the very extensive movement in mixed carloads, with the
result that there is no consistent spread between the carload and the less-
than-carload ratings. Potato Implement Co. v. Ann Arbor R. Co., 477
(478).
General statements and conclusions to the effect that a stoppage-in-transit
arrangement required by State legislature to permit a partial unloading of
shipments within the State was injurious to interstate shippers was not a
sufficient proof for setting aside the action of State authorities. Colonial
Salt Co. v. Chicago & Erie R. Co., 67 (69).
STATE AND INTERSTATE-Continued.
Although the commission's jurisdiction under section 1 of the act covering
traffic from a territory such as the Philippine Islands to destinations in a
State, did not, in the absence of an arrangement for a continuous through
movement, extend to transportation over a water carrier from the Phil-
ippine Islands to Galveston, Tex., it did extend to traffic from that origin
to Dallas, Tex., in so far as the transportation took place within the State
of Texas. Dennery v. Houston & Texas Central R. Co., 164 (165).
The essential character of commerce had to be considered in determining
whether it was interstate or intrastate and the mere billing, or the place
at which title passed to shipments to Dallas, Tex., of imported desiccated
coconut purchased f. o. b. Galveston, Tex., was not determinative nor did
the temporary storage at the port of entry, permitted by tariff authority,
divest the traffic of its foreign character or prevent its being considered
through traffic. The movement from Galveston was merely a stop in the
transportation to Dallas from India according to the original and continu-
ing intent of the parties, and the commission clearly had jurisdiction over
the haul from Galveston. Id. (168).
Where complainant had title to the cargoes of coal and coke imported from
Germany while they were in foreign commerce and its intention ab initio
was to transport the shipments to its New Jersey yards, the rail movement
from Weehawken, N. J., to its yards at East Orange, N. J., was part of a
transportation service which began in Germany, was subject to the act,
and was within the commission's jurisdiction. Feigenspan v. Erie R. Co.
176 (177-178).
The question whether commerce is interstate or intrastate must be determined
by the essential character of the commerce, and not by mere billing or
form of contract, although that may be one of a group of circumstances
tending to indicate such character. Id. (178).
Rate on slab cordwood and excelsior wood from Sandersville, Miss., to New
Orleans, La., found not unduly prejudicial as compared with the Misssis-
sippi intrastate rate from Sandersville to Basic, Miss., a competitive
producing point. Carrollton Excelsior & F. Co. v. New Orleans & N. E.
R. Co., 199.
Commodity rates on collapsible wooden fruit and vegetable crates from
Benton and Camden, Ark., to Texas destinations found unduly prejudicial
to interstate shippers and unduly preferential of intrastate shippers at
Paris, Tex., as compared with the lower intrastate rates from that point,
distance considered. Carriers and Railroad Commission of Texas expected
to remove undue prejudice by establishing rates from Paris on a percentage
relationship to first class not lower than that existing in the Camden and
Benton rates. Owosso Mfg. Co. v. Asherton & Gulf Ry. Co., 219 (222).
STATE STATUTES.
General statements and conclusions to the effect that a stoppage-in-transit
arrangement required by State legislature to permit a partial unloading of
shipments within the State was injurious to interstate shippers was not a
sufficient proof for setting aside the action of State authorities. Colonial
Salt Co. v. Chicago & Erie R. Co., 67 (69).
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