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directly by a decree of specific performance, or indirectly by an injunction, appears to be immaterial.” The case of Frederick: v. Waller was on all fours with Montague v. Floekton. The defendant, after contracting with the plaintiff to perform in “The Three Musketeers" at the Borough Theatre, Stratford, during the present week, entered into an engagement to perform during the same period at the Globe. His agreement with the plaintiff contained no negative term, and the Court of Appeal, therefore, upholding Cmuvnnnn, J., declined to interfere y an injunction. This cannot be done save where there is an express negative stipulation, and even then only with caution. Lumley v. Wagner, it has been said, is to be looked upon rather as an anomaly to be followed in cases like it, but an anomaly which it would be very dangerous to extend.

SHORTLY AI~'I‘ER the passing of the Companies Act, 1862, the question arose whether in the winding up of a company a. shareholder who is a creditor of the company is entitled to set off the debt due to him against calls due from him, and in Griaeelfs case (L. R. 1 Ch. 528) it was answered in the negative. The substantial ground of this and subsequent decisions is that the calls are a contribution to the assets of the company out of which the fund for the payment of the debts is created, and that the creditor-shareholder is not to be allowed to make use of his liability as a shareholder to secure payment in fu.ll of his debt. To permit this, it was observed by Lord SI~:LnoaNn, C., in Black §~ Oo.’s ease (L. R. 8 Ch., p. 262), would be to give him a preference and to exonerate him from his obligation as a shareholder to contribute towards the payment of the debts of the other creditors. Moreover, section 101 of the Act of 1862, in allowing a set-ofi in certain cases in the winding up of an unlimited company, impliedly forbids this in the case of a limited company. In Brighton Arcade O0. v. Dowling (L. R. 3 C. P. 175) the Court of Common Pleas appears to have rested the matter entirely on the construction of section 101, and, since that section is in the part of the Act relating to winding up by the court, it was held that the same rule did not apply to a voluntary winding up. Hence, in such a winding up a shareholder was allowed to set ofl his debt against calls. But the decision is opposed to the grounds upon which Lord Ssnnonxn based his judgment in Black _!j- C'o.’s case, and itwas disapproved of by Jnssi:-:L,M.R.,in Re Wlitehouse §- 0'0. (9 Ch.D. 595). Sir GEORGE Jnssnn started a new theory that the liability for calls in the winding up was not a debt due to the company, and consequently the elements of a right of set-off did not exist. But this, in turn, seems to have been erroneous. There were cross-debts between the shareholder and the company which according to the ordinary law would have founded a claim to set off, but the claim was excluded upon the general principles governing the liability of the shareholder to contribute to the assets of the company. “The decision in Brryhton Arcade Co. v. Do-wlin_q,” said LINDLEY, L.J., in Re Pyle Works (44 Ch. D., p. 585), after criticizing Sir Gnones Jnssi-:L’s theory, “was, in my opinion, clearly erroneous, because, although the call was a debt due to the company, the statute, properly construed, prohibited the allowance of a set-off in cases of voluntary winding up, as well as in cases of winding up by the court or subject to its supervision.

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Bur wrnnn it is thus well settled that no right of set-ofi exists under ordinary circumstances between a company in liquidation -and a creditor-shareholder, difiiculties arise when the shareholder is insolvent. The rights of another set of creditors are ‘then in question, and according to the decision in Re Duekworth (L. R. 2 Ch. 578) these are allowed to prevail. 1’-rimei faeie this is not very intelligible. The considerations which exclude the right of set-off apply equally whether the shareholder is solvent or insolvent, and it is not easy to understand why his insolvency should put his estate in a better position as regards the company -of which he is a member. The explanation is furnished by the specific provision of the bankruptcy law permitting an extensive right of set-off when an estate is being administered in lbankruptcy (section 38 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883). Under


section 95 of the Companies Ant, 1862, the liquidator of the,

company is empowered to prove against the estate of an insolvent contributory for any balance, and to take a dividend on such balance, and since the proof has to be made and the dividend received in the bankruptcy, it has been held that the balance is to be ascertained according to the rules in bankruptcy. Hence the liquidator can only prove for the balance of calls due after allowing for the debt due from the company to the shareholder. The question whether a similar rule prevails when the creditorshareholder is a company which is also in liquidation has arisen in

the recent case of Aarqfirous Properties (Limited) (1898, 1 Ch. 691),

before Wnrenr, J. It was possible that the practice as to set ofi in winding up had been assimilated to the practice in bank

ruptcy by section l0 of the Judicature Act, 1875. It has

already been determined-, however, that as between a company in liquidation and a solvent creditor-shareholder, this section

does not alter the rule established by the cases cited above (Gill’s case, 12 Ch. D. 755; see Re Waslzingtozt Diamond 1[e'm'n_q

Co., 1893, 3 Ch., p. 112), and neither does the rule seem to be altered when the creditor-shareholder is a company in liquidation.

The ground of Re Due/cworth is that the application to enforce the

calls has to be made in the bankruptcy, and is subject to the

bankruptcy law. But the claim against the shareholder-ccm

pany is made in the liquidation and is subject to the ordinary law

of liquidation. Hence the liquidator of what may be called the

principal company can prove for the calls due from the share

holder-company without allowing any set off of the debt due

to the latter. But the position of the principal company is

really better than this, because, as was held by WRIGHT, J .,

upon a further hearing of the same case (1898, 2 Ch. 428),

the shareholder-company cannot take any dividend on the debt

due from the principal company until it has paid in full all calls

due in the winding up of the principal company. This is in accordance with the last point decided in Grissell’s case (supra).

The amount of the call due from a creditor-contributory must be paid before he has any right to receive a dividend with the other creditors.

Tun ream “Magnolia” is likely to attain some notoriety in the records of litigation. The attempt to uphold the registration of it as a trade-mark resulted in an interesting decision in Re Jlagnolia Jlletal C'o.’a Trade-Jllarks (1897, 2 Ch. 371), and various other proceedings have taken place in which the company have sought to protect their rights in the “ anti-friction metal ” which they manufacture. The decision of the Court of Appeal in the latest of these-—The Jllagnolia Jletal O0. v. Tee Tandem Metal Co.—shews the difficulty of maintaining an action

to preserve a trade-name when no right to it exists by registra

tion, and when the process of manufacture is open to the world. The metal in question was originally manufactured by s secret process. Subsequently it was made the subject of an English patent, and the term “Magnolia” was registered as a trade-mark. The mark was, however, in Re 1l[a_qnolz'a llfetal Co.’e Trade-Jlarks, directed by Knxswlcn, J., to be expuuged, the decision being afiirmed by the Court of Appeal, and in subsequent proceedings before Roman, J ., the patent was declared to be void. But even without a trade-mark or a patent it is possible to protect a tradename on the ground that the use of it by a rival manufacturer is a fraud upon the public, though it seems that, for this purpose, it is necessary to shew that the rival manufacturer is passing off spurious goods under a name to which the plaintifi is exclusively entitled. In the present case the verdict given by the jury at the trial did not shew that at the present time the term “Magnolia” is recognized as exclusively denoting the goods of the plaintiff company, and the circumstances repelled the suggestion that the goods of the defendants were a spurious imitation. Where the plaintiff is manufacturing goods by a secret process, it follows that goods which the defendant palms ofi as being identical must be spurious, and the fraud upon the public is complete The most recent instance of this is the case of Birmingham Vinegar Brewery Co. v. Powell (I897, A. C. 710). But where an invention has been patented the process is published to the world, and is open to everyone, subject only to the protection of the patent. In the present case the patent had gone, and there was no reason why t e defendant company should not, had they so wished, have manufactured the metal according to the

revealed process. In fact, however, it was, according to the


r‘ _—. '. 7 finding of the jury, both practically and commercially, different from that of the plaintiffs. Hence the Court _ of Appeal discharged the injunction in favour of the plaintiff company which had been granted by Ri:o1.1:Y, J., at the trial.

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ON the lst of January, 1899, there will come into operation a new and rather important statute for the amendment of the law as to habitual drunkards—the Inebriates Act, 1898 (61 & 62 Vict. c. 60). There have been during the past few years so many demands on the part of experts for fresh legislation_on this subject, and so many Departmental reports and Bills dealing with it, that a critical summary of the points in which the new statute will affect the law may be of interest and use.

We have first a group of provisions as to the compulsory sequestering in inebriate reformatories of criminal habitual drunkards which are entirely new in their character (sections 1-12). It may be presumed that these provisions give effect in substance to recommendations which have run through the whole course of Parliamentary inquiry into this branch of the law, from the Select Committee of 1872, to whose labours the Inebriates Act, 1879, was due, down to the reports of the Departmental Committee of 1893, which were included m Lord HnasonsL1.’s Inebriates Bill, 1894. The law on the matters in question is to be as follows: Where a person is _convicted on indictment of an offence punishable with imprisonment or penal servitude, if the court is satisfied from the evidence that the offence was committed under the influence of drink, or that drunkenness was a contributory cause of the offence, and the offender admits that he is, or is found by the to be, a habitual drunkard (a term not defined in this Act, but the definition must no doubt be sought in that given by the Inebriates Act, 1879, s. 8: see section 30 of the Act of 1898), the court may, in addition to or substitution for any other sentence, order his detention for a term not exceeding three years in a State inebriate reformatory or any certified inebriate reformatory the managers of which are willing to receive him (section 1 (1))The principle of this change in the law has long passed out of the reach of controversy, and the only practical comment that it requires is to point out how superior, in some respects, the wording of the sub-section is to the vague language of the corresponding provision of the Bill as introduced, “Where a person is convicted, &c., and is proved to be a habitual drunkard.”

The procedure under section 1 is to be as follows: It is to be suflicient in indicting, after charging the offence, to state that the accused is a habitual drunkard ; the offender is in the first instance to be arraigned only for the offence charged. If he pleads, or is foimd, guilty of the offence, then the jury, without being re-sworn, are to be charged to inquire whether the convict is a habitual drunkard, unless he admits the fact (section 1 (2)). Unless evidence that the offender is a habitual drunkard has been given before he is committed for trial, seven days’ notice of the intention to charge habitual drunkenness in the indictment is to be given to the proper ofiicer of the court of trial and to the offender (¢'bz'd.). Again, any person who commits any of the offences specified in Schedule I. (chiefly offences under the Licensing and Town Police Clauses Act), and who, within the twelve months preceding the date of its commission has been convicted summarily at least three times of any such offence, and is a habitual drunkard, is liable to be ordered to a similar period of three years’ detention if convicted on indictment or, if he consents to be tried, summarily (section 2 (1)). The Summary Jurisdiction Act is to apply to proceedings under this section (i'bz'd. (2)). The magistrates will thus have for the future ample powers of dealing with offenders of the Guns and OAKEBREAD species, who often score “ centuries ” of convictions for drunkenness.

Then follow a series of administrative provisions as to the establishment of State inebriate reformatories by the Home Secretary, with the approval of the Treasury (section 3), the establishment of certified inebriate reformatories (section 5), and the appointment of insp~~‘~~rs of such reformatories (sec

tion 7). Power--similar to that conferred in consz7mz'li msu by section 300 of the Lunacy Act, 1890—is given to county court judges to make orders for therecovery of expenses against an inebriate’s estate (section 12).

There remain to be noted a number of very important amendments in the Inebriates Acts, 1879 and 1888. (a) The licensing power is transferred to the county council (section 13), and the council of any county or borough is empowered to con~ tribute to the establishment of any retreat (section 14). (6) The duration of a licence is raised from thirteen months to two years (section 15). Objection had long been taken to the thirteen months’ limit on the ground that it discouraged applications for licences or expenditure on improvements by licensees (qf. lst Report of Inspector of Retreats, 1881, c. 354, p. 1, par. 6). (c) The maximum power of detention is raised from one to two years (the twelve months’ maximum was in many cases too short for a cure to be effected: cf. Report Departmental Committee, 1893, A. (3)), and one justice is substituted for two justices as the attesting authority to the signature of an applicant (section 16). Under section 3 of the Act of 1879, two justices having _7'ur1'sdz'ct[on in the place where the matter requiring their cognizance arose were required. The clause in italics hindered the efiicacy of the statute, and it was repealed by section 3 of the Act of 1888—the attestation of any single justice is now suflicient. (ll) A warrant for the apprehension of an escaped patient may be issued by any single justice having jurisdiction in the place where the person having charge of him resides (section 18 (2) ). Apparently this gets rid of the necessity of a sworn information under section 26 of the Act of 1879.

Lastly, there are provisions for the extension of the term of a patient’s detention, and for his readmission without, as under section 10 of the Act of 1879 and section 4 of the Act of 1888, a statutory declaration or the attesting justice being required to satisfy himself that the applicant is a habitual drunkard (section 17). These amendments give the licensees of retreats practically all that they have asked for, except powers of compulsory committal in non-criminal cases. These are much needed, and they will probably be conferred in time.

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Until the judges have had some opportunities of giving their opinions on the doubtful goints which have already turned up, dissertations on the Criminal Evi ence Act cannot be of very great value. The author of this little book has, however, succeeded in giving his readers some notes which throw a good deal of light on the provisions of the Act, and prepare the way for dealing with some of its difficulties. It is, in fact, a good working copy of the Act, together with an appendix of some of the statutes most likely to be referred to in connection therewith. The most interesting part of the work is undoubtedly the introduction by Sir H. Poland giving a short history of the Act. No opinion on any matter of criminal law has more weight than that of Sir H. Poland, and his efforts in bringing about the great change recently eifected are well known. He makes a suggestion which, if adopted, would be a great boon to poor prisoners; that is, that witnesses for the defence should be placed on the same footing as witnesses for the prosecution as to costs. At present risoner’s witnesses are only allowed their costs if they have appeared) before the magistrate and been bound over. It seems only fair that, under proper restrictions, the costs of other witnesses should also in some cases be allowed.

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(history of the Act, and of the arguments which have been put for~


ward, both in the favour of the change and against it, by various authorities on the criminal law.

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‘Q’ In our review of the third edition of Messrs. Macmorran and Dill’s work on the Local Government Act, 1888 (ante, p. 831), we stated that the first edition was, we believed, published in 1894. The work published by those authors in that year was on the Local Government Act, 1894. The book under review was first published in 1888, and attained a second edition in the same year, and now re-appears in a greatly enlarged form~—ab0ut treble the size of the original work.

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We have received the fifty-third annual issue, for 1899, of our old friend THE LAWYER’S COMPANION AND DIARY (Stevens & Sons (Limited) and Shaw & Sons), which contains all the usual information, conveniently arranged and clearly printed. The diary, on good paper, can be had in different forms according to the number of days on each page, and either interleaved for attendances or with blottingpaper or not. The ribbon for keeping references to places, embellished with the name of an institution, which, we think, first appeared last year, is a convenience in using the book. It would be a still greater convenience if other enterprising institutions would supply two or three other ribbons of different colours to keep different references.

At the meeting of the London County Council on Tuesday, the Establishment Committee reported that the solicitor had stated that it would be to the advantage of the council if two of his assistants were to enter into articles of clerkship with him with a view to their becoming qualified as solicitors. The committee saw no objection to this, and had given permission for the articles to be entered into. They now recommended that their action should be approved. Mr. Jerome desired further information on the matter, and moved an amendment to refer the matter back to the committee, with an instruction to report what right or privilege the solicitor had to give articles of clerkship to the clerks engaged in the solicitor’s department, and on what terms, and whether, it such right or privilege existed, it should not be abolished. Mr. Organ seconded the amendment. Mr. Harris, chairman of the committee, explained the advantages to the council of these clerks becoming duly qualified solicitors. In one instance the Incorporated Law Society had objected to the solicitor’s unqualified assistants appearing for the coimcil in police-courts and elsewhere. The solicitor would receive no premium and the fees would be paid by the clerks. The amendment was rejected and the recommendation 8-81'e.6(1 to.

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This was an appeal on a case stated by six of the justices in and for the county of Lancaster. At a petty session holden at Bacup on the 30th of March, 1898, an information was preferred by VV. Solomon, who prosecuted on behalf of the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, which stated that the respondents on the 20th of October, 1897, at Stacksteads, in Bacup, did employ a male servant for the employing of whom a licence was and is required by statute without having a proper licence under the said statute. The justices dismissed the information. The question involved was whether one Jeremiah Clark, alleged to be in the employ of the respondents, was a maleservant within the meaning of sub-section 3 of section 19 cf 32 8: 33 Vict. c. 14. The following facts were proved. The respondents formed part of a committee elected annually by the members of a club known as the Stacksteads Workmen’s Club, which was was duly registered under the Friendly Societies Acts, 1875-1889. This committee managed and conducted the afifairs of the said club, and had full power to discharge Jeremiah Clark, who, seven years previously, had been appointed steward of the said club by the committee then in oifice. Succeeding committees had continued the same Jeremiah Clark as steward. and he was discharging the duties of that oflice at the time of the alleged oflence. The steward must by the custom of the club (though not by its printed rules) be a member of the club, and the amount paid to him by the direction of the committee was 38s. per week. For this sum the steward was to attend at the club premises from 8 a.m. to 1'2 noon, from 1 p.m. to 4.45 p.m., and from 5.15 p.m. to ll p.m. He did not sleep nor have his meals on the said premises, but remained principally during the hours namedin asmaillbarhavinga window openinginto alarger roomused by the members, there beings counter on either side of the window. The steward did not leave the bar to wait on any member or carry beyond the bar window any drink which might be ordered. The practice was for members to come to this window and give their orders to the steward, who passed the glasses (or whatever was ordered) through the window, when the members took their refreshments to another part of the lar room or consumed them on the counter by the window. This service liiicluding the accounting for the moneys received) comprised _all the service rendered by the steward personally. But it was also reqinred of him that he should, out of the 38s. per week, provide for the cleaning of the club premises, not necessarily that he should do this work himself, but that he should be answerable for it being done. As a fact, the steward's wife attended to the cleaning of the premises entirely herself, the steward not assisting in any form. Such was the state of afiairs on the 20th October, 1897, when the Inland Revenue offlcer called and found the steward engaged with his usual duties in the bar, at which time no licence had been taken out by the respondents authorizing them to employ a male servant. Before giving their decision the justices retired and considered the facts as stated, together with the arguments addressed to them. The result of their deliberations was that, as a bench, they were not satisfied that the man Clark was a male servant in respect of whom duty should be paid. The fact that the club premises were simply used as a resort for entertainment and refreshment, that no one slept on the premises, and that the members were all working men of the artizan class, caused a majority of the bench to be clearly of opinion that the premises did not fairly constitute a house or establishment where male servants, fulfilling the duties mentioned in section 19 of 32 & 33 Vict. c. 14, were engaged. They were all of the opinion that at the time of the passing of the Act such persons as stewards in working meii‘s clubs were unlmown, and that the persons chiefly contemplated were those of an inferior social position, who entered service as male servants in private families where such a luxury could be afforded. In the present case, however, the steward Clark was not inferior to his masters in social position, and his interest in the success or prosperity of the club was equal to any of the others. The conviction of the respondents would have been on their part an extension of the Act of Parliament, and brought in a class never thought cf, and consequently not intended to be brought in, at the time the Act was passed. The justices therefore dismissed the information. The questions for the opinion of the court were: (1) Whether Clark was a. male servant within the meaning of sub-section 3 of section 19 of 32 & 33 Vict. c. 14; (2) whether in the event of his being such he came within any of the exemptions mentioned in sub-sections 4 and 5 of section 19 of 32 & 33 Vict. c. 14 or section 5 of 39 & 40 Vict. c. 16. Section 19, sub-section 3, defines a male servant as follows: “Any male servant employed either wholly or partially in any of the following capaeifies—that is to say, mdim-d’)mt¢1, house-steward, master of the house, groom of the chambers, 't'fll¢i-d¢ckambre, butler, under-butler, clerk of the kitchen, confectioner, cook, house-porter, footman, page, waiter, coachman, groom, postillicn, stableboy, or helper in the stables, under-gardener, huntsman, and whipper_-m, or in any capacity involving the duties of any of the above descriptions of servants, by whatever style the person actmg in such capacity may be called.”

Tun Cour.-r (Lord Russsu. or KILLOWEN, C.J., and Wri.Ls, J .) allowed the appeal.

Lord RUSSELL or KILLOWKN, C.J., in giving judgment, said: The decision of the magistrates was wronfg, and the case must go back them with an intimation of the opinion 0 the court. The whole question here


was whether the man Clark was a male servant who came within the definition of sub-section 3 of section 19 of 32 8: 33 Vict. c. 14. Aft/er reading the facts of the case, the learned judge said that in his opinion the committee were put in control of the club; they were empowered to engage and dismiss the employees of the club and to lag down rules and regulations as to the way in which employees of the clu should carry out their duties. The argument that the steward of the club was not under the orders of anyone was a fallacious argument. He was clearly in the position of a servant and came within the definition of the section, than the words of which nothing could be more comprehensive.

Wr1.r.s, J ., concurred. Appeal allowed. —- Courvsnr, Dnuckwcrls ,Borrmquel, Q.C. Soi.Ic1'r0ns, Solicitor to the Inland Rnwrue ; Robbins, Billings, §~ 0'0.

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Great amusement was caused in Mr. Justice Bruce's court in the Queen’s Bench Division on Tuesday, says the St. Jamefa Gazette, by the discovery, after the case had been progressing for about an hour, that there were thirteen jurymen in the box. The extra juryman was found to be a gentleman who had been summoned to serve if required, and who, without being called, had. unobserved, walked into the jury-box, and been sworn with the other twelve. After an amusing discussion between Mr. Witt, Q.C., and Mr. Rufus Isaacs, Q.C., the surperfluous juryrnan was withdrawn, and the hearing of the case proceeded.

The service at Westminster Abbey, at the opening of the legal year, was largely attended by judges and counsel. The service was a shortened form of morning prayer, and the special psalm was the 139th. The prayers were said by Dr. Troutbeck, and the lessons read by the Dean. The Roman Catholic members of the profes~ion, as usual, attended a “ Votive Mass of the lloly Ghost" at the beginning of the sittings. Three of the judges—the Lord Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Mathew, and Mr. Justice Dayattended in their full robes, and the County Court bench was represented by Judge Bagshawe and Judge Stonor.

The sanitary inspector has, says the Globe, presented his accounts to the Urban Council of Beaconsfleld, Bucks. He modestly charges three shillings for " going to infectious hospital to see that the brougham was in the dry, and that the hens had not roosted upon it." Another item in the account says, “ To taking the devil to \Vheatsheaf Farm, ls. Gd. ; and fetching it back, ls. dd." It seems a little absurd that the Urban Council, after having paid to get the devil out of their midst, should be charged for bringing him back. But the sanitary inspector explained that the “ devil " was merely an instrument used in sewers.

The City Press reports a case tried in the Lord Mayor's Court, before the Common Serjeant, on the 19th inst., in which the defendant said that, when sued in a county court, she went to the court to appear in person. One of the ofiicials said, “ Why don’t you go to a solicitor? I can refer you to a reasonable man ; I will give you a card.” He advised her to go, and she took the card and went to the plaintiff in the present action. The Common Serjeant: Did I understand you to say you were introduced to the plaintiff by an oificial of the court? The defendant said that was so. The Common Serjeant: \Vhat is his name? The defendant: I cannot remember; I think I would know the man again. The Common Serjeant raid it was a very objectionable practice for an ofilcer of a court to recommend a suitor to a solicitor, and was not in accordance with the practice of otficials. After a verdict had been returned for the plaintiif, the Common Serjeant, addressing plaintiff's counsel, said he was sure that he, as a member of the bar, would approve of what he had said. The plaintiff was about to interrupt, when the Common Serjeant remarked that the less he (plaintiff) said the better. If there was an official, and he did not know that there was, touting for solicitors who were friends of his, to get plaintiffs in person to take their cases to the solicitor, it Was an objectionable practice, and if it could be brought home to any official he was afraid that the judges would take a serious view of the conduct of such an ofiicial.

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FROM THE QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. (In Bankruptcy.) 1898. In re F Trischler (expte the Debtor) against a receiving order made by Mr Registrar Linklater, dated August 8, 1898 In re Strickland (expte the Debtor) against a receiving order made by Mr Registrar Hope, dated September 23. 1898 In re O’Sul.livan (expte the Debtor) against an order made by Mr Rleigistrar Hope, dated October 6, 1898, refusing to rescind the receiving o er In re Dinkelspiel (expte the Petitioning Creditor) against an order made by Mr Registrar Hope, dated October 5, 1898, dismissing petition FROM THE CHANCERY DIVISION. (lnterlocutory List.) 1897.

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Grifliths V Hammond ti: anr appl of deft Hammond from judgt of Mr

.11 i1SiZl(§% Mathew, dated May 2, 1898, at trial without a jury, Middlesex "7

Jacobs v Lindow appl of pltfli in person from judgt of Mr Justice Bruce, dated May 24, 1898, at trial with common jury, Middlesex (security ordered) May 24

Davis v Witney Urban District Council appl of pltfi from judgt of Justices Ridley & Channell, dated May 10, 1898 May 25

Davis v Poole (Dredge, garnishee) appl of pltif from judgt of Mr Justice Day, dated May 10, 1898, at trial without a jury, Middlesex May 27

Stephen White & Co v Groves, John, & Co appl of delta from judgt of Mr Justice Mathew, dated May 23, 1898, at trial without a jury, Middlesex May 28

The North-Eastern Railway Co (applts) v The Overseers of the Parish of Dalton 8: the Assessment Committee of Thirslr Union (respts) Crown Szdelsagpl fit appgts from judgt of Justices Wills & Kennedy, dated May

a 2

» Y

G Cartwright v The Guardians of the Poor of Sculooates Union, Kingstonupon-Hull (respts) Crown Side appl of applts from jiidgt of Justices Grantham & Ridley, dated May 14, 1898 May 28

J Richardson Willford v Same appl of applts from judgt of Justices Grantham & Ridley, dated May 14, 1898 May 28

J Walsh v Same appl of applts from judgt of Justices Grantham & Ridley, dated May 14, 1898 May 28

A Robinson v Same appl of applts from j udgt of Justices Grantham & Ridley, dated May 14, 1898 May 28

Attorney-Gen and anr v Hudson appl of deft from judgt of Mr Justice Day, dated May 19, 1898, at trial without a j iu'y, Middle-sex May 28

Hudson v VVeynian appl of pltff from judgt of Mr Justice Day, dated May 19, 1898, at trial. without a jury, Middlesex May 28

In re an Arbitration between the Guardians of Roclidale Union and the Guardians of Huslingden Union ap l of llaslingden Union from judgt of Justices Ridley and Channell, diited May 20, 1898 (special case) June 1

The London & North-Westem Ry Co (applts) v The Ogwen District Council (respts) Crown Side appl of respts from judgt of Justices \Vills and Kenncdy, dated May 16, 1898 J une 2

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Apthorpe, Surveyor of Taxes (applt) v The Peter Schoonhofen Brewing Co, ld (respts) Revenue Side appl of respts from judgt of Justices \Vriglit and Channell, dated April 28, 1898 June 3

Manzel v Liegmann appl of plttf from judgt of Mr Justice Day, dated May 13, 1898, at trial without a jury, Middlesex J ime 3 _

Broggi v Robbins, Snelt, & Gore appl of defts from jiidgt of Mr Justice Day, dated May 20, 1898, at trial without a jury, Middlesex June £3

George v Goldsmiths 8: General Burglary Insurance Association ld appl of defts from judgt of Justices Wills 8: Kennedy, dated May 20, 18 8 June 3

Barnes & anor v Glenton & ors appl of deft A J Lewis from judgt of the Lord Chief Justice, dated May 23, 1898, at trial without a jury June 6

Pneumatic Tyre Co ld v Puncture-Proof Pneumatic Tyre Co, ld app of pltifs from judgt of Mr Justice VVi1ls, dated May 23, 1898, at trial without a jury June 6

In the Matter of The Royal College of Surgeons of England _& In the Matter of Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1885 Revenue Side _appl of petners from judgt of Justices Wright & Channell, dated April 29, 1898 J une 10

The Vartigom—1898—Folio 184 E P Babble & ors v J Samuel & Sen (Admiralty) appl of pltifs from judgt ot Mr Justice Gorell Barnes, dated May 27, 1898 June 14

Horsey Estate ld v Steiger 8: ors appl of J Steiger from judgt of Mr Justice Hawkins, dated May 11, 1898 June 15

Horsey Estate ld v Steiger & ors appl of Petriflte ld from judgt of Mr Justice Hawkins, dated March 26, 1898, at trial without a jury, Middlesex Ju.ne16

Sargent & anr v Home Industries ld appl of deits from judgt of Mr Justice Darling, dated May 26, 1898, at trial without a jury, Middlesex June 21

Preece (liquidator, &c) v Ross 8: anr appl of deft Vautin from judgt oi Mr J ustice Bruce, dated J une 15, 1898, at trial without a jury, Middlesex J une 22

Eastern Telegraph Co 1d v Dent & ors appl of A 8: E Dent from judgt of Mr Justice Kennedy, dated J une 21, 1898 J une 27

The Queen v W H Pearce (Crown Side) appl of The London School Board from judgt of Justices Day & Lawrence, dated June ll, 1898 June 28

Church vMaxted& anr appl of pltfi from judgt of Mr Justice Day, dated June 20, 1898, at trial without a jury, Middlesex J une 28

Hedges v Preston appl of deft from judgt of Mr Justice Bigham, dated J une 14, 1898, at trial without a jury, Middlesex June 28

Perfecta Seamless Steel Tube Co & anrv Baron 8: ors (exors Sac) appl of dcfts from judgt of Justices Day & Lawrance, dated J une 15, 1898 June 29

W G Allen & ors (applts) v The Vestry of the Parish of Fulham (respts) Crown Side appl of applts (except R ll Lilies) from judgment ol Justices Day & Ridley, dated June 30

Powell v Marshall, Par-kes& Co appl of detts from judgt of Justice Wills, dated June 8, 1898, at trial with special jury, Middlesex July 1

The John Griifiths Cycle Corpn ld v Humber & Co ld appl of pltffs from judgt of Mr Justice Phillimore, dated J une 21, 1898, at trial without a ju_ry, Middlesex July 1

B H Hill (applts) v The Crediton Urban District Council (respts) Crown Side appl of respts from judgt of Justices Wills & Darling, dated April 1. 1898 July 4

The Hotel & General Advertising Co ld v Wickenden and anr appl of pltifs from judgt of Mr Justice Bigham, dated June 21, 1898, at trial without a jury, Middlesex J uly 4

In re J Hopkins, Solr & Solicitors Act, 1888 appl of J Hopkins from jndgt or Justices Day & Bruce, dated April 4, 1898 July 4

Terry v Salamaii app of pltzfi from judgt of Mr Justice Kennedy, dated June 25, 1898, at trial without a jury, Mjddlesex July 5

Dockrell v Dougall appl of pltfi from judgt of Mr Justice Ridley, dated June 16, 1898, at trial with common jury, Middlesex July 9

Parker v Cunlifie appl of pltfi from judgment of Mr Justice Wright, dated June 29, 1898 (jury discharged) July 9

Bowler v Barbertoii Reefs, ld appl of deft (Jo from judgt of Mr Justice Wills, dated July 5, 1898, at trial without a jury, Middlcsex July ll

Ingrams, ld v Toole appl of deft from judgt of Justices Day & Bruce, dated April 1, 1898 July ll

Lush v Edgcumbe appl of deft from judgt of Mr Justice Wills, dated July 4, 1898, at trial with special jury, Middlesex July 11

Iiines v Short & anr appl of deft from judgt of Mr Justice Bigliam, dated June 27, 1898, at trial without a jury, Middlesex July 12

Grifliths v Deakin appl of deft from judgt of Mr Justice Day, dated June 24, 1898, at trial without ii. jury, Middlesex July 13

Strong & anr v Tyler & ors appl of pltffs from judgt of Mr Justice ‘l)alrling, dated July 12, 1898, at trial without u jury, Middlescx

ii y 15

Wyler v Loewe appl of pltfi from judgt of Mr J uslice Bigliam, duicd June 23, 1898, at trial without a jury, Middlesei: July 15

Macphail v Graham & ors appl ot pltfi from judgt of Mr Justice Dalrling, dated July ll, 1898, at trial without a jury, Middlesex J u y 16

Curry v Stewart appl of deft from judgt of Mr ‘Justice Day, dated July 13, 1898, at trial, &c, Newcastle-on-Tyne July 18

Hughes & anr v Erith Urban District Council appl of defts from judgt of Mr Justice Wills, dared July 5, 1888, at trial Wllll special jury, Middlesex July 19

Times 5: Co v The Sea Insce Co, ld appl of pllfi from judgt of Mr g1li~ll(.'8 Bigham, dated July 4, 1898, at trial without a jury, Middlerex

U y 20 The Ma) or, &c, of Livtrpool (applts) v The As:e=.smeiit Ccmuiittce of

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