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THE PUBLICATION OF ACTS OF PARLIAMENT. [To the Editor of the Solicitors’ Journal.]

Sir,-In the early part of this year I obtained, on behalf of a local authority, a provisional order under the Electric Lighting Acts. This order was duly confirmed by Parliament some time last session.

In order to complete my papers, I have been anxious to obtain a print of the Act by which the order was confirmed, but although I have made repeated enquiries of Messrs. Eyre & Spottiswoode and have arranged with them to send me a print as soon as ready, I have not yet obtained it.

I do not even know the date on which the Act became law, and it is only by reference to the index to the Law Reports that I have been able to get at the title and reference to the Act.

I cannot conceive why there should be four or five months’ delay in printing these Acts, and I think public attention should be called to t e matter. W. H. W.

London, Dec. l.

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This was an appeal against zi decision of Kekewich, J . The facts were as follow: By an indenture dated the 26th of J une, 1867, Lord Bateman mortgaged his lite interest in the Kelmarsh and Shobdon Court estates to the executors of Lady Kerrison‘s will to secure a sum of £11,430, representing trust funds under the will advanced to Lord Bateman; and, subject to trusts for repaying the loan, the executors were to pay the surplus rents and profits of the estates to Lady Bateman, the wife of Lord Bateman during her life for her separate use without power of anticipation, “ Pm.’ vided, nevertheless, that if at any time the said Lady Bateman shall succeed to an income in her own right of £8,000 or more per annum for her separate use, then and in such case the trusts in and by this indenture lastly hereinbefore declared shall absolutely cease and determine, and after the determination of the trust lastly hereinbefore declared (but subject and without prejudice to the trusts hereinbefore declared) upon trust for the said Lord Bateman." Lord Bateman subsequently mortgaged such interest as remained to him to Mr. Andrew liiontagu as a collateral security for .£§110,000. In July, 1886, Lady Batenian became entitled to a life interest in the Kerrison Estates in Norfolk, Suffolk, and Middlesex and a question was soon afterwards raised by Mr. Montagu whether oi not the plaintiff had “succeeded to an income in her own light of £8,000 or more per annum for her separate use,” so as to bring into operation the above-mentoined proviso. Lady Bateman was ultimately advised by her then solicitor (who had since died) that now she was tenant for life of the Kerrison Estates she must be considered as having succeeded to an income of £8,000 within the meaning of the proviso. _On t_he -lth of March, 1890, Lady Biteman, relying on this advice and being desirous of enabling her husband to obtain better terms from the mortgagee, Mr. Montagu, executed a deed - poll whereby she expressly admitted that her life mterest in the Kelmarsh and Shobdon Court estates had d termmed under the proviso and released that life interest in favour of Lord Bateman. In consequence of andsnbsequently to the deed-poll, Mr. Montagu entered into agreements with Lord Bateman whereby the rate of

yinterest on the £110,000 loan was reduced, and payment was arranged for

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on terms favourable to Lord Bsteman. Subsequently, however, Lady Bateman discovered, as she alleged, that her income from the Kerrison estates did not amount to £8,000 a year, inasmuch as she took subject to numerous prior encumbrances, so that the dced of 1890 was executed under a wrong state of facts, and was therefore inoperative to affect the interest secured to her by the deed of 1867. Accordingly, she brought this action against the executor of the mortgagee, Mr. Mont-agu, who had died, the persons to whom Lord Bateman had conveyed his life estate in the Kelmarsh and Shobdon esfates subject to the mortgage, and Lord Bateman himself, claiming n declaration that shc, the plaintiff, had not at any time since the execution of the deed of 1867 succeeded to an income in her own right of £8,000 or more per annum for her separate use within the meaning of the proviso: and also a declaration that the admission by the plaintiff in the deed-poll of 1890 was not binding upon her in respect of the income to which, under the deed of 1867, she became entitled for her separate use without power of anticipation, and that, notwithstanding the deed-poll, she had always been and still was entitled to that income. Kekewich, J ., held that, by reason of the restraint on anticipation, Lady Bat man could not bind her interest by the admission, and that her right ti receive the in-ome continued notwithstanding the deed-poll. The defendant Faber appealed.

THE Cotrrr (Lirini.x\', M.R., and Cuirrr and VAYGHAN \Vii.i.i/ms, L.-IJ.) dismissed the appeal.

Ll.\'llLB\', M.1t.—Tne case is new and important to lawyers as well as socially; but the conclusion at which I have arrived is that it is impossible to reverse the decision of liekewich, J ., unless we are prepared to make law a proposition which I do not believe is law. I f we reverse the decision we must say that it is possible for n married woman to get rid of a restraint upon anticipation by telling nu untruth, on which another person has acted. I agree that it is a question of fact; but what is the evidence before the court? lVe have a deed in which the plaintiff states that she has succeeded to an income in her own right of more than £8,000 a year The first question is whether that deed is admissible in evidence. I think it is, and that it is an admission that she did so succeed. Then she rays : “ I made a mistake, and ilaim relief on the ground of mistake." The answer is: “ You are not entitled to t»ikc advantage of that circumstance because Mr. Montagu has changed his position in reliance on your statement, and therefore you are estopped from denying its truth." As regards anyone except a married woman restrained from anticipation, that would be a good answer ; but if that be so as regards her, you enable her by telling an untruth to deprive herself of the protection which the court desires to afford her. In my opinion that cinuot be done. The authorities shew that a married woman cannot, even hy her own fraud, deprive herself of this protection. The policy of the law I say nothing about, but it has been sanctioned by Parliament in the Married Women's Property Act. The result is that a married woman can play fast and loose to an extent to which no other person can.-Coi'.vss1., Sir E’. Clarke, Q, 0., Renshaw, Q.C., and Brabnnt; Warringlon, Q C‘ , and Beaumont. Soucrroiis, Grrenfield §- Oracknall ; Jllunns if Longdcn.

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The facts of this case were as follows : In February, 1880, Mrs. Walker obtained a protection order against her husb ind under section 21 of the Divorce and Matrimonial Causes Act, 1857. This order was never discharged. By an indenture dated the 6th of March, 1880, Mrs. Walker covenanted to pay Mr. J. C. Stogdon on a certain date the sum of £150 and any other sums due from her on the footing of the security therein contained. The money was not paid. Mrs. Walker died on the 24th of March, 1896, having by her will exercised a general power of appointment over certain funds. The funds so appointed constituted all Mrs. Walker’s property at her death. This was a summons by Stogdon’s assignee, in an action for the administration of Mrs. Walker's estate, asking that his claim to prove as a creditor for the moneys due under the indenture of the 6th of March, 1880, might be allowed.

KEKBWICH, J., in giving judgment, said : It seems to me that I cannot reject this claim without saying that the Act of 1857 does not mean what it says. Section 21 of the Act says that if any such order for protection as is contemplated by that section be made, “ the wife shall during the continuance thereof be and be deemed to have been, during such desertion of her, in the like position in all respects, with regard to property and contracts, and suing and being sued, as she would be under this Act if she obtained a decree of judicial separation" ; and section 26 says that, “ in every case of a judicial separation the wife shall, whilst so separated, be considered as n fame sole for the purposes of contract, and wrongs and injuries, and suing and being sued in any civil proceeding.” It_ has been argued in opposifion to this claim that we are now dealing with the property of the wife and not with her contract, and the case o Hill v. Cooper (41 W. R, 500; 1893, 2 Q. B 85) was relied on in support of that argument. That case, however, decided that a married woman who has obtained a protection order is still a married woman, and that a restraint upon anticipation still remains attached to property which was hers before the order. It was a case under section 25 of the Act, and does not deal with the question now before me, for I am dealing with a question of contract and not with a question of ropcrtv Sections 21 and 26 read

, Weather say that a married woman shrill be considered as a fame sole for

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the purposes of contract, and_ therefore I think she can enter into a contract freed from those restrictions which are imposed upon married women for _tl;eir own protection. Mrs. Walker did enter into such a contract with Mr. Stogdon. The case of Re Ann (1894. 1 Ch. 549), which was referred to in argument, is a case upon a different statute and_does not apply. Relying, therefore, simply upon the 21st and 26th sections of the Act, I decide that Mr. Stog on’s assignee can prove for his debt-—COUNSEI., Warnn_r/tun, Q.C., and Dmmr_:/,~ Trnmn-. Soticiroas, J. (7. Slruydon ,' G, S. Q H. Bramlon.

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This was a petition for the distribution of funds subject to the trusts of the will dated May, 1837, of Francis G. Smyth, who died in June, 1839. A question arose as to_ the payment of probate duty in respect of o share bequeathed to an English legatee of the proceeds of sale of a \Vest Indian plantation which was devised, after the expiration or failure of certain prior interests, in tr_ust_for sale and division of the proceeds. The legatee died before_ the expiration of prior interests for life, and the question was wheéher his shore ought to be regarded as an English or a foreign asse .

Roman, J .—The question as to probate duty which arises in this case

may be shortly stated as follows: A testator, who at the dates of his will and death_ was livmg and domiciled in England, made an English will whereby, in effect, he devised and bequeathed a plantation in Jamaica to trustees upon trusts for the benefit of certain persons for life and their issue, and upon the deaths of those persons and failure of issue upon trust to sell the plantation and divide the proceeds amongst severe persons therein named. The trustees were at the above dates domiciled in the U_nit_ed Kmgdom, and one of them after the testator's death proved the will in England and acted as trustee, and as trustee iii this country held the plantation upon the trusts of the will. The trust for sale ultimately took effect, and the proceeds of sale of the plantation became divisible amongst the several persons named in that behalf in the will or their legal personal representatives. Qne of those persons (I will call him the egatee), w_ho wa_s at the time of his death living and domiciled in England, _died. while the persons entitled for life were in existence, and the question is _ whether probate duty is not payable here on his death in respect of his interest under the will. Now that interest was admittedly of the nature of personalty, and the question, therefore, narrows itself down to this-Is the interest to be considered an English asset or to be tre_at_ed as foreign because the plantation was situate in Jamaica? In my opinion it is to be regarded as an English asset. The case is governed by the principles which led to the decision of the Attorney-Germ-al v. Lord Sudeley (44 W. R._340 ; 1896, 1 Q. B. 354), and the judgment of Lopes, L J ., as reported in the L. B., 1896, 1 Q. B., at p.363, applies almost word for word to the case before me, and that judgment was approved of and adopted by the Lords in the House of Lords when it came for consideration before them on appeal: Sub. nom., Sudeley, Lord, v. Attorney-General (45 W. B. 305; I897, A. 0. 11). At the time of his death the only right the legatee bad in the case before me was to have the trusts of the will duly performed, and in particular to have the trust for sale carried into effect at the due time, and the net proceeds of tho sale, after paying costs and the expenses of the trustee, divided between the legatee and the other persons entitled. As matters stood he was not entitled to the plantation itself or to any specific part or share of it. The trustee was not a trustee of the plantation or of any specific part or share of it for him; all h_e was entitled to was his proportion of the net proceeds of the plantation after real_ization_. He ad no claim against the plantation to recover it or any portion of it ; that was a claim enforceable only by the trustee. The right of the legatee as against the trustee was only to have the trusts of the will admimstered. Administered where? The testator was domiciled in England, his will was proved in England, his trustee was in England, and the money recoverable would in the ordinary and proper course be brought to England. The trustee could be properly and in the ordinary course sued in the English court by the legatee, who was in England. The asset was_an English equitable chose in action, recoverable in England, and an English and not a foreign asset, and as such subject to probate duty here. It was suggested as against the Crown that possibly under some circumstances an action might have been brought by the legatee to enforce his rights in Jamaica. I am bound to say that at present I do not see what action could have been properly brought there. But_even admitting that, under some conceivable circumstances or change of circumstances, some action might have been brought there, the question is not in what place under extraordinary circumstances an action might be brought, but _what _place under existing circumstances was the natural and proper place in which the legatee should enforce his rights? In other w°Td*‘, what was the proper forum for deciding upon the legat/ee's claim? and the answer_to_this clearly is that the forum was English. And in reference to this view I may refer to the case of Re Gigolo‘; Trusts (26 W. R. 2a7, 4 Ch. D. 3§1) and the observations of Jesse], M.R., in that case. I therefore decide that the probate duty is p8yBblG.—COUXSBL, Nmlfe, Q. C-, and R. J. Parker; Vaughan Hawkins. Sonicirons, Norris, Aliens, if Ohajnnan ,' Solicitor of Inland Revenue.

[Reported by J. F. Water, Barrister-at-Inw.l LOVETT 1;. LOVETT. Romcr, I. 24th and 25th Nov. VOLUNTARY SITTLBMEN'l'—CONSTRUC'I‘ION—ES'l‘OPI'BL. Action. In this action the plaintiff asked for a declaration that, subject

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to the life interest of her mother, she was entitled to certain property contained in her parents’ marriage settlement free from the trusts of a voluntary settlement, which she had executed when an infant shortly after her marriage. She married at the age of sixteen on the 28th of January, 1892. The voluntary settlement was dated the 27th of July, 1892. At that date the plaintiff had no property in possession, but she had a vested interest liab e to be divested by the exercise of her mother's power of appointment and subject to her mother’s life interest in certain property comprised in her parents’ marriage settlement dated the 15th of April, 1874; and she was also entitled, under the will of her father, to ot er property in fee in reversion expectant on the death of her mother. The action was with regard to the former—the settlement property. Tho voluntary settlement in question contained recitals to the effect that the plaintiff, therein referred to as the settlor, was entitled to certain property under her parents’ marriage settlement, no mention was made of the overriding power of appointment possessed by her mother, and the settlor assigned and conveyed to the trustees all her reversionary interest in the property subject to the said settlement and under the father’s will. In one operative part reference to the property was made in the words, “ to which she is entitled under the principal indenture of settlement,” the parents’ marriage settlement being thereby meant. On the 5th of August, 1897, the plaintiff's mother exercised her power of appointment byadeed-poll, whereby she appointed all the property subject to the marriage settlement of 1874 to the plaintiff absolutely subject to her own life interest, and on this it was contended on behalf of the plaintiff that she was entitled to the property in reversion absolutely free from the trusts of the voluntary settlement, on the ground that she took an overriding title by the exercise of the power of appointment in her favour. Against this it was contended that she was estopped from setting up any other title to that which the voluntary settlement represented her as having, and which she had thereby settled the property. Reference particularly was made to the cases of Heath v. C'1'ealock (23 W. R. 95, 10 cu. 22) and Swteldpple v. Hm-lock (27 W. R. 865, 1i Ch. D. 745).

Roman, J ., raid he had come to the conclusion that the plaintiff was entitled to the relief she prayed for. The cases had established that if a person assigned his interest in property, either real or personal, to which he was entitled in default of appointment, and afterwards obtained a title to this property by virtue of an exercise of tho power of appointment, he could claim to have the property without being subject to the settlement, the reason being that the interest he obtained by the exercise of the power was distinct from what he had in default of such exercise. In the case before him the deed of settlement was by an infant. P1-imzi fil¢‘f€ it would only pass the interest that she then had and not what she might afterwards acquire. The words of the settlement were consistent with this, and, treating the matter as a. question of construction, his lordship did not think that he ought to construe the deed as intended to pass what the plaintiff might in the future possibly acquire. In the settlement there was no reference to the power of appointment, and there was no covenant or any words to bind the mother not to exercise the power of appointment. The main contention of the trustees was based on the recitals in the deed as to the plaintiff's title, but, on looking at these recitals, it would be seen that so far as they went they were accurate, inasmuch as matters then stood, the plaintifi, the settlor, was entitled to the property subject to the mother’s life interest, although the recital was incomplete, inasmuch as it did not state that her interest was liable to be defeated by the exercise of the power by the mother. But giving the recitals a reasonable construction, and making them it possible accord with facts, they should be treated as a. statement of what the settlor's interest then was, and, in his l0rdship's opinion, the settlement was only intended to piss such interest as she then had, not what she might afterwards acquire. It was not a case of estoppel. The doctrine of equitable estoppel could not be applied in favour of a volunteer, nor was there any estoppel raised by the words used to convey the property; it was an innocent conveyance; nor on the ground of misrepresentation, as the recitals, so far as they went, were accurate, and on these grounds his lordship declared that the plaintiff was entitled to have the property free from the settlement.COUNSEL, Neville, Q,.C., and Leigh Clare; Lavett, Q.C., and Dickinson ; J. Ashton Gross. SOLICITORR, Orirllmid §' Nell; Jonson, Cobb, §- Pearson; Godfrey §~ Robertson.

[Reported by Bsnroii B. Pnii.i.i'-o'r'rs, Barrister-at-Law.)

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In this case, stated to be the first on what is commonly known as the betterment question, there was an award by the arbitrator appointed by the Local Government Beard to make an initial valuation, under the London County Council (Tower Bridge Southern Approach) Act, 1895, in respect of certain “tied” licensed premises. This award was, by an order of the court, made in the form of a special case for the opinion of the Queen’s Bench Division. By the above Act the London County Council was authorized to make a new street on the south side of the River Thames as an approach to the Tower Bridge, and for that purpose to take certain lands compulsorily. By section 36 property contiguous to

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the proposed new street is styled “ the improvement area," and it is pro

vided t at the lands included in such area are liable to have an improve-
ment cparge placed ulpon 2:181]? in rsispept of “any substantial and per-
manen increase in va uew ic iti h h b d ' df
1 the improvement." For arriving dtcth?:Ii;;r§:e!i1iie:tB cheififgo invvisluatfiblg
: is to be made of the property before the improvement is made. This is
called the “initial valuation." The valuer is to separately value the
interesttil of tgefowper otf the site and buildings, and the interest of any
essee ereo or wen -one ear . ' d ' I d" f h h
valuation any “ trade inyterest.5,’ :\fl::t%hL;eim;lgvténi:Et i§OdIdii$l:eteS1uiEn
. assessment is to be made by the London County Council of the amount
rwhich the council alleges is the enhanced market value derived by the
property from its improvement. Subject to the right of the parties inter-
.ested to object to assessment, and have the same decided by arbitra-
tion, (a) the property is to have a charge equal to 3 per cent. per annum
on hali aha enh];i.nce4.tlhmarket value, or (6) the owner may require the county
counci pure use e ro ert at the t f th ' 't' l l t" .
In the present case tile bregery comgdlixigmireotheefi-1::li:il<li;iim(ff)na
public-house called the “Old Rose.” This is situated within the above-
mentioned “improvement area,” and is subject to a lease, of which less
than twenty-one years was unexpired, granted by the company to one
\V. Clements, which lease reserves, besides an annual rental, the right to
exclusive supply of the nialt liquors consumed in the house. \Vhen the
arbitrator was making the “initial valuation,” the question arose as to
the meaning of the words “ excluding from each such valuation any trade
interest" in section 36 of the Act, and whether therefore the value of the
covenant tying the licensed premises was to be taken into account. The
iqgiestions for the opinion of the court were: (1) Whether, according to
l.';.:..::'::: 2:11:~::st:;.i.i.:“1;“*%Aii "5 "hr “““““?i“‘*“-‘i.‘i"
- an 1 anner-s ree was a missi e;
t(2) \Vhether (the “ Old Rose," being let on a lease whefeof nineteen years
are unexpired at a rental of £100 per annum, subject to the ordinary
pggepsiag ttyc:.I1i§1:l11ZB];‘l)1;Cli!ihB$b0g push; liquqrs tottbe lgssors) in iérriviqg gt‘;
snrs evaueo suc eovnan is o
excluded. The arbitrator then stated alternative finding; of the figures
according to the result of the judgment of the court. There was, besides
the case of the “Old Rose,’_’ that of another public-house not a tied
house. This was dealt with in the judgment in the court.

_ Tnn Couariwarour and Kinmsnr, JJ.) took time to consider their judgment.

On the 26th of November the written judgment of the court was dehvered by WRIGHT, J . After stating the facts of the case and referring rto the sections of the Act bearing upon the case, the learned judge said : {The questions for decision in the present case arise in relation solely to the “initial valuation” of the properties. In the present case of the “‘Old Rose” there is not a lease for twenty-one years, but there is a shorter lease with the common "tying" covenant. In valuing the site apart from the buildings on it the valucr has, with the assent of the c_ounty council, taken into consideration the fact that the premises are licensed as a public-house. On that basis he has made alternative valuations of the site, dependent on the two questions whether the takings and payments of the public-house and the fact that it is tied are elements of the value o_f the site or of the site and buildings. It seems to us plain that neither of them can be considered in valuing the site apart _from any existing buildings “ thereon.” In the next part of the valuation—nam_ely, that of the site and buildings “as a whole”—the same two questions arise. As regards the takings and payments, we think that they cannot be treated as elements of value of the land and building —1.s., as in themselves evidence of value—and that evidence of thorn should not be admitted even for the purpose of testing the evidence of witnesses. In Dobbs v. Asseainimt Commitlee of South Shields (43 VV. R. 1895, 2 Q. B. l33) it was so held with reference to questions of gratmg, and we think that the principle of that decision, although partly ibssed on practice, is applicable to the present case. As regards the '“ tying ” covenant, we think that the valuation of the site and buildings -must _in effect be the same as it that covenant were considered. The real

-question is, What is the market value of thepremisss fit for a public-house, considered apart from any particular distribution of the interests in it—— 1.e., considered as an unqualified freehold? The property must be valued as that of a person who is in all respects a beneficial owner. The fact that the house is tied has not increased its value, but only amounts to thisthat the owner has not parted with that part of its value which consists of the power to tie. The value of the premises is practically the same either -way. The enhancement of the value of the premises which will result from the improvement will be the same, whether the premises are tied or not-, though the benefit of it may be differently apportioned between lessor and lessee; and the charge is intended to be proportioned to the total enhancement of value. The third part of the valuation appears to be introduced for the purposes of sub-sectidn (9), and although it seems pn'm_d facie to be required only when there is a lessee for at least 21 years, yet in order to give full effect to sub-section (9) it seems necessary to construe the provision for this third part of the valuation as requiring iii every case a valuation of the owner's interest. Then it only remains to determine whether in the present case the fact that the house is “ tied " ought to be considered in this third part of the valuation. \Ve think that it ought, in the same manner as in the valuation of the site and buildings, though not for the same reasons. This part of the valuation isa valuation -not of the site and buildings, but of the owner's interest in them, and anything, not being a trade interest. ought to be considered which affects the quanlurn of that interest. The effect will be that if the owner requires the council under sub-section (9) to take his interest, and they do not abandon the charge on his property, they will have to pay him the value of his scliial interest in the premises, and the charge will continue and he

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apportioned between the council and the lessees, just as if the council had a ways been the owner and as if the existing leases had been held from them. In the case of the “ Raven ” and “ Sun ” similar questions arise with this exception-that the premises are under lease for an unexpired term exceeding 21 years without any “tying ” covenant. If the owner gets a rent different from the rent which he could get if the house were tied, and if that difference fairly represents the value to the lessee of his freedom from such a covenant, then the existence or non-existence of such a covenant would seem to be immaterial, otherwise the value of the interest of the one or the other party would be increased or diminished as the case may be. The valuation will therefore stand as a valuation according to the last tables in each case.—Cot".\'siar., Bosanquet, Q 0., and Cabubé ,Hon. .4. Lyttellon. Soniciroas, West:-rn 4- Sons; W. Blarlaml.

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Case stated by the Recorder of Worcester. The prisoner was indicted at the Michaelmas quarter sessions for having falsely pretended to one Julia Cramp that he was then able to pay hcr for a plate of cold meat and a pint of sherry, which he then ordered, and that he than had and possessed suflicient money to pay for them, by means of which false pretence he did then unlawfully obtain from Julia Crump certain victuals, ) whereas in truth and in fact he did not then have or possess sufllcient money to pay. There was also a count for obtaining credit by fraud. It was proved that the prisoner came to a restaurant kept by Julia Grump’s husband and asked what they had ready, and on being informed that they had some cold lamb, said he would have that and half-a-pint of sherry. He then went to the dining-room and was supplied with and consumed the victuals in question. He asked for his bill, which was given to him, and amounted to four shillings. He then said he had no money except t one halfpenny, but was expecting some goods soon. He was then given into custody, and on his being searched one halfpenny only was found on him. Mrs. Cramp stated that generally customers paid immediately after they had finished their meal, and that she would not have supplied the prisoner with the wine and food if she had known he was not able to pay for it, though customers who were known were sometimes allowed to , pay afterwards. In cross-examination she stated that the prisoner was 1 shabbily dressed and that she served him the same as any other customer, and made no inquiries about him, as she sometimes did. She also stated that if an intending customer looked as if he were unable to pay she would make some inquiries about him before supplying food. The recorder directed the jury that before they could convict the prisoner they must be satisfied (1) that he intended to represent that he was of present ability to pay ; (:1) that he was aware of his want of ability to pay; , (3) that the food was supplied in consequence of the false pretence; (4) and that there was an intention to defraud. The jury found the prisoner guilty on both counts, and he was sentenced On the argument of the ease, on the 13th of November, it was contended on behalf of the prisoner that his conduct merely amounted to a promise to pay, and was not sulficicnt to support an indictment for obtaining the food by false pretences, and as to the second count, that credit was not in fact obtained. Rex. v. G004/M” (R- 55 R- 461), Rey. v. Burrows (ll Cox C.C. 258), Rex. VBarnard (7 C. & P. 784), Reg. v. Cooper (2 Q. B. D. 510), Reg. v. Peters (16 Q. B. D. 636), Reg. V. Gordan (23 Q. B. D. 354), Reg. v. llazelton (L. R. 2 O. C. R. 134), Reg. v. Slowly (12 Cox O. (J. 269), and other cases were cited.

The judgment of the Couar (Lord lti'ssnr.i. or KlLLO\YBN, O.J., and Wnioar, KENNEDY, DARLING, and CHANNELL, JJ.) was delivered by

Lord Rosssnr. or KILLOWBN, C.J., who said the question was whether the conviction could be supported in respect of one or both counts, the jury having convicted the prisoner on both, and a concurrent sentence having been inflicted. The question, in other words, amounted to thisWas there any evidence on which the jury ought to have been asked to convict? What the prisoner did was to go into the restaurant and order food and eat it and not pay. N 0 question was asked him as to his ability to pay. No statement was made by him as to whether he had means or I not. Could that be regarded as justifying the jury in finding that he had obtained these goods by false pretenccs? The court thought not. At the same time they did not mean to east the least doubt on the cases deciding that conduct without words could amount to a false pretence, us in the case where a man at Oxford put on a cap and gown in order to make Hpretence that he was a member of the university. ln this ease, however, the prisoner had only ordered and consumed this lunch, and had done nothing else. It was not proper to leave such a case as that to the jury, on a charge of false pretenecs, as there was no evidence on which they could convict the prisoner in such circumstances of false pretences. By section ( S8 of 2-1 & 25 Viet. c 96, it was provided that on a charge of obtaining goods by false pretences, if it were proved that the goods were obtained in such a manner as to amount at law to larceny, the person charged could still be found guilty of the iriisdemeanour. In this case, however, the prisoner could not be convicted under that section, as he had not committed laiceuy. For it was perfectly clear that the prosecutor had voluntarily parted with the property in and possession of the food, a fact which prevented the offence from being larceny, as larceny consisted in the taking away goods against the will of the owner. The court were therefore of opinion that the verdict of the jury on the first count could not be supported. The second count was framed undera different statute , —namclv, section 13 of the Debtors Act, 1869 (32 & 33 Vict. c. 62), which

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, provided that a person should be guilty of a misdemeanour and liable t0 imprisonment for one year “ if in incurring any debt or liability he liflfl

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obtained credit under false pretences, or by means of any other fraud.” There was therefore three e ements in this oifence—first, the incurring a debt or liability ; second, obtaining credit ; and third, fraud. The conjunction of these three was essential to the offence. The prisoner in this case had obviously incurred a debt or liability. Had he obtained credit? In the opinion of the court he did. The prosecutor might have said that he would not furnish the goods unless the money was first paid over, but he did not say so. He relied on the ability of the prisoner to pay, and gave credit. In the opinion of the court the length of the period of credit was not material; at any rate, the prosecutor parted absolutely with the goods without prepayment. Was there, then, fraud? The jury had found that there was, and there was ample evidence to justify them in so finding. The man went into the eating-house, in which the ordinary custom was that people should pay immediately on the consumption of the food. He must be taken to have known this custom, and that it would be observed with regard to him. The jury found that he had no intention of paying. The conviction therefore on the second count and the sentence following thereon must be aflirmed.-Cou.~:ssi., R. Harington ,J. B. Matthews. Sonrcirons, John Slallanl, Worcester ; Arrowsmit/r, Haund, if Coombs, \Vorcester.

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Case stated by Ridley, J . The prisoners were indicted at the Glamorgan July assizes under section 7 of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875, for having, with a view to compel one William Eton to abstain from doing an act which he had a legal right to do—viz., from performing a contract to serve as a seaman on board a certain shipintimidated him, and watched and beset the place where he was, and followed him with others in a. disorderly manner. It was proved that Eton had signed articles on bosrd a steamship lying in Penarth Dcck, and that when he came ashore the prisoners and a number of other persons surrounded him and intimidated and assaulted him, following him for about three hundred yards. The prisoners followed the sea as a calling, each of them having been engaged as a fireman on board steamships, but on the day in question neither of them was engaged or employed as a fireman or seaman on board ship; it did not appear when either of them had last been so employed. It was contended on their behalf that they could not be convicted because section 16 of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875, provides that “ nothing in this Act shall apply to seamen or to apprenl ices to the sea service,” For the prosecution it was contended that the term “ seaman " as used in that section applied only to persons actually “employed or engaged on board ship” within the definition of “ seaman ” in the Merchant Shipping Acts, 1854 (I7 8: 18 Vict. c. 104), s. 2, and 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 60), s. 742. The learned judge directed the jury that the prisoners were not within the exception; they were convicted and sentenced subject to this case, which was heard last term before Lord Russell of Killowen, C.J., the late Baron Pollock, and Hawkins, Lawrance, and Collins, JJ., judgment being reserved.

]‘1'lie judgment of the Court was read by

Lord R.ussiii.i. or KILLOWKN, C.J., who said the question for the court was what was the proper construction to be put upon the word “ seaman ” in section 16 of the Act of 1875. If there were no reason to the contrary “ seaman” might well be construed in its largest sense as a seafaring man. In construing an Act of Parliament, however, it was necessary to inquire into the intention of the Legislature and take into account other legislation bearing on the question. The question then arose, Why should seamen be exempted from the provisions of the Act and not carpenters or other workmen? If “ seamen ” meant seafaring men it would be difficult to suggest any reason for so large an exception, whereas if it was taken in the limited sense of the definition in the Merchant Shipping Acts a reason might be found in the special legislation of those Acts applicable to “ seamen ” a_s therein defined. If, for instance, there were a series of clauses similar in principle to those in the Act of 1875 by their language specially adapted to the case of sailors in actual employment the distinction would be obvious and the argument in favour of the prosecution irresistible. But although the provisions of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, as to sailors in actual employment were not similar to those in the _Act of 1875, the Act of 1854 had provisions which had an important bearing on the present case. By the interpretation clause (section 2) it was enacted that “ seaman shall include every person (except masters, pilots, and apprentices duly indentured and registered‘) employed or engaged in any capacity on board any ship.” By section 243 it was provided that for wilful disobedience to lawful command a seaman should be liable to imprisonment. By section 257 every person who persuaded or attempted to persuade any seaman to refuse to join his ship, or to desert, or to absent himself from duty should in respect of each such seaman incur a pznalty not exceeding £10. These provisions created a wide distinction

tween a seaman actually employed or engaged under the Merchant Shippnig Act and a mere seafearing man not so actually employed or engaged. With reference to the offence dealt with by the Conspiracy Act, 187_5, the captain of a vessel had ample power to deal with a seaman imder his command. He might require him as a lawful command under section 243 (3) to abstain from intimidating, or if the seaman attempted to persuade another to refuse to join or to desert the captain might summon him for the penalty. Under these circumstances the Legislature might well have considered the mischief dealt with by the Conspiracy Act

of 1875, already provided against, and have declined to add a cumulative remedy. It was suggested in argument that a difficulty might arise as to

whether a seaman was “employed or engaged ” ; and also whether, as the Act had the words “ on board any ship,” a seaman would be liable if he committed the illegal act on shore. Those objections had no real foundation, as the employment or engagement must be determined as a question of fact in each case, and a seaman might well be held to be employed or engaged on board ship, although at the particular point of time he might have been sent on shore on duties connected with the ship. The prisoners here followed the sea “as a calling ”; it was not shewn when they were last employed on board a ship. It was consistent with this that they had been out of employment for months and had no immediate prospect of a future engagement. It would be strange if such persons were excluded from the legislation of 1875 as well as the Merchant Shipping Acts. On the whole, therefore, it appeared that at the date of the passing of the Act of 1875 the Legislature had already defined in a statute what is meant by seamen—that the explanation of their exclusion from the later Act must be sought in the fact that they were already the subject of special enactments giving another remedy for some of the matters included in the later statute; and that no ground of reason or common sense could be found for excluding from the operation of the Act in question the whole class of seafaring men not actually engaged in sea service. Under the circumstances, the court was of opinion that the view taken by the learned judge at the trial was correct. and the conviction must be affirmed. Conviction Bifilmed.-—COUNSBL, J. D. Crawford; B. F. William, Q C.. and Arthur Lewis. SoLici'rons, Puttimon Q Brewer; David §- Evans, Cardiff.

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This was an appeal from his Honour Judge David Lewis, sitting at Carnarvon, who had granted the solicitors to the trustee in the bankruptcy acharging order for costs on certain money alleged_to have been recovered or preserved by them in the bankruptcy proceedings. The bankrupt in this case had absconded to Australia, and was arrested by the police at Adelaide, who found upon him about £800, of which they took possession. The trustee instructed the solicitor retained by him, with the consent of the committee of inspection, to claim this money. The solicitor wrote to the police oflicials at Adelaide claiming the money on behalf of the trustee, and executed a power of attorney to a solicitor in Adelaide to receive the money, whereupon it was immediately paid over by the police. A police-constable was subsequently sent out to Adelaide to bring the debtor bick, and he on his return was first charged with forgery before the magistrates, who refused to commit him for trial, and afterwards charged with fraud and committed to the nssizes, where he was acquitted. The solicitors claimed a charging order for their costs in respect of all these proceedings on the £800 recovered from the police at Adelaide, and such order was granted in the county court at Carnarvon. The trustee appealed, and the case was argued on the llth of November.

THE Couar took time to consider their judgment, and on the 26th of November Wnionr, J., delivered the following judgment of the court: On the facts in evidence and the findings of the judge we come. to the conclusion that the solicitors were employed by the trustee with the sanction of the committee of inspection, expressly or mainly for the purpose of the recovery of the money in question for the benefit of the creditors. Therefore, three questions of law are raised, each of them of some importance and diiflculty. The first is, whether the money can be regarded as having been recovered or preserved by the solicitors in or by the bankruptcy proceedings? No jurisdiction was exercised by the Bankruptcy Court in or towards the recovery or preservation of it. So far as appears all that was done was this: The solicitors, _in their capacity as solicitors employed by the trustee, made an application for the money to the police authorities in Adelaide, and obtained it from them. The mere fact this was done by the solicitors as solicitors in the bankruptcy does not seem to us sufficient. Suppose that I instruct a solicitor to bring an action to recover my horse from a person who has wrongfully obtained possession of it, that the solicitor commences an action against that person, but hearing that the horse is iii the hands of a third party, applies to the third party for and receives from him the horse, could it be said that the horse was recovered or preserved by or in the action within the meaning of the statute? On the contrary the action in such a case has been ineffectual, and may have brcn improvident. The second question is, whether, if the money ought to be regarded as recovered or preserved in the bankruptcy procezdings, the Bankruptcy Court has jurisdiction to imake a charging order under section 28 of the Solicitors Act,_1860? |Prim(i frwie the proceedings in a bankruptcy appear to_be within the . language of the section a “ suit or proceeding in a court of ‘ justice” ; nor does there seem to be anything in the objection that 1 the money was already vested in the trustee by the bankruptcy. Property

is often recovered in an action by a solicitor for the very reason that it was already vest/ad in his client. Nor do we think the question decided by Ra . Suflisld (36 W. R. 303, 20 Q. B. D. G93) or by Re Wood (1897, 1 Q. B. 314, ' 45 W. R. Dig. 155). Apart from these authorities the principal difficulty i in the way of holding that there may be cases in which a bankruptcy I court could make such an order is that rule 125 of the Bankruptcy Rules prescribes a certain order of priority of payments, and the effect of_a charging order would presumably be to vary this order of payment in

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favour of the solicitor, although he must be taken to have accepted his retainer with knowledge of the prescribed priority. Although in the view which we have taken of the first question it may not be necessary to express an opinion on this second point, we do not see how the difficulty could be got over. The third question again only arises if the views expressed above are wrong. If the court is entitled to make an order to what costs will the order extend? On the one side it is said that the order will extend to all the solicitor’s costs in the bankruptcy and in prosecutions directed by the court. On the other side it is said that the order ought to be limited to the costs of the actual application for and obtaining the money. We do not think that the whole of the proceedings in a bankruptcy can for this purpose be regarded as necessarily one. There may be separate cases against each of ten or a hundred debtors of the bankrupt. The claims of each of ten or of si hundred creditors may have to be disputed in several ways, and in such a case it could hardly be contended that money recovered from one debtor could be charged with the costs of all the cases. On the other hand there may be cases in which all the proceedings in the court really are directed to one matter, and in such a case the charge,_if any, might properly extend to all the costs. In the present case we think _fhat we have not sufficient information to enable iis to decide on which side of the line the case falls, and that, if it were necessary to decide this_question, the matter ought to go back for further inquiry. The appeal will be allowed with costs here and b8l0W.--COUNSEL, gab”! Reed, Q,.C., and Carrington ; Robson, Q.C., and S. J. Evans. SOLici'i'ons, Safer;/, Huntley, §~ Co; Lloyd, George, §- George.

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The following report of the Law and Parliamentary Committee was submilted to, and a opted by, the vestry of the parish of St. Mary Abbotts, Kensingion, on the 1st of December, 1897.

Stating—

That the attention of the committee has been called to the Land Transfer Act passed in the last session, by section 20 of which power is given to the Privy Council to select one county in England in which the registration of title to land shall be made compulsory, provided the council of the county does not object.

The committee have_also had before them a communication from the London County Council calling attention to this particular provision of the Act, mtimaiing that the council have received formal notice that the county of London has been selected in which such compulsory registration should enforced, stating that the question of applying the Act to London is a very important matter, and that before coming to a decision thereon,_ the council would be glad to have the views of those bodies who are specially interested, and accordingly asking the vestry to furnish the council with their views on the subject.

Your committee desire to state that, recognizing the importance of the matter and in anticipation that the Privy Council intended to select the County of London, they have had the Act under careful consideration for 311;: weeks past, and they now submit the following Observations

on :

Since 1862, when the existing land registry oflice was established, it has been open to landowners to voluntarily register their titles. Experience has, however, proved conclusively that the registration of titles at that office has in_volved far greater expense and delay than the present system of transferring property by deed, and the office has in consequence been practically shunned.

The language of the Act of 1897 is very involved. and the Act has to be read in conjunction with the Land Transfer Act, 1875, some of the sections of which are repealed or amended. As a result many of the provisions are obscure in the extrem_e,_ and can be variously interpreted. If, therefore, the compulsory provisions _of the Act come into operation they will, in the opmion of the committee, certainly be a fruitful source of litigation.

There is every reason _to fear that compulsory registration of title as established by the Act will, if applied to London, add most seriously to the difiicnlty, expense, and_delay of buying, selling, or mortgaging property. A title is to be registered either as (a) indefeasible, (b) ualified, or (c) possessory. Having regard to the elaborate precautions toqbe taken and the length of t_he title that must be shown, an indefeasible title will only be obtainable in the rarest cases. A qualified title will, it is confidently anticipated, be worse than useless, as it will suggest a doubt that will gravely embarrass a sale or mortgage. A possessory title will convey no guarantee of title, and it admittedly cannot be of any value for many years. The certificate will, however, add another to the documents of title that will have to be investigated and paid for whenever the property is dealt_with, and dealings in property, particularly where the purchasemoney is small, will _thus be_greatly hampered.

A_t _the present time it is the practice of the leading London land societies to grant free conveyances to their purchasers. They can do this as the conveyances are prepared in their own offices at a minimum of trouble and expense. _ If, however, the transaction has to be effected

through the Land Registry Office the committee believe that expense and delay will be involved which will impede rather than facilitate the free transfer of land.

Compulsory registration of title in London would, it is submitted, involve thc_cmployment of a large staff of ofiicials, and, if once adopted, it is obvious that, whether successful or not, it will practically be impossible to put an end to the system. If the fees charged on transfers, &c., realize suiiiclent to pay all the expenses of salaries, pensions, &c., including the

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fund to be established for providing an indemnity in case of fraud or

, mistake, the fees will have to be fixed at an amount that will add

materially to the expense of purchasing or mortgaging groperties. If the

fees are limited, and in consequence do not produce su cient to meet the

expenses, the taxpayer will be called upon to make up the deficiency. Your committee accordingly recommend-—

(a) That having regard to the vast number of properties which would beafiected, and the immense value, complexity, and importance of the interests involved, the county of London is not a suitable county for the first trial of the doubtful experiment of compulsory registration.

(b) That the London County Council be informed in reply to their inquiry that the vestry do not ap(prove of registration of title being made compulsory in the county of Lon on under the Land Transfer Act, 1897.

(c) That a copy of this report be forwarded to the members of Parliament for the metropolitan constituencies, to the Corporation of the City of London, and to the other vestries and district boards of the metropolis.

(Signed) W. F. CILAIES, Chairman of the Meeting.

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The General Purposes Committee of the London County Council have reported as follows with reference to the proposed application to London of the Land Transfer Act, 1897. After setting out the letter from the Lord President of the Council enclosing the draft order to apply the Act to London, they referred to the procedure with which, under the Act, the County Council was allowed to deal with the application of the Act to London. They continued: “With reference to the suggestion that compulsory registration should be limited at first to a part only of the county, it is not clear in what way this limitation can be imposed so as to enable subsequent extensions to all parts of the county to be made without a further order being necessary. But we think it reasonable to assume that this can be done, and it appears probable that the draft order may be so amended or varied as to specify a different day for the commencement of compulsory registration of title on sale of freehold land in four or more divisions of the county. Tho Lord President invites the county council to make suggestions for the consideration of the Lord Chancellor as the way in which the Act should be brought into operation, and as to arrangements which would be likely to prove convenient, and it may be thought desirable that the business should be taken up progressively according to divisions of the county, following possibly the divisions recognized by the Local Government or as to county courts. Upon this important matter it is well to remember that sub-section 10 of the same clause provides ‘ that any order made under this section shall be made with due regard to the utilization (if practicable) of any land registry existing in the county.’ The Middlesex Register of Deeds is in operation north of the Thames in every county council division except the old City, and although there is, of course, a wide distinction between such a register and a register of titles, there is obvious economy and advantage in the suggestion. If part only of the county is to be dealt with in the first case there is apparent advantage in taking that portion or some part of that portion of the county which is dealt with in the existing register of deeds. We have addressed a letter to the City Corporation and to other bodies, inviting their views upon the matter, and we proppse to report fully to the council after the Christmas recess when replies ave been received.” The report was, after discussion, adopted.

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Sir Warren Pi-iintnioau, Bart., D.C.L., has been appointed to be one of the Justices of the High Court. Sir Walter is the only son of the late Sir Robert Phillimore, Judge of the Admiralty Court. He was educated at "Westminster and Christ Church, Oxford, and was elected to an All Souls’ Fellowship, and became Vinerian Law Scholar in 1868. He was called to the bar in 1868, and is a bencher of his inn. He has also a patent of precedence.

Lords Justices Harm COLLINS and WILLIAMS have been sworn in as Members of the Privy Council.

Mr. Aniixsiviiiiii. D. O. WBDDBKBUBN, Q,.C., has been appointed Recorder of Gravesend, in the place of Mr. Morton \V. Smith, appointed Recorder of Rochester.

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