HOWARD, WALTER, Portsea, Grocer Portsmouth Pet July JENKINS, WILLIAM, Llanguicke, Glam, Tailor Neath Pet JOHNSON, ALFRED, Willenhall, Stafford, Grocer Wolver- JONES, JOHN EDWARD, Kingswinford, Stafford Stour- LOCKWOOD, GEORGE, Wakefield, Plasterer Wakefield LYNAS, WALTER FRED, Selby, Yorks, Grocer York Pet ONIONS, ISAAC HENRY, Loughborough, Baker Leicester PERRY, ALFRED WILLIAM, South Molton st, Oxford st, PIKE, HENRY, Fouthwark Park rd, Bedstead Manufacturer SMEDLEY, WALTER, Ashover, Derbys, Tailor Derby Pet TAYLOR, FREDERICK, ERNEST TAYLOR, and JOHN TAYLOR, WHITFIELD, J & R, Leeds, Builders Leeds Pet July 5 WILLIAMS, FRANK ARTHUR, Albrighton, Salop, Mechanical FIRST MEETINGS. BULLIMORE, WILLIAM, Deeping St Nicholas, Lincoln, CLARKE, WILLIAM ARTHUR, Norwich July 29 at 4 Off DAVIS, E, Balham, Builders' Merchant July 29 at 12 24, DEES, JOHN ARTHUR, Hartlepool, Timber Merchant July 29 at 11.30 Off Rec, 30, Mosley st, Newcastle on Tyne DUNCAN, THOMAS TAYLOR, Great Yarmouth July 30 at 1 Off Rec, 8, King st, Norwich HAMMETT, WILLIAM, St Thomas the Apostle, Devon, Baker Harrogate, Yorks, Furniture Storers Aug 2 at 12.15 PELLEW, GORDON HL, Alverstoke, Hants July 29 at 3 REES, HENRY, Cardiff, Plumber's Apprentice Aug 3 at July 29 SENIOR, EDWARD, Norton, nr Doncaster, Butcher STAY, WILLIAM, Portsmouth, Hants, Butcher July 29 at BOSWELL, HERBERT WALTER, Stockport, Horse Dealer DUMFORD, WALTER BENJAMIN, Cardiff, Hairdresser Cardiff EVANS, DAVID EDGAR, Llanfihangel, Rhosycorn, Grocer FAIRCHILD, GEORGE EDWIN, Harrington sq Lewes Pet FAIRWEATHER, GEORGE, Diss, Norfolk, Baker's Assistant PEARSON, JOHN WILLIAM, and WILLIAM ROBINSON, Wake- SHEARD, RA & Co, Liversedge, York, Warp Manufacturers FIRTH, JOE, Huddersfield, Woollen Cloth Weaver Hud-SZEK, JOSEPH THEODOR, Chancery lane High Court Pet dersfield Pet July 18 Ord July 18 GOODWIN, RICHARD, South Shields, Builder Newcastle on HAMMETT. WILLIAM, St Thomas the Apostle, Devons, HOWARD, WALTER, Portsea, Grocer Portsmouth Pet JENKINS, WILLIAM, Llanguicke, Glam, Tailor Neath Pet JOHNSON, SAMUEL LOVICK, Eastbourne, Stationer East- JONES, JOHN EDWARD, Wordsley, Stafford Stourbridge KILMINSTER, CHARLES, Brighton, Bootmaker Brighton LAWRENCE, CHARLES FREDERICK, and ARTHUR HALL, LOCKWOOD, GEORGE, Wakefield, Plasterer Wakefield LYNAS, WALTER FRED, Selby, Yorks, Grocer York Pet MARSHALL, JOSEPH, Chorlton on Medlock, Manchester, Leicester ONIONS, ISAAC HENRY, Loughborough, Baker ST JOHN, AUBREY B L, New Lyric Club, Coventry st High SMEDLEY, WALTER, Ashover, Derbys, Tail r Derby Pet STANLEY, ALFRED WILLIAM, Kingston upon Hull, Builder July 18 Ord July 18 Pet WILLIAMS, FRANK ARTHUR, Albrighton, Salop, Mechanical ADJUDICATION ANNULLED AND RECEIVING ORDER RESCINDED. London Gazette.-TUESDAY, July 26. RECEIVING ORDERS. ADEY, FREDERIC ALBERT, Bristol, Insurance Pet July 23 Ord July 23 June 27 Ord July 21 VILE, WILLIAM THOMAS, Wandsworth, Builder Wands- VILLENEUVE, CHARLES, Brockley Greenwich Pet July 20 WALLWORK, JOSEPH, Wigan, Picture Frame Maker Wigan Pet July 21 Ord July 21 WHITE, E, Borough rl, Beerhouse Keeper High Court WILLIAMS, WILLIAM, Redruth, Cornwall, Butcher Truro WILSON, EMMANUEL FENWICK, Plessy, Northumberland, Mon FIRST MEETINGS. ADEY, FREDERIC ALBERT, Bristol, Insurance Manager BURKE, JAMES JOSEPH, Leeds, Grocer Aug 4 at 11 Off CASTLE, HENRY JOHN, Margate, Watchmaker Aug 8 at CORBETT, ARTHUR JAMES, Kensington Aug 4 at 2.30 DE LA CHAPELLE, the Count, West Kensington, Financial JOLLY, HAMILTON WILLIAM, Liverpool, Surgeon's Assistant Manager KAY, THOMAS, Longton, Staffs, Builder Aug 3 at 2.30 Leicester Cambridge BOOTH, ARTHUR, Manchester, General Draper Manchester CASTLE, HENRY JOHN, Margate, Watchmaker Canterbury DARLOW, ALBERT, Sheffield, Innkeeper Sheffield Pet DEAN, WILLIAM, Burnley, Cabinet Maker Burnley Pet GILES, Major GEORGE E, Jermyn st High Court Pet GLENDAY, JOHN CHARLES, Brighton, Schoolmaster HARDING, FRANCIS EDWIN, Leicester, Painter Leicester HARTSHORNE, BERTRAM FULKE, Elm Park gdns, Barrister HILL, THOMAS, Manchester, Chairmaker Manchester Pet HOLMES, CHARLES HERBERT, Salford, Manager Salford HOOD, WILLIAM OWEN, Baneswell, Newport, Baker New- KELLOW, ROBERT WILLIAM, Salisbury, Wilts, Builder MACLEOD, JAMES POLSON, Philpot st, Commercial at, Pet May 26 Pet July 23 The North Stafford Hotel, Stoke upon Trent 5 at 10.30 King's Arms Hotel, Dorchester PERRY, ALFRED WILLIAM, South Molton st, Oxford st, STAUNTON, HENRY JOHN, Gt Malvern Aug 3 at 11.30 Off TRIPP, ROBERT HENRY, Hexton, Hertford Aug 3 at 11.30 VIGNOLES, CHARLES AUGUSTUs, Upper George st, Bryanston sq, Stock Broker Aug 3 at 2.30 Bankruptcy bldge, WAIN, LOUIS, Westgate on Sea, Artist Aug 8 at 11 Off ADJUDICATIONS. ADEY, FREDeric ALBERT, Bristol, Insurance Manager AGUE, SAMUEL, Leicester, Furniture Dealer Leicester BARRETT, JOHN, Newmaket, Upholsterer Cambridge CASTLE, HENRY JOHN, Margate, Watchmaker Canterbury DAVIES, DAVID, Skewen, nr Neath, Publican Neath Pet GOODWIN, EDWARD, Longton, Staffs, Butcher Stoke upon GREEN, ALFRED PHILIP, Pall Mall place High Court Pet GROSSMANN, ALEXANDER JAMES, Dover, Photographer Pet July 23 Ord July 23 Leicester HERMANN, HYMAN, Islington, Wine Merchant High Court Pet June 7 Ord July 21 HILL, EDWARD, Kirkbride, Cumberland, Clogger Carlisle Pet July 21 Ord July 21 HILL, THOMAS, Manchester, Furniture Dealer Manchester Pet July 21 Ord July 21 HOOD, WILLIAM OWEN, Baneswell, Newport, Baker Newport, Mon Pet July 22 Ord July 22 HULME, THOMAS, jun, Northampton, China Dealer Northampton Pet May 6 Ord July 22 JARROLD, THOMAS, Whitland, Carmarthen, Miller Pembroke Dock Pet July 12 Ord July 22 JEREM, ALBERT EDWARD, Gt Grimsby Gt Grimsby Pet LANGRIDGE, THOMAS GEORGE, Plymouth, Licensed Vic- NUGENT, CLAUD, Brighton, Club Manager High Court field, Clothiers Wakefield Pet July 21 Ord July 21 PRICE, WILLIAM THOMAS EDWIN, West Malling, Kent, Miller Maidstone Pet July 16 Ord July 21 RADCLIFFE, JOHN HENRY, Heckmondwike, Yorks, Confectioner Dewsbury Pet June 16 Ord July 21 REAKES, FRANK, Evercreech, Somersets, Farmer Wells Pet June 21 Ord July 22 Cardiff REES, HENRY, Cardiff, Plumber's Apprentice ROBERTS, ARTHUR LINES, Borough rd High Court Pet ROUND, MARY, and ANNIE ROUND, Bury, Lancs, Milliners SPICKERNELL, RICHARD BEDWELL, Kensington, General WAUTER, PETER FRANZ HENRY, Brixton, Wine Merchant High Court Pet April 20 Ord July 22 WHITE, JOSEPH SAMUEL, Liverpool Liverpool Pet June 8 Ord July 21 WILLIAMSON, CHARLES NORRIS, Walton on Thames, Journalist Kingston, Surrey Pet July 16 Ord July 23 WILSON, EMMANUEL FENWICK, Tynemouth, Dairy man Newcastle on Tyne Pet July 23 Ord July 23 ADJUDICATION ANNULLED. HUTTON, ROBERT, Wall-on-Tyne, Northumberland, Clerk in Holy Orders Newcastle on Tyne Adjud Oct 13, 1892 Annul July 21, 1898 DRUGS WON'T DO. FREE TRIAL OF SOMETHING THAT WILL DO. You would be perfectly astonished if you were made aware of the many thousands of pounds absolutely thrown away from year to year upon so-called curatives that are foisted upon a public only too willing to believe the specious arguments laid before them. Even the hard-earned shillings of the very poor are wasted in this way; in fact, it is to the ignorant, anxious to rid themselves of the various ailments which handicap them in the race for life, that such arguments are too often addressed. Now, strength and muscular activity, rosy cheeks, plumpness, and health can be obtained without medicine. The replenishing of the system from the wasting of For passage apply to the latter firm at 5, Fenchurchavenue, London, E.C.; or to the West-End Branch Office, 16, Cockspur-street, 8.W. LONDON GAZETTE (published by authority) and LONDON and COUNTRY ADVERTISEMENT OFFICE.-No. 117, CHANCERY LANE, FLEET STREET. HE ENRY GREEN, Advertisement Agent, begs to direct the attention of the Legal Profession to the advantages of his long experience of upwards of fifty years, in the special insertion of all pro forma notices, &c., and hereby solicits their continued support.-N.B. Forms, Gratis, for Statutory Notices to Creditors and Dissolutions of Partnership, with necessary Declaration. MELBOURNE HOUSE, LEICESTER. Official stamps for advertisements and file of "London BRAND & CO.'S Gazette" kept. By appointment. PATENTS and TRADE-MARKS. W. P. THOMPSON & CO., 322, High Holborn, W.C. (and at LIVERPOOL, MANCHESTER, and BIRMINGHAM), LONDON and INTERNATIONAL AGENTS of Provincial and Foreign SOLICITORS in PATENT matters. Representatives in all Capitals. PATENTS. Mr. F. W. GOLBY, A.I.M.E., M.S.A., Patent Agent (late of H.M. Patent Offices 86, Chancery-lane, London, W.C. Letters Patent obained and Registration effected in all parts of the World. Oppositions conducted. Opinions and Searches as to novelty. EDE AND SON, tissues which is going on every day can only be BIRKBECK BANK accomplished by the proper assimilation of food. It cannot be done with medicine. It can, however, be accomplished with a perfect, flesh-forming, palatable and agreeable Food-beverage. Dr. Tibbles' Vi-Cocoa is such a Food-beverage, possessing, as it does, wonderful nourishing, strengthening and stimulative powers unsurpassed by any other Food-beverage. Dr. Tibbles' Vi-Cocoa is not a medicine. It does simply what it is claimed to do, and its strengthening powers are being recognised to an extent hitherto unknown in the history of any preparation. Medical men and the public are offering conclusive testimony upon the value of Dr. Tibbles' Vi-Cocoa, and to show their confidence in the new preparation the proprietors make the unparelleled offer of a free test of merit, a dainty sample tin being sent gratis and post free to any addrees on mentioning SOLICITORS' JOURNAL. This offer is made because it sells Dr. Tibbles' Vi-Cocoa, the new preparation referred to; in fact, the sales are increasing to such an extent that additional manufacturing facilities have had to be made. Dr. Tibbles' Vi-Cocoa, 6d., 9d. and 1s. 6d. Can be obtained from all Chemists, Grocers and Stores, or from 60, 61, and 62, Bunhill Row, London E.C. Number of Accounts, 85,094. TWO-AND-A-HALF per CENT. INTEREST allowed on DEPOSITS, repayable on demand. TWO per CENT. on CURRENT ACCOUNTS, on the minimum monthly balances, when not drawn below £100. sold for customers. STOCKS, SHARES, and ANNUITIES purchased and SAVINGS DEPARTMENT. Small Deposits received, and Interest allowed monthly on each completed £1. The BIRKBECK ALMANACK, with particulars, post free. FRANCIS RAVENSCROFT, Manager. Telephone No. 5, HOLBORN. Telegraphic Address: "BIRKBECK, LONDON." SPECIALTIES FOR INVALIDS. ESSENCE OF BEEF, BEEF TEA, MEAT JUICE, &c., Prepared from finest ENGLISH MEATS Of all Chemists and Grocers. BRAND & CO., LTD., MAYFAIR, W., & MAYFAIR WORKS, VAUXHALL, LONDON, S.W. LONSDALE PRINTING WORKS, LONSDALE BUILDINGS, 27, CHANCERY LANE. ALEXANDER & SHEPHEARD PRINTERS and PUBLISHERS. BOOKS, PAMPHLETS, MAGAZINES. NEWSPAPERS & PERIODICALS. And all General and Commercial Work. Every description of Printing-large or small. Printers of THE SOLICITORS' JOURNAL Newspaper. Authors advised with as to Printing and Publishing. Estimates and all information furnished. Contracts entered into. S. FISHER. 188, Strand. DIAMONDS, PEARLS, GOLD JEWELLERY, PLATE MEDALS EST: 1772 Diamond Merchants FROM &c. VALUED PURCHASED OR EXCHANGED 1& 2 GRACECHURCH SI LONDON £5 TO $10,000. Valuations FOR THE + LEGAL + PROFESSION PROBATE, &c. PROMPTITUDE. LOW CHARGES. Proposal Forms and full information may be had at the Society's Offices. MIDLAND RAILWAY HOTELS. LIVERPOOL LEEDS DERBY MORECAMBE ADELPHI For Peak of Derbyshire. FUNDS ESTABLISHED OVER HALF A CENTURY. 10, FLEET STREET, LONDON. SYSTEM LIFE ASSURANCE. AND SECURE. VOL. XLII., No. 40. The Solicitors' Journal and Reporter. LONDON, AUGUST 6, 1898. LEGAL NEWS.................................... 705 Cases Reported this Week. In the Solicitors' Journal. Plaskett v. Eddis Riley v. Hall 702 703 ON TUESDAY last the Companies Act, 1867, Amendment (No. 2) Bill received the Royal Assent. The passing of this measure, the provisions of which will be found stated ante, p. 666, is due to the initiative of the Council of the Incorporated Law Society, and it may be added that it is one of the benefits which the profession have derived from the skill and energy of the late president, Mr. GODDARD, to whom no small acknowledgment is due for his mode of discharge of the duties of his office. THE REPEAL, by the Finance Act, 1898, of section 57, subsection 9, of the Taxes Management Act, 1880, will be received with general satisfaction. The sub-section in question prohibited the hearing by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, on an appeal to them from the assessment of a surveyor, of any "barrister, solicitor, attorney, or any person practising the law"; the prohibition applied equally to appearances on behalf of the appellant or on behalf of the surveyor or assessor, and it is now removed in both cases. The extreme difficulty of many of the cases determined by the commissioners, and the importance of the questions involved, make it extremely desirable that the parties should, if they desired it, instruct solicitors or counsel to plead for them. And, apart from this consideration, it is very doubtful whether any real economy is effected, or any good purpose served, by imposing such a disability as that which has now been abolished in the case of these appeals. Parties will be far more likely to be contented with the decision of the commissioners or other like tribunal if they know that their case has been set out with the skill and fulness which only the knowledge and practice of the law can insure, and will be less Mellor, The Right Hon. John W., Q.C., disposed to carry an adverse decision to a higher tribunal. In " other lay individuals. We are glad to notice this tendency intimation, however, was sent to the Kensington branch, and towards removing prohibitions as to the employment of skilled the cheque was not dispatched to them until Wednesday afterlegal advice; the prohibition still remains as to arbitrations noon. Under these circumstances BIGHAM, J., held that the under section 9 of the Local Government Act, 1894, respecting defendants, by failing to comply with the rules of the Clearingthe compulsory taking of land by parish and district councils; house, had in effect represented to the Kensington branch on but here the Local Government Board has a dispensing power the Wednesday morning that the cheque for £307 would be which we hope is freely exercised. paid, and that the Kensington branch had on the faith of this representation paid the acceptance for £65. Consequently the defendants were liable for this amount. The rapidity of banking business does not, apparently, allow much chance for change of mind. DECISIONS upon section 3 of the Judicial Trustees Act, 1896, usually depend too much upon the discretion of the court as applied to the circumstances of the particular case for it to be possible to extract any rules from them; but the case of Re Grindey, in which the Court of Appeal have just affirmed the decision of KEKEWICH, J., granting relief to trustees, appears to suggest that, where the sum involved is small, trustees will be safe in adopting a business view of the meaning of the trust instrument, whatever its strict legal construction may be. A testator who died in 1892 had, two years previously, advanced £166, and had taken for it a promissory note payable on demand. By his will he directed his trustees to retain his property for a specified period in the same state of investment as it was in at the time of his death. The interest on the promissory note was paid till the time of the testator's death, and no suspicions were entertained as to the credit of the borrower. The trustees treated the advance as an investment and refrained from calling it in. In 1894 the borrower died insolvent and the trustees recovered only a small dividend on the debt. The question then arose whether they were entitled to relief under the Act for not having called in the money before. Strictly speaking, it would seem that the advance could hardly be considered as an "investment," though on this point the Court of Appeal gave It was held that upon the terms of the will a business man would be justified in regarding it as such, and hence as being within the direction given by the testator. To obtain relief it is necessary that the court shall be of opinion that the trustees have acted "honestly and reasonably, and ought fairly to be excused for the breach of trust and for omitting to obtain the directions of the court." The former part of the requirement was accordingly satisfied, and as to the latter it was sufficient that an application to the court would have run away with a large part of the sum in question. The decision will be valuable if it is to be taken as establishing that in small matters trustees may act upon the fair business meaning of the trust instrument without applying to the court. no decision. CONSIDERING the vast amount of business transacted between banks in clearing cheques, disputes as to liability are of very rare occurrence. One such has just been decided by BIGHAM, J., in the case of Parr's Bank (Limited) v. Thomas Ashby & Co. The defendants are bankers at Staines, having for their London agents WILLIAMS, DEACON, & Co. The plaintiffs have a branch bank at Kensington. In 1897 A., who had an account at the Kensington branch, formed his business into the B. company. On Saturday, the 30th of October, A. paid into his account at the Kensington branch a cheque for £307, drawn by the B. company on the defendants' bank. In the ordinary course this was sent to the head office of PARR's Bank, and on the Monday was handed to WILLIAMS, DEACON, & Co. at the Clearing-house. By them it was sent to THOMAS ASHBY & Co. at Staines, reaching there on Tuesday. According to the rules of the Clearing-house THOMAS ASHBY & Co., if they intended to dishonour the cheque, should have forthwith intimated this to their London agents, and should at the same time have returned the cheque direct to the Kensington branch. Thus it would have been known at Kensington on Wednesday morning that the cheque was to be dishonoured, and from non-return of the cheque it would be inferred that it had been honoured. On Wednesday the cheque had not been received at Kensington, and acting upon the natural inference the bank manager treated the £307 as safe, and out of it met A.'s acceptance due that day for £65. The natural inference, however, was not in accordance with the facts. The Staines bank on Tuesday wrote their London agents that the cheque would be paid, but early on Wednesday morning wired them that it would not. No AN IMPORTANT decision was given last week by the Court of Appeal, in the case of Pethick v. The County Council of Dorsetshire, on the liability to pay for damage caused by "extraordinary traffic." Section 23 of the Highways and Locomotives Act, 1878, puts this liability upon the person "by whose order" the extraordinary traffic on a road has been conducted. The difficulty which is constantly arising in practice is to construe the words "by whose order." The point was fully considered almost exactly a year ago by the House of Lords in The Kent County Council v. Lord Gerard (45 W. R. 531; 1897, A. C. 633). In that case the respondent contracted with several persons to deliver to him large quantities of building materials.. The price to be paid included the cost of carriage, and the property in the materials was not to pass to the respondent until they had been delivered to and accepted by him. There was a great divergence of opinion amongst the judges of the Queen's Bench Division and of the Court of Appeal as to whether or not Lord GERARD was liable for the damage done to the highway by the carriage of these materials. The House of Lords, however, decided unanimously that he was not the person by whose order the traffic had been conducted, and consequently that he was not liable under the Act. Lord HERSCHELL said: "The contention of the appellants amounts to this-that by whose order the traffic is conductod' must be interpreted as meaning 'at whose instance' or 'for whose benefit' the traffic is conducted. That might or might not have been expedient legislation, but at any rate, to my mind, that is not the legislation to be found in the enactment." In all their judgments the noble lords seem to have been influenced by the fact that until the materials were delivered on Lord GERARD's premises, the property in them did not pass to him, and he had nothing whatever to do with the mode of delivery. Thus Lord DAVEY said: "The traffic was being conducted by the order of the person to whom the goods at the time belonged, at whose risk and under whose control these goods were being carried." The recent case goes somewhat beyond this. The facts were that P. had contracted to construct a very large building, and had made a contract with T. to do all the hauling of the materials required. This hauling admittedly amounted to extraordinary traffic, and caused considerable damage to certain main roads; the question was whether or not P. was liable to make good the damage, T. having become bankrupt. The court held that P. was not liable, as he had given no order, and his contract with T. did not amount to such order. Here, therefore, the traffic was not being conducted by the order of the person to whom the goods belonged, and the property did not pass on the completion of the haulage. T seems to have had no interest in the materials whatever beyond the obligation to carry them safely from one point to another. It appears, therefore, that the words "by whose order" must be interpreted very literally, and that the question of liability reduces itself to the question, Whose servants were the drivers of the horses or traction engines by which the heavy weights were drawn? The employer of these men seems to be the person by whose order the traffic is conducted, and therefore the person liable to make good the damage to the roads. THE ATTEMPT to qualify agreements for the sale or leasing of land by introducing a clause stipulating for the preparation of a formal contract has been a fruitful source of litigation, and a new case is added to the long series of authorities by the recent decision of KEKEWICH, J., in North v. Percival (46 W. R. 552). The distinction between the cases where the stipulation is effectual to prevent the conclusion of a binding contract and the learned judge considered that the order had clearly fixed the allowance with reference to the whole year. The order, therefore, did not provide for an allowance at a certain rate per annum to be taken as accruing de die in diem, nor for a quarterly allowance at that rate; nor did it authorize payment in advance. That was a matter of arrangement between the committee of the estate and the committees of the person, and payment went on the footing that the lunatic should be maintained for the whole year, and on that footing was reasonable. The lunatic was in fact maintained for nine months altogether, and yet the committees were claiming to keep a whole year's allowance. The payments made to them were not made on that footing, and their claim, therefore, could not be sustained. Any difficulty arising from Re Ponsonby was met by ROMER, J.'s, treating it as confined to the ordinary case, where there was proper maintenance of the lunatic for the full year; and both that case and Grosvenor v. Drax are commented on by Lord CAIRNS, L.J., in Re French, in his important review of the authorities on the jurisdiction to order the committee of the person to account (see L. R. 3 Ch., at pp. 319, 320). those where it fails to have this result has been frequently quarterly or yearly allowance, and could not be so treated. But pointed out, but it is not a distinction which it is easy to apply in practice. According to the judgment of Lord WESTBURY, C., in Chinnock v. Marchioness of Ely (4 Do G. J. & S. p. 646), provided there is a final agreement, and the terms are evidenced in a manner to satisfy the Statute of Frauds, the agreement is binding, notwithstanding that the parties have declared that it is to serve only as instructions for a formal agreement, or although it may be an express term that a formal agreement shall be prepared and signed by the parties. If, on the other hand, to a proposal or an offer an assent be given subject to a provision as to a contract, then the stipulation as to a contract is a term of the assent, and there is no agreement independent of that stipulation. This statement, which was accepted by Lord CAIRNS, C., in Rossiter v. Miller (3 App. Cas. p. 1139), overlooks what is probably the real intention of the parties, and it would have conduced to simplicity | had the finality of the contract in all such cases been postponed till the execution of the formal instrument. The only object of referring to such an instrument is that the parties contemplate that subsidiary terms will have to be arranged before the negotiation is complete. With respect to leases, JESSEL, M.R., in Winn v. Bull (7 Ch. D. 29), admitted this to be the case, and he held that an agreement to take a house "subject to the preparation and approval of a formal contract" was not final. "Where," he said, "you have a proposal or agreement made in writing expressed to be subject to a formal contract being prepared, it means what it says; it is subject to and is dependent upon a formal contract being prepared." The reasoning of this passage applies of course equally to sales and leases, and could it be accepted as authoritative, the introduction of the words "subject to the preparation of a formal agreement " would be a sure protection to the party using them. In North v. Percival, however, similar words were used without effect. A document which professed to contain the heads of an agreement for the sale of land concluded as follows: "Subject to the approval of conditions and forms of agreement by purchaser's solicitor." According to the decision of KEKEWICH, J., this stipulation was not a condition precedent to a complete contract, and the purchaser was bound, although no formal agreement was ever prepared. Doubtless, upon the facts of the case, the decision was right, but it shews that the test proposed in Winn v. Bull is not conclusive, and the true effect of the stipulation in question in any particular case will usually be a matter of doubt. WHERE A fixed annual sum is ordered to be paid to the committee of the person for the maintenance of a lunatic, the committee is not bound to keep accounts, and, as a general rule, will not be ordered to account: see Re French (16 W. R. 657, L. R. 3 Ch. 317). In Re Ponsonby (8 Dru. & War. 27, 31, 2 Connor & L. 30, 32), Lord ST. LEONARDS said that the law would seem to give the savings in such a case to the committee, referring to Grosvenor v. Drax (2 Knapp 82), where the Privy Council, reversing Lord BROUGHAM's opinion, refused the representative of a lunatic an account against the committee. In Strangways v. Read (ante, p. 654), before ROMER, J., a fixed annual allowance ordered to be paid to the committees of the person had been paid quarterly in advance, and the lunatic died in the first month of the fourth quarter, and after the usual quarterly sum had been paid in advance to the committees. They nevertheless claimed to be entitled to retain the whole amount so paid to them as against the personal representatives of the lunatic, in reliance on the doctrine of the above-mentioned cases. It was not alleged that the lunatic had not been properly maintained, and, this being the case, it was said that there was no ground for ordering the committees to account. Whatever they saved from the maintenance allowance they could keep for their own benefit. This raised the question of the true construction of an order allowing so much money per annum for maintenance, and the decision really turned on the meaning and intention of the order. It had been argued for the personal representatives that the allowance ought to be treated as accruing de die in diem and as being apportionable accordingly on the death of the lunatic, while the committees claimed that it was a THE decision recently given by the Court of Appeal in Warren v. Moore illustrates the danger incurred by a vendor who undertakes to sell property to which he has not completed his title. The rule upon the subject was clearly laid down by Lord ROMILLY, M.R., in Forrer v. Nash (35 Beav. 167), where he said that, when a person sells property which he is neither able to convey himself, nor of which he has the power to compel a conveyance from any other person, the purchaser, as soon as he finds this to be the case, can decline to proceed with the matter. He is not bound to wait to see whether some third person, who haз the power, can join in making a good title. The principle was applied in Bellamy v. Debenham (39 W. R. 257; 1891, 1 Ch. 412) where enfranchised copyholds in which the minerals were reserved to the lord were sold as freehold. At the time when the vendor should have been ready to convey the property, the lord's rights had not been got in, and, although this was subsequently done, the purchaser was held justified in repudiating his bargain. Similarly, in Re Bryant and Barningham's Contract (38 W. R. 469, 44 Ch. D. 218) trustees who had contracted to sell without having any present power of sale were not allowed to force upon the purchaser a title derived from the tenant for life. In Warren v. Moore a free lease of a public-house was held by a brewery company for a term of which sixty-five years were unexpired. There was a tied sub-lease for forty years. The sub-lessee contracted to sell the whole lease for sixty-five years as a free lease, and in the subsequent negotiations the solicitors of the company stated that the company would free the lease and would join in the assignment. Practically this was a sufficient assurance that the sub-lessee would be able to give what he had sold; but the Court of Appeal held that there was nothing in the solicitors' statement which was legally binding on the company, and hence the purchaser was entitled, according to the settled rule, to repudiate the contract and recover his deposit. THE LETTER of our recent correspondent "W. N." (ante, p. 668) refers to a practice prevailing in the county courts, but certainly not sanctioned either by the County Courts Act, 1888, or by the existing County Court Rules, of withdrawing a summons issued against a defendant on his paying the plaint fee and part of the debt, and agreeing to pay the balance by instalments. When such a course is adopted, the plaintiff is entirely at the mercy of the defendant, whose subsequent default in paying the agreed instalments cannot, it appears, be made the subject of a fresh summons, as such a splitting of demands is contrary to the spirit of the County Courts Act, 1888, which indeed expressly forbids a plaintiff to divide any cause of action for the purpose of bringing two or more actions in any of the courts (section 81). The proper method of procedure, however, applicable where the parties to a county court action agree, before trial, upon the amount of the debt or demand in respect of which a plaint shall have been entered, and upon the terms and conditions upon which the same shall be paid and satisfied, is prescribed by section 99 of the County |