The fact that commodity rates on certain commodities for application within
and to southern territory had been prescribed or approved to approxi-
mately the same level of rates as applied on those commodities in central
territory and that rates on certain other articles in southern territory were
on a lower percentage basis of first-class rates than were the rates on the
same articles in the Southwest did not prove that all commodity rates in
the South should be on a lower percentage basis of first-class rates than in
the Southwest or that traffic conditions in the South were more nearly
comparable with those in central territory than with those in the South-
west, especially in view of former pronouncements that a lower level of
rates was warranted in central than in southern territory. Creomulsion
Co. v. Southern Ry. Co., 95 (96).
Although sixth-class rates on wood pulp between points in trunk-line terri-
tory have under certain circumstances been approved, the general bases
throughout trunk-line and New England territories, where there is regu-
larity and volume of movement, are commodity rates lower than the class
rates between the same points. Pittston Paper Corp. v. Lehigh Valley
R. Co., 264 (268).
The general basis of rates on wood pulp in central territory is 90 per cent of
sixth class and from eastern trunk-line territory to New England it is
generally sixth class, but wherever wood pulp actually moves it apparently
receives the benefit of commodity rates which are considerably lower.
Ajax Paper Mills v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 357 (359-360).
While the rate for the shorter single-line haul from Sioux Falls, S. Dak., to
Duluth, Minn., was higher than the rate for the longer two-line haul
from Fort Dodge, Iowa, the rate from Sioux Falls did not appear to be
out of line with the lower rate as traffic from Sioux Falls moved through
higher-rated territory. American Hide & Fur Co. v. Chicago, M., St.
P. & P. R. Co., 481 (483).
Where an unreasonable joint rate has been collected, the liability of the
carriers made parties defendant in a complaint is joint and several and
reparation may be awarded although all of the carriers which partici-
pated in the transportation have not been named parties defendant.
Ciresi Fruit Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 233 (234).
LIGHT AND BULKY ARTICLES.
Fruit and vegetable baskets and hampers are light and bulky articles, and
a comparison of the rates thereon with those on lumber products which in
numerous decisions have been accorded the lumber rates, without taking
notice of the average weight of the lumber products, was of little value.
Verhalen Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 133 (135).
LIGHTERAGE. See also DRAYAGE; WHARFAGE.
When freight is lightered it requires at least two additional handlings.
Wharfage Charges at Atlantic and Gulf Ports, 663 (672).
A previous finding that points within the lighterage limits of New York
Harbor should be considered a unit within the meaning of the fourth
section was without force where it was impossible to move traffic from the
more distant point through the alleged intermediate point except over
an unnatural route involving a retracing rail movement. Valentine &
Co. v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 781 (782-783).
Complaint, not having been filed within the statutory period, was barred
by the statute of limitations:
Southwest Utility Ice Co., v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 146 (147).
Keeney & Son v. Oregon S. L. R. Co., 225 (226).
Obermoller v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 430 (431).
A complaint, filed within 90 days from the date suit was instituted in the
courts for the collection of undercharges, was seasonably presented under
the provisions of section 16 (d) of the act. Holmes Coal Co. v. Chesa-
peake & O. Ry. Co., 188 (189).
The statute of limitations is not tolled by alleged admissions contained in
correspondence between a defendant carrier and the commission, for the
provisions of section 16 of the act are not mere statutes of limitation
which may be waived or pleaded as a matter of defense, but are jurisdic-
tional. Keeney & Son v. Oregon S. L. R. Co., 225 (226).
Although the informal complaint named Pittston, Pa., as the destination
point and the formal complaint named Forest Castle, a nonagency station
within the corporate limits of Pittston, the fact that the informal complaint
specified the commodity, the point of origin, and the rate assailed was
sufficient to identify the shipments and put the carrier on notice as to the
subject matter of the formal complaint. Shipments covered by the infor-
mal complaint were therefore not barred. Pittston Paper Corp. v.
Lehigh Valley R. Co., 264.
Claims for reparation on shipments moving subsequent to the filing of the
informal complaint and more than two years prior to the filing of the
formal complaint were not barred by the statute of limitations where the
formal complaint was filed within six months after complainant was
advised that the complaints were not susceptible of informal adjustment.
Ajax Paper Mills v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 357.
The commission has jurisdiction to consider an allegation of unreasonableness
in a complaint filed within 90 days after the commencement of a suit at
law by the carrier for the recovery of undercharges, although such action
was not brought until more than two years after the shipment had moved.
Dawson Produce Co. v. Florida East Coast Ry. Co., 647 (648).
LINE-HAUL RATES.
The cost of packing dressed stone is something separate and apart from the
transportation service reflected in the level of line-haul rates, since shippers
of all forms of Bedford limestone must load and pack carload shipments
prior to delivery to carrier for shipment, and any attempt to equalize
such cost by means of change in line-haul rates would seem to be such an
equalization of commercial conditions as was expressly condemned in
89 I. C. C. 428. O'Meara v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 785 (796).
Preservice charges on rough-quarried limestone in blocks or slabs, assessed
for the movement of the stone to the point where it was stopped, unloaded,
and either scabbled, sawed, or dressed were separate and distinct from
the line-haul service and should not affect the level of the line-haul rates.
Id. (796).
It is entirely reasonable that shippers of nonheavy loading freight should be
prepared to utilize the additional space in extra-length equipment whet
such equipment is furnished on their order. Fisher Supply Co. v. Alabama
& V. Ry. Co., 711 (717).
Where mixed carloads of similar commodities were involved and the record
failed to show, as to specific carloads, precisely what articles were included
in the mixture, or in what proportions, reasonable loadings were determined
by the evidence as to the weights per cubic foot of the various commodities.
Id. (717).
In requiring a reduction of the rates assessed on rough limestone, the com-
mission gave consideration to the fact that it generally loads to, and fre-
quently in excess of, the marked capacity of the car. O'Meara v. Balti-
more & O. R. Co., 785 (789, 794).
LONG AND SHORT HAUL.
Since no damage resulted to the complainants from an unrestricted
tariff routing which was subsequently restricted, it was unnecessary
to determine whether an unauthorized fourth-section departure
existed. Watab Paper Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 37 (38).
In a complaint alleging unreasonableness of the rate, even though no
allegation was made of a violation of section 4 of the act, evidence
disclosing such a violation raised a prima facie presumption that the
rate assailed was unreasonable, but that presumption was rebutted.
Carroll-Graham Bottle Co. v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 43 (45-46).
The presumption of unreasonableness attaching to the rate to the inter-
mediate point higher than the rate to the more distant point was
successfully rebutted on a showing that the rate assailed was the same
as those generally prevailing in the same territory.
Co. v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 56 (57).
Where an appropriate application protecting a fourth-section departure
existed at the time of shipment but was denied by the commission after
shipments had moved, a presumption of unreasonableness in rate
arose from such departure and constituted a prima facie case for
complainant. Erb. Co. v. St. Louis-S. F. Ry. Co., 195.
The establishment of store-door delivery service at one point on carrier's
line and not at intermediate points does not result in violations of the
long-and-short-haul provision of section 4 of the act. Rules Covering
Freight at Bennettsville, S. C., 277 (279).
Rates prescribed by the commission in 85 I. C. C. 270, from Vicksburg,
Miss., as the basis for revision of rates from points in the South to
eastern trunk-line territory in connection with fourth-section applica-
tions, were reasonable maximum rates. The commission would hardly
have prescribed rates in excess of a maximum reasonable basis merely
that they might apply to intermediate points, in many instances for
considerably shorter hauls, as it would not be justified in violating
section 1 of the act to satisfy the requirements of section 4. Adams-
Bank Lumber Co. v. Aberdeen & Rockfish R. Co., 280 (289).
The granting of relief from the long-and-short-haul provision by an
appropriate order indicates that the rate to the more distant point is
not the proper measure of the reasonableness of the rate to the inter-
mediate point, and is sufficient to rebut the prima facie presumption,
Calamari Co. v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 366 (367).
It is prima facie unreasonable to charge more for a shorter than for a
longer haul but as the presumption thus raised is not absolute it was
successfully rebutted by carrier's evidence. Globe Superior Corp. v.
Southern Ry. Co., 456 (457).
LONG AND SHORT HAUL-Continued.
In General-Continued.
It is settled that where carriers have charged more for a shorter than for
a longer haul over the same route a presumption is raised that the
higher rate was unreasonable. Smith Agency v. Seaboard Air Line
Ry. Co., 464 (465).
The adjustment of rates on fertilizer in the South was replete with
fourth-section departures prior to the establishment of the distance
rates prescribed in 113 I. C. C. 389. South Georgia Traffic Bureau v.
Atlanta, B. & C. R. Co., 472 (474).
A previous finding that points within the lighterage limits of New York
Harbor should be considered a unit within the meaning of the fourth-
section was without force where it was impossible to move traffic
from the more distant point through the alleged intermediate point
except over an unnatural route involving a retracing rail movement.
Valentine & Co. v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 781 (782-783).
Intermediate Clause:
Shipments from Borger, Tex., reached Paducah, Ky. from the west so
that the normal traffic movement to make that point intermediate to
destinations beyond was eastward. Shipments from Burkburnett,
Tex., moved through Parker and Metropolis, Ill., to Paducah over the
direct route, although a longer route existed over which Paducah was
intermediate to those points. As the intermediate clause of the tariff
publishing the lower rates to Parker and Metropolis provided for their
application only to directly intermediate points, those rates were not
applicable to Paducah. Kendrick Oil Co. v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry.
Co., 11 (12-13).
To construct rates to Paducah, Ky., by application under an inter-
mediate clause of rates published to apply to Illinois and Indiana and
other central territory points north of the Ohio River would necessitate
going outside of the destination territory provided for as Paducah is
South of the Ohio where, as a general rule, rates are on a somewhat
different basis and are published by a different set of carriers, or their
agents. Id. (13).
Rates under an intermediate clause were not applicable where specific
rates were published from the intermediate points. Watab Paper Co.
v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 37 (38).
Rates on strawboard and ammonical liquor from Terre Haute, Ind., and
on green-salted hides from Indianapolis, Ind., to St. Louis, Mo.,
found inapplicable, since tariffs showing specific routes from Joilet,
Ill., through Terre Haute, and from Dubuque, Iowa, through Indian-
apolis, published lower rates subject to intermediate clauses. Repa-
ration awarded. Gaylord Co. v. Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co.,
47.
LONG AND SHORT HAUL-Continued.
Intermediate Clause-Continued.
Under section 1 of the governing tariff the proportional rate on corn
from Kansas City, Mo., to Chicago, Ill., applied on shipments origi-
nating at unnamed points in Kansas. Section 2 of the same tariff
provided lower rates from and to these points but from specifically
named points of origin in Oklahoma. Under the intermediate rule,
as amended, in connection with section 2 rates, the complainant con-
tended that the Kansas points, not listed, being directly intermediate
to two points on the same railroad that are listed, took the basis of
rates applying from the next more distant points in Oklahoma.
However, considering the rule and the tariff as a whole, the extremes
comprehended by the term "intermediate" were points in Oklahoma
and the rule was not applicable from points in Kansas on lines of
those carriers. Wolcott & Lincoln v. Chicago & Alton R. Co., 203.
As the governing tariff contained no routing restrictions over the lines
of participating carriers, and under the intermediate rule a lower rate
contemporaneously applied over a longer route than over the route
of movement, the rates assessed over the latter route were inapplicable.
Reparation awarded. Amber Furniture Co. v. Cleveland, C., C. &
St. L. Ry. Co., 311.
Fifth-class rate on wire nails, fencing, steel fence posts, and fasteners
from Kokomo, Ind., to Chicago, Ill., and from Chicago Heights, Ill.,
to Kokomo found inapplicable, since another tariff, which provided
routing between Hoopeston, Ill., and Chicago and Chicago Heights
over the routes of movement involved, to which points Kokomo was
intermediate, published a lower commodity rate which was applicable
on traffic to or from Kokomo under an intermediate clause. Repara-
tion awarded. Kokomo Steel & Wire Co. v. Michigan Central R. Co.,
368.
An intermediate clause which provided for rates from unnamed points
of origin located between any two other points on the same line, from
which rates were named, was inapplicable because the point of origin
from which a rate was named was not on the same line as the point
from which shipments moved but was on a different system. Fulton
Bag & Cotton Mills v. Mississippi Warrior Service, 401 (402).
Shipments of brick from Springfield, Ill., to Redfield, S. Dak., assessed
combination rates reduced by the combination rule, were undercharged
where a higher joint rate subject to an intermediate rule was in effect
from St. Louis, Mo., to which Springfield is directly intermediate.
Waiver of undercharges authorized. Sioux City Brick & Tile Co. v.
Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 405.
Rates under the intermediate clause did not apply where the intermedi-
ate point was not between two points from which rates were named
in the tariff. National Bag Mfg. Co. v. Ann Arbor R. Co., 447 (448).
Rate on fertilizer from Cordele, Ga., to Lee, Fla., moving as routed by
shipper via Thalman, Ga., found unreasonable as compared with
lower rates to more distant points over the same route, which were
protected by fourth-section applications, and to the extent that it
exceeded a rate based on a rate over a more direct route, which was
applicable to Lee under an intermediate clause. Reparation awarded.
South Georgia Traffic Bureau v. Atlanta, B. & C. R. Co., 472..
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