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directly by a decree of specific performance, or indirectly by an company is empowered to prove against the estate of an insolvent injunction, appears to be immaterial." The case of Fredericks contributory for any balance, and to take a dividend on such v. Waller was on all fours with Montague v. Flockton. The balance, and since the proof has to be made and the dividend defendant, after contracting with the plaintiff to perform in received in the bankruptcy, it has been held that the balance "The Three Musketeers" at the Borough Theatre, Stratford, is to be ascertained according to the rules in bankruptcy. Hence during the present week, entered into an engagement to perform the liquidator can only prove for the balance of calls due after during the same period at the Globe. His agreement with allowing for the debt due from the company to the shareholder. the plaintiff contained no negative term, and the Court of Appeal, The question whether a similar rule prevails when the creditortherefore, upholding CHANNELL, J., declined to interfere by an shareholder is a company which is also in liquidation has arisen in injunction. This cannot be done save where there is an the recent case of Auriferous Properties (Limited) (1898, 1 Ch. 691), express negative stipulation, and even then only with caution. before WRIGHT, J. It was possible that the practice as to set Lumley v. Wagner, it has been said, is to be looked upon rather off in winding up had been assimilated to the practice in bankas an anomaly to be followed in cases like it, but an anomaly ruptcy by section 10 of the Judicature Act, 1875. It has which it would be very dangerous to extend. already been determined, however, that as between a company in liquidation and a solvent creditor-shareholder, this section does not alter the rule established by the cases cited above (Gill's case, 12 Ch. D. 755; see Re Washington Diamond Mining Co., 1893, 3 Ch., p. 112), and neither does the rule seem to be altered when the creditor-shareholder is a company in liquidation. The ground of Re Duckworth is that the application to enforce the calls has to be made in the bankruptcy, and is subject to the bankruptcy law. But the claim against the shareholder-company is made in the liquidation and is subject to the ordinary law of liquidation. Hence the liquidator of what may be called the principal company can prove for the calls due from the shareholder-company without allowing any set off of the debt due to the latter. But the position of the principal company is really better than this, because, as was held by WRIGHT, J., upon a further hearing of the same case (1898, 2 Ch. 428), the shareholder-company cannot take any dividend on the debt due from the principal company until it has paid in full all calls due in the winding up of the principal company. This is in accordance with the last point decided in Grissell's case (supra). The amount of the call due from a creditor-contributory must be paid before he has any right to receive a dividend with the other creditors.

SHORTLY AFTER the passing of the Companies Act, 1862, the question arose whether in the winding up of a company a shareholder who is a creditor of the company is entitled to set off the debt due to him against calls due from him, and in Grissell's case (L. R. 1 Ch. 528) it was answered in the negative. The substantial ground of this and subsequent decisions is that the calls are a contribution to the assets of the company out of which the fund for the payment of the debts is created, and that the creditor-shareholder is not to be allowed to make use of his liability as a shareholder to secure payment in full of his debt. To permit this, it was observed by Lord SELBORNE, C., in Black & Co.'s case (L. R. 8 Ch., p. 262), would be to give him a preference and to exonerate him from his obligation as a shareholder to contribute towards the payment of the debts of the other creditors. Moreover, section 101 of the Act of 1862, in allowing a set-off in certain cases in the winding up of an unlimited company, impliedly forbids this in the case of a limited company. In Brighton Arcade Co. v. Dowling (L. R. 3 C. P. 175) the Court of Common Pleas appears to have rested the matter entirely on the construction of section 101, and, since that section is in the part of the Act relating to winding up by the court, it was held that the same rule did not apply to a voluntary winding up. Hence, in such a winding up a shareholder was allowed to set off his debt against calls. But the decision is opposed to the grounds upon which Lord SELBORNE based his judgment in Black & Co.'s case, and it was disapproved of by JESSEL, M.R., in Re Whitehouse & Co. (9 Ch. D. 595). Sir GEORGE JESSEL started a new theory that the liability for calls in the winding up was not a debt due to the company, and consequently the elements of a right of set-off did not exist. But this, in turn, seems to have been erroneous. There were cross-debts between the shareholder and the company which according to the ordinary law would have founded a claim to set off, but the claim was excluded upon the general principles governing the liability of the shareholder to contribute to the assets of the company. "The decision in Brighton Arcade Co. v. Dowling," said LINDLEY, L.J., in Re Pyle Works (44 Ch. D., p. 585), after criticizing Sir GEORGE JESSEL's theory, "was, in my opinion, clearly erroneous, because, although the call was a debt due to the company, the statute, properly construed, prohibited the allowance of a set-off in cases of voluntary winding up, as well as in cases of winding up by the court or subject to its supervision.

BUT WHILE it is thus well settled that no right of set-off exists under ordinary circumstances between a company in liquidation and a creditor-shareholder, difficulties arise when the shareholder is insolvent. The rights of another set of creditors are then in question, and according to the decision in Re Duckworth (L. R. 2 Ch. 578) these are allowed to prevail. Prima facie this is not very intelligible. The considerations which exclude the right of set-off apply equally whether the shareholder is solvent or insolvent, and it is not easy to understand why his insolvency should put his estate in a better position as regards the company of which he is a member. The explanation is furnished by the specific provision of the bankruptcy law permitting an extensive right of set-off when an estate is being administered in bankruptcy (section 38 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883). Under section 95 of the Companies Act, 1862, the liquidator of the

THE TERM "Magnolia" is likely to attain some notoriety in the records of litigation. The attempt to uphold the registration of it as a trade-mark resulted in an interesting decision in Re Magnolia Metal Co.'s Trade-Marks (1897, 2 Čh. 371), and various other proceedings have taken place in which the company have sought to protect their rights in the "anti-friction metal" which they manufacture. The decision of the Court of Appeal in the latest of these-The Magnolia Metal Co. v. The Tandem Metal Co.-shews the difficulty of maintaining an action to preserve a trade-name when no right to it exists by registration, and when the process of manufacture is open to the world. The metal in question was originally manufactured by a secret process. Subsequently it was made the subject of an English patent, and the term "Magnolia" was registered as a trade-mark. The mark was, however, in Re Magnolia Metal Co.'s Trade-Marks, directed by KEKEWICH, J., to be expunged, the decision being affirmed by the Court of Appeal, and in subsequent proceedings before ROMER, J., the patent was declared to be void. But even without a trade-mark or a patent it is possible to protect a tradename on the ground that the use of it by a rival manufacturer is a fraud upon the public, though it seems that, for this purpose, it is necessary to shew that the rival manufacturer is passing off spurious goods under a name to which the plaintiff is exclusively entitled. In the present case the verdict given by the jury at the trial did not shew that at the present time the term "Magnolia" is recognized as exclusively denoting the goods of the plaintiff company, and the circumstances repelled the suggestion that the goods of the defendants were a spurious imitation. Where the plaintiff is manufacturing goods by a secret process, it follows that goods which the defendant palms off as being identical must be spurious, and the fraud upon the public is complete The most recent instance of this is the case of Birmingham Vinegar Brewery Co. v. Powell (1897, A. C. 710). But where an invention has been patented the process is published to the world, and is open to everyone, subject only to the protection of the patent. In the present case the patent had gone, and there was no reason why the defendant company should not, had they so wished, have manufactured the metal according to the evealed process. In fact, however, it was, according to the

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finding of the jury, both practically and commercially, different tion 7). Power-similar to that conferred in consimili casu by from that of the plaintiffs. Hence the Court of Appeal section 300 of the Lunacy Act, 1890-is given to county court discharged the injunction in favour of the plaintiff company judges to make orders for therecovery of expenses against an inebriate's estate (section 12). which had been granted by RIDLEY, J., at the trial.

THE NEW INEBRIATES ACT.

On the 1st of January, 1899, there will come into operation a new and rather important statute for the amendment of the law as to habitual drunkards the Inebriates Act, 1898 (61 & 62 Vict. c. 60). There have been during the past few years so many demands on the part of experts for fresh legislation on this subject, and so many Departmental reports and Bills dealing with it, that a critical summary of the points in which the new statute will affect the law may be of interest and use.

We have first a group of provisions as to the compulsory sequestering in inebriate reformatories of criminal habitual drunkards which are entirely new in their character (sections 1-12). It may be presumed that these provisions give effect in substance to recommendations which have run through the whole course of Parliamentary inquiry into this branch of the law, from the Select Committee of 1872, to whose labours the Inebriates Act, 1879, was due, down to the reports of the Departmental Committee of 1893, which were included in Lord HERSCHELL'S Inebriates Bill, 1894. The law on the matters in question is to be as follows: Where a person is convicted on indictment of an offence punishable with imprisonment or penal servitude, if the court is satisfied from the evidence that the offence was committed under the influence of drink, or that drunkenness was a contributory cause of the offence, and the offender admits that he is, or is found by the jury to be, a habitual drunkard (a term not defined in this Act, but the definition must no doubt be sought in that given by the Inebriates Act, 1879, s. 3: see section 30 of the Act of 1898), the court may, in addition to or substitution for any other sentence, order his detention for a term not exceeding three years in a State inebriate reformatory or any certified inebriate reformatory the managers of which are willing to receive him (section 1 (1)). The principle of this change in the law has long passed out of the reach of controversy, and the only practical comment that it requires is to point out how superior, in some respects, the wording of the sub-section is to the vague language of the corresponding provision of the Bill as introduced, "Where a person is convicted, &c., and is proved to be a habitual drunkard."

The procedure under section 1 is to be as follows: It is to be sufficient in indicting, after charging the offence, to state that the accused is a habitual drunkard; the offender is in the first instance to be arraigned only for the offence charged. If he pleads, or is found, guilty of the offence, then the jury, without being re-sworn, are to be charged to inquire whether the convict is a habitual drunkard, unless he admits the fact (section 1 (2)). Unless evidence that the offender is a habitual drunkard has been given before he is committed for trial, seven days' notice of the intention to charge habitual drunkenness in the indictment is to be given to the proper officer of the court of trial and to the offender (ibid.). Again, any person who commits any of the offences specified in Schedule I. (chiefly offences under the Licensing and Town Police Clauses Act), and who, within the twelve months preceding the date of its commission has been convicted summarily at least three times of any such offence, and is a habitual drunkard, is liable to be ordered to a similar period of three years' detention if convicted on indictment or, if he consents to be tried, summarily (section 2 (1)). The Summary Jurisdiction Act is to apply to proceedings under this section (ibid. (2)). The magistrates will thus have for the future ample powers of dealing with offenders of the GATES and CAKEBREAD species, who often score centuries" of convictions for drunkenness.

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Then follow a series of administrative provisions as to the establishment of State inebriate reformatories by the Home Secretary, with the approval of the Treasury (section 3), the establishment of certified inebriate reformatories (section 5), and the appointment of inspects of such reformatories (sec

There remain to be noted a number of very important amendments in the Inebriates Acts, 1879 and 1888. (a) The licensing power is transferred to the county council (section 13), and the council of any county or borough is empowered to contribute to the establishment of any retreat (section 14). (b) The duration of a licence is raised from thirteen months to two years (section 15). Objection had long been taken to the thirteen months' limit on the ground that it discouraged applications for licences or expenditure on improvements by licensees (cf. 1st Report of Inspector of Retreats, 1881, c. 354, p. 1, par. 5). (c) The maximum power of detention is raised from one to two years (the twelve months' maximum was in many cases too short for a cure to be effected: ef. Report Departmental Committee, 1893, A. (3)), and one justice is substituted for two justices as the attesting authority to the signature of an applicant (section 16). Under section 3 of the Act of 1879, two justices having jurisdiction in the place where the matter requiring their cognizance arose were required. The clause in italics hindered the efficacy of the statute, and it was repealed by section 3 of the Act of 1888-the attestation of any single justice is now sufficient. (d) A warrant for the apprehension of an escaped patient may be issued by any single justice having jurisdiction in the place where the person having charge of him resides (section 18 (2)). Apparently this gets rid of the necessity of a sworn information under section 26 of the Act of

1879.

Lastly, there are provisions for the extension of the term of a patient's detention, and for his readmission without, as under section 10 of the Act of 1879 and section 4 of the Act of 1888, a statutory declaration or the attesting justice being required to satisfy himself that the applicant is a habitual drunkard (section 17). These amendments give the licensees of retreats practically all that they have asked for, except powers of compulsory committal in non-criminal cases. These are much needed, and they will probably be conferred in time.

REVIEWS.

THE CRIMINAL EVIDENCE ACT, 1898. THE CRIMINAL EVIDENCE ACT, 1898. WITH NOTES. BY WILFRID BAUGH ALLEN, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. AND A SHORT HISTORY OF THE ACT. By Sir HARRY BODKIN POLAND, Q.C. Butterworth & Co.; Shaw & Sons.

Until the judges have had some opportunities of giving their opinions on the doubtful points which have already turned up, dissertations on the Criminal Evidence Act cannot be of very great value. The author of this little book has, however, succeeded in giving his readers some notes which throw a good deal of light on the provisions of the Act, and prepare the way for dealing with some of its difficulties. It is, in fact, a good working copy of the Act, together with an appendix of some of the statutes most likely to be referred to in connection therewith. The most interesting part of the work is undoubtedly the introduction by Sir H. Poland giving a short history of the Act. No opinion on any matter of criminal law has more weight than that of Sir H. Poland, and his efforts in bringing about the great change recently effected are well known. He makes a suggestion which, if adopted, would be a great boon to poor prisoners; that is, that witnesses for the defence should be placed on the same footing as witnesses for the prosecution as to costs. At present prisoner's witnesses are only allowed their costs if they have fair that, under proper restrictions, the costs of other witnesses should appeared before the magistrate and been bound over. It seems only also in some cases be allowed.

THE CRIMINAL EVIDENCE ACT, 1898, COMPRISING THE HISTORY

OF THE ACT AND ITS FULL TEXT. WITH EXPLANATORY NOTES. By CHARLES BRONTE MORGAN, Barrister-at-Law. Effingham Wilson.

This little book contains the text of the Criminal Evidence Act, with some short explanatory notes and comments. Considerably more than half of it, however, consists of an interesting sketch of the history of the Act, and of the arguments which have been put for

ward, both in the favour of the change and against it, by various authorities on the criminal law.

In our review of the third edition of Messrs. Macmorran and Dill's work on the Local Government Act, 1888 (ante, p. 831), we stated that the first edition was, we believed, published in 1894. The work published by those authors in that year was on the Local Government Act, 1894. The book under review was first published in 1888, and attained a second edition in the same year, and now re-appears in a greatly enlarged form-about treble the size of the original work.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Investigation of Title; being a Practical Treatise and Alphabetical Digest of the Law Connected with the Title to Land. With Precedents of Requisitions. By W. HOWLAND JACKSON and THOROLD GOSSETT, B.A., LL.M., Barristers-at-Law. Stevens & Sons (Limited). The Law of Negligence. By THOMAS WILLIAM SAUNDERS, Esq., Barrister-at-Law, Recorder of Bath. Second Edition. Re-written, with the Addition of the Employers' Liability Act, 1880, and the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897. By E. BLACKWOOD WRIGHT, B.A., LL.B., Barrister-at-Law. Butterworth & Co.

Local Government Act, 1894. A Practical Ready Reference Guide to Parish Councils and Parish Meetings. By J. HARRIS STONE, M.A., and J. G. PEASE, B.A., Barristers-at-Law. Eighth Edition, Revised and Enlarged. George Philip & Son.

NEW ORDERS, &c.

THE LAND TRANSFER ACT, 1897.
ORDER IN COUNCIL.

At the Court at Balmoral, the 20th day of October, 1898. Present, The Queen's Most Excellent Majesty in Council. Whereas it is expedient that the operation of the Order in Council, dated the 18th of July, 1898, and made pursuant to the Land Transfer Act, 1897, should be postponed: Now it is hereby ordered and declared that the said Order is to be read and to take effect as if instead of the words "first of November, 1898," the words "first of January, 1899," had been inserted in the Schedule thereto.

Land Registry Office,

A. W. FITZROY.

34, Lincoln's-inn-fields, London, 18th October, 1898.

The Lord Chancellor, with the concurrence of the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, hereby gives notice that the under-mentioned situation is added to Schedule B of the Order in Council of 4th June, 1870

Temporary Draughtsman in the Land Registry.

We have received the fifty-third annual issue, for 1899, of our old friend THE LAWYER'S COMPANION AND DIARY (Stevens & Sons (Limited) and Shaw & Sons), which contains all the usual information, conveniently arranged and clearly printed. The diary, on good paper, can be had in different forms according to the number of days on each page, and either interleaved for attendances or with blottingpaper or not. The ribbon for keeping references to places, embellished with the name of an institution, which, we think, first appeared last year, is a convenience in using the book. It would be a still greater convenience if other enterprising institutions would supply two or three other ribbons of different colours to keep different references. At the meeting of the London County Council on Tuesday, the Establishment Committee reported that the solicitor had stated that it would be to the advantage of the council if two of his assistants were to enter into articles of clerkship with him with a view to their becoming qualified as solicitors. The committee saw no objection to this, and had given permission for the articles to be entered into. They now recommended that their action should be approved. Mr. Jerome desired further information on the matter, and moved an amendment to refer the matter back to the committee, with an instruction to report what right or privilege the solicitor had to give articles of clerkship to the clerks engaged in the solicitor's department, and on what terms, and whether, if such right or privilege existed, it should not be abolished. Mr. Organ seconded the amendment. Mr. Harris, chairman of the committee, explained the advantages to the council of these clerks becoming duly qualified solicitors. In one instance the Incorporated Law Society had objected to the solicitor's unqualified assistants appearing for the council in police-courts and elsewhere. The solicitor would receive no premium and the fees would be paid by the clerks. The amendment was rejected and the recommendation agreed to.

I

CASES OF THE WEEK.

High Court-Queen's Bench Division.

SOLOMON. CROPPER AND ANOTHER. Div. Court. 25th Oct. INLAND REVENUE-MALE SERVANT-CLUB STEWARD-LICENCE-32 & 33 VICT. c. 14, s. 19, SUB-SECTION 3.

This was an appeal on a case stated by six of the justices in and for the county of Lancaster. At a petty session holden at Bacup on the 30th of March, 1898, an information was preferred by W. Solomon, who prosecuted on behalf of the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, which stated that the respondents on the 20th of October, 1897, at Stacksteads, in Bacup, did employ a male servant for the employing of whom a licence was and is required by statute without having a proper licence under the said statute. The justices dismissed the information. The question involved was whether one Jeremiah Clark, alleged to be in the employ of the respondents, was a male servant within the meaning of sub-section 3 of section 19 of 32 & 33 Vict. c. 14. The following facts were proved. The respondents formed part of a committee elected annually by the members of a club known as the Stacksteads Workmen's Club, which was was duly registered under the Friendly Societies Acts, 1875-1889. This committee managed and conducted the affairs of the said club, and had full power to discharge Jeremiah Clark, who, seven years previously, had been appointed steward of the said club by the committee then in office. Succeeding committees had continued the same Jeremiah Clark as steward. and he was discharging the duties of that office at the time of the alleged offence. The steward must by the custom of the club (though not by its printed rules) be a member of the club, and the amount paid to him by the direction of the committee was 38s. per week. For this sum the steward was to attend at the club premises from 8 a.m. to 12 noon, from 1 p.m. to 4.45 p.m., and from 5.15 p.m. to 11 p.m. He did not sleep nor have his meals on the said premises, but remained principally during the hours named in a small bar having a window opening into a larger room used by the members, there being a counter on either side of the window. The steward did not leave the bar to wait on any member or carry beyond the bar window any drink which might be ordered. The practice was for members to come to this window and give their orders to the steward, who passed the glasses (or whatever was ordered) through the window, when the members took their refreshments to another part of the large room or consumed them on the counter by the window. This service (including the accounting for the moneys received) comprised all the service rendered by the steward personally. But it was also required of him that he should, out of the 38s. per week, provide for the cleaning of the club premises, not necessarily that he should do this work himself, but that he should be answerable for it being done. As a fact, the steward's wife attended to the cleaning of the Such premises entirely herself, the steward not assisting in any form. was the state of affairs on the 20th October, 1897, when the Inland Revenue officer called and found the steward engaged with his usual duties in the bar, at which time no licence had been taken out by the respondents authorizing them to employ a male servant. Before giving their decision the justices retired and considered the facts as stated, together with the arguments addressed to them. The result of their deliberations was that, as a bench, they were not satisfied that the man Clark was a male servant in respect of whom duty should be paid. The fact that the club premises were simply used a resort for entertainment and refreshment, that no one slept on the premises, and that the members were all working men of the artizan class, caused a majority of the bench to be clearly of opinion that the premises did not fairly constitute a house or establishment where male servants, fulfilling the duties mentioned in section 19 of 32 & 33 Vict. c. 14, were engaged. They were all of the opinion that at the time of the passing of the Act such persons as stewards in working men's clubs were unknown, and that the persons chiefly contemplated were those of an inferior social position, who entered service as male servants in private In the present case, families where such a luxury could be afforded. however, the steward Clark was not inferior to his masters in social or prosperity of the club position, and his interest in the success was equal to any of the others. The conviction of the respondents would have been on their part an extension of the Act of Parliament, and brought in a class never thought of, and consequently not intended to be brought in, at the time the Act was passed. justices therefore dismissed the information. The questions for the opinion of the court were: (1) Whether Clark was a male servant within the meaning of sub-section 3 of section 19 of 32 & 33 Vict. c. 14; (2) whether in the event of his being such he came within any of the exemptions mentioned in sub-sections 4 and 5 of section 19 of 32 & 33 Vict. c. 14 or section 5 of 39 & 40 Vict. c. 16. Section 19, sub-section 3, defines a male servant as follows: " Any male servant employed either wholly or partially in any of the following capacities-that is to say, mâitre-d'hotel, house-steward, master of the house, groom of the chambers, valet-dechambre, butler, under-butler, clerk of the kitchen, confectioner, cook, house-porter, footman, page, waiter, coachman, groom, postillion, stableboy, or helper in the stables, under-gardener, huntsman, and whipper-in, of servants, by whatever style the person acting in such capacity may be or in any capacity involving the duties of any of the above descriptions

called."

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THE COURT (Lord RUSSELL OF KILLOWEN, C.J., and WILLS, J.) allowed the appeal.

Lord RUSSELL OF KILLOWEN, C.J., in giving judgment, said: The decision of the magistrates was wrong, and the case must go back to them with an intimation of the opinion of the court, The whole question here

Was whether the man Clark was a male servant who came within the definition of sub-section 3 of section 19 of 32 & 33 Vict. c. 14. After reading the facts of the case, the learned judge said that in his opinion the committee were put in control of the club; they were empowered to engage and dismiss the employees of the club and to lay down rules and regulations as to the way in which employees of the club should carry out their duties. The argument that the steward of the club was not under the orders of anyone was a fallacious argument. He was clearly in the position of a servant and came within the definition of the section, than the words of which nothing could be more comprehensive.

WILLS, J., concurred. Appeal allowed. - COUNSEL, Danckwerts; Bosanquet, Q.C. Billings, & Co.

Great amusement was caused in Mr. Justice Bruce's court in the Queen's Bench Division on Tuesday, says the St. James's Gazette, by the discovery, after the case had been progressing for about an hour, that there were thirteen jurymen in the box. The extra juryman was found to be a gentleman who had been summoned to serve if required, and who, without being called, had. unobserved, walked into the jury-box, and been sworn with the other twelve. After an amusing discussion between Mr. Witt, Q.C., and Mr. Rufus Isaacs, Q.C., the surperfluous juryman was withdrawn, and the hearing of the case proceeded.

The service at Westminster Abbey, at the opening of the legal year, was largely attended by judges and counsel. The service was a shortened form

SOLICITORS, Solicitor to the Inland Revenue; Robbins, of morning prayer, and the special psalm was the 139th. The prayers

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LAW STUDENTS' DEBATING SOCIETY.-October 25.-Mr. C. Augustus Anderson in the chair.-The subject for debate was: "That the case of Manners v. Pearson & Sons (1898, 1 Ch. 501) was wrongly decided." Mr. W. A. Jolly opened in the affirmative; Mr. S. F. Fitton seconded in the affirmative; Mr. Rupert Blagden opened in the negative; Mr. G. H. Thorne seconded in the negative. The following members al-o spoke: In the affirmative-Messrs. A. W. Watson, W. Gurney Winter, Haseldine Jones, W. E. Tyldesly Jones; in the negative-Messrs. G. H. Daniell, E. R. Kahn, E. L. Chapman, and Percy U. M. Hart. The motion was carried by one vote.

were said by Dr. Troutbeck, and the lessons read by the Dean. The Roman Catholic members of the profession, as usual, attended a "Votive Mass of the Holy Ghost" at the beginning of the sittings. Three of the judges-the Lord Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Mathew, and Mr. Justice Dayattended in their full robes, and the County Court bench was represented by Judge Bagshawe and Judge Stonor.

The sanitary inspector has, says the Globe, presented his accounts to the Urban Council of Beaconsfield, Bucks. He modestly charges three shillings for "going to infectious hospital to see that the brougham was in the dry, and that the hens had not roosted upon it." Another item in the account says, fetching it back, 1s. 6d." It seems a little absurd that the Urban Council, "To taking the devil to Wheatsheaf Farm, 1s. 6d.; and after having paid to get the devil out of their midst, should be charged for bringing him back. But the sanitary inspector explained that the 66 'devil 99 was merely an instrument used in sewers.

The City Press reports a case tried in the Lord Mayor's Court, before the Common Serjeant, on the 19th inst., in which the defendant said that, when sued in a county court, she went to the court to appear in person. One of the officials said, "Why don't you go to a solicitor? I can refer you to a reasonable man; I will give you a card." He advised her to go, and she took the card and went to the plaintiff in the present action. The Common Serjeant: Did I understand you to say you were introduced to the plaintiff by an official of the court? The defendant said that was so. The Common Serjeant: What is his name? The defeudant: I cannot remember; I think I would know the man again. The Common Serjeant said it was a very objectionable practice for an officer of a court to recommend a suitor to a solicitor, and was not in accordance with the practice of officials. After a verdict had been returned for the plaintiff, the Common Serjeant, addressing plaintiff's counsel, said he was sure that he, as a member of the bar, would approve of what he had said. The plaintiff was about to interrupt, when the Common Serjeant remarked that the less he (plaintiff) said the better. If there was an official, and he did not know that there was, touting for solicitors who were friends of his, to get plaintiffs in person to take their cases to the solicitor, it was an objectionable practice, and if it could be brought home to any official he was afraid that the judges would take a serious view of the conduct of such an official.

LEGAL NEWS.

CHANGES IN PARTNERSHIPS, &c.

Mr. GEORGE BOYD WICKES, Solicitor, of 82, Bishopsgate-street Within, London, is about to take into partnership Mr. EDWARD FRANK CHAMPION, LL.B., solicitor, formerly of 15, Bedford-row, and on and after the 1st of November, 1898, the business will be carried on under the firm name of Wickes & Champion.

GENERAL.

The list of House of Lords appeals up to the present comprise, it is stated, eleven cases of appeal from the High Court of England and four from Scotland. There are also seven causes waiting for judgment, including the important betting appeal of Powell v. Kempton Park Racecourse Co. (Limited).

A Reuter telegram from Rangoon announces the death of Mr. Edward Hosking, judge of the High Court of Burma, has died at the sanitary station of Yercand, in the Shevaroy hills. Mr. Hosking was first sent to Burma in November, 1892, as judicial commissioner, and became judge of the High Court in May, 1896.

Lord Justice Collins will preside at the inaugural law lecture of the ensuing session of the series arranged by the Solicitors' Managing Clerks' Association, which will take place in the Middle Temple Hall on Tuesday, the 1st of November, when Mr. Crump, Q.C., will deliver a lecture on the subject of "Malice."

As Mr. Justice Mathew was proceeding up the oaken staircase of the Queen's Bench judges' private entrance at the Law Courts on We Wednesday morning, says the Times, he slipped on the stairs and fell heavily forward, thereby sustaining a somewhat severe shaking. The learned judge, however, later on took his seat in court as usual.

The Times says that in consequence of additional accommodation being required for the Land Registry Office in Lincoln's-inn-fields, the court of the junior official referee, Mr. Pollock, has been transferred from Portugalstreet, Lincoln's-inn, to Room 305 at the Royal Courts of Justice. It is expected that the other official referees will be removed to the Law Courts before long.

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Lancaster (Preston District), dated June 21, 1898 (order not perfected) | Apthorpe, Surveyor of Taxes (applt) y The Peter Schoonhofen Brewing July 16

FROM THE QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.

(In Bankruptcy.) 1898.

In re F Trischler (expte the Debtor) against a receiving order made by Mr Registrar Linklater, dated August 8, 1898

In re Strickland (expte the Debtor) against a receiving order made by Mr Registrar Hope, dated September 23, 1898

In re O'Sullivan (expte the Debtor) against an order made by Mr Registrar Hope, dated October 6, 1898, refusing to rescind the receiving

order

In re Dinkelspiel (expte the Petitioning Creditor) against an order made by Mr Registrar Hope, dated October 5, 1898, dismissing petition FROM THE CHANCERY DIVISION. (Interlocutory List.) 1897.

Wilkinson v Leyland appl of deft from order of Mr. Justice Kekewich, dated August 10, 1897 (order not perfected.) August 13

Lake v Harrison app of dft from order of Mr Justice North, dated Aug, 1897 (order not perfected) Aug 20

Boord v The African Consolidated Land & Trading Co, ld app of defts from order of Mr Justice North, dated Dec 10, 1897 (order not porfected) Dec 18

Stephens v Lydall appl of pltff from order of Mr Justice Kekewich, dated July 9, 1898 August 4

Brookman v Associated Gold Mines of Western Australia ld appl of pltff from order of Mr Justice Kekewich, dated July 29, 1898 (order not perfected) August 6

In re Hay Hay v Hockey appl of pltff from order of Mr Justice Kekewich dated July 29, 1898 August 9

Pugh v Stower appl of pltff from order of Mr. Justice Stirling, dated July 27, 1898 (order not perfected) August 12

SE Brinsmead & Sons ld v Lomax appl of defts The Consolidated
Exploration and Finance Co ld from order of Mr Justice North, dated
August 1, 1898 August 12

Ainsworth v Wilding appl of deft J Wilding from order of Mr Justice
Stirling, dated August 9, 1898 (order not perfected) August 16
Roberts v Heaton appl of pltff from order of Mr Justice Stirling, dated
August 9, 1898 (order not perfected) August 23

In re James Boyton & Rules of Supreme Court, 1883 appl of respts W E
Holmes and anr from order of Mr Justice Kekewich, dated July 8, 1898
August 24

RE King ld v Gardner appl of deft from order of Mr Justice Kekewich, dated August 9, 1898 August 26

Hutchings v The Seaford Urban Dictrict Council appl of pltff from order of Mr Justice Channell (sitting, &c), dated September 21, 1898 (order not perfected) October 4

FROM THE QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION.

For Hearing. (Final List.)

1898.

Griffiths v Hammond & anr appl of deft Hammond from judgt of Mr Justice Mathew, dated May 2, 1898, at trial without a jury, Middlesex May 23

Jacobs v Lindow appl of pltff in person from judgt of Mr Justice Bruce, dated May 24, 1898, at trial with common jury, Middlesex (security ordered) May 24

Davis v Witney Urban District Council appl of pltff from judgt of
Justices Ridley & Channell, dated May 19, 1898 May 25
Davis v Poole (Dredge, garnishee) appl of pltff from judgt of Mr Justice
Day, dated May 10, 1898, at trial without a jury, Middlesex May 27
Stephen White & Co v Groves, John, & Co appl of defts from judgt of
Mr Justice Mathew, dated May 23, 1898, at trial without a jury,
Middlesex May 28

The North-Eastern Railway Co (applts) v The Overseers of the Parish of
Dalton & the Assessment Committee of Thirsk Union (respts) Crown
Side appl of applts from judgt of Justices Wills & Kennedy, dated May
16, 1898 May 28

G Cartwright v The Guardians of the Poor of Sculcoates Union, Kingstonupon-Hull (respts) Crown Side appl of applts from judgt of Justices Grantham & Ridley, dated May 14, 1898 May 28

J Richardson Willford v Same appl of applts from judgt of Justices Grantham & Ridley, dated May 14, 1898 May 28

J Walsh Same appl of applts from judgt of Justices Grantham &
Ridley, dated May 14, 1898 May 28

A Robinson v Same appl of applts from judgt of Justices Grantham &
Ridley, dated May 14, 1898 May 28
Attorney-Gen and anr v Hudson appl of deft from judgt of Mr Justice
Day, dated May 19, 1898, at trial without a jury, Middlesex
May 28
Hudson v Weyman appl of pltff from judgt of Mr Justice Day, dated
May 19, 1898, at trial without a jury, Middlesex May 28
In re an Arbitration between the Guardians of Rochdale Union and the
Guardians of Haslingden Union appl of Haslingden Union from judgt
of Justices Ridley and Channell, dated May 20, 1898 (special case)

June 1

The London & North-Western Ry Co (applts) v The Ogwen District Council (respts) Crown Side appl of respts from judgt of Justices Wills and Kennedy, dated May 16, 1898 June 2

Co, ld (respts) Revenue Side appl of respts from judgt of Justices Wright and Channell, dated April 28, 1898 June 3

Manzel v Liegmann appl of pltff from judgt of Mr Justice Day, dated May 13, 1898, at trial without a jury, Middlesex June 3

Broggi v Robbins, Snelt, & Gore appl of defts from judgt of Mr Justice Day, dated May 20, 1898, at trial without a jury, Middlesex June 3 George v Goldsmiths & General Burglary Insurance Association ld appl of defts from judgt of Justices Wills & Kennedy, dated May 20, 1898 June 3

Barnes & anor v Glenton & ors appl of deft AJ Lewis from judgt_of_the Lord Chief Justice, dated May 23, 1898, at trial without a jury June 6 Pneumatic Tyre Co ld v Puncture-Proof Pneumatic Tyre Co, ld app of pltffs from judgt of Mr Justice Wills, dated May 23, 1898, at trial without a jury June 6

In the Matter of The Royal College of Surgeons of England & In the Matter of Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1885 Revenue Side appl of petners from judgt of Justices Wright & Channel, dated April 29, 1898 June 10

The Vartigom-1898-Folio 184 E P Babbie & ors v J Samuel & Son (Admiralty) appl of pltffs from judgt of Mr Justice Gorell Barnes, dated May 27, 1898 June 14

Horsey Estate id v Steiger & ors appl of J Steiger from judgt of Mr Justice Hawkins, dated May 11, 1898 June 15

Horsey Estate ld v Steiger & ors appl of Petrifite ld from judgt of Mr Justice Hawkins, dated March 26, 1898, at trial without a jury, Middlesex June 16

Sargent & anr v Home Industries ld appl of defts from judgt of Mr Justice Darling, dated May 26, 1898, at trial without a jury, Middlesex June 21

Preece (liquidator, &c) v Ross & aur appl of deft Vautin from judgt of Mr Justice Bruce, dated June 15, 1898, at trial without a jury, Middlesex June 22

Eastern Telegraph Co ld v Dent & ors appl of A & E Dent from judgt of Mr Justice Kennedy, dated June 21, 1898 June 27 The Queen v W H Pearce (Crown Side) appl of The London School Board from judgt of Justices Day & Lawrance, dated June 11, 1898 June 28 Church v Maxted & anr appl of pltff from judgt of Mr Justice Day, dated June 20, 1898, at trial without a jury, Middlesex June 28 Hedges v Preston appl of deft from judgt of Mr Justice Bigham, dated June 14, 1898, at trial without a jury, Middlesex June 28 Perfecta Seamless Steel Tube Co & anr v Baron & ors (exors &c) appl of defts from judgt of Justices Day & Lawrance, dated June 15, 1898 June 29

W G Allen & ors (applts) v The Vestry of the Parish of Fulham (respts) Crown Side appl of applts (except R B Lilles) from judgment of Justices Day & Ridley, dated June 30

Powell v Marshall, Parkes & Co appl of defts from judgt of Justice Wills, dated June 8, 1898, at trial with special jury, Middlesex July 1

The John Griffiths Cycle Corpn ld v Humber & Co ld appl of pltffs from judgt of Mr Justice Phillimore, dated June 21, 1898, at trial without a jury, Middlesex July 1

BH Hill (applts) v The Crediton Urban District Council (respts) Crown Side appl of respts from judgt of Justices Wills & Darling, dated April 1, 1898 July 4

The Hotel & General Advertising Co ld v Wickenden and anr appl of pltffs from judgt of Mr Justice Bigham, dated June 21, 1898, at trial without a jury, Middlesex July 4

In re J Hopkins, Solr & Solicitors Act, 1888 appl of J Hopkins from
judgt of Justices Day & Bruce, dated April 4, 1898 July 4
Terry v Salaman appl of pltff from judgt of Mr Justice Kennedy, dated
June 25, 1898, at trial without a jury, Middlesex July 5
Dockrell v Dougall appl of pltff from judgt of Mr Justice Ridley, dated
June 16, 1898, at trial with common jury, Middlesex July 9
Parker v Cunliffe appl of pltff from judgment of Mr Justice Wright,
dated June 29, 1898 (jury discharged) July 9

Bowler v Barberton Reefs, ld appl of deft Co from judgt of Mr Justice
Wills, dated July 5, 1898, at trial without a jury, Middlesex July 11
Ingrams, ld v Toole appl of deft from judgt of Justices Day & Bruce,
dated April 1, 1898 July 11

Lush v Edgcumbe appl of deft from judgt of Mr Justice Wills, dated
July 4, 1898, at trial with special jury, Middlesex July 11
Innes v Short & anr appl of deft from judgt of Mr Justice Bigham, dated
June 27, 1898, at trial without a jury, Middlesex July 12
Griffiths v Deakin appl of deft from judgt of Mr Justice Day, dated
June 24, 1898, at trial without a jury, Middlesex July 13
Strong & ant v Tyler & ors appl of pltffs from judgt of Mr Justice
Darling, dated July 12, 1898, at trial without a jury, Middlesex
July 15

Wyler v Loewe appl of pltff from judgt of Mr Justice Bigham, dated
June 23, 1898, at trial without a jury, Middlesex July 15
Macphail v Graham & ors appl of pltff from judgt of Mr Justice
Darling, dated July 11, 1898, at trial without a jury, Middlesex
July 16

Curry v Stewart appl of deft from judgt of Mr Justice Day, dated July
13, 1898, at trial, &c, Newcastle-on-Tyne July 18
Hughes & anr v Erith Urban District Council appl of defts from judgt
of Mr Justice Wills, dated July 5, 1898, at trial with special jury,
Middlesex July 19
Times & Co v The Sea Insce Co, ld appl of pltff from judgt of Mr
Justice Bigham, dated July 4, 1898, at trial without a jury, Middlesex
July 20

The Mayor, &c, of Liverpool (applts) v The As: e:sment Committee of

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