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for any loss period during which he has been in the employment the termination of a voluntary winding up (sections 142, 143) of the same employer, such weekly payment not to exceed £1." require the liquidators to call a general meeting for the
purpose This is clear enough for cases where the workman's employment of receiving a final account. The liquidators then make a has lasted for a sufficient number of weeks to make it possible return to the registrar of the meeting having been held and of to strike an average-possibly one week would give an average its date, and on the expiration of three months from the date for this purpose.
But what is to be done where, as in the of the registration of the return, the company is to be deemed to present case, there has neither been a week's work nor has any be dissolved. Such dissolution, however, is not an absolute bar rate of wages been agreed upon ? The claimant pro- to all further proceedings in relation to the company. In Re posed to refer back to his previous employment as Crookhaven Mining Co. (L. R. 3 Eq. 69) it was held that the blacksmith, where he earning 338.60. & week. court had jurisdiction to make an order in the voluntary He accordingly claimed a weekly payment of 168. 9d. winding up after the expiration of the three months, if the But this was obviously inadmissible, and so Judge WHITE- application for the order was made before the expiraHORNE held. The rate of wages contemplated by the Act tion of such period. There the delay in the hearing of refers only to the time of employment under the employer the application had been due to the intervention of the Long against whom the claim is made. It would be possible to argue Vacation. Lord ROMILLY, M.R., held that this could not affect that the case was not within the Act at all, no weekly earnings the rights of the applicant, and that he was entitled to stand in upon which to strike an average having accrued. But this the same position as though the application had been heard view was not put forward by the insurance company who were before the expiration of the three months. A similar delay has behind the defendants, and if it had been it seems the judge led to a similar decision in Whiteley Exerciser (Lim.) v. Gamage would not have adopted it. His desire, he said, was to carry (1898, 2 Ch. 405), the delay on this occasion, however, being due out the purpose of the Act loyally, and this was inconsistent to the congested state of business in the court. The general with a narrow interpretation of its provisions. But if some scale meeting under section 142 in the winding up of the plaintiff of wages had to be applied, and none had been agreed upon company was held on the 8th of January, 1898. The between the parties, it seemed inevitable to adopt the current rate return was registered under section 143 on the 14th of January. for the kind of work to which the plaintiff had been actually put. Consequently the company was to be deemed to be dissolved For the unskilled labour in which he was employed at the time on the 14th of April. A summons dealing with the taxation of the accident the current rate was 24s. a week, and at half of the costs in the action was taken out by the defendant on the this, or 128. a week—the amount which the contractor had 4th of February, but it did not come on for hearing until the 15th originally offered to pay—the compensation was fixed by the of July. NORTH, J., however, considered that the decision of Lord court.
ROMILLY in Re Crookhaven Mining Co. was ample justification for
his adjudicating upon the matter, notwithstanding the statutory THE DECISION of the Court of Appeal in New London Credit dissolution of the company. In Coxon v. Gorst (1891, 2 Ch., Syndicate (Limited) v. Neale (1898, 2Q. B. 487) is an apt illustra- p. 75) CHITTY, J., is reported to have intimated in the course of tion of the rule that the effect of a written contract cannot be the argument that Re Crookhavon was contrary to the later varied by evidence of a contemporaneous oral agreement. An decisions, and that the dissolution was an absolute bar to the action was brought against a company by B. and C. A., who jurisdiction of the court. But apparently this was said under a was the chairman of the company and interested in it, accepted misapprehension. In Re Pinto Silver Mining Co. (8 Ch. D. 273) a bill for £110, a sum which it was agreed should be paid to and Re London and Caledonian Marine Insurance Co. (11 Ch. D. B. and C. in settlement of the action. The bill, which was at 140) the Court of Appeal refused to make a compulsory order three months, was drawn by B. and C. and made payable to their for winding up after the company had been dissolved under the order. When it was given it appears that a verbal arrangement voluntary liquidation, and it was said that such an order could was made under which the drawers were to renew the bill only be made on the ground of fraud. But these cases do not should the acceptor not be in a position to pay it at maturity. seem to prohibit the jurisdiction in matters which are pending B. and C. indorsed the bill over to the syndicate, who were the at the date of the statutory dissolution. Otherwise the delay of plaintiffs in the present action and who took with notice of the the court would mean a denial of justice. agreement for renewal. They declined, however, to renew at maturity, and sued upon the bill. Practically the agreement to renew was an undertaking that the bill should not be negotiated, It is, as was observed by VAUGHAN WILLIAMS, J., in Re and DARLING, J., held that, since the syndicate took with notice. Smith & Logan (43 W. R. 413), a constant practice in proving of this agreement, their title to the bill was defective
against a bankrupt's estate for a creditor who has several and they had no right of action. But the only effect of distinct debts due to him to lump his debts and securities in one notice to them was to put them in the same position as the proof, although this does not prevent the trustee from subsedrawers, and their title to the bill and their right to sue on it quently requiring the securities to be valued separately should were alike good, save in so far as the right to sue was qualified he desire to redeem any particular security. The decision of by the verbal agreement. Here the acceptor found that the arrange- ROMER, J., in Re Morris (46 W. R. 627) suggests a further case ment proved useless to him. It is not competent to the party to a in which a distinction between the debts should be made. A bill to stipulate verbally that it shall not be met at maturity. creditor had a right under a creditor's deed to prove against “What is to become,” said Lord ELLENBOROUGH in Hoare v. the debtor's estate in respect of three bills of exchange for Graham (3 Camp. 57), "of bills of exchange and promissory £2,000 each and one bill for £1,000. Various other parties notes if they may be cut down by a secret agreement that they who were also insolvent were liable on the bills and the shall not be put in suit. The condition for a renewal entirely creditor had proved against their estates also. The result was contradicts the instrument which the defendants have signed. that upon two of the bills the creditor received in dividends Such an agreement rests in confidence and honour only, and is from the various estates sufficient to pay more than 20s. in the not an obligation of law.” So in Young v. Austen (L. R. 4 C. P. £, but in respect of the others he had received less than the 553) it was said to be clear that the defendant could not set up full value. He had, however, in accordance with tbe practice a contemporaneous oral agreement for renewal to contradict the referred to above, proved against the estate of MORRIS for a contract on the face of the bill, though by a written agreement lump sum in respect of the four bills, and he now claimed to entered into at the time the bill was accepted the parties might apply the surplus upon the two paid bills to make good the regulate their rights between themselves. This, of course, is deficiency upon the other two. Clearly, however, this was a continually done when bills are given as security for loans. In wrong to the parties who were liable on the former two bills. the present case the verbal agreement for renewal of the bill The parties liable upon the four bills were not the same, was excluded upon the above principle, and the plaintiffs ob- and, this being so, there could be no right to charge tained judgment in the Court of Appeal.
the parties liable upon any one bill more in the aggregate than 20s. in the £. The proofs in respect of the various bills
had, therefore, to be separated and the surplus on the two overTHE PROVISIONS of the Companies Act, 1862, which relate to paid bills handed back for distribution among the parties en
titled. Primá facie, as ROMER, J., remarked, the proving of assets.” Similarly, if the necessities of the case require it the several debts in a lump sum may be right, but where in respect executor is empowered to give notice to quit. Finally, when the of some of the debts the trustee has different rights over against real estate no longer requires to be retained for the purposes of third parties, or where there are different debts covered by administration, he must convey such as remains intact to the different securities, without right of consolidation, the rights heir or devisee, and hand over also the surplus proceeds of any cannot be worked out without a distinction being made. sale or mortgage.
These extensive powers of the personal representatives make
it important to determine with certainty how far they become DEVOLUTION OF REAL ESTATE UPON AN
immediately exercisable on the death of the owner.
In the case where executors have been appointed no difficulty arises. An INTESTACY.
executor derives his title under the will, and his rights and THE Land Transfer Act, 1897, deals with two separate matters : powers date from the death of the testator. The law, it has in Part I. it purports to establish a real representative, in Parts been said (Whitehead v. Taylor, 10 A. & E, p. 212) knows no II. and III. it amends the system of registration of title and interval between the testator's death and the vesting of the provides for rendering registration compulsory. The connection right in his representative. He may accordingly do before between these two matters is very slight. The establishment of probate all acts incident to the administration which do not a real representative will facilitate dealings with registered land require the actual production of probate of the will, and such upon the death of the owner, but otherwise the change effected acts will remain good even though he dies without having taken by Part I. is quite independent of registration, and there would out probate (Williams on Executors, 9th ed., I., 250). He canhave been obvious advantages in placing it in a separate statute. not, however, in general bring an action because in the course of More attention could have been given then to the details of the proceedings the probate will have to be produced. With an what constitutes the most important alteration in real property the letters of administration, and the property of the deceased
He derives his title wholly from law of recent yeare.
The plan which has been adopted of extending personal representation to cover real representation, vests in him only from the time of the grant Woolley v. Clark, and boldly giving to the personal representative in respect of
5 B. & A., p. 745). Consequently there is no rule of law to real estate all the powers he has with regard to personal estate, assist the operation of the provision of the Land Transfer Act pleases by its simplicity, but in practice it will probably be vesting the real estate in the administrator upon the death of the found that the diversities between personal and real estate raise intestate by carrying back the administrator's title from the date nume 'ous points of difficulty.
of his appointment to the death, One of those, to which attention has already been called by A similar question arose on the provision of section 30 of the various writers, relates to the vesting of the real estate of an Conveyancing Act, 1881, vesting trust and mortgage estates in iatestate in the interval between his death and the grant of the personal representatives of a sole trustee or mortgagee. letters of administration. Section 1 of the Act provides, in “Where," it is provided, "an estate or interest of inheritance, sub-section 1, that “where real estate is vested in any person or limited to the heir as special occupant, in any tenements or without a right in any other person to take by survivorship, it hereditaments, corporeal or incorporeal, is vested on any trust shall, on his death, notwithstanding any testamentary die- or by way of mortgage in any person solely, the same shall, on position, devolve to and become vested in his personal repre- his death, notwithstanding any testamentary disposition, devolve sentatives or representative from time to time as if it were a to and become vested in his personal representatives or reprechattel real vesting in them or him.” Section 2 provides for sentative from time to time in like manner as if the same were the administration of real estate in the same manner as personal a chattel real vesting in them or him.” Under this provision it estate, and it gives to the personal representatives in respect of seems to have been assumed by Fry, J., in Re Pilling's Trusts real estate the powers, rights, duties, and liabilities of personal (26 Ch. D. 432), that, in the absence of an administrator of a representatives in respect of real estate”; save, however, that deceased sole trustee, the estate would vest in the heir-at-law, and one of several joint personal representatives may not, without upon the appointment of now trustees an order was made for the authority of the court, sell or transfer real estate, vesting in thom certain lands forming part of the trust estate and save, also, that the Act is not to "alter or affect “ for the estate therein now vested in the heir-at-law of the the order in which real and personal effects respectively are now deceased intestate trustee.” Subsequently administration applicable in or towards the payment of funeral and testamentary was taken out to the deceased trustee's estate, and the expenses, debts, or legacies, or the liability of real estate to be question was raised whether the legal estate in the real charged with the payment of legacies.” Subject to the powers, estate did not thoroupon vest in his administratrix notwithrights, duties, and liabilities thus specified, the personal re- standing the vesting order. PEARSON, J., presentatives hold the real estate as trustees for the persons by securing the trust estate, seems to have assumed that it did, and law beneficially entitled thereto, and at the end of a year such he made a new order that, notwithstanding the previous order, beneficiaries can invoke the assistance of the court to compel a the land should post in the now trustees for all the estate conveyance to them. If there is no reason for keeping open therein vested in the legal personal representative. Thus under the administration beyond that time it may be assumed that a one order or the other the legal estate was clearly vested in the convoyance will be directed.
trustees. But upon the question where the legal estate had been The general effect of these provisions is sufficiently clear. in the interval before the grant of administration, PEARSON, J., It is rendered impossible for a testator to interfere by his gave no decision. “The question is," he said, "what happens will with the devolution of the legal interest in his real when there is no personal representative ? If the legal estate does ostate. That necessarily passes to his personal repre- not vest in the heir, where is it? On the other hand, the sentatives. In their hands it becomes subject to whatever wording of the section seems to ovince an intention to exclude liabilities can now be enforced against real estate, and for the the heir." In subsequent cases the difficulty has been got over purpose of satisfying such liabilities they have power either to by vesting the trust estate in the new trustees for the estate sell or to mortgage it. In the interval, while it remains under which was vested in the deceased trustee at the time of his their control they are responsible for the management, and must death: Re Rackstrau's Trusts (33 W. R. 559), Ro Williams' receive the rents. If necessity arises they can let the property, Trusts (36 Ch. D. 231). but this power will have to be exercised cautiously. In Oceanic As we have already stated, the question has already been Steam Navigation Co. v. Sutherbury (16 C. D., at p. 243), JESSEL, discussed in relation to the Land Transfer Act by several M.R., speaking of an underlease by an executor of leasehold writers. In a note contained in the addenda to the last edition property, said: “It is quite true tňat, having the legal estate of Woodfall's Landlord and Tenant (p. lxxv.) the view is taken in the leaseholds, he may in some cases underlet them, and the that the heir-at-law stands in the shoes of the deceased landlord! underlease will be supported in equity as well as in law. But for all such purposes as distraining, granting leases, and that is an exceptional mode of dealing with the assets, and those determining tenancies until the administrator has acquired a who accept a title in that way must take it subject to the title. This is the view which, in Re Pilling's Trusts, presented question whether it was the best way of administering the itself as the most natural one, the estate devolving according to
the ordinary law until there was an administrator in whose This book has for some years been considered a standard work favour the now statutory rule could operate. On the other hand on the liquor licensing laws, and has been in the hands of most it is pointed out by Mr. ROBBINS (Devolution of Real Estate, lawyers interested in this branch of practice. The fact that it has p. 19) that, even if the legal estate does vest in the heir pending since the eleventh edition appeared, shows the popularity of the
now reached a twelfth edition, and that only two years has elapsed the grant of letters of administration, no purchaser, mortgagee, work, and the recent important and far-reaching decisions make a or lessee could safely take from him a conveyance or lease, since
new edition of “Paterson” especially welcome at the present time. the estate of the heir would be determinable on the appointment Although we have never admired the arrangement of the book, of an administrator.
which in form is merely an annotated copy of the Acts of 1872 and Mr. TYSSEN, in his Real Representative. Law (p. 19) adopts 1874, still it is a singularly complete work and contains everything the view, which PEARSON, J., referred to as the apparent inten- that can be expected in a book of its class. The reputation gained tion of the Legislature, that all right of the heir-at-law, qua by it in years past will suffer in no particular at the hands heir, is excluded pending the grant of administration, and for of the present editor, who has given the profession a book want of anyone in whom the legal estate can vest it must of the decision of the House of Lords in Boulter v. The Justices of Kent
thoroughly up-to-date and carefully revised.
The consequences perforce remain in abeyance ; unless, indeed, it is vested like (46 W. R. 114; 1897, A. C. 569), as far as they have been recognized the intestato's personalty in the judges of the High Court. up to now, are noted in their proper places. It is quite certain, Formerly, as Mr. TYSSEN observes, the personal estate of a however, that the full consequences of this famous decision have yet deceased intestate vested in the ordinary, pending the grant of to be revealed, and that for some years frequent references to the administration. For the ordinary the Court of Probate Act, case will have to be made. The editor has evidently been fully alive 1858, by section 19, substituted the judge of the Court of to this, and has well consulted the convenience of his readers by Probate; and under the Judicature Acts it seems probable that including in the appendix a full report of the judgments in the for the judge of the Court of Probate ara substituted all the judges of the High Court. For practical purposes, of course, the result would be the same as if the freeħold were in abey- LICENSING PRACTICE (RETAIL SALES). PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE ance, and this seems to be the effect of the new law. The Land
IN APPLICATIONS AND PROSECUTIONS UNDER THE INTOXICATING Transfer Act, it is to be noticed, expressly says that
LIQUOR LICENSING Acts (ENGLAND
AND WALES). the real estate vests the death of the owner in his
STATUTES AND FORMS. By O. F. CHRISTIE, Barrister-at-Law.
Grant Richards. personal representative, and the fact that there is personal representative ready to receive it does not seem to
The author of this work quotes the saying of Cockburn, C.J., revive in the heir a right which is thus emphatically jumbles he had ever met with,” and he sets himself the task of
that the Licensing Act, 1872, was one of the most extraordinary taken
away from him. It would seem then that, pending the grant of administration, there is no one who can legally deal he has achieved success to a considerable extent, and has produced
unravelling the jumble as far as possible. In this difficult task with the real estate, though, of course, if the solvency of the a useful and carefully-written treatise on the liquor laws. The intestate is above suspicion it will be safe to pay rent to the heir. style of the book is distinctly good, and the subject is probably Such payment, however, would be no discharge to the tenant if made as clear as it is capable of being made. The book is, the circumstances of the estate made it necessary for an however, in our opinion, rather too condensed in some parts, administrator subsequently appointed to call for the money over
and its practical value, moreover, is to some extent lessened by again. The practical conclusion is that administration should be the entire omission of many minor matters, which probably the taken out as speedily as possible. Under section 1 (3) of the author would argue are outside the scope of his work, but Act it can be granted in respect of real estate only, although book is silent concerning the provisions of the Revenue Act, 1885, there is no personal estate; and under section 2 (4) the court in as to the adulteration of beer, the Act of 1883, prohibiting the granting administration must have regard to the rights of persons payment of wages in public houses, and the law forbidding publicans interested in the real estate, The heir has it in his power, to deal in game. In the excellent chapter on certiorari the author therefore, to protect himself,
does not hesitate to indicate that in his opinion the correctness of the decision in Reg. v. Sharman (1898, 1 Q. B. 578) is still open to question. In that case, it will be remembered, the court held that,
as a consequence of Boulter's case, certiorari no longer lies to licensing REVIEWS.
justices, and we may point out that in Reg. 7. Bowman (1898,
1 Q. B. 663) Wills, J., also intimated that he was not quite satisfied THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT.
that the decision was right. The book is, on the whole, a useful THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT Act, 1888, WITH THE INCORPORATED addition to the literature on this subject, and in the appendix there PROVISIONS OF THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Act, 1882, AND
will be found some valuable forms of notices of applications for OTHER ACTS, AND THE WHOLE OF THE STATUTES, RULES, AND
licences and notices of appeal. ORDERS PASSED AND ISSUED SINCE 1888 RELATING TO THE POWERS AND DUTIES OF COUNTY COUNCILS. WITH NOTES AND INDEX. THIRD EDITON. By ALEXANDER MACMORRAN, M.A., A GUIDE TO THE LAW OF LICENSING, SO FAR AS IT AFFECTS THE Q.C., and T. R. COLQUHOUN DILL, B.A., Barrister-at-Law. Shaw SALE BY RETAIL OF INTOXICATING LIQUORS IN ENGLAND AND & Sons; Butterworth & Co.
WALES. WITH AN APPENDIX OF STATUTES AND FORMS OF A third editiou of this book, the first edition of which, we believe,
LICENCES. By B. STEPHEN FOSTER, Barrister-at-Law. Waterlow was only published in 1894, is a sufficient testimony to its merits,
& Sons (Limited). We described it when it first appeared as an admirable example of a As the author of this work points out, the complicated state of the text-book, and we see no reason to alter our verdict with regard to law of licensing is due mainly to the great number of amendments the present edition. The notes appended to the different sections are and additions which have been imposed upon the earlier Acts by clear, accurate, and concise, and one advantage of the book is that later legislation. The object he therefore aims at is to lessen the difficulties and questions arising, although not yet covered by any trouble of referring to a large number of Acts by grouping together decision, are pointed out and discussed. By means of careful cross- under appropriate headings those sections in the various statutes references the reader is directed to all the statutory provisions which relate to a particular subject, setting out the text of those relating to the matter in hand, and a good index renders the contents sections verbatim and adding notes and references to decided of the work easily accessible. We could not desire a more convenient cases. This plan has undoubtedly great advantages, and the or complete book on the subject.
author has carried it out most successfully, and has given lawyers a book in which it is possible to find what is wanted with the
minimum of trouble. As, however, to carry out such a plan THE LICENSING ACTS.
completely, a section of an Act might have to be repeated in some
cases under several distinct headings, all the important statutes are THE LICENSING ACTS, BEING THE ACTS OF 1872 AND 1874, TOGETHER set out in full in the Appendix. The notes give the effect of reported
WITH ALL THE ALEHOUSE, BEERHOUSE, REFRESHMENT House, decisions accurately and clearly, and very few omissions can be found WINE AND BEERHOUSE, INLAND REVENUE, AND SUNDAY CLOSING of cases of real importance or of statutory provisions which in any ACTS RELATING THERETO, WITH INTRODUCTION, NOTES, FORMS, way relate to the subject. The important recent cases down to a AND INDEX. By the late JAMES PATERSON, M.A., Barrister-at- very recent date are all carefully noted. In short, the author has Law. TWELFTH EDITION. By WILLIAM MACKENZIE, M.A., done his work well, and we believe the profession will find the book Barrister-at-Law. Shaw & Sons, Butterworth & Co.
useful and reliable.
HANDBOOK ON THE LICENSING ACTS AND THEIR ADMINISTRATION.
By ALFRED T. DAVIES, Solicitor and Notary Public, Cursitor of the
CASES OF THE WEEK.
Before the Vacation Judge.
TAYLOR *. THE CAMBRIDGE GAZETTE CO. (LIM.) AND KILNER,
12th Oct. intended, not so much for the use of the legal profession, as to enable intelligent persons connected with the trade” to inform themselves as MORTGAGE-- REDEMPTION - GOODWILL OP NEWSPAPER-OBLIGATIONS to the law on any ordinary matter that may occur. It has now reached a MORTGAGEE AFTER REDEMPTION-SOLICITATION OF CUSTOMERS-ALLEGED third edition, and therefore no doubt satisfies a demand.
This is by
ATTEMPTS to INDUCE SERVANTS TO BREAK CONTRACTS. no means surprising, as the book contains a large amount of general information under headings in alphabetical order, clear and practical the defendants might be restrained from soliciting in any way, or
This was a motion on behalf of the plaintiff William Farrow Taylor that directions to persons desiring the grant, renewal, or transfer of licences, endeavouring in any way to obtain, the custom or goodwill of the paper some useful forms not to be found in more pretentious works, and called the Cambridge Daily News, or the custom or goodwill of the business a table of offences. It is evidently the work of a practical man with of printers, newspaper proprietors, and publishers carried on by the a sound knowledge of the subject.
plaintiff at the Cambridge Daily News office, Cambridge, or from attempting in any way, either directly or indirectly, to take away any portion of the plaintiff's business or goodwill; from representing or making statements
to the customers of the plaintiff so as to deceive, or calculated to deceive, the A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE LIQUOR LICENSING ACTS. By W. HUGH customers, and induce them to believe that the new business, now or about to
JONES, Barrister-at-Law. Effingham Wilson; Cardiff: Roberts be carried on, was formerly the plaintiff's business or is a continuation of the Brothers.
plaintiff's business ; from inducing the plaintiff's employees or servants to
break their engagements with the plaintiff, or leave the plaintiff's employThis is a small book consisting of only about 100 pages, but for its ment or service for the purpose of being employed in the new business. size it contains an extraordinary amount of information on the law of From the affidavits it appeared that the plaintiff was the proprietor of the licensing: If this branch of the law formed one of the subjects for Cambridge Daily News, the paper having been started by him in 1888. In the Solicitors' Final Examination it would be an ideal book for the 1897 the defendant Kilner and others, as executors of one John Kilner, student, for it is clear, accurate, and well-written. The author is to commenced an action against the present plaintiff in which a declaration be congratulated on the ability with which he has compiled an was made that they were possessed of the business of the newspaper as excellent summary of a difficult subject, which, as he says, * affords mortgagees, and by a later order it was ordered, with the consent of all perhaps one of the very best examples of tessellated legislation.” In parties, in effect that upon payment by the plaintiff into court of £9,200 practice, however, something more than a summary is required, and and about the 28th of June, 1898, retook possession of the premises. The it is constantly necessary to refer to the very words of the numerous plaintiff alleged that he subsequently discovered that one John Smart, statutes governing this important subject. Such words are, of course, while acting as his manager and editor, at the instigation of the defendant not to be found in a book of this size, and therefore it cannot Kilner, who contemplated starting á rival paper at Cambridge, had aim at entering the lists as a competitor with larger well-known endeavoured to induce the staff to leave his employ and to join the staff text-books. At the same time, as far as it goes, the book is reliable, of the defendant Kilner. In their afidavits, however, Smart and Kilner and will be acceptable to many. It also contains in the appendix entirely denied this allegation. It was further alleged by the plaintiff some useful forms not easily to be found elsewhere.
that in consequence of representations made by Smart that the defendant Kilner had authorized him to engage several of the plaintiff's employees at higher wages such employees had given notice and left his service.
It was further alleged with regard to one Robert Oleaver, who was also BOOKS RECEIVED.
employed by the plaintiff, that Smart told him that if he would leave the The Criminal Evidence Act, 1898 (61 & 62 Vict. c. 36), comprising plaintiff's, employment without giving notice the defendant Kilner the History of the Act and its Full Text, with Explanatory Notes, would hold him harmless against any action for damages. The plaintiff By CHARLES BRONTE MORGAN, Barrister-at-Law. Effinghan Wilson. named Sophia George and informed her that a new daily paper was about
further complained that Smart's son had called upon a newsagent A Treatise on the Law and Practice relating to Letters Patent for to be started in Cambridge in connection with Cambridge Daily News and Invention, with an Appendix of Statutes, International Convention asked if she would sell it. She had for ten years been an agent for the Rules, Forms and Precedents, Orders, &c. By ROBERT FROST,
sale of the Cambridge Daily News. Mrs. George's allegations were, however, B.Sc. (Lond.), Barrister-at-Law. Second Edition. Stevens &
entirely denied. The Cambridge Gazette Co. (Limited) was registered on Haynes.
the 8th of September, 1898, and the plaintiff further alleged that on or
about the 12th of September, 1898, it came to his knowledge that the A Calendar of the Inner Temple Records. Edited by F. A. defendant company, through their directors or agents the defendant INDERWICK, Q.C., Treasurer of the Hon. Society of the Inner Kilner and the said Smart and others, were soliciting his customers and Temple. Vol. II. : James I. (1603)— Restoration (1660). Stevens & agents to transfer their custom to the defendant company and the Haynes ; Stevens & Sons.
proposed newspaper, the Cambridge Gazette. He also alleged that he had
heard that the defendants, their servants or agents, had represented to Accidents to Workmen : being a Treatise on the Employers Liability from his office. In the affidavits filed on behalf of the defendants all these
Mrs. George that the Gazette was his newspaper and was to be issued Act, 1880, Lord Campbell's Act, the Workmen's Compensation Act, allegations were denied, and it was said from the first the defendants had 1897, and matters relating thereto. By R. M. MINTON-SENHOUSE, particularly endeavoured to make it known that the plaintiff had nothing Barrister-at-Law, and G. F. EMERY, LL.M., Barrister-at-Law,
to do with the defendant company, Effingham Wilson.
Upon behalf of the plaintiff it was
submitted that where a mortgage had been redeemed and the mortgaged The People's Progress, in the Light of Concrete Revealings of the property was a business, the obligations of the mortgagee to the mortgagor Mind. By the Rev. W. G. DAVIES, B.D. Elliot Stock.
are at least the same as those of the vendor of the goudwill of the
business. The mortgagee must not destroy that which he held as Redress by Arbitration : a Digest of the Law relating to Arbitrations mortgagee.
The defendant Kilner and his co-executors and Awards, incorporating the Arbitration Act of 1889 and the trustees for the plaintiff. It was true that the defendants had a Decisions of the Courts thereon. By H. FOULKS LYNCH, Solicitor. right to start rival
newspaper, but they had right THIRD EDITION. Revised by D. F. DE L'HOSTE RANKING, M.A., nine others of his employees. Smart was actiug for Kilner, and no
to seduce away Smart, the plaintiff's editor and manager, and LL.D. Effingham Wilson.
doubt a part of the scheme was to induce the plaintiff's staff to leave the The Maritime Codes of Holland and Belgium. Translated and plaintiff's service. The defendant Kilner had no right to use the knowAnnotated by F. W. RAIKES, LL.D., Q.C., Judge of County Courts. ledge he had gained as mortgagee as to the value of the services of the Effingham Wilson.
plaintiff's servants, and the defendant company ought not to have used
The secrets its directors had obtained. Kinnard v. I'rollope (37 W. R. 234; Documents and Correspondence relating to the Judicial Crisis in 39 Ch. D. 636) and Trego v. Hunt (44 W. R. 225 ; 1896, A. C. 7) were the South African Republic ('Transvaal). Translated by J. G. KOTZE. referred to. Upon behalf of the defendant company it was submitted that William Clowes & Sons (Limited).
there was no evidence against it; and Robb v. Green (1895, 2 Q. B. 315; 43 W. R. Dig. 49) was cited. For the defendant Kilner it was submitted that there was no evidence against him of having solicited the plaintiff's customers to leave him. If any such solicitation had in fact taken place
(which was denied) it was not authorized by him. As to the charge of It is announced that Mr. J. F. Oswald, Q.C., M.P. for Oldham, has instigating Smart to induce the plaintiff's servants to leave his employment intimated to the Conservative executive that he will not seek re-election in breach of their engagements with him, Kilner in his affidavit denied on the dissolution of Parliament. Mr. Ascroft, M.P., the senior member that he did any such thing, and Smart said that no suggestion had been of the borough, in making the announcement, says that Mr. Oswald, / made to any one to break his contract with the plaintiff and no indemnity whose condition some time ago caused great anxiety, has benefited greatly offered by anyone. In reply it was submitted upon behalf of the plaintiff by his stay in Yorkshire.
that upon the evidence the attempts alleged had been made out, and that
the plaintiff was therefore entitled to the injunction asked for. Exchange thereto on the east side thereof, that is to say: To execute such of the Telegraph Co. v. Gregory (1896, i Q. B. 147; 44 W. R. Dig. 44) was works to the party structure as may on survey be found necessary or referred to.
desirable-namely, To make good, underpin, or repair the same where CHANNELL, J.—I do not think that any case has been made out which defective or out of repair; to pull down and rebuild the same wholly or in will justify me in granting an injunction. I do not refuse the injunction part, if (1) so far defective or out of repair as to make such operation upon the ground that a mortgagee after reconveyance would not be under necessary or desirable for the intended new building ; (2) not conformable the same obligations as a vendor. It is not necessary to decide that point. with the regulations of the said Act; (3) of sufficient strength for the The obligation which a vendor is under is that he may not, although he intended new building. To raise or underpin the same or any external may set up a rival business, solicit the customers of the old' firm to leave wall built against the same as may be necessary or desirable for the the old firm and to come to him. It depends upon the nature of the intended new building. To cut into the same for any lawful purpose. business whether the request to deal with him would be a request to leave To cut away any footings, jambs, flues, or other projections, as may be the old business. Where the business is that of a newspaper proprietor, necessary in order to erect the intended new building. To cut or it appears to me that a request by the vendor to a person to buy his take down such parts of any wall or building of the adjoining
may be necessary
in newspaper is not a request to leave off buying the old newspaper. In the
consequence of the present case I do not find a breach of any obligation which Kilner would overhanging the ground of the building owner in order to erect the on by the plaintiff is that of Mrs. George. It is said that Smart, jun., thereto.” It was submitted that the notice was bad under the London be under if he had sold the newspaper to the plaintiff. An instance relied intended new building: To perform any other necessary works incident endeavoured to persuade her to sell the new newspaper, and told her a falsehood by falsely stating it was to be started in connection with the Building Act, 1894. It did not say what the defendants proposed to do. Cambridge Daily News. I do not think that the plaintiff's evidence upon The London Building Act, 1894, imposed an obligation upon the building this point is sufficient, and it is contradicted. The next instance
owner to give particulars of his proposed scheme. If a notice such as this complained of relates to the plaintiff's employees.
Now, it is were sufficient, and intended by the Legislature, the Act would have part of the common law that a person may not induce another's expressly said that it was to be a notice for all or any of the works servant to break his contract of service. The decision in Allen mentioned in section 88 of the Act. The building owner need not set out v. Flood (46 W. R. 258 ; 1898, A. C. 1) shews that it is not wrong his proposed scheme. Upon behalf of the defendants, an undertaking not
the details of what he proposed to do, but he must disclose the nature of to induce a servant to leave his master's employment, provided that the servant commits no unlawful act in leaving his master's service. to act upon that part of the notice which dealt with raising the wall In the present case the plaintiff's servants committed no breach of without giving the plaintiffs further notice was offered.
in point. The instance of Robert Cleaver, who is alleged to have been but I have some doubt as to whether the part relating to raising the wall requested to break his contract with the plaintiff, is the only shadow of a is good. Upon the defendants undertaking not to act upon that part of case made out upon the plaintiff's behalf. It appears to me that this the notice which deals with raising the wall without giving the plaintiffs might be an attempt upon the part of Smart which would be sufficient to further notice (without prejudice to any question), and to give the plaintiffs justify an injunction against the person so attempting to commit a wrong. inspection of their plans, and to give the plaintiffs a further ten days to But, in my opinion, this one case is not sufficient to justify me in granting appoint a surveyor, there will be no order except that costs be costs in the an injunction against the defendant Kilner. I do not think that there is action.—COUNSEL, Mulligan, Q.C. (J. Gatey with him); Alexander, Q.C. sufficient evidence that Kilner authorized it in such a way that it can be (4. H. Jessel with him). Solicitors, Savery & Stevens ; Emmanuel $ imputed to him that he attempted to do an unlawful act. There is no Simmonds. ground for granting an injunction against the Cambridge Gazette in the
(Reported by J. E. ALDOUS, Barrister-at-Law.] absence of any sufficient case against Kilner. As to the allegations with regard to Mrs. George, I think that in all probability there is some mistake on the part of Mrs. George in reference to that matter. It might assist a new newspaper to say that Smart was editor of it, but that would be no
County Courts. wrong thing. The plaintiff would be entitled to say that the Cambridge Gazette was edited by the gentleman who so successfully edited the
C. & W. WALKER. Birmingham. 11th Oct. Cambridge Daily News. The costs of the motion will be the defendants' costs in the action.-Counsel, Everett, Q.C. (E. Ford with him); Alexander, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION Act, 1897—Basis on Which COMPENSATION IS Q.C. (W. Baker with him); Clauson. SOLICITORS, Stanley Evans & Co., for
PAYABLE. C. P. Jones, Cambridge; Torr, Gribble, Oddie, f Sinclair ; E. Bromley.
This was the first case brought under the above Act in the Birmingham (Reported by J. E. ALDOUS, Barrister-at-Law.]
County Court. It was an arbitration at the instance of an injured work
The undisputed facts were as follow : The applicant was Richard
Thomas Jones, described in his application for arbitration as HOBBS, HART, & CO. (LIM.) v. GROVER AND ROE. 19th Oct.
smith,” employed at the time of accident as a “ fitter.” The responLOCAL GOVERNMENT-BUILDING OWNER-PARTY WALL-Norice STATING dents were c. & W. Walker, of Donnington, Salop, engineers, who were “NATURE AND PARTICULARS OF " PROPOSED Work-LONDON BUILDING engaged in the erection of a gas-bolder for the Birmingham Corporation at Act, 1894 (57 & 58 VICT. C. CCXIII.), s. 90.
Saltley. Jones, who had been out of work for seven weeks, called several
times at the Saltley Works to ask Monk, the respondents' foreman there, This was a motion on behalf of the plaintiffs, Messrs. Hobbs, Hart, & for employment, stating that he had previously worked as a smith. On Co. (Limited), that the defendants, their agents, servants, workmen, and the last of the occasions, about 7.30 a.m. on the 11th of July, Monk told others employed by them might be restrained from pulling down, cutting, Jones that there was no smiths' shop up as yet, but that he could go and under-pinning, raising, or otherwise injuring or interfering with the help a fitter named Foxhall who was engaged in fixing guide-rails to party wall between the premises Nos. 75 and 76, Cheapside, in the City of stays for a gas tank. About 10.30 a.m., when Jones had been at work some London, and from appointing any surveyor under section 91, sub-section two and a half hours, Foxhall was bolting the rails at the top and Jones 3, of the London Building Act, 1894, or otherwise until the trial of was holding them in position at the bottom, when a sledge-hammer, in use this action or further order, otherwise than in accordance with the by another workman at work fifty feet above, accidentally broke, and the provisions of the said London Building Act, 1894. In support of the head fell and struck Jones in the back, inflicting severe injuries which had motion it was said that the plaintiffs were the owners of 76, Cheap- caused him total present incapacity to work. When Monk put Jones on side, and the defendant Grover was the building owner of adjoining to work, nothing was said as to rate of wages. In his previous employment premises, 75, Cheapside, the defendant Roe being his surveyor appointed as a smith his weekly earnings had averaged 33s. 6d. per week. He thereunder the London Building Act, 1894. The premises 76, Cheapside were fore claimed the maximum allowance under the Act - viz., half wages at separated from No. 75, Cheapside by a wall which is a party wall within that rate, or 16s. 9d. per week, after the first fortnight. It was admitted the meaning of the London Building Act, 1894. The plaintiff company that the current rate of labourer's wages was 24s. per week, and that the occupied the basement, ground floor, and first floor of the premises No. 76, respondents had tendered compensation accordingly, at the rate of 12s. per Cheapside, as showrooms, warehouses, and offices, and the remaining week, which the applicant had refused, and instituted these proceedings to portion of the building was let to tenants. The building was erected in recover the larger sum. The evidence as to the kind of work Jones was or about the year 1888, and was specially constructed to carry the great doing before the accident occurred was conflicting. For the applicant, weights of the iron safes and strong rooms which were on show there, and reference was made to Schedule I., s. 1 (6) of the Act, which provides that any interference with the party wall between that and the adjoining the amount of compensation payable shall be as follows: “Where total building would have to be carried out with the greatest care and under or partial incapacity for work results from the injury, a weekly payment strict supervision. Jf the party wall was to be taken down to be rebuilt, during the incapacity after the second week, not exceeding fifty per cent. or seriously interfered with, it might entail the removal of a large portion of his average weekly earnings during the previous twelve months, if he of the plaintiff company's safes and the taking of other temporary has been so long employed; but if not, then for any less period during premises by the company, and in order to make the necessary which he has been in the employment of the same employer, such weekly arrangements for this the company would require at least several payment not to exceed one pound.” It was argued that, though, no doubt, months' notice, otherwise very great loss and inconvenience would the language of the section more properly applied to cases where the work
On the 2nd of September last the plaintiff company received man had been actually employed for more than a week, there was nothing from the defendant Grover the following party-wall notice purporting to preclude an applicant, in a case like the present, where the actual employ, ing to be given under section 90 of the London Building Act, 1894 : ment had existed for less than a week, from claiming compensation computed “Î, the undersigned, being the building owner of No. 75, Cheapside, in the on his average weekly earnings in a previous and different employment. The county of London, hereby give you notice that upon the expiration of two section said nothing about any contract between employer and employed, months from the date hereof I intend to exercise the rights conferred upon and in a case like this an agreed rate of wages to be paid, whether exthe building owner by section 88 of the above Act in respect of the party pressed or implied, could not be taken as a basis. Moreover, “earnings" structure separating No. 75, Cheapside from No. 76, Cheapside adjoining meant wages actually received for work done, and not wages agreed to be