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In Drawing LEASES or MORTGAGES of X
LICENSED PROPERTY
To see that the Insurance Covenants include a policy covering the risk of
LOSS OR FORFEITURE OP THE LICENSE.

Suitable clauses, settled by Counsel, can be obtained on application to THE LICENSES INS URANCE CORPORATION AND GUARANTEE FUND, LIMITED,

:4, MOORGATE STREET, LONDON, E.C. Hortgagea Guarontoad on Licensed Proportion promptly. without spacial valuation and at low rates.

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Contents. Ouansn-r Torres ............ ...... ...... ...... 725 Lion. Nlws...... - . . 733 Tss Liasrmriasor Csnauon Owzums 727 w,sD,_,m U, No.,.,o" _ H 73;; Rlvisws ...................................... .. 728 Cnxnwou, Nona“ H . 73‘ Coaaasrosoasol ... NEW OED!“ aw 732 Bsxranrror ‘N01-rols ........... .. 734 , . ......................... ..

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Cases Reported this Week.

In the Solicitors’ Journal.

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B. nfll v. Brown ............................ .. 729 (Gases or Lssr SITTIIGS.)

Attorney-General v. Earl Grey ....... .. 729

Fisher and Grazebrook’s Contract Re 781 John v. John . Jones & Sons v Scnllard ................... .. 781

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I I

In the Weekly Reporter.

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and The Assessment Committee of Birkenhead ............ 781 "

Society ................................... .. 668 swckport Rafilledv Indlmhh-I1 ma Re‘ Lumsden v. Burnett ........................ .. 664

formatory Schools, 730 Phi, V The London School Board The Mersey Docks and Harbour Board Cdcfizrbbn V The same _ _ _ V 658 Strangways v. Read........................... 671

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Warns ran bulk of the provisions of the new Vaccination Act, 1898, do not come into force until the 1st of January next, the much-debated “conscience clause ” is expressly made to operate from the 12th inst., on which day the Act received the Royal Assent. The present law, therefore, is that no penalty can be imposed for the neglect to have a child vaccinated it the parent or other person responsible, within four months from the birth of the child, “satisfies two justices or a stipendiary or metropolitan police magistrate in petty sessions that he conscientiously believes that vaccination would be prejudicial to the health of the child,” and within seven days thereafter delivers to the vaccination officer a. certificate hy the justices or magistrate of such conscientious objection. Experience will shew whether magistrates will be easily “satisfied” as to this very important matter; it does not appear that they can have any evidence to act upon except the ipsa rlizit of the conscientious objector, tested perhaps by something in the nature of cross-examination from the bench. It is to be noticed, however, that the objection must be that the operation will be prejudicial to health in the particular oase; no more general objection to vaccination or to the compulsory system, and no elevated ideas of the liberty of the subject, will suflice. As to children born before the passing of the Act, the Legislature has made special provision: in such cases the four months’ period is to run from the 12th inst., and not from the date of the birth. One consequence of the Act, ct course, is that no proceedings for penalties under the Vaccination Acts can be taken in respect of any child until the four months’ period has expired, for until than there will have been no default in complying with the Acts.

Tun DECISION of Ksuswrcn, J., in the case of Re Farbor (reported ante, p. 718), sets at rest any doubt upon the question whether a moi-tgagee’s solicitor is entitled to charge the scale fee for negotiating a mortgage when the proposed security does not consist exclusively of “ freehold, copyhold, or leasehold property.” The solicitor in the case in question, who was acting also for the mortgagor, and negotiated advances from some of his other clients upon the security of the mortgagor-‘s reversionary interest in certain property consisting principally of personalty and a fund in court. The solicitor charged for

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the negotiation according to the scale; but upon taxation the taxing-master disallowed the charges, being of opinion that the following words in Schedule I., Part I ., of the General Order under the Solicitors Remuneration Act, 1881—namely, “ Mortgagee’s solicitor for negotiating loan,” were by the context restricted to loans upon “freehold, copyhold, or leasehold property.” Upon a summons by the solicitor to review the taxing-master's certificate, KEKEWICH, J., dissented from the taxing-master’s view, and decided that the solicitor was entitled to charge the scale fee for negotiating the loans notwithstanding that the mortgages were not exclusively of “ freehold, copyhold, or leasehold property.” This decision of the court, so far as it goes, confirms the opinion of the Council of the Incorporated Law Society, expressed during recent years, that the negotiating scales apply to all descriptions of property, including, for instance, besides reversionary interests in personalty, life policies, rates, stock-in-trade, goodwill, patents, ships, &c., but excepting vendor’s charges under the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act or any other private or public Act under which the same are paid by the purchaser.

Sncrrou 22 of the Patents Act, 1883, which provides a remedy for cases where patents are taken out and not worked in this country, has been at length put in operation. By the section it is enacted that if, on the petition of any person interested, it is proved to the Board of Trade that, by reason of the default of a patentee to grant licences on reasonable terms, (a) the patent is not being worked in the United Kingdom, or (b) the reasonable requirements of the public with respect to the invention cannot be supplied, or (0) any person is prevented from working or using to the best advantage an invention of which he is possessed, the Board of Trade may order the patentees to grant icences on such terms as to royalties or otherwise as the board may think just. Hitherto the difficulty of putting this section in force has made it inoperative. Previously to this year there were only four applications under it and none of these were proceeded with. An application has now been made to the Board of Trade by Messrs. Lnvmsrnm, of Manchester, who are the possessors of inventions for the manufacture of dye stuffs. The use of these inventions depends upon materials the patents for which have been taken out by German manufacturers in this country, though they are not worked here. Messrs. Lnvmsrsm accordingly have proceeded under clause (c) of the above section and have obtained an order requiring the patentees to grant them a licence to use the patented inventions. A curious feature in the matter is that in Germany the inventions are, it is stated, free, one of the patents having been refused in that country and the other revoked for want of novelty. It is also stated that the present inquiry lasted eleven days, at a total expense to all parties of not less than £4,000. It is doubtful, therefore, whether the experiment of proceeding under the section will be repeated. It has been for some time realized that a shorter and more etlicacious mode of dealing with patents which are being kept dormant is required. In France a patentee is liable to have his patent revoked if he does not use it for two years alter it has been granted, and in Germany he is under a similar liability after three years. A provision of this kind ought to be substituted for section 22.

Tun nsroar just issued by the Board of Trade on bankruptcy in 1897 contains some satisfactory figures. Both in the number of receiving orders and in the total amount of liabilities there has been a steady annual decrease since 1803. In that year the receiving orders were 4,874, and the aggregate liabilities £7,492,367; the corresponding numbers for 1897 were 4,074 and £5,678,498. As compared with I896 there is also a remarkable increase in the value of the assets. While for 1896 and 1897 the total liabilities were respectively £5,902,138 and, as just mentioned, £5,678,498, the value of the assets was £2,334,251 and £2,756,079—an increase of £421,828. There has been a similar decrease in the number of deeds of arrangement and in the aggregate liabilities under such deeds. The failures in which the unsecured liabilities exceeded £20,000 were thirty-two in number. Of these nine are classed as ordinary trading cases, eighteen as due to financial and specula

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tive enterprize, and two to extravagance and gambling. The liabilities in the ordinary trading cases were swollen by a wellknown banking failure in the south of England. The speculative cases shew a total liability of nearly a million pounds. With reference to these Mr. Joan Smrn, the Inspector-General in Bankruptcy, calls attention to the hopelessly sanguine view which the debtors take of the value of their assets, these consisting as a rule of “ unworkable concessions or unsaleable shares in abortive companies.” The debtors’ estimates of value were upwards of £600,000, whilst the probable results of realization will not exceed £86,000. Seeing that one such debtor estimated his assets at over £400,000, and the bankruptcy ofiicials estimate them at ml, this disparity is readily accounted for. In reference to deeds of arrangement, the report refers to the circumstance that no security is required from trustees under such deeds, nor is there any provision corresponding to that of section 85 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, under which the trustee vacates his oflice upon a receiving order being made against him. As a result it is stated that creditors suffer loss through the defalcation of trustees, and, when bankruptcy supervenes, they are helpless unless they take steps to have the defaulting trustee removed. Moreover, no machinery exists for enabling trustees under deeds of arrangement to pay over unclaimed dividends to the bankruptcy department, and so secure a complete discharge from their trust.

Tun nsnxaurrcr report also calls attention to the remarkable discrepancy which exists between the total number of adjudications and the number of bankrupts who obtain their discharge. The adjudications under the Act of 1883 down to the end of 1897 amount to 59,903, while the applications for discharge have been only 13,568. As these applications include the cases where the discharge has been refused or suspended for periods which are still current, it is obvious that, after making allowance for deaths and for cases in which the adjudication has been annulled, there must, at the present time, he a vast number of undischarged bankrupts. Many of these are carrying on business under their own or under assumed names. It has been suggested that in order to protect the trading community all undischarged bankrupts should he required to attend once a year at their respective courts tobe examined as to their dealings in the previous year. But this would be a measure of great hardship, and, as the report points out, the Legislature would not be likely to favour it. The danger incident to trading by

iundischar ed bankrupts is probably more fancied than real, and

there is already in existence the provision of section 31 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, which makes it a misdemeanour for an undischarged bankrupt to obtain credit to the extent of £20 without giving notice of his circumstances. So far as title to property acquired after the bankruptcy is concerned, the safety of persons dealing with the bankrupt is secured by the doctrine of Cohen v. l{1'tcIwZl(38 W. R. 551, 25 Q. B. D. 262). Until the trustee intervenes any disposition of personal property, including leaseholds (Rs Clayton and Barclaj/‘a Contract, 43 W. R. 549; 1895, 2 Ch. 212), which the bankrupt has acquired since the bankruptcy, in favour of a person dealing bond fide and for value, although such person has knowledge of the bankruptcy, is valid. A doubt has been suggested whether this applies to dealings not incident to the carrying on of a usiness by the bankrupt; and, although Cohen v. Mitchell does not seem to furnish any ground for the doubt, the Board of Trade are anxious to have the question raised. An opportunity for so doing had apparently occurred in a case where a bankrupt had sold a share devolving upon him under an intestacy, and it was decided to contest the purchaser’s claim. Upon the issue of the writ, however, the claim was withdrawn, and the bankrupt’s share became available for his creditors. The share, it seems, had been sold at an undervalue, and probably this accounts for the early termination of the proceedings. But the department look forward to another opportunity of testing the generality of the doctrine of Cohen v. Jllitc/zell.

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A oonrnnrs answer might be found (says a correspondent) to the charge of the law’s delay in the proceedings in an action

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of Daflqkton v. Liverpool Revs-rsionary Co. (lindted), heard before Brass, J., on the 29th ult. The action was brought by the vendor for specific performance of a contract to purchase a reversionary interest in a legacy of £1,000. The writ was issued in the Liverpool District Registry on Wednesday, the 27th of July, and the action came on for hearing, and the final order was made by BYRNE, J., on the 29th of July. There was an admitted statement of facts on which a question of some interest with respect to the rights of transferees of mortgages was brought for the decision of the court. The facts were that W. by a deed dated the 24th of November, 1897, mortgaged his reversionary interest in a legacy of £1,000 to two mortgagees, A. and H. On the lst of January, 1898, he assigned his equity of redemption to D., the plaintifi in the action, the deed of assignment containing express provisions that D. should not in any way be personally liable to W. or his representatives for any money charged on the reversionary interest. On the the lst of April, 1898, D. took a transfer from A. and H. of their mortgage, the interest on this, due on the 25th of March, then being six days in arrear. In June D., claiming to have the right to exercise the statutory power of sale by virtue of the mortgage, contracted to sell the property mortgaged to the defendants. This contract the defendants refused to carry out, on the ground, first, that D. being the owner of the equity of redemption, the mortgage had merged upon his taking a transfer, and therefore that the power of sale was no longer kept alive ; or secondly, even assuming that the mortgage was kept alive and with it the mortgagees’ various remedies, yet that the power of sale had not arisen, inasmuch as when the same person became debtor and creditor it could not be said that interest was any longer due, and so interest could not be in arrear and unpaid within the meaning of section 20 of the Conveyancing Act, 1881, so as to give the right to exercise the power of sale. At the hearing, having regard to the cases of T/zorne v. Cann (1895, A. C. ll), and L;'quz'dation Estates, §-0., Co. ,v. Willougkby (1898, A. O. 321), it was conceded that the mortgage and the power of sale were kept alive in the holder of the equity of redemption by his taking the transfer, and reliance was placed on behalf of the purchaser on the second point. BYRNE, J ., however, held that the interest, which was six days in arrear at the date of the transfer on the 1st of April, became more and more in arrear as time went on, and that therefore in J une it was two months in arrear and unpaid, and that the mortgagee could therefore exercise his power of sale under the provisions of the 20th section of the Conveyancing Act, 1881.

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THE JULY number of the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution contains the lecture on recent changes in the rights and duties of belligerents and neutrals delivered at the institutions last May by Master MACDONELL. The lecture was arranged for before the outbreak of the recent war, but it was given at a time when that outbreak had made the subject one of keen interest. As a matter of fact neutrals have not been affected in the way that was anticipated, and the war will probably be found to have left international law pretty much as it found it. But the interest of the lecture does not depend upon any such transitory considerations. Master Macnonau. takes a bold line at the start by calling attention to the change which has resulted from the disappearance of the “ law of nature.” In former days jurists thought they had in this law an infallible authority. Their faith is an exploded superstition. The law of nature was a creature of their own imagination. “Learned men,” says the lecturer, “ seemed to project their voices some distance from themselves, and their voices came back to them as the utterance of the law of nature.” Something more tangible was found in the Roman law, but as an engine of modern development this also must now be admitted to be useless. The result is that much which is to be found in the authorities on international law is obsolete. It belongs to circumstances and to modes of thought which have vanished. International law, says Master Maononann, though it has no recognized organ or mouthpiece, “ advances—sometimes rapidly; never more rapidly than to-day. By few expounders of international law is sutficient notice takenof this element of change. And so there is an international law known to soldiers, diplomatists, and men of affairs, and another partly obsolete, but still taught in books.”

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TURNING to specific changes of recent times, Master Macnousm. gives some valuable information as to the provisions of the Declaration of Paris. It is interesting to note NnLsoN's opinion of privateering, which he quotes. “ The conduct of all privateers is, as far as I have seen, so near piracy that I only

= wonder any civilized nation can allow them.” Now that belli

gerents not bound by the declaration have shewn no dispcsi-a tion to depart from it, it may be anticipated that_ privateering will never be revived. More controversy exists with regard to the protection of enemies’ goods in neutral bottoms, and Master MACDONELL is by no means confident as to the result in a future war in which this country may be engaged of her abandonment of the right of capturing enemies’ goods wherever found which she had previously maintained. The fact is that the opinion or interest of civilized nations generally has compelled the adopt-ion of the half-way principle, “free ships, free goods,” but it is not advanced enough to go as far as British interests and humanity alike require, and to declare all private property at sea free however carried. And according to Master MACDONELL there is no chance of this result being reached. “ Exemption from capture at sea,” he says, “ is probably for a long time to come out of the question. Such exemption would be in war to the supreme advantage of England, which stands to lose so much. It would, therefore, be to the disadvantage of our opponents. We cannot hope that other nations, knowing our weak spot, will relinquish this right.” It is unfortunate, after all, that there is no longer a law of nature to which we can appeal against the dictates of selfinterest.

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T111: WIFE of a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, by Royal Warrant dated the 22nd of December, 1876, “so long as she continued his wife or remained his widow,” obtained the style, rank, _and precedence of a baroness. But the warrant expressly provided that nothing therein contained should be deemed or construed to authorize or permit any of the children of a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary to assume or use the prefix of “ Honourable,” or to be entitled to the style, rank, or precedence of the children of a baron. This last-mentioned provision is revoked by a Royal Warrant, dated the 30th of March last, but only published in last Tuesday’s London Gazette, which confers on the children of all Lords of Appeal in Ordinary, past, present, _and future, appointed and created Lords of Parliament for life, the style and title enjoyed by the children of hereditary barons, with rank and precedence next to and immediately after the younger children of hereditary barons now created or hereaftei-_to be created, and immediately before all baronets. The Society of the Baronetage are up in arms against this grant of precedence, which they allege to be in contravention of the decree of James I. dated the 28th of May, 1612. It will be interesting to see what steps, beyond a petition to the Grown, they will adopt to test this momentous question.

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An important decision was given last week by the Lord Chief Justice in a case of Jones §~ Sons v. Scullard (reported elsewhere), dealing with the respective liabilities of the owner of a carriage and of the livery stable keeper who supplied him with a man to drive it, for the negligence of such driver.

On Jubilee Day, the 22nd of June, 1897, the defendant’s brougham ran into, and did damage to, the plaintiffs’ shop in Holloway-road, London. The horse between the shafts of the brougham belonged to the defendant, and so did the harness, but the coachman on the box, though wearing the defendant’s livery, had been hired by ‘him from a livery stable keeper. Under the contract with the livery stable keeper the inan had driven the defendant’s carriage for some months continuously, but he had only driven the horse which was in the shafts on the day of the accident, and which was, in point of fact, fresh from the country, some two or three times. Various acts of negligence were alleged, some of them relating to the manner in which the horse was harnessed, and it was proved that at the time of the accident the coachman had lost control of the

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horse. The jury found that the coachman was guilty of negligence. But in addition to denying the negligence, the defendant had pleaded that the coachman was not his servant, and it was, by agreement between the parties, left to his lordship to decide this question. His lordship decided that the coachman was the defendant’s servant, and that the defendant was therefore liable to the plaintiff for the damage done.

Cases of this kind often give rise to some difficulty, and there has been some conflict of opinion among the judges. The point at which the liability of the livery stable keeper ends and that of the hirer begins is not always easy to ascertain. The present case seems well beyond this dividing line. The Lord Chief Justice, in his judgment, dwelt upon the circumstances that the hirer evinced approval of the coachman by continuing to accept his services; that the horse and harness belonged to the hirer, and that the coachinan had only had the opportunity of driving the horse and learning its peculiarities two or three times before.

The principles are clear and well established. It is in the application of them to each set of circumstances that the difficulty arises. The liability depends, not on the ownership or use of the carriage, but upon the relation of master and servant. Thus a man who hires a cab is not liable for the negligence of the cabman, nor is a man who hires an equipage for the day, week, or month liable for the negligence of the driver. Similarly it has been held that the man who hires horses and coachman for his own carriage is free from liability. In this respect a distinction has been established between fixed and moveable property. A man is bound to see that his fixed property is so used and managed that other persons are not injured, but in the case of moveable property it is otherwise for reasons too obvious to need indicating. A man who has sent his gun to a shop to be repaired cannot, for example, be held responsible for the negligence of a shop-boy who, on his way from the shop to deliver the gun, fires it off and injures a passer-by. The liability, in fact, depends upon the principle that a master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant done in the course of his employment, and upon the further principle thata servant, though in the general employment of one person, may yet be considered, for the purpose of establishing liability, to be in the particular employment of another. The liability of the person in whose particular employment he is claimed to be is determined by the extent of the control exercised by such person, and also in a certain measure upon the opportunity for selection. In Quarman v. Burnett (6 M. & W. 499, at p. 509), PARKE, B., says : “ Upon ihe principle that gui facit par alimn facit per ea, the master is responsible for the acts of his servant; and that person is undoubtedly liable who stood in the relation of master to the wrongdoer~—he who had selected him as his servant, from the knowledge of or belief in his skill and care, and who could remove him for misconduct, and whose orders he was bound to receive and obey.”

The facts of that case, which is one of the leading authorities on the subject, are as follows. Two ladies who owned a carriage were accustomed to hire from a j ob-mistress a coachman and a pair of horses for use in their carriage. They always had the same coachman. The job-mistress had in fact only one coachman regularly employed. The ladies did not pay the man any wages, but were in the habit of giving him a gratuity each time he drove them. They also supplied him with a coat and hat for his use while he was driving them. The coat and hat were kept in the hall of the ladies’ house, and the man before and after each drive had to go into the house to change. One clay while he was in the house the horses ran awayjand did damage. In an action brought against the ladies, PARKE, B., held that there was no evidence to go to the jury. The only suggestion of particular emploxment or control in that case seems to have been that the man a to go into the house to fetch his hat and coat. PARKE, B., dismissed this point by observing that the man ought not to have left his horses unattended, and was not under the circumstances bound to obey the order of the ladies if any such order had been given.

The recent decision of the Lord Chief Justice suggests another set of circumstances which will, in all probability, arise. That‘

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is, the case where the carriage and harness belong to the hirer

and the horses and driver to the job-master, but the horses are kept and fed at the stables of the hirer. This state of facts is by no means uncommon, the plan being adopted by persons who are staying in London for a short time, or who do not care to run the risk of being short of a horse on account of lameness or other casualty. The question of liability in such a case _would be a very nioe one. If the considerations which prevailed in Jones §- Sons v. Sou-llard are to prevail, the fact that the hirer has control of the horses—the feeding, shoeing, &c., of them-—-woul_d suflice to fix him with liability. This seems reasonable, and it is also in accordance with the more modern decisions which were regarded by the Lord Chief Justice as conflicting with Laugfier v. Pointer (5 B. & C. 547) and with Quar-man v. Burnett (ubi supra). One of these cases is Rourke v. White ./lloss Colliery C0. (L. R. 2 C. P. 205). The defendants in that case were colliery owners who employed a contractor to sink a shaft in their colliery. They lent to the contractor for the purpose of doing the work a fixed engine at the mouth of the shaft and an engine-driver. The latter continued to be paid by the defendants. In the course of the work the plaintifi was injured in consequence of the negligence of the engine-driver. It was held, per CoexBURN, C.J., Mnnmsn, BAGGALLAY, and BBAMWELL, L.JJ., that the engine-driver was at the time the servant of the contractor and not of the defendants. Similarly in Donovan v. Lamg and Others (1893, 1 Q. B. 629) it was held that the owners of a crane, who lent it, with a man to work it, to a firm of wharfingers for the purpose of loading a ship, were not liable for the neghgence of the man, committed while acting under the orders of the wharfinge rs. The two sets of decisions are diificult to reconcile, for there seems to be no difference in principle between the negligence of the driver of a horse and that of the driver of a steam-engine in considering the liability of_ the person who hires from another for a time the benefit of their services.

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Pratt’s Income Tax ; being a Full Analysis of the Provisions of the Income Tax Acts, with Cases of Illustration, Explanatory Notes, and a Copions Index. Sixth Edition. By JOSEPH HAWORTH REDM.A_N, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Shaw & Sons ; Butterworth & Co. Price 7s. 6d.

APractical Guide to the Liquor Licensing Acts. By W. HUGH JONES, Barrister-at-Law. Etfingham Wilson.

The Justice of the Peace Digest of Cases Reported during the years 1893 to 1897 inclusive; with Table of Cases and Titles and full References to the Law Reports. Compiled by M. CaMPBEI.L-JOH:NSTON, Esq., Barrister-at-Law. Shaw & Sons.

Journal of the Royal United Service Institution. Published imder the Authority of the Council. Editor, Captain H. GARBETI‘, R.N. (Retired). July, 1898. J. J. Keliher & Co.

CORRESPONDENCE.

SEARCHES IN PARISH REGISTERS. [To the Editor of the Solicitors’ J0ur1u1l.]

Sir,-—Can you or any of your readers who have experience in such matters refer me to any cases bearing on the following point ?

The Act 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 86, s. 35, enacts “ That every rector, vicar, or cu.rate, and every registrar, registering officer, and secretary, who shall have the keeping for the time being of any register book of births, deaths, or marriages, shall at all reasonable times allow searches to be made of any register book in his keeping, _and shall give a copy, certified under his hand, of any entry or entries in the same on payment of the fee hereinafter mentioned (that is to say) for every search extending over a period not more than one year the sum of one shilling, and sixpence additional for every additional year, and the sum of two shillings and sixpence for every single certificate.”

I have recently had to make a general search of a Middlesex county parish church register which covers about 200 y_ear_s, which took me the whole dayi, and I was treated with great civility and charged a f f 10 . .

ee o s on y I next was instructed to search the register of a_ London church,

and I wrote asking what the fee for a general search would be; by a mistake the letter was addressed to the rector of a church of some

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what similar name, and I got a reply from the parish clerk of that church saying the fee for a general search would be 10s.

I subsequently applied to the parish clerk of the first mentioned London church, who claimed 1s. for the first year, and sixpence for every subsequent year, and on my expressing surprise, the rector came up and insisted on this charge.

If his contention is right (and certainly the actual words seem to bear out his claim), the result is that I could not have searched the register at the Middlesex church I have mentioned, if the rector had insisted on the strict legal fees, for less than £15 (which w<-ul-I

have been practicall prohibitive), thus: Births (say , 200 years . . . . £5 0 6 Marriages say), 200 years . . . 5 0 6 Deaths (say), 200 years . . . 5 0 6 £15 1 6

and in the case of the London church the fee will no doubt be more.

But this is not all ; the rector contends that my search must be made on Monday, Wednesday, or Friday between the hours of 10.30 and 12, so that he limits “ all reasonable times” to four and a-half hours a week, spread over three several days, at which pace it is not likely that my task will be rapidly accomplished.

Gnonon Wanus BEAL.

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This was a motion on behalf of Catherine Brown for an order that she might be at liberty to issue a writ of attachment against her husband, Frederick William Brown, for contempt in disobeying an order of the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty Division dated the 2nd of August, 1898, and in not delivering Doris Clements Brown, the child of the marriage, to the said Catherine Brown, which child had been, and still was, in his custody and control, but the legal custody of which child had been committed to the said Catherine Brown by the said order. Upon behalf of the husband the preliminary objection was taken that rule 115 of the Divorce Rules had not been complied with. By that rule the notice of motion must be served four clear days previously to the hearing of the motion. The notice of motion was dated the 13th of August, so that there had not been compliance with the rule. In support of the application it was submitted that ord. 63, r. 12, of the Rules of Supreme Court, 1883, applied, and that there was therefore jurisdiction to hear the motion. Further, by the Long Vacation notice printed at the back of the Vacation Cause List, papers were to be left at the Chancery Registrars’ Office before one 0’clock on the Monday previous to the day on which the application was intended to be made, and that regulation had been complied with.

Puinniuons, J ., said that the notice at the back of the cause list was good as to filing papers, but it did not apply to the length of the notice of motion. The matter must stand over till Wednesday next. The motion must be dismissed and a fresh notice served for Wednesday next. -—C01.'NBBL, Ros!-rill ; Grazebrook. Somcrross, Scott, Lawson, 5- Palmer, for Arthur W illey, Leeds; Emmet Q Co., for C’. Leatlmm j Co., Wakefield.

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This was a motion on behalf of the plaintiffs, the Bristol Tramways and Carriage Co. (Limited), against the National Telephone Co. (Limited), for an injunction restraining the defendant company, its agents and servants, until the trial of the action or further order, from placing, except with the consent of the plaintiff company, any work under, in, upon, over, along, or across so much of the street or public road known as St. Augustine’s Bridge in the City of Bristol as lies between the rails of the plaintiffs’ tramway or within eighteen inches from the outside rail on each side. In support of the application sections 9, 12, and 13 of the Telegraph Act, 1863, were relied upon. By section 9 of the Telegraph Act, 1863, “ The company shall not place a telegraph under any street within the limits of the district over which the authority of the Metropolitan Board of Works extends, or of any city or municipal borough or iovincorpcrate, or of any town having a population of thirty thousand inhabitants or upwards (according to the latest census), except with the consent of the bodies having the control of the streets within such respective limits.” By section 12: “ The company shall not place a telegraph over, along, or across a street or public road, or a post in or upon a street or public road, except with the consent of the body having the control of such sire et or public road ; and where a public road passes through or by the ride of any park or pleasure-grounds, and where a public road crosses by ru( ans of a bridge or viaduct, or abuts on any ornamental water belonging to any park or pleasure-grounds, and where a public road crosses or abuts on a private drive through any park or pleasure-grounds, or to any

mansion, the company shall not without, or otherwise than in accordance with, the consent of the owner, lessee, and occupier of such park, pleasure-grounds, or mansion, place any work above ground on such public road.” By section 13 : " Where any landowner or other person is liable for the repair of any street or public road (notwithstanding that the same is dedicated to the public), the company shall not place any work under, in, upon, over, along, or across such street or pu lic road, exept with the consent of such landowner or other person, in addition to the consent of the body having the control of such street or epublio road, where, under this Act, such last-mentioned consent is requir ; provided that where the company places a telegraph across or over any street or public road they shall not place it so low as to stop, hinder, or interfere with the passage for any purpose whatsoever along the street or public road.” Sections 28 and 30 of the Tramways Act, 1870 (33 Sc 34 Vict. c. 78), were also referred to, and it was submitted that the defendants were not entitled to proceed with their works without the plaintiffs’ consent. Upon behalf of the defendants it was submitted that the plaintiffs were not persons who were responsible for the repair of the whole road, and therefore their consent was not required. North London Railway v. Great Northern Railway (26 W. R. 485, 11 Q. B. D. 40) shewed that the plaintiffs’ right must be absolute. If the contention upon behalf of the plaintiffs, that any person responsible for the repair of any portion of the highway was aperson whose consent had to be obtained by the defendants, they would also have to obtain under section 13 of the Act of 1863 the consent of gas and water companies.

PHILLIMORE, J ., said that gas and water companies were in a different position to the plaintiffs. The order would be that, upon the defendants undertaking to apply for leave to withdraw a summons which they had taken out before the Bristol magistrates, and undertaking in the event of the plaintiffs succeeding at the trial to make such provisions for the security of the plaintiffs as might have been made on an application for the plaintiffs’ consent, the action to be set down at once without pleadings. Pleadiugs to be delivered in the Long Vacation if desired. No further order except that the costs of an er parte motion made before North, J ., foran interim injunction, which would now be discharged, and of this motion be costs in the action.—Coi'sssr., Mulligan, Q.C., and G. D. Pepys (Stewart Smith with them) ; Roskill. Soucrrons, Warwick Webb ,' W. E. L. Gains.

[Reported by J. E. Annous, Barrister-at-Lam]

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Ixmxn Ravsm:1:—Es'rs-rs DUT\'——GlI-"1' Irrrna Vrvos-Possrssror: Assmmn 'ro Em-ran Exonusron or Dor:ou—Irv'rsass'r R3snavsn—Powsa or Rn\'ocs'r1oN—Cusro||s AND INLAND Rsvnrws Acr, 1881 (44 Vrcr. c. 12), s. 38(2) (A) (c), as Ansnnnn BY Uvsrons arm INLAND Rsvsrwn Acr, 1889 (522V1c'r. 0. 7), s. 11—Fuv.u\'cs Aer, 1894 (57 & 58 Vicr. o. 30), ss. 1, .

This was an appeal from the Divisional Court (46 W. R. 251). By a ,deed dated the 19th of October, 1885,- Henry, third Earl Grey (since deceased), transferred to his nephew, Albert Grey, now fourth earl, his estates in Northamptonshire, including the mansion-house of Howick and its appurtenances and the effects therein, subject to an annual rentcharge of £4,000 in favour of the third earl, issuing out of all the property transferred other than the mansion-house and its appurtenances and the effects therein. The deed provided that the mansion-house, &c., should be held by the fourth earl in trust to permit the third earl to occupy and enjoy the same as theretofore. By the same deed the fourth earl covenanted (1) to pay certain annuities; (2) to pay all mortgages and other charges on the land, and all interest then or thereafter due under them; (3) to pay the rent-charge of £4,000 ; (4) to keep up the mansionhouse; (5) to deliver farm or garden produce required for the use of the household at Howick; (6) to pay the funeral expenses, debts, &c., of the third earl; (7) not to sell or dispose of certain of the lands; and (8) at request of the third earl to produce receipts and vouchers for payments made under clauses (1), (2), (4), or (6). It was also provided that in the event of Albert Grey, now fourth earl, dying in the lifetime of the third earl, or of any breach by the fourth earl of any covenant on his part, that it should be lawful for the third earl to revoke the deed either wholly or in part. By a deed dated the 26th of September, 1894, the third earl, in consideration of £5,000, released the rent-charge of £4,000, and also released the fourth earl from the covenant to retain unsold the lands named in the 7th clause of the covenant in the deed of 1885, as well as from the power of revocation reserved in the same deed. The third earl died on the 9th of October, 1894. The average net income of the property comprised in the deed of the 19th of October, 1885, was before, as well as after, the 26th of September, 1894, very considerably in excess of £4,000. The fourth earl paid estate duty upon the value of the mansion-house of Howick and the effects therein only. The information claimed that estate duty was payable upon the value of the whole of the property comprised in the deed of the 19th of October, 1885, as property passing on the death of the third Earl Grey within the meaning of sections 1 and 2 (1) (c) of the Finance Act, 1894, and having regard to section-38 of the Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1881, as amended by section 11 of the Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1889. Section 2 (1) (2) of the Finance Act, 1894 (57 & 58 Vict. c. 30) provides that property passing on the death of the deceased, which is by section 1 declared to

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