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Suitable clauses, settled by Counsel, can be obtained on application to THE LICENSES INSURANCE CORPORATION AND GUARANTEE FUND, LIMITED,

24, MOORGATE STREET, LONDON, E.C. Mortgages Guaranteed on Licensed Properties promptly, without special valuation and at low rates.

ALLIANCE ASSURANCE COMPANY.

Established 1824. Capital, £5,000,000 Sterling.

HEAD OFFICE: BARTHOLOMEW LANE, LONDON.
Chairman: RIGHT HON. LORD ROTHSCHILD.

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FALSE PRETENCES CORRESPONDENCE............

NEW ORDERS, &c.

Contents.

75

LAW SOCIETIES

78

LEGAL NEWS

COURT PAPERS...

79

WINDING UP NOTICES

80

THE LAND TRANSFER ACT, 1897......... 8t

CREDITORS' NOTICES..... BANKRUPTCY NOTICES

Cases Reported this Week.

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LONDON BRANCHES : 1, ST. JAMES'S ST., S.W.; 63, CHANCERY LANE, W.C.; Land Transfer Act, 1897, which has been made by the Privy

NORFOLK ST., STRAND; WIGMORE ST.; 3, MINCING LANE, E.C.

LIFE AND FIRE INSURANCES AT MODERATE RATES.

Life Policies free from Restrictions, with Perfect Security and Liberal Bonuses, Special forms of Policies have been prepared to provide for payment of ESTATE DUTIES. LEASEHOLD AND SINKING FUND POLICIES.

Full Prospectuses on application.

ROBERT LEWIS, Chief Secretary.

Council. In our comments last week we overlooked a provision in the Interpretation Act, 1889, which we believe is relied on as sanctioning both the making of the draft order and the giving of formal notice to the London County Council. Section 37 of

LEGAL AND GENERAL LIFE ASSURANCE that Act runs as follows:

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"Where an Act, passed after the commencement of this Act, is not to come into operation immediately on the passing thereof, and confers powers so make any appointment, to make, grant, or issue any instru ment, that is to say, any Order in Council, order, warrant, scheme, letters patent, rules, regulations, or bye-laws, to give notices, to prescribe forms, or to do any other thing for the purposes of the Act, that power may, unless the contrary intention appears, be exercised at any time after the passing of the Act, so far as may be necessary or expedient for the purpose of bringing the Act into operation at the date of the commencement thereof, subject to this restriction, that any instrument made under the power shall not, unless the contrary intention appears in the Act, or the contrary is necessary for bringing the Act into operation, come into operation until the Act comes into operation."

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THE FEAST of All Souls has from time immemorial been one of the chief events in the year for the judicial bench. This year the judicial bench will be the chief event of the year at the Feast of All Souls. For, within the year, two former Fellows of that college have been raised to seats in the High Court. There are those who persist in believing that the Lord Chancellor, unlike the king, can do no right, and who profess themselves to be ever at fault in the attempt to find a clue to his mysterious mind. To such wanderers in the labyrinth we may offer the pious hope that they may now find one or more threads which will lead them out of their difficulties. Sir WALTER PHILLIMORE was a Fellow of All Souls; and, in addition to this, he was twice Commissioner of Assize. Here are two criteria of selection which we would suggest that they should apply to certain recent nominations. Let us, however, put aside

"chaff," and congratulate the Lord Chancellor on a graceful act in appointing a political opponent of a rather violent type, who is also a popular and a learned man, and has had a large practice in the Admiralty Court and in ecclesiastical cases, and a fair practice also on the Western Circuit. He has, no doubt, in him the making of a good judge; but we may, perhaps, be permitted to hint that he has two tendencies which should be severely curbed. He is too voluble for the Bench, being overmuch endowed with what has been called the "accursed gift of eloquence"; and he is rather given to strong "views on certain subjects. If he can keep his eloquence down, and hide with scarlet and ermine his views as effectively as his waistcoat, he should go far to justify the Chancellor, and to bring honour to Westminster, All Souls, and Oxford.

IT HAS long been perfectly well settled that the receiver of a letter has no such property in it as to entitle him to publish it against the wishes of the writer, and the same rule applies, of course, to persons other than the receiver into whose hands the letter may subsequently come. The judgment of NORTH, J., in Labouchere v. Hess does no more than apply this rule. The argument that the writer of the letter makes a gift of it to the receiver so as to vest the property in him was met by Lord HARDWICKE in Pope v. Curl (2 Atk. 342) with the remark that the receiver has at most a joint property with the writer, and that this does not give him a licence to publish the letter to the world. Following this and other authorities, Lord APSLEY, C., without hesitation, granted an injunction in Thompson v. Stanhope (Amb. 737) to restrain the publication, without the consent of the Earl of CHESTERFIELD's executors, of the letters of that nobleman to his son. In subsequent cases the grounds of these decisions have been examined and their correctness to some extent questioned, but the decisions have never been overruled. The true legal doctrine appears to be that the property in the paper is in the receiver of the letter, and the copyright in the writer. In Perceval v. Phipps (2 Ves. & B. 19) PLUMER, M.R., drew a distinction between letters which have a literary value and those which are simply ordinary letters of friendship or business. Business letters, he said, it would be very extraordinary to describe as a literary work in which the writers have a copyright. But the distinction has not been adopted, and it would certainly have no chance of recognition at the present day, when the protection of the courts has been successfully invoked in favour of trade catalogues and Stock Exchange price lists. The right of the author of the letter being thus fully recognized, on the ground of his property in the copyright, it becomes unnecessary to seek for further justification of it on the grounds of the confidence he reposes in the person to whom the letter is addressed. In our courts of equity the maintenance of this confidence, however important in point of morals, has not been regarded as a ground for interference; though Lord ELLON, in Gee v. Pritchard (2 Swanst., p. 426), referred to it as an additional reason why he should exercise a jurisdiction which the court had already claimed to possess on the ground of property. The receiver of the letter may, indeed, publish it for the purpose of clearing his own character (Earl of Lytton v. Devey, 52 L. T., p. 122), and the letter is not privileged from production in the course of litigation (Hopkinson v. Lord Burghley, 2 Ch. App. 447), but, subject to such special circumstances, the possessor can only use it in the manner contemplated by the writer at the time it was sent.

A REMARKABLE state of things had to be dealt with in the case of Reg. v. Harris last week at the Old Bailey. The prisoner was indicted for the murder of his wife, and it was alleged that, having murdered her, he had attempted to commit suicide by cutting his own throat. Anyhow, he was found to be wounded in such a way in the throat that he was unable to speak, and being an illiterate person, who could neither read nor write, he was absolutely unable to give any instructions to the soiicitor retained for his defence by his friends. A jury was sworn, and in answer to questions put to them by DARLING, J., they replied that the prisoner was able to plead to the indictment, and that he was sane, but that he was unable to communicate with his legal

advisers, and that this disability was caused by his own unlawful act. Under these circumstances the trial was postponed, and it yet remains to be determined what is the proper course to be adopted. A most important question, and apparently a novel one, is raised in this strange case-i.e., whether a person can be tried who, though perfectly sane, is utterly unable to make any proper defence because of his inability to communicate with his counsel or with anyone else. There have been cases somewhat similar in which deaf and dumb persons were concerned. Thus, in Rex v. Pritchard (7 C. & P. 303), a man was indicted for felony before ALDERSON, B., and in answer to questions the jury found that he was mute by visitation of God, that he was able to plead, but that he was not of sufficient intellect to comprchend the course of proceedings or the details of the evidence so as to make a proper defence. This finding the learned judge held to be equivalent to a finding that the prisoner was insane, and ordered him to be detained during his Majesty's pleasure. This case was followed much later in Reg. v. Berry (1 Q. B. D. these decisions. It is clear, however, in all these cases that 447), and there are one or two other cases in agreement with the prisoner was held to be incapable of taking his trial because of his inability to defend himself arising from an intellectual incapacity to understand the proceedings. In the present case the prisoner seems to be quite able to understand the proceedings, but is unable to properly defend himself because he can neither ask a witness a question, nor instruct his counsel what to ask, nor in any way take part in the trial. It is submitted that it is contrary to all justice to put a man on his trial in such a condition. It is true it must be assumed that he has, by his own unlawful act, brought himself into that condition; but even then it would be dangerous to allow a man to be convicted of a capital crime when, if he were able to communicate his thoughts, he might be able to give his advisers such instructions as would lead to his acquittal.

THE CASE of Re Humphreys, recently decided by a Divisional Court (WRIGHT and KENNEDY, JJ.), raised several important questions as to the power of the court to make charging orders under section 28 of the Solicitors Act, 1860, though in the result a decision was given only upon one point. The section provides that, in every case in which a solicitor is employed to prosecute or defend any suit, matter, or proceeding in any court of justice, it shall be lawful for the court or judge before whom any such suit, matter, or proceeding has been heard, or shall be depending, to declare such solicitor entitled to a charge on the property recovered or preserved for his taxed costs, charges, and expenses. In Re Humphreys a farmer in Carnarvonshire, early in 1895, realized his assets, and sailed for Australia with about £800. After his departure a warrant for his arrest was issued on a charge of forgery, and bankruptcy proceedings were commenced, in the course of which a prosecution was ordered against him for alleged offences under the Debtors Act, 1869. He was arrested at Adelaide and brought back to this country, but a sum of £813 which was found upon him was detained by the Adelaide police. The charge of forgery was dismissed by the magistrates, and at the assizes the debtor was acquitted of the other offences. Messrs. LLOYD-GEORGE & Co., of Criccieth, acted as solicitors for the trustee in the bankruptcy in these prosecutions and also generally, and, upon their application, the £813 was transmitted to this country by the Adelaide police. This proved to be the only asset in the bankruptcy, and the solicitors applied to the county court judge for an order in the bankruptcy and under the Solicitors Act, 1860, charging the sum with the costs incidental to its recovery, including the costs and expenses of the arrest and prosecutions. The county court judge made the order, but there is the objection, which, in the opinion of the Divisional Court, was fatal, that the money was recovered on the mere application of the solicitors to the Adelaide police, and not as the result of the exercise of any jurisdiction by the court. For the purpose of section 28 it seems essential that proceedings should have been commenced for the recovery of the property, and the conduct of the police made any proceedings unnecessary. The immediate compliance of a person against whom a claim is made does not appear to give any chance for the operation of the statute, and it makes no difference that the claim is made on behalf of a trustee in bankruptcy. The bankruptcy proceedings

are not directed against the holder of the property in question. | Ch. 223), the judgment of KEKEWICH, J., in which has this week Had this point been out of the way, it would still have been necessary to decide whether the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to make an order under section 28 of the Solicitors Act, 1860, and whether the order would extend to all the costs of the bankruptcy and of the prosecutions. Upon the latter point it seems that, if the order can be made in bankruptcy at all, its effect must be limited to so much of the bankruptcy proceedings as have been conducive to the recovery of the property. Upon the former, although in Re Suffield & Watts (20 Q. B. D. 693) and Re Wood (1897, 1 Q. B. 314) charging orders made by the judge in bankruptcy have been held to be made by him as a judge of the High Court, and not in the exercise of his bankruptcy jurisdiction, it is by no means clear that the latter jurisdiction is not exercisable for the purpose where the proceedings which have resulted in the recovery of the property have been solely in the bankruptcy. At the same time the Divisional Court inclined to think that the order for the distribution of the assets prescribed by rule 125 of the Bankruptcy Rules might form an insuperable difficulty.

IN THE COURSE of a strike promoted by the Seamen and Firemen's Union, two men were arrested at a South Wales seaport town, and were subsequently indicted at the Glamorgan Assizes, under section 7 of the Conspiracy and Property Protection Act, 1875, for having intimidated a certain person, watched and beset the place where he was, and followed him with others in a disorderly manner, in order to prevent him from serving on a certain ship as he had contracted to do. Now, section 16 of this Act contains a proviso that nothing in the Act "shall apply to seamen." Hence, as the accused were admittedly men who followed the sea as a calling, it was contended in their defence that they were not liable to be convicted on this indictment. At the time of the alleged offence, however, they were not actually engaged on board any ship, but were out of work. They were convicted, and the question whether, under these circumstances, the conviction could stand was argued before the Court for Crown Cases Reserved, on a case stated by RIDLEY, J. Judgment was given last week. It is not reasonable to suppose that the Legislature could have intended to exclude a large body of men from the provisions of this statute, unless such men were capable of being adequately dealt with under some other statute, in case they committed the offences aimed at. It is also clear that the only reason why seamen are excepted is that they can be dealt with under the Merchant Shipping Acts. Section 225 (e) of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, provides that every "seaman lawfully engaged" shall be liable to a maximum punishment of twelve weeks' imprisonment, with hard labour "if he combines with any of the crew to disobey lawful commands or to neglect duty, or to impede the navigation of the ship or the progress of the voyage." Persons not seamen are also liable, under section 236, for persuading or attempting to persuade a seaman not to join his ship, but they are only liable to a fine not exceeding £10. "Seaman" is defined, both in this Act and in the repealed Act of 1854, as every person "employed or engaged in any capacity on board any ship -with certain exceptions not material to this case. If, then, the argument for the defence were sound, persons like the prisoners, who act as they did, would not be liable at all under the Conspiracy Act, and would only be liable to a fine under the Merchant Shipping Act. Why should such persons be so favoured? It seems plain that "seaman" in the former Act must be construed as referring to those persons so defined in the latter Act. The Merchant Shipping Acts use the word "seaman," not as equivalent to seafaring man, but as a description of a man actually under engagement to serve in some capacity on board a certain ship. There can be little doubt that the court were right in affirming the conviction. Any other decision would lead to the absurdity of a large number of persons being practically exempted from the provisions of a penal statute for no sort of reason.

THE RULE that a married woman restrained from anticipation cannot by her own act annul the restraint, has received a curious illustration in the recent case of Lady Bateman v. Faber (1897, 2

been affirmed by the Court of Appeal. The defendant sought to establish that a married woman was bound by her admission, made in good faith but untrue, that a certain event had taken place, the occurrence of which would have determined her life interest which she was restrained from anticipating. The facts of the case were shortly as follows: The plaintiff was entitled to the income of certain property during her life for her separate use without power of anticipation, subject however to a proviso that if at any time she should succeed to an income in her own right of £8,000 or more per annum for her separate use, then her life interest should determine and the property should be held in trust for her husband. The husband's interest in the property was mortgaged by him as collateral security to a crediitor, whose executor was the defendant FABER. Subsequently, upon the death of her brother, the plaintiff became entitled to a life interest in the Kerrison estates, and thereupon the question arose whether the proviso had not taken effect. Acting under the advice of her then solicitor, and in order to enable her husband to obtain easier terms with his creditors, the plaintiff executed a Deed Poll, whereby she admitted that, in the events which had happened, the proviso had taken effect in consequence of her having fulfilled the condition, and she thereby released the first-mentioned property from all claims in respect of her life interest therein. As a result of the Deed Poll, the plaintiff's husband was able to arrange with his creditor for a reduction in the rate of interest on the loan, and for repayment of the capital on advantageous terms. Subsequently, the plaintiff found that, owing to prior incumbrances, the income which she derived from the Kerrison estates did not amount to £8,000 per annum, and she consequently brought the present action claiming a declaration that she had not succeeded to the requisite income, and that her admission in the Deed Poll was not binding upon her. It was to this latter question that the point at issue was confined at the trial. The defendants did not deny that the plaintiff was restrained from dealing with the property, but they argued that the question involved was simply one of fact-namely, Had the plaintiff succeeded to the specified income or not? No better evidence to prove the fact could be produced than the express admission of the plaintiff herself contained in the Deed Poll. The fact of her succession being thus proved by the best evidence obtainable, the condition in the proviso had been fulfilled, and ipso facto her interest had determined. KEKEWICH, J., however, said that it made no real difference whether the defendants put their case in this way, or argued at once that the plaintiff could evade the restraint on anticipation; whichever way their case was put, the result was the same-viz., the restraint on anticipation was disregarded and the life interest was got rid of by her own act. It might be said that the admission only affected the life interest and not the restraint on anticipation; but in his lordship's opinion this was a fallacy, for the interest and the restraint were inseparable, an 1 in destroying the one you destroyed the other; and he therefore held that the plaintiff, being restrained from anticipation, could not by any act of hers bring about a cesser of her life interest. As the Master of the Rolls said, the result of the decision is that a married woman can play fast and loose to an extent to which no other person can.

THE REASONING which found favour with RIGBY, L.J., in delivering his dissentient judgment in Badische Anilin Fabrik v. Bindschedler (45 W. R. 481) has not prevailed in the House of Lords, and foreigners, or Englishmen carrying on business abroad, are perfectly free to make use of the Post Office as a means of infringing English patents. The plaintiffs are a German company who have an English patent for an orange dye. The defendant is a manufacturing chemist at Basle who makes a dye which is covered by the patent. In June, 1895, JOHNSON & Co., a London firm, ordered from BINDSCHEDLER & parcel of his dye to be sent by post, and the dye was, in the usual course of BINDSCHEDLER's business, sent to forwarding agents at Basle and by them despatched through the post to JOHNSON & Co. The plaintiff company took proceedings for infringement of their patent against both JOHNSON & Co. and BINDSCHEDLER, but the former at once submitted to an injunction. BINDSCHEDLER appeared to the writ and contested

the company's claim, on the ground that what he had done
was confined to Switzerland where the patent was not in
force, and that for the delivery of the dye to JOHNSON &
Co. he was not responsible. However hard this view may be
for English patentees, it has been accepted as correct by the
majority in the Court of Appeal (LINDLEY and A. L. SMITH,
L.JJ.) and unanimously by the House of Lords. JOHNSON & Co.
had themselves named the Post Office as the agents by whom
the dye was to be transmitted, and, according to the settled rule,
the dye was delivered to the Post Office as the agents for the
purchasers.
Upon such delivery BINDSCHEDLER'S connection
with the matter ceased and he was not responsible for the
passage of the goods into England. RIGBY, L.J., in dissenting
from this view, regarded the course pursued by BINDSCHEDLER
as being the same as if the two countries had been contiguous
and he had himself thrown the parcel of dye across the border,
but the analogy doos not correspond to the actual facts. The
parcel was brought into England by the purchasers' agents, and
the responsibility was on the purchasers and not on the vendor.
Even were the law different, it would as a rule be impossible to
proceed effectually against foreign manufacturers.
SCHEDLER chose to appear to the writ, but it would seem to have
been perfectly competent for him to object to the jurisdiction
and to have got the writ set aside. English patentees will have
to devise some other means of getting over the difficulty.

BIND

THE Court of Appeal have had no hesitation in affirming the judgment of BYRNE, J., in Re Peveril Gold Mines (Limited) The tendency of the courts is to insist upon the observance of the statutory conditions under which companies are formed, and amongst these essential conditions must now be reckoned the right of members of the company to present a petition for winding up the company. Under section 82 of the Companies Act, 1862, contributories of the company a term which includes paid-up shareholders (National Savings Bank Association, L. R. 1 Ch. 547)-are entitled to present a winding-up petition; but the articles of association of the Peveril Gold Mines (Limited) attempted to restrict this right by requiring that a member of the company should not petition unless by consent of two directors, or in pursuance of a resolution passed by a majority at a general meeting, or unless the petitioner or petitioners held not less than one-fifth of the issued capital. The only way of supporting this article was to treat it as a contract binding on all the members of the company, but any such contract, so far as it flows from the constitution of the company, and is not peculiar to an individual shareholder, is subject to the limitations imposed by the Acts under which the company is established. The passage quoted by the Master of the Rolls from the judgment of Lord MACNAGHTEN in Welton v. Saffery (45 W. R., p. 515; 1897, A. C., p. 324) puts this point very clearly: "These companies are the creatures of statute, and by the statute to which they owe their being they must be bound in regard to shareholders as well as in regard to creditors in all matters coming within the conditions of the memorandum of association." In the present case, indeed, the memorandum of association was not in question, but even that document cannot interfere with the statutory conditions inherent in the constitution of the company. Technically shareholders may not be entitled to plead that they have not read the articles, but in practice they rarely do read them; and it i important that such rights as the Legislature has conferred should not be interfered with.

A dinner was given at the Grand Hotel, Charing Cross, on Wednesday evening, by the justices of the peace for the county of Middlesex and members of the Middlesex County Council, to Mr. R. M. Littler, C. B, Q.C., the chairman of the Court of Quarter Sessions, and chairman of the

Middlesex County Council. Sir F. Dixon-Hartland, M.P., presided.

Notification is given of an intended application to Parliament next Session by the Honcurable Society of the Inner Temple for an Act to modify and amend section 28 of the Thames Embankment Act, 1862, and to authorize the society to erect and maintain buildings upon so much of the reclaimed land belonging to them as lies between the southern extremity of the buildings proposed to be erected in extension of King's Bench-walk and the northern side of the tunnel of the Metropolitan District Railway.

FALSE PRETENCES.

A MAN without any money in his pocket goes into a restaurant,
orders a good dinner, eats it, and then tells the proprietor he
has no money and cannot pay. How is the law to deal with a
person who deliberately and fraudulently acts in this way?
Cases of the kind frequently occur in London and other large
towns, and the magistrates have found this question very hard
to answer in a satisfactory manner. It has, however, now been
answered in a considered judgment of the Court for the Con-
sideration of Crown Cases Reserved. Therefore, as far as
practice goes, the matter is settled; but probably many lawyers
will disagree with a good deal of the judgment.
The case (Reg. v. Jones) was stated by the Recorder of Wor-
cester, and the facts, as far as a question of law is concerned,
were as stated above, and precisely the same as in all these cases.
The prisoner was indicted in two counts. The first charged
him with having falsely pretended to the prosecutor that he was
then able to pay him for certain food, and that he then
had and possessed sufficient money to pay for the food, by
means of which false pretence he obtained the food from the
of the Debtors Act, 1869, which provides that any person shall
prosecutor. The second count was framed under section 13 (1)
be guilty of a misdemeanour " if, in incurring any debt
or liability, he has obtained credit under false pretences or
by means of any other fraud." The recorder told the jury that,
before convicting the prisoner, they must be satisfied that he
intended to represent his then present ability to pay, that he
knew at the time his inability to pay, that the food was supplied
to him in consequence of his representation, and that he had
an intention to defraud. The jury convicted the prisoner on
both counts.

Now, it is quite clear in such a case that the prosecutor intends to part with the property in his goods. He knows that the goods from their nature can never be recovered, and, by supplying the customer without asking for prepayment, he consents to the goods being immediately consumed. The offence, then, cannot possibly be larceny, whether by a trick or otherwise, and the court intimated that this is beyond argument. Those London magistrates, therefore, who have been in the habit of treating this offence as larceny, and dealing with it summarily, will henceforth have to adopt a different course. If the court had come to the conclusion that there was evidence that the prisoner had been guilty of larceny, the conviction on the first count would certainly have been right, for by section 88 of the Larceny Act, 1861, a person is not entitled to be acquitted on an indictment for obtaining goods by false pretences if the evidence shews that he was really guilty of larceny. The question, therefore, had to be answered whether or not there was evidence to justify the jury in convicting the prisoner of obtaining the goods by false pretences.

It was admitted that he spoke no words which could bo construed into a false pretence, and that he did no act to induce the prosecutor to believe anything false, beyond ordering the food and consuming it. It was argued that to convict a person of having made a false pretence by conduct, more than this must be proved, and that it is necessary to shew that he actively did something to induce the false belief, and did not merely passively allow the prosecutor to form the false impression. This view the court took, and came to the conclusion that, under the circumstances, there was no evidence upon which the prisoner could properly be convicted upon the first count. At the same time, however, the court intimated that it was not intended in any way to throw doubt upon the cases which decide that there may be a false pretence by conduct alone, such as Reg. v. Barnard (7 C. & P. 784), where a person at Oxford, not. a member of the university, put on a cap and obtaining goods on credit as if he were an undergraduate, and thereby gown, it was held he was properly convicted of obtaining the goods by a false pretence.

Upon the second count of the indictment, the court held that clearly there was an obtaining of credit. The prisoner was supplied with goods on the implied agreement that he would pay for them in the future, that is to say, at the end of the meal, and the shortness of the time for which credit was given

was not material. The court also held that there was ample evidence to prove fraud. The ordinary custom is, that persons eating at restaurants shall pay for the food soon after they have consumed it, and before they quit the premises. The prisoner knew that the food was supplied to him in the belief that he would follow the ordinary custom, and he also knew when he consumed it that he was not in a position to pay for it. This was clearly fraud, and therefore the prisoner was properly convicted on the second count. With this argument it is difficult to find any fault, and it is satisfactory to find that the court has approved of one method by which this offence can be punished, as many magistrates have treated it as if it were merely ground for a civil action for the price of

the food.

It is, however, respectfully submitted that the court was wrong in holding that there was no evidence to support the first count. It was allowed by the court that a person may make a false pretence by conduct alone, without making any false statement in words. It was also recognized that it is the universal custom for persons dining at restaurants to pay immediately after the meal, and it was held (in effect) that the prisoner's fraud consisted in taking unfair advantage of this custom. Now, a false pretence is a false and fraudulent representation as to some existing fact, which may be made either by words or by conduct. Nearly every one who dines at a restaurant, at the time he orders his dinner has money in his pocket sufficient to pay for it. Certainly the customer is supplied by the restaurant keeper only in the belief that he is then possessed of so much money, and is able and willing, when he has eaten his dinner, to pay the ordinary and reasonable charges. Is it not fair, then, to conclude that a person who enters a restaurant and orders dinner in the usual way, does, by those very acts, hold himself out to the proprietor as one in the position of other persons who act in a similar manner-i.e., he by his conduct represents that he has in his pocket at the time enough money to pay for what he orders? If, after having made this representation, it turns out that he has not enough money, and that he knew it, and intended to defraud, surely he has made a false representation as to an existing fact and is liable to be convicted of obtaining the food by a false pretence. The court held that there was evidence of fraud. But in what did the fraud consist? Unless the fact that he deliberately acted in such a manner as to get the food by leading the prosecutor to believe he was possessed of money to pay for it constituted the fraud, it is difficult to see in what it did consist. And if so acting was the fraud, the line between such a fraud and a false pretence is so fine as probably to be invisible to the majority of eyes.

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE LAND TRANSFER ACT, 1897.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-It may be impolitic for solicitors openly to combine together for the purpose of offering any purely professional opposition to the adoption of this Act. Those professional persons, however, who are personally, and perhaps pecuniarily, interested in its adoption are evidently determined, from the course of action which is being pursued, to bring it into operation as speedily and as extensively as possible. I quite recollect the discussion which took place in the expiring hours of the last Parliamentary Session, when, by a mere fluke, this Act was considered and passed, in the absence of many of the Parliamentary representatives of metropolitan constituencies, who had then departed for well-earned repose.

It was distinctly understood that the City of London was to be excluded, yet it is a fact that the Privy Council, on the motion of the Lord Chancellor, are appealing direct to the City of London to give the measure a trial.

When this is considered, and also the fact that for some time past daily advertisements have appeared in the Times newspaper inviting purchasers and mortgagees to search at the Land Registry, as if they could not trust their legal advisers to make such searches, whenever necessary, and so to advertise the business of the department, one cannot help thinking that the Land Registry officials are a body of gentlemen who require considerable looking after and watching.

It is not usual for public departments of the State to advertise for business. The merits of the department are generally supposed to be

sufficient to attract the public attention without resorting to the machinery of public advertisement. It is evident that, now the authorities have obtained the Act, they are resolute and determined to put it into force as extensively as they possibly can. Solicitors and their clients are not likely to receive much consideration, and Parliamentary promises and assurances will be plainly disregarded whenever their operation is found to be inconvenient. The Lord Chancellor may be well content for his name to be associated with the passing of the Act. Having accomplished this object, one cannot help desiring that all feeling of partizanship hostile to solicitors and their clients, and in support of officialism, should now be dropped, and that the judicial fairness which the great body of the profession may expect to receive from the hands of the Lord Chancellor and the Attorney-General should be resumed, and that the ardour of interested officials should be restrained within reasonable limits.

The compulsory provisions of the Act are either good or bad. There is a considerable difference of opinion on this point, and probably the opinion materially preponderates in favour of the latter view, as is abundantly evidenced from the able references to this subject at the last annual provincial meeting of the Incorporated Law Society. succeed; but if it is bad, by all means let this be discovered with as If the compulsory system is good, by all means let it be tried and little delay and with as few harmful results as possible.

The Yorkshire people have got in them a good deal of backbone, and when they combine they generally manage to get their way. I admire them for this.

I hope, however, that London solicitors, their London clients, and London owners of property will not be less wanting in backbone, and will take good care that the London County Council, the Coporation of London, and whoever else it may concern, shall have properly put before them all the facts relating to the case. Nothing could be better than that they should receive, and be asked to read, some of the papers read at the recent provincial meeting at Sheffield. What, however, is everybody's business generally results in being no one's business. Hence the necessity of some small informal organization to educate the authorities with whom rests the responsibility of determining whether, if a man wants to dispose of his freehold or perhaps leasehold interest in his property, he must wait the convenience of some department of the State, and if he wants unfriend or to meet an imperative need, he can only have to take with expectedly and hurriedly to borrow money of his bankers to oblige a him a piece of paper or parchment, which will supply no real information to the banker, and practically prevent the freeholder, and perhaps also the leaseholder, from turning to immediate beneficial account the property which, by a life of diligence and reasonable thrift he has managed to secure for the benefit of himself and the generation in which he lives.

What with the death duties recently imposed upon landed property and what with this proposal to fetter a man in the disposition of what is his own, one is apt to think that it may be best after all to follow the example of the spendthrift and spend what you possess on present gratifications and leave the State to support you in your declining years in case of need.

Solicitors in London are so devoted to the business of their clients, and so busy, that they are apt to become very apathetic with regard to the legislation affecting the just interests of themselves and their clients. But solicitors, as citizens, have nevertheless duties to discharge, and I do hope that my professional brethren resident in the metropolis will not fail to remind their representatives in the Corporation of London and on the London County Council that it is well worth considering whether the metropolis should be the first place to be experimented upon for the purposes of the Act, bearing in mind that the experiment once tried will be practically irrevocable so far as that district is concerned; and that they will accordingly see that the experiment, if it is to be tried, is confined within reasonable limits-say, to so much of the large county of Middlesex as is situated within the jurisdiction of the London County Council, or to some smaller area, and that all the facts and circumstances are impartially placed before the London County Council and the Corporation of London.

Many solicitors are owners of property and therefore quite as much affected as the general public.

The sole opposition of solicitors to this measure has been caused by their experimental knowledge of the fact that the system of transfer proposed is not to the real interests of the public, while at the same time it may be detrimental to the interests of the profession.

Some informal organization may be necessary, and perhaps it would not be out of the way for a few solicitors, owners of property in the county of London, to meet in Chancery-lane and discuss the position, not from a professional point of view, but solely in the interests of the public. W. J. FRASER.

2, Soho square, W., Dec. 1.

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