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that nearly half those cases were stillborn. In the ease of 31,808 actions nothing was ever heard of them after the issue of the writ. No step whatever was taken after the issue (and probably service) of the writ. The presumption is that they were ordinary debt actions and that the mere issue (and probably service) of the writ secured the payment of the claim.
The remaining 35,944 Queen's Bench actions were all disposed of by the machinery of the court, with the exception of 1,510 remitted to the county courts. This leaves 34,434 actions which remained in the High Court and were there disposed of in one way or another. We may divide the various processes or methods which the court has established for disposing of its actions in the Queen’s Bench Division into three separate branches. First, by the automatic action of rules dealing with default on the part of defendants, in which case there is no application to the judge or master, judgment being obtained by filing the necessary proofs and producing the necessary papers at the judgment department. Secondly, by summary order of the master in chambers without the intervention of the judge ; and, thirdly, after trial before a judge or otficial referee.
The following table will show how the court in 1895 disposed by one or other of the above processes of the 35,944 cases which were dealt with in the Queen's Bench Division in 1895 :
The above statement presents in clear outline precisely what became of all the actions dealt with in the Queen’s Bench Division in a single year. It does not, however, do more than shew how those actions were terminated, and gives no information as to interlocutory proceedings. It is especially necessary to bear this in mind with regard to the number of cases dealt with under order 14 in the second heading of the above table. The 12,000 cases under order 14 do not represent the total number of summonses issued under that order, for there were 13,352 summonses issued, and it is necessary for our purpose that we should analyze that total, because the issue of such a summons is an alternative provided by the new order 30 to the issue of a summons for directions.
1. fiummonser undrr Order 14.. . 13,352
2. Orders made.
Unconditional leave to defend 1,754
Conditional leave to defend 975 For final judgment . 7 T30
Excess of summonses issued over orders
It is reasonable to assume from the above figures that in 2,884 cases the order made under order 14 was never drawn up, probably because the defendant had merely been fighting for time, and paid, or arranged for payment, when the master decided against him. It is not possible to say precisely in how many actions summonses under order 14 were issued, because some of the 13,352 summonses were, no doubt, separate applications against difierent defendants in the same action. But we may assume that there were not less than 12,000 different actions which came under the operation of order H, and that total may be taken to represent the approximate number of cases which will be exce ted from the operation of order 30, subject to the somewhat rfiabateable question whether a case in
which leave to defend is given, without insertion in the special list, will again become subject to order 30.
Turning now to Table I. above, we find that the total number of cases tried in court under the general list was 2,196, and if we have rightly judged that the real and only purpose of the new order 30 is to sift out_from that group of cases those which ought to be tried without pleadings, it is this particular item which is the true working-ground of the new departure in procedure inaugurated by that order.
Our inquiry, therefore, has led us to the conclusion that a summons for directions will have to be issued in 3,223 out of the 35,944 actions disposed of by the court, but that the actual intention of order 30 is merely to control and direct a portion of the 2,196 cases which are tried in court under the general list. The total of 3,223 cases in which the summons for directions will be issued is arrived at by deducting from the 35,914 cases disposed of in the Queen’s Bench Division those which are dealt with automatically without order (Table I.) and also the estimated‘ number of those which are dealt with under order 14 (Table II.) all of which are exempted from the operation of the new order 30.
It is not possible by analysis of the 2,196 cases which go to trial on pleadings, to estimate even approximately the number of those which will be sifted out from that total as cases which can and ought to be tried without pleadings. The power given to the court by order 30 is discretionary, and it is impossible as yet to estimate the amount of rigour with which it will be exercised. We have, however, shewn that the probable scope of the new order 30 is very much more limited than appears at first sight.
\Ve have only one general criticism to offer. If we have rightly assumed that the new order 30 was intended merely to enable the court to control interlocutory proceedings in Queen’s Bench actions sent to trial, why -was it also applied to Chancery actions for which it is not really intended ? We have already suggested the probable reason for this. It may have been intended to prevent litigants on the Queen’s Bench side from evading the new rule by bringing what are properly Queen’s Bench actions in the Chancery Division. But if this was the reason, one is tempted to ask whether the same purpose would not have been completely attained if the new order had contained as one of the classes of actions excepted from its operation by rule 1 (d) the further exception of all actions specifically assigned to the Chancery Division by section 34 of the principal Act and order 54/». It would then have applied only to such actions brought in the Chancery Division as were in their nature outside the limits of its special jurisdiction, and would not have needlessly disturbed Chancery procedure in the great bulk of its actions by writ.
JUDICIAL REPEA1. '71" THE SETTLED LAND ACTS. I.
Wn have already pointed out that the decisions in Ra Jllearlia Settkrl Estates (1897, 1 Ir. Rep. 121) and Re Tibb1't.v' Estates ( 1897, 2 Ch. 149) cannot be supported (41 Somcrrons’ J onus.-11., 708). We now proceed to give the reasons for our opinion, and to state some of the consequences of these decisions.
We must refer our readers to our former article for a full account of the facts in each of these cases ; for the present purpose it may suffice to say that the decisions in Re Meade’; Settled Estates and in Ra Tibbits’ Estates lay down that the instrument by which portions or jointures are charged under a power oontiined in a settlement constitute, together with the original settlement, a compound settlement. Re Tibbita‘ Estates also decided that charges made on the marriage of a tenant for life on his life estate, such as pin-money, and a disentailing deed and re settlement by a tenant in tail, also form part of the compound settlement. So far as we have stated the decisions they may be unobjectionable; but they appear also to lay down that a purchaser cannot safely pay his purchase-money to the trustees of the original settlement on a sale by the tenant for life; or, in other words, that where any instrument executed subsequently to the original settlement forms together with it a “compound settlement,” the power conferred by the Settled Land Acts on
the tenant for life of the original settlement cannot be exercised unless and until trustees of the compound settlement are appointed. .
\Ve need hardly point out the extreme inconvenience that will arise if these decisions are upheld. No person will henceforth be able safely to accept a conveyance of any nature, even a lease (unless it falls within the exception contained in the Settled Land Act, 1890, s. 7) from a tenant for life purporting to act under his statutory powers without ascertaining whether a compound settlement has been created—a fact which possibly may not be within the knowledge of the tenant for life. For if the decisions are correct, it appears to be in the power of any adult tenant in tail—even for a remote remainderman-—-to render it difficult, or even impossible, for the tenant for life to exercise his statutory powers. The tenant in tail has only to bar his estate tail and resettle the base fee which he acquires. A subsequent exercise of his statutory powers by the tenant for life will be invalid (with the exception above pointed out), since notice of his intention to exercise the powers will‘ have been given to, and, in case of a sale, the purchase-money will be aid to the wron ersons—namel the trustee
_ p , _ g p y, s of the 'or1g1nal settlement, instead of the trustees of the compound
settlement. Possibly the safer plan for the remainderman who wished to harass the tenant for life would be to give notice to him, and to the trustees of the original settlement, that a resettlement had been made, without giving him sufficient information to enable him to make a proper application to the court to have trustees appointed of the compound settlement.
It is a rule that, in the construction of a statute, we must take into consideration what was the law before the statute; what was the defect in that law, and what remedy Parliament provided for it, “and then the oflice of all the judges is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief and advance the remedy, and to suppress subtle inventions and evasions for continuance of the mischief . . . and to add force and life to the cure and remedy, according to the true intent of the makers of the Act pro bono publ1'co" (Hayden's case, 3 Rep., at p. 76; see also, to the same effect, Attorm>_z/- General v. Earl of Powya, Kay 186; Cope v. Dolwrty, 4 K. & J. 367; P/zfllipps v. Rees, 24 Q. B. D. 17 ; Pvlton Brothers v. lTarrfs0n, 1891, 2 Q. B. 422).
The defects of the law before the passing of the Settled Land Act, 1882, and the remedy intended to be provided by Parliament, are tersely stated by Lord Hsnsntmr, 0., in Bruce v. Aileabu-ry (1892, A. 0., at p. 361), as follows: “The power given for the tenant for life to sell, notwithstanding that by the terms of the settlement the powers did not extend beyond his own life, seems to me, apart from any extraneous consideration, enough to shew that what the statute intended to do was to release the land from the fetters of the settlement—to render it a marketable article notwithstanding the settlement. And, historically, one knows very well what were the objections made to the law of settlement in its effect upon the cultivation and useful occupation of the land.”
The decisions which shew that the statutory power of sale can readily be made incapable of being exercised without an application to the court are opposed to the spirit of the Settled Land Act, 1882, so that there is a very strong presumption that they are erroneous; in other words, that they cannot be upheld unless they clearly fall within the express words of the Act.
We now proceed to shew that if the decisions above referred to are upheld it will be far more difficult and expensive to sell land settled by a settlement made after the Settled Land Act, 1882, came into force than by one made before that time, assuming in each case that the settlement was drawn by an expert conveyancer.
t commonly happens that a strict settlement contains powers of jointuring and charging portions. If these were exercised, the power of sale usually inserted in settlements before 1883 remained exerciseable and overrode them, while, according to Re ll[eade‘s Eslatcs and Re Tz7bbz'ts’ Estates, the statutory power conferred by the Settled Land Act, 1882, cannot be exercised until trustees of the compound settlement, formed by the settlement containing the owers and the deed by which the powers were exercised, have been appointed by the court.
Where a tenant for life charged his life estate with pin
money, the careful conveyancer took care not to destroy the power of sale conferred by the settlement, but, according to the decision in Pa T ibbils’ Estates, trustees of the compound settlement will have to be appointed by the court before the sale can be made.
The Settled Land Act, 1882, has now been in operation for nearly fifteen years—11alf a generation; the provisions of the Act were, immediately after it came into operation, adopted by all competent conveyancers, and it must be extremely rare that a strict settlement, executed after 1882, contains an express power of sale. The general opinion of conveyancers has been that the conveyance of a tenant for life under the Act operates so as to pass the land conveyed discharged, not only from the uses and powers of the settlement, but also from all estates created by virtue of those powers; the result being that a purchaser was not concerned to see whether any of the powers had been exercised, except a power under which money had been actually raised (see Wolstenholme, Brinton, & Cherry, p. 321; the note by Mr. KEY, 1 K. & E., 4th ed., p. 506 ; and the still more emphatic Opinion of the editors of the 5th edition 1 K. & E., p. 467). Having regard to these opinions, it cannot be doubted that a vast number of titles have been accepted on a conveyance by a tenant for life under a settlement, on payment of the purchase-money to the trustees of that settlement, without making inquiry whether powers of jointuring, &c , have been exercised ; it follows that, if the decisions above referred to are correct, a vast number of titles are bad.
\Ve do not wish to create unnecessary alarm, but we must point out that many cases must have occurred when small parts of a settled estate have been sold for building purposes, and that, owing to the fall in value of land, the residue of the estate, together with the purchase-money, will, at the death of the tenant for life, be insufficient to provide for the jointures and portions, in which case, if the sale is invalid, the jointress and portioners may possibly be able to have the jointure and portions raised out of the land comprised in the invalid sale; also, possibly, the Crown may be able to claim estate duty in respect of the land which was sold, on the ground of the invalidity of the sale.
Now that the defect has been pointed out, it will always be necessary for the abstract of the settlement to state any powers of jointuring, &c., which have been exercised, and to abstract the deeds by which the jointures and portions were appointed, and to have trustees appointed by the court of the compound settlement formed by the original settlement and the deeds of appointment. We need hardly say that the necessity of having trustees apppinted by the court will occasion great delay and expense. e may add that sometimes the appointments are not in the possession of the tenant for life, and that he appears to have no right to have a deed appointing a jointure produced to him, as it does not affirmatively prove his title; and as, although the charge of the jointure is a “mortgage ” within the meaning of the Conveyancing Act, 1881, the tenant for life is not a person entitled to redeem, and therefore has no right to production under section 16.
No doubt in future settlements the careful draftsman will guard against the necessity of applying to the court in these cases, either in the manner suggested at 41 Somcrroas’ J ouan.-\I., p. 709, or by the insertion in the original settlement of an express power of sale. \Ve cannot help thinking that the rule of construction above laid down affords a strong reason for thinking that the decisions in question are erroneous.
We will now consider the words of the Act. The Act of 1882, s. 2 (1) provides that
“ Any deed, will, agreement for a settlement, or other agreement, covenant to surrender, copy of court roll, Act of Parliament, or other instrument, or any number of instruments, whether made or passed before or after, or partly before and partly after, the commencement of this Act, under or by virtue of which instrument or instruments any land, or any estate or interest in land, stands for the time being limited to or in trust for any persons by way of succession, creates or is for purposes of this Act a settlement, and is in this Act referred to as a settlement or as the settlement, as the case requires.”
Or, to state it concisely, “any instrument or any number of instruments by virtue of which any land or any estate in land stands limited to or in trust for any persons by way of succes
sion, is a settlement.” It will be observed that the section does not say “all the instruments by which land is settled are a settlement.” The word used is “any,” which =means a sole instrument or any number of instruments, or all the instruments by which land is settled. Thus, to take the case of Re Ailesbury and Ivangh (1893, 2 Oh. 34 5), where there were a series of deeds by which jointures were limited, followed by a resettlement, we may consider all the deeds as a compound settlement of the fee; all, except the first, as a compound settlement of the fee subject to the first jointure; and the resettlement as a settlement of the fee subject to all the jointures. The tenant for life under the resettlement is also necessarily tenant for life under each of the compound settlements, but as he can only convey the land “ for the estate or interest the subject of the settlement ” (Settled Land Act, 1882, s. 20 (1)), the effect of a conveyance by him depends upon whether he conveys as tenant for life under a compound settlement or under the resettlement. If he conveys as tenant for life under the compound settlement formed of all the instruments, he conveys free from all the jointures, while if he conveys as tenant for life under the resettlement only, he conveys subject to all the jointures.
Now consider the case of Re Jl[aa(Ia’s Settled Estates. Here there was a. strict settlement, followed by a charge under powers of appointment of pin-money j ointure and portions, and a limitation of a term to secure them. In this case the estate in the land settled by the original settlement was the same as that settled by the compound settlement. So that, whether the tenant for life sells as tenant for life under the original settlement or under the compound settlement, he can convey the same estate. Add to this that, it he sells as tenant for life of the original settlement, his conveyance passes the land “discharged from all the limitations, powers, and provisions of the settlement, and from all estates, interests, and charges subsisting or to arise thereunder.” So that it is expressly enacted that the conveyance by the tenant for life of the original settlement shall pass the land free from the pin-money jointure and portions charged, and from the term limited under the power.
It may be objected that we have been discussing only the question whether the tenant for life must sell as tenant for life of the original or of the compound settlement, while the decisions in question related to whether the purchase-money ought to be paid to the trustees for the purposes of the Settled Land Acts of the original or the compound settlement. The question, however, is the same in substance, as both the tenant for life (section 2 (5) ) and the trustees (section 2 (8) ) are defined by reference to “ a settlement,” which obviously means the same thing in each case.
We shall consider other aspects of the decisions next week.
ADJUDICATION AND DENOTING OF INSTRUMENTS
ONE of the results of the enormous number of new companies which have recently come into existence has necessarily been a great increase in the business of the Adjudication Department at Somerset House. Agreements for sale, and conveyances and assignments in pursuance of such agreements, have constantly, under Section 59 of the Stamp Act, 1891, to be presented either for denotinglpayment of the ad mlomn duty on the conveyance, or for transferring t e ad vulorein duty to the conveyance, or obtaining an adjudication stamp on the conveyance.
Solicitors will be glad to hear that arrangements have been made for extending the official hours within which deeds and other original documents required to be produced for purposes of adjudication or denoting can be lodged at Somerset House. Such instruments may now be odged at the Solicitor’s Department, Somerset House, between the hours of 10 and 4 o’clock, except on Saturdays, when the hours are 10 to 1 o’clock.
The Solicitor of Inland Revenue has issued a circular calling the attention of Solicitors and others tendering instruments for adjudication under Section 12 of the Stamp Act, 1891, to the great extra trouble and delay which are occasioned both to the public and to the Department by reason of the fact that the parties often fail, in the first instance, to supply, with the Abstract, the information that is obviously necessary to enable an assessment to be made. He says that as the work of the adjudication branch has very largely increased and appears to be on the increase, it is thought that the public may be fairly called upon to prevent in future the occurrence of this difliculty.
case will be adjudicated.
Where it is claimed that any part of the subject-matter of the Agreement is exempt from (lit valorem duty as falling within one or another of the exceptions contained in Section 59 of the Stamp Act, 1891 (i.r.=., as being a legal estate or interest in lands, tenements, hcreditaments, or heritages, or as being property locally situate out of the United Kingdom, or goods, wares or merchandise, or stock, or marketable securities, or any ship or vessel, or part interest, share, or property of or in any ship or vessel).
Where the Purchaser takes over or indemnifies the Vendor against mortgage or other debts and liabilities.
Where the property is sold subject to a mortgage.
Generally, if property is sold subject to, or in consideration of the taking over or release of any debt or pecuniary liability.
If the Conveyance or Transfer is made on the occasion of the appointment of a New Trustee.
lf the Conveyance or Transfer is made for ellectuating a Settlement.
In all cases.
No'rs.—A security for advances without limit cannot be the subject ‘ of adjludication.
W ere a Trust Deed secures payment of Debentures.
Where it is claimed that collateral, auxiliary, addition or substituted security duty only is payable.
In all cases.
It is, of course, impossible to particularize all the cases in which the information sup lied is commonly defective, but attention is called below to a few oi)the instances which most frequently occ'ur.
It will be clearly understood that, in requesting that these particulars may be furnished, no ruling whatever is intended as to how a particular
Furnish separate values of the property coming within each of the heads in respect of which exemption is claimed, and state the ground on which the exemption is claimed. Where a Balance Sheet or Valuation is in existence, which shows the value of the several items or any of them to be us stated, this is ordinarily sulficient evidence of value, and it should, therefore, accomp any the Abstract. Where no such Balance Sheet or Valuation is in existence, some reasonable evidence of value must be supplied.
A list of these must be suppliei, accompanied by similar documentary evidence, showing that the amounts are correct.
State the amount owing for principal (and interest, if any, if the purchaser undertakes payment thereol) at the date of the Conveyance.
State the amount thereof.
III.-Cos\'s\'acun on Trumsrsn on ANY OCCASION EXCEPT Sana on Moaresen.
Produce the Deed of Appointment.
Produce the Settlement.
Produce the Debentures executed and duly stamped. _
Produce the principal or primary security.
Where a share onlgin a reversionary interest in a rust fund is settled.
Where a Settlor covenants to settle other property which he may then have, but which is not specifically mentioned.
Furnish particulars of the Stocks and Securities if not specified in the Settlement, and in any case produce a statement of the several items as at date of Settlement—
(rt) From prices quoted in any authorised Stock and Share List; or,
Where there is no quotation, based on the average of the latest private transactions, which can generally be obtained from the Secretary of the Company.
In addition to the above articulars of the investments of the fund at the date of Settlement state the Settlor’s interest therein.
State whether the Settlor was at the date of Settlement entitled, in possession or reversion, or in default of the exercise of a power of
appointment, to any money, stocks, or shares not specified in the deed, and give as above particulars and
value of such property. Where the settled fund com
prises a policly of life insurance
(a-.) If t e Settlement (or any
(u.) State the amount of any bonuses added.
foot. (Ir) If there is no such (b.) Produce a certificate of provision. the surrender value
We have to announce the receipt of the issue for 1898 of our old friend the Lawyer's Companion and Diary. In addition to all the useful matter usually contained in it, there has this year been added to the name of each country town in the list of country solicitors the name of the county court for such place. The book is, as usual, excellently got up. We have also received Messrs. Water-low Bros. & Layton’s Legal Diary and Almanack for 1898. It contains, in addition to lists of English counsel and solicitors, lists of Irish and Scotch solicitors; and a great deal of information on legal matters.
The annual dinner of the Hardwicke Society was held on Monday at tho Criterion Restaurant, Piccadilly-circus. The chair was taken by the president, Mr. F. M. Sherwood. In reply to the toast of “Our J udges," Mr. Justice Bryne said that he owed a deep debt of gratitude to the Hardwicke Debating Society. He was glad to see that the society was now more flourishing than ever, and numbered in its ranks mun who would probably do even more credit to it than those who had gone before. Mr. Justice Bigham, who also replied, said he looked u on the society as representing the youth, energy, and learning of the Bar oi) England. A society such as theirs was of inestimable advantage to the whole of the profession. It was extremely desirable at the Bar that its members sho Jld be able to say what they had to my in tho simplest possible manner, and a society like tho Hardwit-ke gave them n training which would enable them to do so. He had left his work at the Bu with the greatest reluctance ; it was the occupation in which he took the deepest delight, and when he left it he doubted, and still did so, whether the happiest years of his life had not been assed. It was when he was at the Bar, smuggling amongst the many arounvfhim, that he had passed his very happiest days. If, in his new caplcity, they found him falling short of his duties he trusted they would tell him of ir, nnl they would find he was always willing to listen and desirous to learn.
REVIEVVS. LONDON LOCAL GOVERNMENT.
Loxnox Locsr. GOVERNMENT: run Law RELATING T0 run Louoon Couxrr Couuorn, run Vrsrmns sun Drsrnrcr Boaaos ELECTED urznsn run METROPOLIS ltlauacsnnur Acrs, AND orusa LOCAL Auri-ronrrlns. By Joan HUNT, Barrister-at-Law. Two Volumes. Stevens & Sons (Limited.).
Mr. Hunt is to be congratulated on having accomplished successfully very ditlicult task. London Local Government as become a comlicated subject, and it will be of great use to the legal profession to have within the compass of two neat and well-printed volumes the whole of the statutes which regulate the government of the Metropolis by its various local authorities. We do not know of any other work which covers precisely the same ground. Its scope is far wider than lthat of “Woolrych's Metropolis Management Acts,” the latest edition of which was published before either the Local Government Act, 1888, or the Public Health (London) Act, 1891, had become law, and is now in many respects obsolete. Mr. Hunt deals with the constitution, powers, and duties of the London County Council, the vestries and district boards, and several minor authorities. He has adopted the method of collecting and annotating the statutes and the more important statutory orders bearin on the sub'ect. The first volume contains the main enactments— viz, the Local dovernment Acts of 1888 and 1894, the Metropolis Management Acts, the Public Health (London) Act, the London Building Act, Michael Angelo Taylor’s Act, and some others. In the "second volume is a collection, in alphabetical order of their subjectmatter, of subsidiary enactments affecting} the bodies with which the book is concerned, and the exercise of t eir powers and duties; these are also annotated. The notes throughout the work are concise and to the point. Numerous references to cases are given, and these have been brought down to July of the present year. The collection of statutory orders is not intended to be complete: to make it so would have involved an enormous increase in the bulk of the work"; bub those orders which are of permanent and practical importance are set out. ln one case the author has included an order (as to the election of vestrymen in 1897) which is already spent, and would have been better omitted. We do not like the position of the index at the end of the first volume ; it comprises, of course, references to the second volume, and we would have preferred to find it in its natural place at the end of the work, or, better still, to find it in duplicate at the end of each volume. We also think that the arrangement of statutes in the second volume is open to criticism. An arrangement according to subjects leads, of necessity, to the splitting up of a single statute dealing with different subjects. Most practitioners will, we think, find it preferable to have each statute complete by itself, the arrangement being in chronological order, and the notes and index supplying the necessary references to other statutes dealing with each particular subject. But these small defects will not seriously interfere with the usefulness of Mr. Hunt's excellent work.
This book gives a very interesting and useful account of the law and practice incident to dealings in stocks and shares. It contains all that is needful to be known by the stockbroker and the lawyer, while laymen who are interested, either as investors or as speculators, will be able by its help to follow the somewhat intricate course of an actual sale and purchase of securities on the Stock Exchange. The latter class will find special interest in the chapter on “ The Course of Business on the Stock Exchange." and in that in which Mr. Brodhurst has given a glossary of Stock Exchange terms. The latter explains the technical terms in use among brokers and jobbers, and the former takes up an imaginary dealing in shares--a sale of two lots of £500 Brighton “A ” stock to a buyer of £1,000 of the stock-—~and traces the whole course of the transaction, from its commencement, when the price is made by the jobber, to its final settlement, when the stock is actually transferred. In the course of his account Mr. Brodhurst explains also the bookkeeping operations of the various brokers and jobbers concerned, and no point upon which practical information can be of service seems to be omitted. Of the other chapters some will appeal specially to members of the Stock Exchange—such are “The Stock Exchange and its Management" and “ Stock Exchange Securities”——and some to lawyers. The points of law which arise in connection with share
‘transactions are, as is well known, numerous and difficult. Of
recent years special prominence has been given to the question of gambling speculations. By a curious error Mr. Brodhurst appears to say in his preface that the law relating to wagering contracts rarely affects bargains in stocks and shares, but in the text a more practical view is taken, and in the chapter on the “ Avoidance of the Contract,” the cases which have turned upon the illegality of wagering contracts are fully discussed. These include Forget v. ()str'gn_z/ (43 W. R. 590), in which the Privy Council recently defined the nature of legitimate speculation, and Strachan. v. Universal Stock Ercharzge (43 W. R. 611), in which the Court of Appeal held that there was suflicient evidence to justify a jury in holding dealings in shares to be a gambling transaction, notwithstanding the regularity of the documents in which they were embodied. This result was, we believe, affirmed by the House of Lords, though Mr. Brodhurst does not a pear to notice the fact. The chapter on “ Mortgages of Stocks and Shares” is well written, and the Appendix contains two useful forms of agreement upon mortgage, which, being under hand, require by virtue of section 23 of the Stamp Act, 1891, a sixpenny stamp only. This notice of a book which promises to become a standard work on the law of the Stock Exchange would not be complete without reference to the interesting introductory chapter in which the history of stockbroking in this country is traced.
A TBEATISE UPON THE Law srrncrmo SOLICITORS or THE SUPREME COURT. WITH APPENDICES CONTAINING THE Somerrons Aors, 1843-189.3; ENACTMENTB SPECIALLY REFERRING TO SOLICITORS; REGULATIONS RELATING TO SOLICITORS; ALSO THE STATUTES REGULATING :rnE ADMISSION or COLONIAL Arroaivnrs AND SOLICITORS IN ENGLAND. By Aarnuii P. PoLEY, B.A., Barrister-at-Law. William Clowes & Sons (Limited).
The law which touches solicitors personally, as distinguished from the law in which they are only interested on behalf of clients, is 0 extensive that a new and careful statement of it is sure to meet with a welcome. Such a statement appears to be contained in the volume before us. Among the more important topics discussed are the procedure before the Discipline Committee and upon their report, the authority conferred by retainer upon a solicitor, the method of charging under the Remuneration Order, solicitor’s lien, and the procedure and practice on taxation, and upon these Mr. Poley has succeeded in placing the results of the statutes, rules, and cases clearly before his readers. At p. 161, in discussing the power of a solicitor to incur unusual expenses, it is perhaps hardly enough to say that a client who enjoys the benefit of the expenses will be preshined to have authorized them if he was cognizant of the facts. In htigious matters the circumstance of chief importance is that he should distinctly informed by the solicitor that the expenses are extraordinary and cannot be recovered from the other side, and this is rather a matter of law than of fact. In Re Blyth (10 Q. B.- D. 207), one of the cases to which Mr. Poley refers, the shorthand notes, the costs of which were in question, were taken with the full cognizance of the client, but since he was not informed that. they were not_recoverable on party and party taxation it was held that he was not liable. Elsewhere at p. 430 this is expressly stated. On p. 293 a paragraph pointing out the distinction with regard to scale costs between the creation and the transfer of an easement is seriously
marred by defects of punctuation. But the book as a whole appears
to be accurately written, and the author has spared no pains to collect the most recent cases, and to state their effect fully and clearly. The series of cases which have been gradually elucidating the efi'e_ct of the Remuneration Order form an important subject for discussion and arrangement of which Mr. Poley has not failed to take advantage, and the cases on the implied authority of a partner in a firm of solicitors are conveniently collected. There is a full index, but happily one item, which implies that company-promoting ls professional misconduct, is not borne out by the text. Altogether the work is a useful addition to the existing books on the law affecting solicitors.
REPORTS or LAW CASES AFFECTING FRIENDLY SociE'r1Es, conrsmmc MOSTIMPORTANT Dncisioivs, WITH COPIOUS INDEX 01-‘ PRACTICAL Ponvrs, TABLE or Casns, ABBREVIATIONS AND ExPLANATIONS, REFERENCES T0 Acre or PARLLAMENT; TOGETHER WITH FRIENDLY SOCIETIES Aor, 1896 (59 & 60 Vicr. c. 25) ; Ex'rs.sc'r (arrncrnvc FarEivm.Y SooIEriEs) FROM Poon LAW AMENDMENT Aer, 1876; AND THE Poor; Law AMENDMENT Aer, 1879; ALSO THE PROVIDEN1.‘ NOMINATIONS AND SMALL IsmsTACIES Aer, 1883. Compiled by Jorm DIPROSE, P.G.M., assisted by JOSEPH GAMMON, P.P.G.M. Reeves & Turner.
THE LAW or FRIENDLY Soomrms AND INDUSTRIAL AND PROVI
AND A COPIOUS INDEX. THIRTEENTH Enrrioiv. By Enwaan W1LLmii Bnmnoox, F.S.A., Barrister-at-Law, Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies. Shaw & Sons.
We gather from the preface to the collection of reports of cases affecting friendly societies that the previous collection, published in 1892, has been for some time out of print. The task of forming a fresh collection was entrusted by the authorities of the Manchester Unity of Oddfellows to Mr. Diprose, and with the assistance of Mr. Gammon, a clerk in the chambers of Mr. Justice Kekewich, it has been very adequately performed. A large number of the cases are reprinted from the former edition. There is a full report, for instance, from this source of the case of Schofield v. Vause in which the decision of the Vice-Chancellor of Lancaster, denying to a branch the right to secede from the central society against the wishes of a dissentient minority of its members, was afiirmed after a four days’ hearing by the Court of Appeal. As in many of the cases, the arguments are given at length. The new cases have been taken from the ordinary series of law reports, and the newspapers also have been laid under contribution. They include the case of Regina v. Duncan before the Recorder of Bristol, on appeal Duncan v. 1)owd1'n_q (pp. I28, 551), in which the Royal Antediluvian Order of Bufihloes had the merit of establishing the point that the police have no right under the Licensing Acts to enter rooms in a public house let to a society and used for the purposes of music and singing. Other recent cases which have been in the Court of Appeal, and which are reported here, are Cunnack v. Edwards, on the application of the funds of a society whose objects are exhausted, and Rudd v. James, in which the right of the infant members of a juvenile society to dissolve without the consent of the governing committee came in question.
On a smaller scale reports of cases form a feature also of the useful volume of the law of friendly and similar societies originally compiled by Mr. Tidd Pratt and now edited by Mr. Brabrook. But in the main it is a reprint of the Friendly Societies Act, 1896, and the Industrial and Provident Societies Act, 1893. The book has long been known as a handy guide to the Acts dealing with these societies, and the consolidation of the Friendly Societies Acts by the Act of 1896 has made a new edition indispensable. -The introduction contains an interesting account of the course of legislation on the subject.
THE PB.ACI‘ITIONER’B GUIDE T0 THE DUTIES or EXECUTORB AND ADMINISTRATORS, FROM DEATH TO DISTRIBUTION; wirn WHICH IS INCORPORATED LAYTON & Haiir‘s PRACTICAL Gums 'ro run MAKING AND PROVING or WiLLs. Revised and corrected by AN OFFICIAL or THE LEGACY AND SUCCESSION Dory OFFICE, SousaSET HOUSE. Waterlow Bros. & Layton (Limited).
In chapters on Wills and the Wills Act, Oflice of Executor and Proof of Will, Oflicc of Administrator, Rights and Duties, &c., of Executors and Administrators, Chain of Representation, and Death Duties, this book contains much practical information upon tho course of the administration of the estate of a deceased person. It would have been improved had the arrangement of the matter been more carefully attended to, and had the table of contents shown where information on particular topics was to be found. The compiler has, indeed, been more careful in collecting his materials than in putting them into the form adapted for a text-book. But subject to this remark, the book is a convenient guide to the duties of an executor and administrator, and the authorities have been introduced in such a manner as to make a perusal of tho book interesting. In general they are taken from the recognized sources. but not infrequently the assistance of unreported cases is invoked. The courts may, as it is remarked, be more reluctant than ever to assume death—-though we are not aware that it is so—-—but surely any court would presume death under such circumstances as those in Re Jllurray, mentioned at p. 88. Here the person alleged to be dead was known to have gone at night to the neighbourhood of a lime-kiln, and in tho morning various personal articles belonging to him were found with what might be supposed to be his bones in the kiln. His total disappearance from that date seems to complete a pretty clear case of death. At p. 152 there is a full table of succession to real and personal property, and elsewhere the results of the text are usefully summarized—at p. 162, for instance, where the duties of an executor are enumerated. In the chapter on death duties it would have been an advantage to have an introductory statement of the nature of the duties now chargeable. Instead of this, the chapter plunges at once into the provisions of the Finance Act, 1894, with respect to estate duty, and then, in succession, the various other statutes imposing duty are 1'cf€1'!'6€l to. All these statutes, as well as several other germane to the subject, are given in full in the Appendix, and this part contains also the various Inland Revenue forms for payment of duty. The book will be found to be of considerable practical value.