Rates assailed found not unreasonable in the past but for the future found
unreasonable to the extent indicated:
Sumter Packing Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 137.
Obermoller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 430.
United States Graphite Co. v. Canadian Pac. Ry. Co., 443 (444)
Cancellation of Commodity Rates on Sewer Pipe, 514 (534).
The rate sought was part of the general revision of rates on brick in 107
I. C. C. 702, but no finding was made therein as to the past and the record
in the case under consideration did not warrant giving a retroactive effect
to the rates prescribed in that case. Sioux City Brick & Tile Co. v.
Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 405 (406–407).
Reparation was awarded, based on a finding in 140 I. C. C. 131, even though
the rates found unreasonable in the latter decision were approved by the
commission in 35 I. C. C. 187, as no order was enterd in that case requiring
the maintenance of the approved rates for the future and the evidence
in 140 I. C. C. 131, as well as in the case under consideration, was dissim-
ilar thereto. Brannon Coal Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 486 (487).
PEDDLER-CAR SERVICE.
The proposed cancellation of rates on fresh meats, packing-house products,
and other articles in peddler cars from Illinois and Indiana points to
destinations on branch lines of the Chesapeake & Ohio, diverging from the
main line at Catlettsburg, Ky., and Barboursville, W. Va., applicable
over the Southern to Louisville, Ky., and thence over the C. & O., found
not justified as they were published to meet rates prescribed in 104 I. C. C.
641, between the same points, over a longer route over which transpor-
tation conditions were not shown to have been more favorable. Fresh
Meats and Packing-House Products, 121.
Under Rule 5, section 3, of the consolidated classification, whereby loose
articles are rated three classes higher than the same articles packed in
authorized containers, the rate assessed on wooden wall cases, or shelving,
shipped loose in a mixed carload of store fixtures, consisting of the com-
modity rate on furniture plus the penalty charge, was found not unreason-
able although the classification was subsequently amended to permit ship-
ments of the kind involved to move at furniture rates. Jackson Traffic
Bureau v. Alabama G. S. R. Co., 327.
No finding for the future was warranted as to rates on petroleum products
from Group 3, Oklahoma Points, to Paducah, Ky., as the rates were under
consideration in a pending proceeding. Illinois Oil Co. v. Atchison,
T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 381 (385).
Application for authority to charge on cotton and cotton linters from Okla-
homa points on the St. Louis-San Francisco to southern and Carolina
mill points, Virginia cities, and south Atlantic ports, over routes through
Texas, thence via New Orleans or Baton Rouge, La., rates less than those
in effect from intermediate Texas points was held in abeyance until a
decision was rendered in a pending docket of broader scope. Routing
and Transit on Cotton, 762 (763).
As the fruit and vegetable baskets and hampers were not shown to load to
the minimum weight requested, that minimum was not justified, and the
request for that minimum subject to the lumber rates was interpreted
to mean that complainants desired a charge per car not in excess of that
resulting from the lumber rate applied to the minimum weight sought.
Verhalen Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 133 (135).
PERCENTAGE RATES.
Rates on rough-quarried granite from Quincy, Adams, and West Quincy,
Mass., and Barre and Ryegate, Vt., to Rochelle Park, N. J., found unrea-
sonable to the extent that they exceeded 80 per cent of sixth-class rates,
minimum 50,000 pounds. Riverside Monument Works v. Erie R. Co., 81.
Commodity rates and class rates subsequently made applicable under an
alternative provision on glass bottles from East St. Louis and Alton, Ill.,
to Griffin, Ga., found unreasonable to the extent that they exceeded rates
equal to 38 per cent of the first-class rates under the distance scale pre-
scribed in the southern class-rate investigation, that also being the per-
centage relationship between commodity and first-class rates under the
scale prescribed in Consolidated Southwestern Cases and applicable in
the Southwest. Reasonable rates prescribed for the future and reparation
awarded. Creomulsion Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 95.
Rates on excelsior from Hallsboro, Norfolk, and other points in Virginia
to Louisville, Ky., St. Louis, Mo., and Cincinnati, Cleveland, and Colum-
bus, Ohio, found unreasonable for the future to the extent that they
exceeded or may exceed 27.5 per cent of contemporaneous first-class rates
in effect from and to the points involved. Hallsboro Mfg. Co. v. Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co., 124.
Compared with the percentage of first-class rates on sewer pipe in central
territory, class E ratings in the western and in Illinois classifications are
less than 75 per cent of the central territory sixth-class rates. Cancel-
lation of Commodity Rates on Sewer Pipe, 514 (524).
Rates on vitrified-clay sewer pipe and on wall coping from Craigsville, Pa.,
to destinations in the eastern trunk-line territory and New England
territories found unreasonable and unduly prejudicial for the future to
the extent they exceed 90 per cent of the contemporaneous sixth-class
rates, and rates from St. Marys, Brockway, Patton, and Clearfield, Pa.,
to the same destinations found unduly preferential to extent they exceed
90 per cent of the lowest sixth-class rates in effect from any one of the
four points specified to the destinations involved. Reasonable rates
prescribed for future. Id. (528).
Rates on vitrified-clay sewer pipe from Uhrichsville, Ohio, to Williamsville,
N. Y., found not unreasonable in the past but unreasonable for the future
to the extent that it may exceed 90 per cent of the contemporaneous
sixth-class rate. Reasonable rate prescribed for future. Id. (534).
Maintenance of the same rates on both rough and dressed limestone from
points in the Bedford district of Indiana to Baltimore, Md., and Washing-
ton, D. C., found unduly prejudicial, since the value of dressed limestone,
its susceptibility to damage in transit, and its loading, as contrasted with
the same transportation characteristics of rough limestone, establish that
the rates on the latter should not exceed 80 per cent of the rates on the
former. Reasonable rates prescribed for the future. O'Meara v. Balti-
more & O. R. Co., 785.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE. See also ISSUE.
A motion to exclude lighterage and car-float service from the investigation
of rail-water terminal facilities, switching costs having been excluded,
was denied as the investigation included every service beyond the rail
ends at the ports. Wharfage Charges at Atlantic and Gulf Ports, 663 671).
The commission deemed it unnecessary to decide whether the examiner
erred in sustaining the objection of the carrier to the introduction of
evidence as to divisions and the denying the protestant's motion that the
carrier be required to file a statement showing the revenue accruing to it
under the proposed and existing routes, since the proposed rates appeared
to be compensatory, and the matter of divisions to only one participating
carrier was immaterial. Routing and Transit on Cotton, 762 (768).
PORT DIFFERENTIALS AND EQUALIZATION.
Making rates to and from the nearest rate-making point applicable to and
from ship side, with a segregation of uniform port rates, would not bring
about equalization of rates to and from ports as carriers could still meet
competition by shrinking the line-haul rates. If port charges were dif-
ferent the carrier having the larger charge could shrink the line-haul rate
to offset it. Wharfage Charges at Atlantic and Gulf Ports, 663 (684).
POWER OF COMMISSION. See JURISDICTION.
PRACTICES OF CARRIERS. See RULES, REGULATIONS, AND PRACTICES.
PREFERENCES AND PREJUDICES. See also DISCRIMINATION.
There can be no undue prejudice under section 3 of the act unless it is
within the power of the carrier charged with the prejudice to ren ove
it by its own act. Hallsboro Mfg. Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.,
124 (128).
The test of discrimination is the ability of a carrier participating in both
the preferred and the prejudiced traffic to put an end to the discrimi-
nation by its own act. Atlantic Lumber Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co.,
236 (239).
A common carrier may not unduly prefer one community or disadvan-
tage another, and if it voluntarily chooses to meet competition at one
point in respect to absorption of drayage, its obligation to other com-
munities on its line is clear under past decisions of the commission.
Rules Covering Freight at Bennettsville, S. C., 277 (278).
Preference or prejudice under section 3, to be undue, must ordinarily
be such that the difference in rates is in itself a source of advantage
to the party alleged to be favored and a disadvantage to the other
party. Watab Paper Co. v. Chi cago & N. W. Ry. Co., 335 (339).
A carrier can not be charged with undue prejudice because of conditions
not within its control. Lake Charles Harbor & Term. Dist. Brim-
stone R. & C. Co., 720 (723).
That portion of section 3 of the act which provides that carriers shall
not discriminate in their rates, fares, and charges between connecting
lines has application only to such connecting lines as are subject to
regulation by the commission. Luckenback S. S. Co. v. Southern
Ry. Co., 752 (759).
A carrier complaining of undue prejudice under section 3 of the act
must be one which comes under the jurisdiction of the commission
and to which the provisions of the act apply. Id. (759).
PREFERENCES AND PREJUDICES-Continued.
The fact that the actual amount of money damages suffered by com-
plainants on any particular transaction would be difficult to ascertain
offers no obstacle to a finding of undue prejudice for the future, since
the relationship between complainants and their competitors must
necessarily be affected by the freight rate, an element of cost common
to both producers. O'Meara v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 785 (797).
The existence or nonexistence of undue prejudice is a question of fact
which must be decided upon the facts in each case. Id. (797).
Rate comparisons alone are not sufficient to sustain an allegation of
undue prejudice, since prejudice, to be undue, must ordinarily be
such as to be a source of advantage to the party alleged to be favored,
and generally a competitive relationship between the commodities
must appear.
Dunn Mfg. Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 798
(801).
Board, wall, fiber: Rates on fiber wall board from Lockport, N. Y., to
points in western territory found not unreasonable but as compared
with rates on plaster wall board from Southard, Okla., Sweetwater,
Tex., and Fort Dodge, Iowa, to the same destinations found unduly
prejudicial to complainant and unduly preferential of manufacturers:
of plaster wall board at the latter points. Basis for removal of undue
prejudice prescribed. Upson Co. v. Ann Arbor R. Co., 586.
Board, wall, fiber and wood, combined: Rates on wall board, made of
fiber board and wood combined, from Oakland, Calif., to transconti-
nental Groups A to M, inclusive, found not unreasonable or unduly
prejudicial as compared with rates on plaster board. Upson Co. v..
Ann Arbor R. Co., 586 (606).
Board, wall, plaster: Maintenance of rates on mixed carloads of plaster
and plaster products (including plaster wall board) from Southard,
Okla., Sweetwater, Tex., and Fort Dodge, Iowa, to points in western
territory lower than on plaster wall board found unduly prejudicial.
Undue prejudice ordered removed by establishment of a rule to the
effect that the rate on plaster wall board and the highest minimum
applicable to any article in the car shall apply on the mixed shipment.
Upson Co. v. Ann Arbor R. Co., 586 (611).
Castings and boxes or pots, chromium-iron-nickel: First-class, any-
quantity rating in official classification on new and old, burnt-out
chromium-iron-nickel alloy castings and annealing or carbonizing
boxes or pots found not unduly prejudicial as applied to either c. 1. or
1. c. 1. shipments, when compared with ratings on similar iron and
steel articles, which are very much lower in price. General Alloys
Co. v. Akron, C. & Y. Ry. Co., 733.
Limestone, rough: Maintenance of the same rates on both rough and
dressed limestone from points in the Bedford district of Indiana to
Baltimore, Md., and Washington, D. C., found unduly prejudicial,
since the value of dressed limestone, its susceptibility to damage in
transit, and its loading, as contrasted with the same transportation
characteristics of rough limestone, establish that the rates on the
latter should not exceed 80 per cent of the rates on the former. Rea-
sonable rates prescribed for the future. O'Meara v. Baltimore & O.
R. Co., 785.
PREFERENCES AND PREJUDICES—Continued.
Commodities-Continued.
Spreader, insecticide: Joint class A rate on insecticide spreader from San
Francisco, Calif., to Wenatchee, Wash., found not unduly prejudicial
as compared with a lower combination rate on insecticides, since the
compared commodities were not alike and there was no competition
between them. Hercules Glue Co. v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 445.
Dockage: No finding of undue prejudice or unjust discrimination was war-
ranted where free dockage was not shown to have diverted the channel of
traffic from one port to another or from one carrier to another at the same
port. Wharfage Charges at Atlantic and Gulf Ports, 663 (689).
Localities:
Alabama and Mississippi points: Rates on lumber from points in Ala-
bama and Mississippi on the Memphis division of the Southern
Railway to destinations in Illinois and Indiana found not unduly
prejudicial as compared with lower rates from Corinth, Miss. Adams-
Bank Lumber Co. v. Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co., (308-309).
Albion, Ind. Since to warrant an award of reparation based upon
a finding of undue prejudice proof of specific pecuniary injury must
be made, the mere fact that complainant paid higher rates on cotton
piece goods to Albion, Ind., than were in effect to Chicago and certain
other destinations, failed to prove that it suffered pecuniary loss, and
in the absence of other evidence of damage, that the rates assailed
were unduly prejudicial. Elin & Golub v. Baltimore & O. R. Co.,
373 (375).
Big Island, Va.: Rate on pulpboard from, to Atlanta, Ga., found unduly
prejudicial to the extent that it exceeded the rate from Canton, N. C.,
by more than the prescribed differential. Nonprejudicial rates pre-
scribed for the future. Bedford Pulp & Paper Co. v. Chesapeake & O.
Ry. Co., 110.
Craigsville, Pa.: Rates on vitrified-clay sewer pipe and on wall coping
from, to destinations in eastern trunk-line territory and New England
territories found unreasonable and unduly prejudicial for the future to
to the extent that they exceed 90 per cent of the contemporaneous
sixth-class rates; and rates from St. Marys, Brockway, Patton, and
Clearfield, Pa., to the same destinations found unduly preferential to
the extent that they exceed 90 per cent of the lowest sixth-class rates
in effect from any one of the four points specified to the destinations
involved. Reasonable rates prescribed. Cancellation of Commodity
Rates on Sewer Pipe, 514 (528).
Fostoria, Ohio: Since lawful rates on iron and steel articles between
all points in official territory were prescribed in 155 I. C. C. 517, and
the rates assailed from Fostoria, Ohio, as being unduly prejudicial and
preferential of its competitors at Cleveland, Ohio, would be super-
seded by the rates prescribed, the complaint was dismissed. Seneca
Wire & Mfg. Co. v. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co., 349.
Hallsboro and other Virginia points: There can be no undue prejudice
under section 3 of the act unless it is within the power of the carrier
charged with the prejudice to remove it by its own act, and as the
Southern did not control the rates from the alleged preferred points
in Florida and other States, no finding of undue prejudice was war-
ranted as to the rates on excelsior from the specified Virginia points to
the Kentucky, Missouri, and Ohio destinations involved. Hallsboro
Mfg. Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 124 (128).
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