The words complained of were apparently contained in the particulars of claim filed in a county court action. Were not these statements made in judicial proceedings and absolutely privileged ? The point is of importance to solicitors and their clients. either of them. In this mortgage deed was contained the express proviso that the mortgage debts transferred to the Prudential Co. should continue on foot as subsisting charges on the life estate of the second earl for the benefit of the Prudential Co. by way of an additional security for the principal sum then borrowed of that I refer to Mr. Odgers book on "Libel," p. 191 of the 2nd company. Subsequent mortgages were executed to secure the further edition. Dec. 2. CASES OF THE WEEK. W. P. Re THE DUTY PAYABLE ON THE ESTATE OF EARL COWLEY. No. 1. REVENUE-ESTATE DUTY-SETTLED PROPERTY-MORTGAGE OF LIFE ESTATE A. L. SMITH, L.J., read a judgment, in which he said that the question raised upon the appeal was upon what amount was estate duty, under the Finance Act, 1894, to be assessed upon the estate of the second Earl Cowley, who died upon the 28th of February, 1895-was it to be upon the sum of £538,426 11s. 1d., the then net principal value of what he (the Lord Justice) would call the settled estates, less only the sum of £9,140 17s., or less also the sum of £230,000, the amount of a mortgage debt, and less also the sum of £65,200, the captalized value of an annuity of £3,000 a year payable to the third earl, then Viscount Dangan, by his father, the second earl, during his lifetime? It appeared that on the 27th of June, 1863, the Earl of Mornington by will devised the settled estates to trustees upon trust for the first Earl Cowley for life, and then to the second Earl Cowley for life, and then upon trust for the first and every other son of the second Earl Cowley in tail male. The testator died on the 25th of July, 1863. The first Earl Cowley thereupon entered into possession of the estates, and whilst in possession died on the 15th of July, 1884, and the second Earl Cowley then entered into possession thereof. The second earl had previously-viz., on the 1st of April, 1865-exercised a power of jointuring granted to him by the will of the Earl of Mornington and appointed a rent-charge of £500 a year in favour of his wife charged upon the settled estates. The second earl, after he had entered into possession of the settled estates, mortgaged his life interest therein to the London Assurance Corporation to secure the repayment to them of large sums of money then borrowed by him of them, and he further secured the repayment thereof by policies of insurance upon his life. In these circumstances the second Earl Cowley and his eldest son (then Viscount Dangan), who was then of age, being each in need of money, agreed to disentail the settled estates, and for that purpose, upon the 14th of January, 1887, executed a disentailing deed, which was duly enrolled, whereby the father and the son conveyed the settled estates subject to the above-mentioned mortgages and charges to a trustee upon such trusts as the second earl and his son might thereafter jointly appoint, and in default of such appointment to the use of the second earl for life, and then to the use of Viscount Dangan in tail. The second earl and his son proceeded to raise money from the Prudential Assurance Co., and, to summarize the figures, they obtained from that company a loan of £210,000, afterwards increased by further advances to the sum of £230,000, of which the father, the second earl, took £199,987 11s. 8d., and the son, Viscount Dangan, took £30,012 88. 4d. To secure the repayment of the £210,000 to the Prudential Co. a mortgage, dated the 8th of June, 1888, was executed by the second earl and his son, with the concurrence of the Countess Cowley, in favour of the Prudential Co., whereby they transferred to that company the mortgages which the second earl had given to the London Assurance Corporation and which were then existing upon his life estate in the settled estates, which mortgages the London Assurance Corporation by deed of the same date conveyed and assigned to the Prudential Assurance Co. The policies upon the second earl's life were also assigned to the Prudential Co. This mortgage deed recited that it was part of the arrangement for the loan that the mortgage debts to the London Assurance Corporation should be paid off and that they should be transferred to the Prudential Assurance Co. as a further protection and security for their loan; and by this deed the second earl and his son, as beneficial owners, in the exercise of the power of appointment vested in them by the disentailing deed and in the exercise of any other power in that behalf, with the consent of the countess conveyed to the Prudential Co. the settled estates in fee subject to an equity of redemption reserved t the second earl and Viscount Dangan or advances above-mentioned. That was the position of matters when the second earl died upon the 28th of February, 1895. His lordship could not doubt that in these dealings with the settled estates the life estate of the second earl therein was expressly kept on foot as security for the moneys borrowed thereon, and that it was not extinguished or merged in an equitable estate in fee in the Prudential Co. The real substance of what was done-and this was what must be looked at apart from the form of the conveyancing-was that the second earl mortgaged his life estate to the Prudential Co. and that his son mortgaged his reversion to that company to secure the repayment of the £230,000. He could not agree with the learned judges in the court below that it was one charge on the fee It was true that by the conjoint operation of the father and son the simple of the settled estates-in other words, an overriding charge thereon. Prudential Co. obtained an equitable estate in fee, but the charge remained a charge upon the life estate of the second earl and upon the reversion of Viscount Dangan. The life estate of the second earl remained extant until his death on the 28th of February, 1895, charged with the mortgage of £230,000, when the life estate and the mortgage thereon each ceased. Coming to the Finance Act, 1894, section 1 would not cover the present case, for the life estate of the second earl ceased at his death and did not pass to anyone. By section 2, sub-section 1, however, it was enacted that property passing on the death of the deceased should be deemed to include the following property: "(a) Property of which the deceased was at the time of his death competent to dispose." That did not embrace the present case. "(b) Property in which the deceased or any other person had an interest ceasing on the death of the deceased to the extent to which a benefit accrues or arises by the cesser of such interest." This sub-section, in his judgment, covered the case of the life estate of the second earl, which ceased upon his death, mortgaged as it was to the Prudential Co., and was intended to embrace such a case; and the extent to which a benefit accrued by the cesser of such interest was the extent of the interest which then ceased. That is the life estate of the second earl, and consequently his life estate, when he died, became property which by the Act was to be deemed to have passed on his death, and came within section 2, sub-section 1 (6). The next consideration was how by the Act property which was to be deemed to pass upon a death was to be valued for estate duty. By section 7, sub-section 1, in valuing an estate allowance was to be made for reasonable funeral expenses and for debts or encumbrances, if such debts or encumbrances were incurred or created bona fide for full consideration in money or money's worth wholly for the deceased's own use and benefit and took effect out of his interest. That, in his opinion, meant debts or encumbrances to take effect out of the estate which passed. This mortgage debt of the second earl was not a debt or encumbrance upon the estate which passed or was deemed to pass pursuant to the Act, for the mortgage upon the estate of the second earl came to an end when that estate also came to an end, and was no longer a charge upon the life estate which was deemed to pass, and was not a debt upon the estate which passed, but only upon the reversion. Then by section 7, sub-section 7, the value of the benefit accruing or arising from the cesser of an interest ceasing on the death of the deceased shall (b) if the interest extended to less than the whole income of the property, be the principal value of an addition to the property equal to the income to which the interest extended." It was under this sub-section that the value of the benefit accruing was to be ascertained, because the interest which ceased at the death of the second earl did not extend to the whole income, but only to the income less the charges represented by the before-mentioned sum of £9,140 17s. Whatever might be the true interpretation of the words "of an addition to the property," they did not mean that the value was to be arrived at by making an allowance for a mortgage debt like the mortgage debt of £230,000 in this case. It was the value of the interest which passed or was deemed to pass which was to bear the estate duty, and when this interest passed it was no longer, except by the son's own act, clogged with this mortgage, for when the life estate ceased so did the mortgage thereon. It was not upon the value of what a man succeeded to that estate duty was payable, and how could the act of a reversioner in diminishing the value of his reversion when he got it affect the value of the property which passed upon a death? In his opinion, the value of the benefit accruing upon the death of the second earl must be ascertained under section 7, sub-section 7 (b), without making any allowance for the £230,000 mortgage. As regards the annuity of £3,000 charged upon the life estate of the second earl and payable thereout during his life to hi son, in his opinion the same reasoning applied, and no deduction could be made for that. As before stated, the Finance Act made liable to estate duty the value of the estate which passed, and not the value it might be to any individual successor, and this was the key to the construction of the Act; and consequently the point taken by Mr. Haldane, that the third earl, when he succeeded to the settled estates, was no better off by the cesser of this annuity than he was before, was in reality not in point. The appeal of the Crown as to the £230,000 mortgage succeeded, and the cross-appeal of the third earl failed. Judgment must be entered for the Crown with costs. RIGBY and COLLINS, L.JJ., read judgments to the same effect.COUNSEL, Sir R. E. Webster, A.G., Sir R. B. Finlay, S.G., and Vaughan Hawkins'; Haldane, Q.C., and H. Fellows. SOLICITORS, Solicitor of Inland Revenue; Collyer-Bristow & Co. [Reported by W. F. BARRY, Barrister-at-Law.] Re THE PEVERIL GOLD MINES (LIM.). No. 2. 1st Dec. COMPANY-WINDING-UP-RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTORY TO PETITION-CONDITIONS IMPOSED BY ARTICLES-VALIDITY-COMPANIES ACT, 1862 (25 & 26 VICT. c. 89), ss. 79, 82. Appeal from a decision of Byrne, J. A shareholder in the above-named company holding 5,000 fully-paid shares presented a petition to the court for a winding-up order. It was admitted that he was entitled to present a petition but for clause 164 of the articles of association, and the question was whether he was estopped by that clause, as he had not fulfilled any of the conditions precedent. Clause 164 was as follows: "No petition shall be presented or proceeded with by a member to wind up the company, except and unless (a) by consent in writing of not less than two of the then board, or (b) in pursuance or by permission of a resolution passed by a majority at a general meeting of the company, or (c) the petitioner or petitioners shall hold, or together hold, not less than onefifth of the then issued capital of the company, upon which all calls shall have been paid." The company and two shareholders, one holding twenty shares, on which 16s. 6d. had been paid, and the other holding 13,600 fully-paid shares (being £1 shares nominal value), moved the court to stay proceedings. Section 79 of the Companies Act, 1862, is as follows: "A company under this Act may be wound up by the court, as hereinafter defined, under the following circumstances (that is to say): (1) Whenever the company has passed a special resolution requiring the company to be wound up by the court; (2) whenever the company does not commence its business within a year from its incorporation, or suspends its business for the space of a whole year; (3) whenever the members are reduced in number to less than seven; (4) whenever the company is unable to pay its debts; (5) whenever the court is of opinion that it is just and equitable that the company should be wound up"; and section 82 is as follows: "Any application to the court for the winding up of a company under this Act shall be by petition; it may be presented by the company, or by any one or more creditor or creditors, contributory or contributories of the company, or by all or any of the above parties, together or separately." Byrne, J., being of opinion that clause 164 was inconsistent with sections 79 and 82 of the Companies Act, 1862, refused to stay proceedings, and dismissed the motion. The company and the two shareholders appealed. THE COURT (LINDLEY, M.R., and CHITTY and VAUGHAN WILLIAMS, L.JJ.) dismissed the appeal without calling upon the respondent. LINDLEY, M.R.-I will start with reading an extract from the judgment of Lord Macnaghten in Welton v. Saffery (45 W. R. 508, at p. 515; 1897, A. C. 324): These companies are the creature of statute, and by the statute to which they owe their being they must be bound, in regard to shareholders as well as in regard to creditors, in all matters coming within the conditions of the memorandum of association. Shareholders in these companies require protection just as much as creditors, perhaps even more. Shareholders are not partners for all purposes; they have not all the rights of partners; they have practically no voice in the management of the concern; their security in a great measure depends on the directors adhering to the requirements of the Act." Anybody who is familiar with these Acts knows that companies are formed on certain conditions and are regulated and dissolved on certain conditions. The important sections in the Act are sections 79 and 82. (His lordship stated their provisions and continued:) I take it that any article contrary to those which in substance says that the life of a company shall not cease in conformity with the statute is a condition which is fundamentally at variance with the statutory obligations. I am not disposed to deny that a bargain may be made with a contributory or a creditor under certain circumstances, but a bargain such as this would be contrary to the true principle of the statute. Sections 14 to 16 are not in point. I regard this as contrary to the inten. tion of the Act. The appeal must be dismissed with costs. CHITTY, L.J.-I am of the same opinion. We are not concerned to consider whether a shareholder may contract not to present a petition. There is a condition annexed that a company may be wound up under certain prescribed conditions by section 79, and an article which stipulates that shareholders shall not present a petition must be invalid. I think this condition attached is an essential one and cannot be varied by the consent of the shareholders in the articles. VAUGHAN WILLIAMS, L.J.-I entirely agree and have nothing to add. 66 Re ROWE, PIKE v. HAMLYN. No. 2. 30th Nov.; 2nd Dec. WILL-CONSTRUCTION LEGACY IN ADDITION TO SUMS OWING " ΤΟ LEGATEE-NO SUMS LEGALLY OWING-MONEY SECURED BY PROMISSORY NOTE AND I.O.U. GIVEN WITHOUT CONSIDERATION-SUMS 80 SECURED, WHETHER PAYABLE--SATISFACTION OF DEBT-GIFT OF MONEY INTER VIVOS. This was an appeal by one of the defendants from a decision of Romer, J., in favour of the plaintiff. THE COURT (LINDLEY, M.R., and CHITTY and VAUGHAN WILLIAMS, L.JJ.) allowed the appeal. LINDLEY, M.R., said: In order to make my judgment intelligible, I will state shortly what were the circumstances at the date when the testatrix died, which are legitimately in evidence. It appears that a Mr. and Mrs. Rowe, two married people, had staying with them as part of their family a grandniece of Mrs. Rowe named Miss Margaret Ann Hooper Hamlyn. Mr. Rowe in his lifetime made Miss Hamlyn certain presents. On the 15th of February, 1894, he gave her an I.O.U. for £500, and on the 2nd of July, 1894, he gave her a promissory note for £500. In February, 1895, he gave her a deposit note for £500, but forgot to endorse it, and so 66 [Reported by R. C. MACKENZIE, Barrister-at-Law.] High Court-Chancery Division. Re TESSYMAN'S SETTLED ESTATES. North, J. 27th Nov. PRACTICE-MARRIED WOMAN-DISPENSING WITH SEPARATE EXAMINATIONSETTLED ESTATES ACT, 1877, s. 50—SETTLED Land Act, 1882, s. 33— No TENANT FOR LIFE. This was a petition under the Settled Estates Act, 1877, under the following circumstances: By his will, dated the 4th of February, 1871, invest the same, and to pay or apply the whole, or such part as they should Richard Tessyman gave his residuary estate to trustees upon trust to think fit, of the income to arise from the investment of his residuary personal estate or the capital thereof "unto or for the personal benefit of my son Charles Edward Tessyman, or unto or for the personal benefit of his wife and child or children during his life, to the intent that my trustees may be enabled to adapt the disposition of the income or capital of the said funds or moneys to the circumstances for the time being of my said son, and thereby to secure as far as possible his and their personal enjoyment thereof respectively"; and after the death of his said son, the testator directed his trustees to hold his residuary trust funds upon trusts in favour of his son's children as therein mentioned, and the testator devised his real estate to his trustees, upon trust that the rents thereof should be held and applied during the life of his said son under and subject to the same trusts and for the same purposes as were thereinbefore declared concerning the profits arising from the investment of his residuary personal estate. Charles Edward Tessyman, his wife, and two and which now belonged to the county council; that the reversion had Winding-up Cases. Re RIPLEY'S TRADE-MARK. Kekewich, J. 3rd Dec. TRADE-MARK - REGISTRATION - INVENTED WORD "PIRLE" WORD SIMILAR IN SOUND TO WORD REGISTRATION OF WHICH HAS BEEN REFUSED -PATENTS, Designs, and TRADE-MARKS ACTs, 1883-1888, ss. 64, 69. This was a motion on behalf of Messrs. Ripley & Son, of Bradford, dyers and cloth finishers, made under section 69 of the Patents, Designs, and Trade-Marks Acts, 1883-1888, by way of appeal from the decision of the Comptroller-General of Patents, Designs, and Trade-Marks. The applicants had attempted in the first place to register the word "Pearl" as a trade-mark in respect of woollen goods in class 34. The comptroller refused to register "Pearl" as a trade-mark, and thereupon the Re INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY OF AUCTIONEERS AND VALUERS. applicants attempted to obtain registration of "Pirle," but registration was also in this case refused, on the ground (inter alia) that the word "Pearl" was not registrable, and that Pirle was merely a mis-spel- COMPANY-WINDING-UP-MISREPRESENTATION-CONTRIBUTORIES-REMOVAL ling of "Pearl." From this refusal of registration of "Pirle" the applicants now appealed. It was contended in support of the application that "Pirle" was an invented word within section 64 of the Act of 1888; that it was formed by the transposition of the letters in the name Ripley (omitting the y), that it was neither geographical nor descriptive of the character or quality of the goods, and so did not come within the exceptions of the section; and that consequently it was registrable as a trade-mark, and the comptroller was wrong in refusing to register it merely because it happened to have a similar sound to "Pearl." 66 KEKEWICH, J. (without calling on the defendants), said: It seems to me that this application may be disposed of on extremely short grounds. I am not called upon to consider whether or no the word "Pearl" is capable of registration. I wish to say nothing whatever on that point because it may be competent for the applicants to bring forward the word again, possibly basing their application upon different evidence to that in the present case, and it is only right that such an application, if made, should be made without its being prejudiced by anything that may be said now. But the word "Pearl" has been brought before the comptroller and has been rejected; therefore I must for the present purposes hold that that word could not be registered. In order to decide whether the word "Pirle" is capable of registration, not the eye only, but also the ear, must be consulted, and to an ordinary person the difference in sound between "Pearl" and "Pirle" is not to be perceived. If "Pearl" is wrong I think that "Pirle" is equally wrong, and I agree with the comptroller in saying that this is a mere mis-spelling of the word "Pearl," and if the applicants fail as regards one, they must fail as regards the other. It is said that "Pirle" is an invented word, but this transposition of the letters in the word Ripley, with the final letter left out, seems but a poor attempt at humour. I do not, however, decide the case upon that ground, but simply on the ground that "Pearl" not being capable of registration, Pirle," being the same in sound, is also not capable of registration. On that ground I refuse the application with costs. COUNSEL, Moulton, Q.C., and A. J. Walter; The Attorney-General (Sir Richard Webster, Q.C.) and Ingle Joyce. SOLICITORS, Speechley, Mumford, Landon, & Rogers; Solicitor to the Board of Trade. 66 [Reported by C. C. HENSLEY, Barrister-at-Law.] DYE v. PATMAN. Byrne, J. Dec. 1. This was an action without pleadings. The plaintiff by writ issued the 13th of October, 1896, claimed an injunction to restrain the defendants from building opposite to premises known as the Fishmongers' Arms in Clare-market so as to damage the plaintiff's ancient lights, and damages. The defence relied on by the defendants was that the plaintiff's premises had been acquired compulsorily by the London County Council under the provisions of Part 1 of the Housing of the Working Classes Act (53 & 54 Vict. c. 70), 1890. The facts were as follow: In November, 1894, an official representation within the meaning of section 4 of that Act was made by the Medical Officer of Health of the Strand district. The premises in which the plaintiff was interested as reversioner were included in the representation, and the London County Council prepared a scheme and presented a petition for a confirmatory order. An inquiry was held at the Home Office in March, 1896, and a provisional order was made on the 20th of January, 1897, confirming the scheme, which in turn was confirmed by an Act, the 3rd of June, 1897, entitled, "The London, Clare-market, Strand, Provisional Order Confirmation Act, 1897," 60 Vict. c. 59. It was admitted that but for the action of the county council the plaintiff would have had a good right of action. It was submitted on behalf of the defendants that the plaintiff being owner of a reversion had no title to sue in respect of a house declared unfit for human habitation BAILLIE'S CASE. OF NAME. This was a summons for the removal of the applicant's name from the list of contributories of this company on the ground that the applicant had been induced to become a shareholder by the misrepresentation of the promoter of the company. It appeared from the evidence that there is another and older society, the Institute of Auctioneers and Valuers of the United Kingdom, and that Baillie was induced to join this society on the representation that it was the institute. THE COURT held that the applicant was entitled to have his name removed, on the ground that the contract was not voidable on the ground of the misrepresentations made to him, but void ab initio; in other words, that there was no contract at all.-COUNSEL, Herber Hart; A. C. Clauson. SOLICITORS, Timbrell & Deighton; Riddell, Vaizey, & Smith. [Reported by C. W. MEAD, Barrister-at-Law.] This was a summons by the liquidator of the above-named company for the direction of the court as to the meaning of certain words in one of the articles of association. This article provided that in the event of the corporation being wound up the "surplus assets available for distribution among the shareholders" should be divided among the holders of founders' shares and the ordinary shareholders in certain proportions. THE COURT held that there was no real distinction between this case and Re New Transvaal Co. (1896, 2 Ch. 751), and that, therefore, the "surplus assets available for distribution" meant the assets which remained after debts, costs, and other liabilities had been paid and the shareholders repaid their paid-up capital.-COUNSEL, 4. G. Lawrence; Christopher James; A. Pattullo. SOLICITORS, Meredith, Roberts, & Mills; Clarke, Rawlins, & Co; Neish, Howell, & Macfarlane. [Reported by C. W. MEAD, Barrister-at-Law.] High Court-Queen's Bench Division. PONTEFRACT PARK TRUSTEES v. PONTEFRACT UNION; AND These were two appeals by the guardians of the poor of the Pontefract Union by way of special cases stated against the decision of the Recorder of Pontefract, T. R. D. Wright, Esq., who had quashed an assessment made by the guardians imposing a liability to poor rate upon certain property known as Pontefract Park. THE COURT (WRIGHT and KENNEDY, JJ.) dismissed the appeale. KENNEDY, J., who delivered the considered judgment of the court, said the recorder at quarter sessions held in January last at Pontefract had decided that the respondents were exempt from the rate and quashed the assessment. The respondents were the occupiers of land forming part of Pontefract Park and they had upon the land grand-stands, a house, and refreshment rooms. They occupied this property under a lease granted to them in July, 1895, by a public statutory body called the park trustees. Prima facie the respondents would be liable to pay poor rate, but they claimed exemption under the provisions of an Act of Parliament passed in 1780 intituled "An Act for providing the park of Pontefract, in the county of York, and for other purposes therein mentioned." Under that Act a large tract of land belonging to the Duchy of Lancaster, known as the Pontefract Park, was divided as there set out, and a portion or allotment of it, containing 325 acres, became vested in trustees" on trust for and for the sole benefit of the inhabitants of Pontefract and Tanshelf," and the residue of the Pontefract Park became the King's share, and was by section 6 erected into a separate "vill" or holding, the tenants or inhabitants of which were to be assessed and rated "to all taxes and assessments within the vill," but were not to contribute to taxes, rates, or assessments, or to the relief of the poor or the repair of the roads and highways elsewhere except as expressly provided in the Act. The respondents' property was not within the vill, but was within the 325 acres vested in the trustees, and the section of the Act, upon the true construction of which, read in connection with the other provisions of the statute, the case mainly turned, was section 1. That section provided that this portion or allotment of 325 acres should from henceforth" be and remain vested in the several persons who should for the time being be the trustees under the statute and this portion or allotment should be united and annexed unto, and be for ever thereafter deemed and taken as being within the parcel of the borough or township of Pontefract, and be subject to the jurisdictions and enjoy all the exemptions and privileges of the said borough and township, but should in no wise be assessed to any church rates, poor's rates, constable rates, or highway rates, or be subject to any statute duty within the said townships of Pontefract and Tanshelf, or either of them, or any other township, parish, or place whatsoever." The respondents' contention was that by the words of section (1): "The said portion or allotment shall in no wise be assessed to any church rate, poor's rate, &c.," they occupying as they did part of the allotment to which the exemption related, were not liable to be assessed as they had been by the appellants. The appellants contended that the exemption was by implication conditional and only applied to such occupiers as occupied in conformity with the conditions, regulations, and restrictions imposed upon the park trustees which were referred to generally in the earlier part of section (1), and that as the park trustees had divested themselves of all interest in the demised premises and had only a reversionary interest therein they were not entitled to avail themselves of the exemption granted by the Act. The recorder came to the conclusion in favour of the respondents on this point and his decision in the opinion of that court was right. The cases of Williams v. Pritchard and Eddington v. Borman, both reported in 4 T. R., Durnford and East's Reports, at pp. 2 and 4-cases of exemption of houses built on land which had been embanked from the Thames and which had been vested in the owner of adjoining wharf free from all taxes and assessments whatsoever could not be regarded as direct authorities in the present case. Nor, indeed, was the later case of Reg. v. London Gas Light and Coke Co. (8 B. & C. 54), which was also cited by the respondents. The appellants contended, in short, that by the various provisions of the Pontefract Extension Act, 1875-which was clearly intended, and did in fact, impose liability to rating in respect of lands within Pontefract Park for all purposes for which hereditaments in the old part of the borough might be assessed--that inasmuch as the poor rate assessment was essential to the levying of rates by the corporation, a poor law assessment to liability in respect thereof was enacted for all time by the terms of this later local Act. The words of the exemption in section 1 of the Act of Geo. 3, which came into force in 1780, might have contained some such proviso limiting the exemption as was contained in 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 30, with regard to the exemption from rating of churches and chapels. There was no such proviso, however, in that section, and the words being absolute the court ought to give them their full and natural meaning. The appeal, as raised by the first case, failed, and must therefore be dismissed. The second case was that of the Pontefract Assessment Committee against the same respondents. The questions to be decided were practically the same. The facts were there that the appellants sought to make the respondents themselves liable to the poor rate in respect of their occupation of three acres of the same allotment on which the trustees had constructed and enclosed a lake or artificial piece of water, and at certain times made charges on persons using the same for boating. In this case also the decision of the recorder was in favour of the respondents, and in the opinion of the court his decision was right and ought to be upheld. Both appeals, therefore, would be dismissed with costs. Leave to appeal granted.-CoUNSEL, E. Tindal Atkinson, Q.C., and W. L. Williams; A. W. Bairstow and G. Banks. SOLICITORS, Clarke & Blundell; Carter, Atkinson, & Bentley, for the trustees; and Charles Lowden, for the Racecourse Committee, Pontefract. [Reported by ERSKINE REID, Barrister-at-Law.1 Re NEW PAR CONSOLS. Div. Court. 26th Nov. COMPANY WINDING-UP APPOINTMENT OF LIQUIDATOR DEBENTUREHOLDERS-APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO RECEIVER TO TAKE POSSESSION OF -- COMPANY'S PROPERTY AND FOR ORDER OF SALE TO BE POSTPONED DEBENTURE-HOLDER'S RIGHT TO COMMENCE ACTION TO PROVE SECURITY-DISCRETION OF COURT-COSTS-STANNARIES ACT, 1887 (50 & 51 VICT. c. 43), s. 19. Appeals by a debenture-holder and by the debenture-holders' trustees from a refusal of the judge of the County Court of Cornwall to admit their claims or grant them leave to commence an action in the High Court for the purpose of enforcing their security. The facts were these: In September, 1896, the company were proceeding to issue debentures for the purpose of raising the sum of £2,000 on the assets of the property, and a deed in ordinary form was entered into by the present appellants, Charles and Albert Gregory, managing directors of the company, and certain other parties. The company shortly afterwards went into liquidation and an official receiver and trustee was appointed by order of the court. The debenture-holders sought to prove their security, but the liquidator refused to admit their proof (1) on the ground that the deed not having been registered as required by the Stannaries Act, 1887, their security was postponed, certain creditors mentioned in section 19 of that Act taking precedence over their claim, and (2) on a question of title. Section 19 of the Stannaries Act, 1887, is as follows: "All mortgages, mortgage debentures, and other documents whatever, whereby power is given by any company to any persons to take possession of any mining effects of or on a mine shall, in addition to any registration thereof now required by law, be registered and no such mortgage, &c., unless so registered, shall confer any priority over or title as against the claims of any persons whatever for work and labour done or services performed in or upon such mine, or for goods and material supplied to any company by which the said mine is carried on; such registration shall not affect any priority in respect of wages under the provisions of this Act." For the appellants it was argued that as the liquidator had refused to admit their claim, they were entitled as a matter of practice, if not of right, to commence an action to test the validity of their security. Lloyd v. Lloyd (6 Ch. D. 339), Re Henry Pound, Son, & Hutchins (42 Ch. D. 402), and also the preferential payment sections of the Bankruptcy Act, 1897, were referred to. [WRIGHT, J.-Are the debenture-holders willing to pay to the liquidator such a sum as in his opinion will meet the claims of those creditors secured under section 19 of the Act of 1887? If so, then he could remain in possession and act as receiver for them. We cannot direct the appointment of a receiver for the debenture-holders now the liquidator is in possession] Counsel for the debenture-holders said he was willing to agree to that proposal; the amount was not large. If the liquidator sold the machinery apart from the mine, the sums separately realized for the machinery and mine would be very small compared with the amount that might be obtained if a purchaser could be found to buy the whole as a going concern. Counsel on behalf of the liquidator stated he had no instructions, and could neither object nor assent then to such a proposal. The liquidator was an official of the Board of Trade, and as such could not, he submitted, act for both parties. His present instructions were to sell the machinery, and the sum realized would be sufficient to cover the claims admitted up to that date. Nothing would be gained by an action in the High Court, for the debenture-holders could prove as unsecured creditors in the ordinary winding up. He opposed the application on the ground of expense. THE COURT (WRIGHT and KENNEDY, JJ.) decided that the application, so far as it related to leave to commence an action to prove the security, must be allowed, but without costs. The application as to the second point raised was dismissed, and also without costs. The order would be that the official receiver and trustee should act as receiver for the debenture-holders, but subject to an arrangement being made to fully protect the interests of preferential creditors under the Act. Liberty to apply in the county court for a postponement or rescission of the order to sell upon terms.-COUNSEL, Alexander, Q.C.; Seddon; Muir Mackenzie. SOLICITORS, Nye & Moreton; The Solicitor for the Board of Trade. [Reported by ERSKINE REID, Barrister-at-Law.] LAW SOCIETIES. THE BRADFORD INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY. The annual dinner of the Bradford Incorporated Law Society was held on Tuesday. The chair was occupied by Mr. W. B. Gordon (the president of the society), and amongst those present were Mr. Justice Kennedy and Mr. Justice Phillimore. Mr. J. H. WADE, in proposing "Her Majesty's Judges," remarked for the first time in the history of the society. Nearly thirty years ago that on this occasion the company included two of Her Majesty's judges, Mr. Baron Martin came to Bradford to try an election petition, and Sir Edward Fry, also, who had ceased to be a judge, came to a gathering in the Friends' Meeting-house. However, as he (Mr. Wade) had said, on this occasion two of Her Majesty's judges were present in Bradford; and he could assure them of a hearty welcome. Mr. Justice KENNEDY, in responding to the toast, said it was the desire of his fellow-judges and himself to foster anything that brought together any branch of their great common profession. He was quite sure that the organization of public opinion in every branch was good for the tone of the whole. He understood that it was the first occasion on which the judges of assize had had the pleasure of being present at one of the gatherings of the Bradford Incorporated Law Society. It was certainly not so serious an undertaking as trying an election petition, but, speaking for his fellow-judges as well as for himself, he could say that any member of the judicial Bench was pleased to see as much as possible of the country which he was appointed to serve. Though he had never been in Bradford before, he had heard a good deal of the city from Mr. Justice Bruce, who always spoke of Bradford with enthusiasm, and mentioned with special pleasure the work done by the Bradford Discharged Prisoners' Aid Society. He did not know whether the relations of Leeds to Bradford were those, as he hoped they would be, of friendly rivalry, but he could quite understand from the kind reception given to his brother Phillimore and himself that night that the members of that society would not be sorry to have an assize at Bradford as well as at Leeds. He was afraid he could not hold out any great hopes on that point. The great battle being fought in legal circles was the extent to which judges must concentrate themselves even more on London, He himself hoped that the great system of assize would, with such improvements and developments as time showed to be desirable, continue to bring round to the country regularly judges whose sole duty was to do the best to maintain unimpaired the fabric of judicial administration in this kingdom. With the growing assize lists and the increasing variety of civil and criminal business due to the constant advance of civilization and science, which constantly introduced new classes of commercial disputes, and, he was afraid, occasionally new classes of cases for the Crown Court, the difficulties of maintaining the assize system with the same number of judges was great. He hoped the time would never come when the assize or some similar system did not bring near to the poorest as well as to the richest, in all parts of the country, the evenhanded justice of judges whose purity was never called in question, and whose independence and efforts, he might add, were encouraged by the help received from the bar and from solicitors. He hoped that the welcome accorded to his brother Phillimore and himself on that occasion was only a sign of the feeling which the profession at large had for those who were deputed to do justice to the best of their ability to every one of Her Majesty's subjects. Mr. Justice PHILLIMORE proposed "The Bradford Incorporated Law Society." He said he knew generally of the advantages of the Incorporated Law Societies-from the local one to the central body-to the profession of the law. The time was when lawyers of all kinds participated, if not in public contempt, in public abuse, and when that branch which was now received with respect and honour was a byword to the novelist and the dramatist. But only isolated specimens had given rise to much of this picturesque illustration. The profession as a whole was amongst the very highest. The Inns of Court had done much for the bar. and many solicitors owed much to the Incorporated Law Societies. It was in circles such as this that effective discipline could alone be maintained. He had long regretted that at Liverpool, Manchester, and at Leeds there had been no local council of the bar. He was sure that the high standard which had been maintained there existed in spite of, and not in consequence of, that state of affairs. He knew very well that as the local bar and local professional bodies grew up, it was essential, as had been found in other countries-France, for instance, and Belgium-that there should be local professional councils and tribunals. It was for that reason, amongst others, that he heartily welcomed the formation of local Incorporated Law Societies. Disagreeable instances of professional misconduct occurred in all bodies. There was another and much pleasanter side to the work of such societies. Such societies fostered a high standard of legal education; they encouraged a thoroughness of learning such as would not exist in their absence. Moreover, he personally had been extremely indebted to the Bristol Incorporated Law Society, for he had frequently made use of the reference library owned by that society, which contained the tools without which a lawyer could not properly ply his trade. They might have an advocate in the flesh and a careless adviser, but they could not have a thorough and complete lawyer unless he constantly imbued himself with the great sources of his profession and applied himself to the fountain-head. There were many other grounds-the good-fellowship, the good-comradeship, the spirit of honesty, and the spirit of professional chivalry-which all those cocieties engendered, of which he might have spoken. But anyone who was interested in the due and complete administration, without flaw or wrinkle, of the law, would rejoice in the development of such societies as the Bradford Incorporated Law Society. THE PRESIDENT, in responding to the toast, said that there was an old maxim referring to the legal profession, "It's hard to get on, it's harder to get honour, it's hardest to get honest." It might be that in the past there was reason for resenting such pleasantries on the ground that there was an element of truth in them. But to-day, if Diogenes were to return to the earth and with his lantern were to search for an honest man, the ranks of solicitors, he believed, would not be the last in which the cynic would search to find one. That such was the fact was largely due, he was quite sure, to the work of organizations such as theirs. The Incorporated Law Society had done a great deal-more than was generally supposedto raise the character and tone of the profession of the solicitor. It was the duty of societies such as theirs to assist the central society, and in every way in their power to conduce to the higher tone of the legal profession. The first object of the Bradford Incorporated Law Society was the formation of a library-a most important thing in these days, when even solicitors were expected to advise and to act with an almost impossible celerity which often prevented them from even having recourse to members of the higher branch of the legal profession. He was glad to say that a most useful legal library had been formed in Bradford. The second object of the society was "The protection of the character status, and interests of solicitors, the promotion of honourable practice, the settlement of disputed points of practice, and the decision of all questions of professional usage or courtesy in conducting legal business of all kinds." In one unpleasant branch of their work they could not act independently, but merely as adjuncts of the central society, who undertook the investigation of cases reported to them and the delivering of judgment. But the Professional Etiquette Committee of the Council of the Bradford Incorporated Law Society occasionally had to perform more pleasant duties. He had seen solicitors come before the committee full of wrath could not be entered without hard labour and training, and without serious expense, and it would be unnatural if lawyers saw efforts being made for some reason or another to take the work which they had been declared qualified to perform out of their hands, and to place it in the hands of another body of public officials specially created for that purpose, and did not advocate their own interests. They had done so in the past, and it would be their duty to do so until they were satisfied that the change was not only necessary in the interests of the public, but was also, in all details, capable of being satisfactorily worked. But the Council of the Bradford Incorporated Law Society did not endeavour to work entirely on selfish grounds. They were not only an exclusive profession. They were a body of experts-better qualified in many ways than anyone else to speak on certain subjects. They came closely into contactmore closely, he ventured to say, than any other body of men-with the working of some branches of the law, and their experience enabled them to form an opinion of some value on the working of certain laws and on the possibility of increasing their efficiency. It was to be hoped that the voice of the Bradford Incorporated Law Society would be heard in the councils of other professional societies on such questions, but to that end It was to promote that unity in the legal profession was necessary. unity that they had met that night, and they needed all the help they could get, especially from those who might very well consider that the time had come when they might rest from their labours. UNITED LAW SOCIETY. Dec. 6.-Mr. C. W. Williams in the chair.-Mr. Neville Tebbutt moved "That the decision of His Honour Judge Sir A. G. Marten in Mathias v. Mr. G. D. Elliman opposed, Dipple (L. T., Nov. 13, 1897) was wrong.' and the debate was continued by Messrs C. H. Kirby, A. W. Marks, and W. F. Symonds; Mr. Tebbutt replied. The motion was lost by two votes. Mr. W. F. Symonds moved "That the decision of Mr. Justice Wright in Wilkinson and Wife v. Downton (1897, 2 Q. B. 57) was wrong." Marks, and S. E. Hubbard; Mr. Symonds replied. The motion was Mr. C. H. Kirby opposed, and the debate was continued by Messrs. A. W. lost by two votes. SOLICITORS' BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION. The usual monthly meeting of the board of directors of this association was held at the Law Institution, Chancery-lane, London, on Wednesday, the 8th inst., Mr. Henry Morton Cotton in the chair. The other directors present being Messrs. W. F. Blandy (Reading), W. B. Brook, Robert Cunliffe, Grantham R. Dodd, Samuel Harris (Leicester), John Hunter, John H. Kays, F. Rowley Parker, Henry Roscoe, Sidney Smith, R. W Tweedie, F. T. Woolbert, and J. T. Scott (secretary). A sum of £310 was distributed in grants of relief, four new members were admitted to the association, and other general business transacted. NEW ORDERS, &c. COUNTY COURTS ACT, 1888. ANNUAL VACATION AT CHRISTMAS. I, Hardinge Stanley, Baron Halsbury, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, pursuant to The County Courts Act, 1888, and all other powers enabling me in that behalf, do hereby order that the offices of the County Courts may be closed every year, until further order, on the following days (not including Sunday), viz. On the day before Christmas Day, the Bank Holiday following Christmas Day, and the two days next after the Bank Holiday. Given under my hand this 3rd day of December, 1897. TRANSFER OF ACTIONS. ORDER OF COURT. HALSBURY, C. Thursday, the 2nd day of December, 1897. I, Hardinge Stanley, Baron Halsbury, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, do hereby Order that the Actions mentioned in the Schedule hereto shall be transferred to the Honourable Mr. Justice Wright. SCHEDULE. Mr. Justice Kekewich (1897-D.-No. 1,869). In re The Deburgo Spring Wheel Company, Limited The London and South-Western Bank, Limited v The Deburgo Spring Wheel Company, Limited. HALSBURY, C. ORDER OF COURT. Monday, the 6th day of December, 1897. I, Hardinge Stanley, Baron Halsbury, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, do hereby Order that the Action mentioned in the Schedule hereto shall be transferred to the Honourable Mr. Justice Wright. SCHEDULE. Mr. Justice North (1897-S.-No. 4,262). HALSBURY, C. against each other, and had seen them depart with misunderstandings John Charles Tucker Steward v The Mayfair Property Co Limited cleared up, personalities done away with, and amicable relations renewed. Next to these points came that of considering general questions affecting the administration of the law. A large section of the public regarded lawyers as a sort of close corporation, more or less in the nature of a trade union. It was assumed that if lawyers proor opposed any legislation they did it with selfish objects. He was not going to say that lawyers never acted in those matters from selfish motives. They were men of a profession which moted WARNING TO INTENDING HOUSE PURCHASERS AND LESSEES.-Before purchasing or renting a house, have the Sanitary Arrangements thoroughly Examined, Tested, and Reported Upon by an Expert from Messrs. Carter Bros., 65, Victoria-street, Westminster. Fee quoted on receipt of full particulars. (Established 21 years.)—[ADvt.] |