NEW ORDERS, &c. THE LAND TRANSFER ACT, 1897. (a.) In respect of the average rent 2s. for every £10 a year, and (b.) In respect of the premium (if any) the same fee on its amount as above prescribed for a transfer for value of land. Provided that no greater fee than £10 be paid in any case. (D.) For entry of first proprietorship of land with an absolute or Three times the fee prescribed for registration of a possessory title, with a minimum fee of £3. At the Court at Windsor, the 18th day of July, 1898. Present: The qualified title:- Pursuant to the 20th section of the Land Transfer Act, 1897, Her Registration of title to land is to be compulsory on sale in the several portions of the county mentioned in the first column of the Schedule hereto, on and after the respective days mentioned in the second column of the same Schedule. In this Order "parish" means a place for which a separate poorrate is or can be made, or for which a separate overseer is or can be appointed, and the boundaries of each such parish shall be those constituted and limited at the date of this Order. This Order may be amended or added to or repealed by Order in Council. THE SCHEDULE. (B.) For registration of transmissions, and of transfers not for value (including exchanges), notices of leases, rectifications of the Register under the 95th section of the Act cf 1875, and entries and corrections under Rules 97 and 117: One-quarter of the above fees, according to the capital value of the interest dealt with, with a minimum of 1s. and a maximum of £5. (C.) For entry of first proprietorship of leasehold land on the occasion of the original grant of the lease; for entry of first proprietorship of freehold land with a possessory title on the occasion of a grant, wholly or partly in consideration of a rent; and for registration of the transferee on a transfer of freehold land on a like occasion: prior to registration, and of a transfer or transmission thereof :- The same fee as for registration of a charge or of a transfer or required by the Acts or Rules to be issued free of charge :- Where the value of the land or charge does not ... £ s. d. ... 0 10 0 1 0 0 2 0 0 £1,000 Register, except where such alteration is required by the Acts or (G.) For altering a land certificate to correspond with the Rules to be made free of charge : Half the fee for a certificate. (H.) For registering an inhibition For entering notice of an estate in dower or by the ... ... For preparing or settling a statement for the Court ... ... ... ... ... 0 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 ... 0 10 0 For an entry negativing or altering implied covenants, ... ... ... For entering an additional address for service... ... ... ... 0 5 0 0 10 0 050 0 50 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 5 0 For noting the determination of a lease, or of an For every notice under the Registry stamp ... ... ... 660 003 0 0 3 ... Such charges, according to time and labour employed, as the Registrar shall from time to time authorize. RULES. 1. The above fees include, in the matters to which they relate, all necessary stationery and mapping done in the Registry; the preparation, issue, endorsement, and deposit of certificates wherever such issue, endorsement, or deposit is obligatory; discharges of incumbrances; the filing of auxiliary documents (if any); and all other necessary costs of and incidental to the completion of each registration or transaction. They also include, in districts where registration of title is compulsory, any surveying that may be necessary to enable the land to be identified on the ordnance map. 2. Where an application for first registration with absolute title is fee may be made as the Registrar may deem reasonable, under the completed with a qualified title only, such abatement (if any) in the circumstances of the case. into title are exclusive of the fees of conveyancing counsel, 3. The fees payable in respect of any matter involving an inquiry and of any costs or expenses incurred by the Registry in regard to the matter. 4. Where land, already registered with a possessory title, is to be registered with a qualified or an absolute title; or where land, already registered with a qualified title, is to be registered with an absolute title, the Registrar may make such abatement (if any) in. the fee as he shall deem reasonable. 5. The fee for an entry in, or withdrawal from the Register affecting several titles whereof the same person is registered as proprietor, shall be the same as for an application respecting one title only. In other cases an extra fee of 2s. 6d. shall be charged for every title affected after the first. 6. Where a transfer for value and a charge are registered together only half the fee shall be paid in respect of the charge. 7. Where an application is made by post, the fee may be paid by banker's draft, or by postal or post office order, or in Bank of England notes. 8. The fee for the first registration of leasehold land shall include the entry of a notice of the lease against the lessor's title, if registered. 9. When a transfer of freehold land in consideration of a rent, or a transfer by which mines and minerals are dealt with separately, is registered, the fee shall not include the registration of the proprietor of the rent, or of the severed land or mines and minerals respectively, as the case may be, for which a separate fee shall be payable as on a transfer of land. 10. The fee payable for registration of proprietorship of an incumbrance, if made on the first registration of land, shall be reduced to one quarter of the fee above prescribed. 11. The fee for every entry of, and in respect of, a caution, inhibition or restriction, condition, note or notice of any kind, shall not be payable when such entry is made on the first registration of land, or on any registration for which an ad valorem fee is payable. 12. The amount of an average rent for the purposes of these fees shall be ascertained in the same manner as for the purposes of Inland Revenue Stamp Duty. 13. Where a charge or incumbrance is also secured on unregistered land as well as on registered land, an abatement in the fee shall be made, proportional to the value of the unregistered land as compared with the value of the whole security. 14. The word "land" includes both freehold and leasehold land, and every hereditament the title to which may be registered under the Land Transfer Acts. 15. When boundaries are to be noted on the Register as accurately defined, such additional charges may be made for mapping and surveying as the Registrar shall in each case direct. 16. Where land is transferred subject to charges or incumbrances, no deduction from the value of the land is to be made in respect thereof, except where the transfer is to a mortgagee, in which case the value of the equity of redemption shall be taken to be the value of the land. CASES OF THE WEEK. Court of Appeal. A. L. SMITH, L.J., said that sub-section 5 of section 35 could not be pressed into the service and construed as a general provision not limited to boroughs with a population of 10,000 and upwards. The Legislature had dealt differently with quarter sessions boroughs having a population of 10,000, and quarter sessions boroughs having a smaller population. 7 of section 38 they could petition Her Majesty to revoke the grant of a The smaller boroughs were not without a remedy, because by sub-section court of quarter sessions and also a grant of a commission of the peace. In his opinion the decision in Ex parte Kent County Council and Borough of Sandwich was wrong. As regards the salary of the clerk to the borough justices in petty sessions, section 84 of the Act of 1888 did not tranfer the obligation of paying his salary on to the county council. That section dealt with salaried clerks of county petty sessional divisions and not with salaried clerks of borough petty sessional divisions. Therefore the plaintiffs were liable to pay the salary of their own clerk to their own borough petty sessions. In his opinion the decision in Re Herefordshire County Council was wrong. RIGBY, L.J., read a judgment to the same effect. VAUGHAN WILLIAMS, L.J., also read a judgment agreeing with the above, saying that upon consideration he had come to the conclusion that his decision in Ex parte Kent County Council and Borough of Sandwich was wrong.-COUNSEL, Crump, Q.C., Rufus Isaacs, Q.C., and Le Riche; Sir R. T. Reid, Q.C., and W. Wills. SOLICITORS, Ford, Lloyd, Bartlett, & Michelmore, for J. Houchen, Thetford; Sharpe, Parker, & Co., for C. Foster, Norwich. [Reported by W. F. BARRY, Barrister-at-Law.] Re J. BATT & CO.'S TRADE-MARKS. No 2. 13th and 22nd July. GOODS IN WHICH THE PERSON REGISTERING DOES NOT DEAL AND HAS NO This was an appeal by Mr. Kottgen, trading as John Batt & Co., from a LINDLEY, M.R., read the judgment of the court as follows: One trademark, No. 27,850, was registered in July, 1882, in the name of J. Batt & Co., for several classes of goods, including class 42. The other trademark, No. 72,790, was registered in August, 1888, in the same name, for class 42 alone. Both trade-marks consisted of a butterfly with open wings. Class 42 was as follows: "Substances used as food or as ingredients in food." It includes cereals. Messrs. James Carter & Co., the well-known seed merchants, applied to register a butterfly with closed wings for oats, which were comprised in class 42. The Comptroller refused to register this as there were already on the register the butterflies CORPORATION OF THETFORD v. NORFOLK COUNTY COUNCIL. No.1. of J. Batt & Co. for class 42. Thereupon Messrs. Carter & Co. applied to 25th July. expunge these marks. The main ground for expunging them, and for the decision of the learned judge, was that J. Batt & Co. never dealt in goods in class 42, and were not justified in registering any trade-mark for goods in that class. The appeal was based on two grounds-(1) that the evidence did not warrant the conclusion of fact arrived at by the learned judge, and (2) that, even if the fact was as he stated, such fact was not sufficient to entitle the court to remove the marks from the register. As regards the fact of user, everything depends on the evidence of Mr. Kottgen. He carried on business in the name of John Batt & Co., and he registered the marks in question. He said he was an exporter of and dealer in every kind of goods, including articles of food. But in crossexamination he refused to give any information as to the kind of goods in class 42 which he exported or dealt in. He said in re-examination that he had exported or dealt in confectionery, biscuits, and butter. It came out clearly that he never exported or dealt in oats. But he intended to export or deal in anything he could. His demeanour in the witnesstory witness, and was not to be relied upon when he spoke of the user of his trade-marks in connection with any goods comprised in class 42. His manager, Greimer, has made an affidavit stating, like his master, that J. Batt & Co.'s business extended to goods comprised in class 42, but giving no instances, and after his master's cross-examination it was not thought necessary to cross-examine Greimer. There was one other piece of evidence of very great importance, which was that J. Batt & Co. had a large number of trade-marks, and that the register contained no less than 169 entries in their name. Stevens, a member of the firm, had offered all these except fourteen for sale, and the fourteen not for sale did not include any registered mark applicable to class 42. Under these circumstances we are unable to come to the conclusion that LOCAL GOVERNMENT-COUNTY COUNCIL-BOROUGH UNDER 10,000 HAVING SEPARATE QUARTER SESSIONS-COSTS OF SESSIONS-LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT, 1888 (51 & 52 VICT. c. 41) ss. 35, 38, 84. Appeal by the plaintiffs and cross appeal by the defendants, from the judgment of Wills, J., at the trial of the action. The borough of Thetford contained a population of less than 10,000, and was situate, for administrative purposes, in the county of Norfolk. It had a separate court of quarter sessions, presided over by a recorder, and a clerk of the peace, both of whose salaries before and since the Local Government Act, 1888, were paid out of the borough fund. The borough had also a separate court of petty sessions, and the clerk to the borough justices in petty sessions was paid a salary out of the borough fund. The plaintiffs claimed a declaration that under section 38 of the Local Government Act, 1888, the liability to pay the salaries of the recorder, the clerk of the peace, and the clerk to the borough justices in petty sessions, was trans-box was such as to lead Romer, J., to say that he was a very unsatisfacferred to the county council, and they claimed to be reimbursed the salaries so paid by them. Wills, J., refusing to follow the decision of a divisional court (Stephen and Vaughan Williams, JJ) in Ex parte Kent County Council and Borough of Sandwich (1891, 1 Q. B. 389, 39 W. R. Dig. 114), held that the obligation to pay the salaries of the recorder and of the clerk of the peace were not transferred to the county council, but, following the decision in R Herefordshire County Council (1895, 1 Q. B. 43, 43 W. R. Dig. 101), that the salary of the clerk to the justices in petty sessions was so transferred. By section 35 of the Local Government Act, 1888, in the case of the quarter sessions of boroughs, not being county boroughs, containing a population of 10,000 or upwards, the following provisions shall apply: (5) "The payment of the costs of assizes and sessions stall be a general county purpose for which the parishes in the borough may be assessed to county contributions, and all costs of prosecutions mentioned in section 169 of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882, shall be paid out of the county fund." Section 38 applied to boroughs having a separate court of quarter sessions and containing a population of less than 10,000, but there was no provision similar to that in sub-section 5 of section 35. THE COURT (A. L. SMITH, RIGBY, and VAUGHAN WILLIAMS, L.JJ.) dismissed the appeal and allowed the cross-appeal. the learned judge was wrong in his view of the facts. This brings us to the question of law. We will assume that Mr. Kottgen, when he obtained registration of his marks, was a general exporter and dealer, exporting and dealing in goods of various descriptions, but not, in fact, exporting or dealing in goods in class 42, although ready to do so if opportunity offered. We will assume, further, that he has always been, and is still, ready to do so, but that he has not even yet exported or dealt in any goods in that class except confectionary, biscuits, and butter, which exception we will assume in his favour. A question of JACOB v. JACOB. No. 2. 22nd July. will, dated the 25th of July, 1832, devised certain specific property to LINDLEY, M.R., said: We do not see our way out of the authorities in law then arises, which may be stated shortly as follows. Can a man properly register a trade-mark for goods in which he does not deal or intend to deal; meaning by intending to deal, having at the time of registration some definite and present intention to deal in certain goods, or descriptions of goods, and not a mere general intention of extending his business at some future time to anything which he may think desirable? This question we answer in the negative. To answer it otherwise will be unduly to strain the language of the Acts relating to trade-marks, and to render those Acts extremely mischievous instead of beneficial to trade and commerce. The Trade-Mark Registration Acts presuppose some business or trade in some kind of goods made, sold, or otherwise dealt with in the way of business. Although section 75 of the Act of 1883 said that "registration of a trade-mark shall be equivalent to public use of the trade-mark" this language, even when in force, did not and could not mean that continued registration was equivalent to continued user. So to construe the language would lead to the irrational conclusion that a man might properly register a trade-mark for any goods he chose, although he carried on no trade or business in them at all. Such a person if properly on the register might then object to anybody else registering that mark (see section 72) without buying him off. Section 75 was addressed to the time of registration; it substituted registration for previous user and reputation gained by it. The corresponding section of the prior Act of 1875 (viz., section 2) was discussed in Edwards v. Dennis, Re Edwards' Trade-mark (30 Ch. D. 454), and the contention that the language of that section meant more than we have stated was emphatically repudiated by the Court of Appeal, although it had found favour in the court below. That decision fairly looked at really governs this case in principle. It is true that in Edwards v. Dennis the court had to deal with the assignee of a trade-mark; but the rights acquired by his assignor on registration were very carefully examined, and Bacon, V.C., at p. 465, and also Cotton, L.J., on p. 474, and I myself, on pp. 476, 477, all expressed clear opinions that the assignor had no right to register his trade-mark for goods with which he had no concern. Fry, L.J., went less fully into this question, but it is plain that his view was the same (see p. 479). The Act of 1883 must of course be looked at to see whether its language has rendered it necessary to come to a different conclusion on this point, and we have looked at it carefully, but we cannot find that it has. Section 75 of the Act of 1883, on which Mr. Levett based his argument, was repealed by section 17 of the Act of 1888, and that section, which is retrospective, makes "application for registration" instead of "registration "equivalent to public use. This alteration makes it still plainer than before that the public use referred to is not use since registration, but use and reputation at the time of application. Section 65 of the Act of 1883 says that " a trade-mark must be registered for particular goods or classes of goods." This leaves open the question what goods or classes of goods are referred to. Does the section refer to goods or classes of goods which the applicant for a registered mark makes or deals in or intends to make or deal in in the sense above explained, or does it refer to goods or classes of goods which he does not make or deal in, and which he has no definite intention of making or dealing in? Common sense and Edwards v. Dennis (ubi supra) concur in confining the goods or classes of goods to those which a man makes or deals in or intends to make or deal in when he applies for registration. It remains only to consider whether section 90 of the Act of 1883 (the rectification section) is applicable to this case. We are of opinion that it is. That section provides that "the court may on the application of any person aggrieved by the omission without sufficient cause of the name of any person from any register kept under this Act, or by any entry made without sufficient cause in any such register, make such order for making expunging or varying the entry as the court thinks fit." The applicants are parties aggrieved; for the trade-mark they desire to have registered is kept off the register by reason of the presence on it of the marks of J. Batt & Co. The entry of these marks is " an entry made without sufficient cause in the register." We are not disposed to put a narrow construction on this expression; nor to read it as if the word "made" were the all-important word, and as if the words "made without sufficient cause" must be read as if they were "made without sufficient cause at the time of registration," so as to be confined to that precise time. If any entry is at any time on the register without sufficient cause, however it got there, it ought, in our opinion, to be treated as covered by the words of the section. Its continuance there can answer no legitimate purpose; its existence is purely baneful to trade and, in our opinion, in the case supposed the court has power to expunge or vary it. But however this section is construed, the present case falls well within it. It may be said that this decision may impose undue restrictions on the acquisition of trade-marks by general dealers in goods of many sorts. We do not, however, believe it will fetter legitimate trade. A man can always apply to register a mark or marks as he really wants them. But if a man procures a mark to be registered for goods in which he does not deal, either when he applies for registration or within a reasonable time afterwards, he does so at his peril (to use Fry, L.J.'s expression), and he exposes himself to the risk of having his mark expunged or varied, and of having the monopoly conferred by registration restricted to his legitimate requirements. The trade-mark 72,790 is confined to goods in class 42, and the learned judge was right in expunging that entry. The trade-devised. Does the direction to pay debts include mortgage debts? If mark 27,850 ought to be expunged as to goods in class 42, but on the evidence before us there is no reason for expunging it from the register as regards other goods. The order ought to be corrected in this respect. But this variation, which rectifies what is probably a slip made in drawing up the order, will not affect the appeal, which must be dismissed with costs.-COUNSEL, Levett, Q.C., and Sebastian; Neville, Q.C., and J. Austen Cartmell; Ingle Joyce. SOLICITORS, Shepheards; Mann & Taylor; Solicitor for Board of Trade. [Reported by R. C. MACKENZIE, Barrister-at-Law.] CHITTY, L.J., said: I am of the same opinion. It is now sixty years since the great change made in the law by the Wills Act of 1837, but the old law, as it stood before that Act, has still occasionally to be applied. The old law was strict and logical, and it is quite plain that conferred by the statutes of Henry 8 as to testamentary disposition of this doctrine we are now considering arose from the limited powers real estate. I think that the decision of Kindersley, V.C., stands as an authority, and that we cannot at this time of day interfere with it. If distinction, though perhaps, in the circumstances, it would not have very we did we should simply be creating some new refinement or subtle much operation. Still, there may be some subsequent cases of the same sort; and I would rather leave the law as it was decided to be at least sixty years ago." St. John Clerke, and Bailhache; Grosvenor Woods, Q.C., and Methold. COLLINS, L.J., concurred.-COUNSEL, Cozens-Hardy, Q.C., Jenkins, Q.C., SOLICITORS, Warriner & Co., for Llewellyn & Moore, Newport; Hier Jacob. [Reported by R. C. MACKENZIE, Barrister-at-Law.] High Court-Chancery Division. Re ALLEN. BASSET v. ALLEN. North, J. 21st July. MORTGAGE-ESTATE SPECIFICALLY DEVISED-LOCKE KING'S ACT-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. The testator made a will in 1854 and a codicil in 1855 specifically devising certain real property to his widow for life with remainder to his two sons equally, and in other respects confirmed his will. By his will he directed payment of his debts. The testator had become entitled to the equity of redemption, subject to a mortgage for £3,000, in certain property, part of which he devised by his codicil. In 1865 the £3,000 was paid off out of the proceeds of the sale of residue. The widow under the testator's will was equitable tenant for life. The questions now raised were (1) was the £3,000 payable out of residue, or in part out of the property specifically devised; and (2) if payable out of the property specifically devised, had the Statute of Limitations run? The widow died in 1895, and it was argued that while she lived the Statute of Limitations had no application. NORTH, J.-The will was before the original Locke King's Act, and if there had been no codicil, there would have been no question. The codicil confirms the will except as regards the property specifically the testator had died before the Act came into operation, the debts would have been payable out of personal estate and not out of property specifically devised. But the testator made a codicil confirming the will, and that had the same effect as if he had made a new will in the same words as the old one. The later Act only applies after 1867. The residuary estate, and not the estate specifically bequeathed, has to bear the testator's own debts, but the £3,000 is not a debt of the testator, who only took an equity of redemption, and was under no personal liability to pay, so that the directions to pay debts had no application. The question whether the Statute of Limitations applied was then argued. Topham v. Booth (35 Ch. D. 607) and Re England (1895, 2 Ch. 820) were cited. NORTH, J.-In my opinion Re England applies. The whole estate was charged with the debt. In 1865 the residuary estate was sold and the £3,000 paid, and nothing was done to keep alive the charge of part of the £3,000 upon the estate specifically devised. The widow died in 1895, and the question is, Whether the £3,000, which was wholly paid out of residue, ought not to have been paid in part out of the estate which was specifically devised? It is suggested there was something equivalent to payment of interest, but I do not see how anything of the sort is made out in this case. The widow was under no obligation to pay the interest upon the sum that she was not compelled to pay. I think that the Statute of Limitations is a bar to the recovery of any sum now.-COUNSEL, E. P. Hewitt, Ingpen; Vernon Smith, Q.C., Smith, Attwater. SOLICITORS, Preston, Stow, & Preston (for E. P. Berridge, Leicester); J. T. Rossiter. [Reported by G. B. HAMILTON, Barrister-at-Law.] upon his premises he is bound to keep it there at his own peril, but there is an exception to that rule there laid down-namely, that where a man uses his land in an ordinary and reasonable manner and damage ensues to his neighbour without wilfulness or negligence, no action lies. I think the case comes within this exception. Here there was a usual and reasonable user of the house, and if water escape without any negligence on the part of the owner, then, as between the owner and the occupier, the owner is not liable. Then there is another exception to the general rule as to the liability, that where the party has consented to the dangerous matter being brought to the premises, then he cannot recover. Here the plaintiffs may be said to have consented to the water being brought there and they consented to their own part of the premises being supplied with the water. Instances of these principles may be found in the cases of Carstairs v. Taylor, Ross v. Fedden (L. R. 7 Q. B. 661), and Gill v. Edouin (71 L. T. 762, and 72 L. T. 579). There is nothing here to shew that the defendant did not do all a man could do to have the defect remedied. He employed a competent plumber, but it has been said that if the work was done negligently then a person cannot defend himself from liability by shewing that he employed an independent contractor. I do not know of any case in which that doctrine is established. The ordinary doctrine is that a person is not liable for the acts of an independent contractor On these grounds I think that the judgment of the deputy judge in the court below cannot be sustained. DARLING, J., concurred.-COUNSEL, Ritter; H. Tindal Atkinson. SOLICITORS, H. Dade & Co.; Phelps, Sidgwick, & Biddle. [Reported by Sir SHERSTON BAKER, Bart., Barrister-at-Law.] Winding-up Cases. July. COMPANY-WINDING UP-STATEMENT IN PROSPECTUS-DIRECTOR'S LIABILITY. Application for a balance order against a Mr. Bartholomew, one of the directors of the company, the question being whether he was liable to be placed on the list of contributories as an ordinary shareholder by reason of statements made in the prospectus. The company was registered in September, 1893, under the Companies Acts. The articles of association contained these clauses amongst others: Clause 77, "Until otherwise determined by a general meeting the number of the directors shall not be less than three or more than 6. The following gentlemen shall be the first directors of the company-viz., Alfred Watson, James Moore, William Moore, Henry Blatch Wells, Melton Bartholomew, Robert Colman." Clause 78, "The qualification of every director shall be the holding of shares or stock of the company of the nominal value of £500." On the 28th of October, 1893, the directors held their first meeting, at which all the directors attended. From the minutes of that meeting it appeared that the draft prospectus was approved and settled and the secretary was instructed to place the same in the printer's hands. The prospectus, which invited applications for preference and debenture capital, so approved, stated that the capital of the company was "1,500 ordinary shares of £20 each (the whole of which will be taken by the directors) 750 £6 per cent. preference shares of £20 each and 300 £5 per cent. debentures of £50 each. It also gave the names and addresses of the six directors and stated, amongst other things, "The vendors after discharging every liability up to the date of purchase will re-invest the whole of the purchase-money in the company principally in the ordinary stock, on which they will receive no dividend until the £5 per cent. interest on the debentures and the £6 per cent. dividend on the preference shares have been paid. Seeing that, with the other directors, they take the whole of the ordinary shares, investors have the best possible assurance that every effort will be made to ensure the prosperity of the company's business.' Neither Messrs. Watson, Wells, Colman, or Bartholomew were ever placed on the register of members of the company, nor were ordinary shares allotted Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the deputy judge sitting at the City of London Court. The defendant was the owner of a certain house and premises in the City, and the plaintiffs were tenants of a certain part of the house, consisting of the basement and the ground Re MOORE BROTHERS & CO. (LIM.). Wright, J. 9th June and 19th floor, which they had taken from the defendant as the landlord. The water for the whole house was supplied from the defendant's (the landlord's) cistern at the top of the premises, and the plaintiffs took the premises after the water was laid on, and they took their supply of water from the defendant's cistern. On a certain Friday the plaintiffs discovered that there was a leakage of water from the cistern, and that there was an escape of water therefrom. On the same day they gave notice to their landlord (the defendant) that the cistern leaked and requested him to have it set right. The defendant, on receiving this notice on the Friday, went to an independent and competent plumber and employed him to set the matter right. The plumber came and did something to the cistern, but was negligent in what he did, with the result that the leakage became worse, and when the premises were opened on the Monday the plaintiffs' place was found to be flooded and their goods damaged. The plaintiffs then brought this action against their landlord and claimed the sum of £15 for the damage so caused by the flooding from the cistern. The deputy judge found that there was no negligence on the part of the defendant in employing the plumber he went to, although he did not know him, and he found that the damage was in fact caused by this plumber not having made the cistern right on the Friday when he was called in, and that in fact he did not get rid of the mischief. The deputy judge held that when the landlord received notice of the leakage on the Friday it became his duty to take means to remedy it, and that it was his absolute duty to have it remedied, and that, not having remedied it, it was his own fault and that he was liable; and he accordingly gave judgment for the plaintiffs on the question of liability for an amount to be afterwards ascertained by the registrar, with leave to the defendant to appeal. The defendant now appealed. For the defendant it was now contended that upon the facts there was no evidence of any negligence on the part of the defendant; that he had gone to an independent contractor, who was a competent plumber, and instructed him to set the matter right; and, although this plumber may have been guilty of negligence, the defendant was not liable for the negligence of an independent contractor: Carstairs v. Taylor (L. R. 6 Ex. 217) and Rylands v. Fletcher (L. R. 3 H. L. 330). For the plaintiffs it was contended that the defendant, having this water on his premises, was bound to take reasonable care to keep it safely, and that, as between himself and his tenants, he was bound, when he received notice that the cistern was out of repair, to put it in repair, and that there was a duty cast on the defendant to repair it; and that, once establish that there is a duty on the part of the landlord to keep the premises in a state of repair, then the employment of an independent contractor by the landlord cannot relieve him of the obligation and liability: Miller v. Hancock (41 W. R. 578; 1893, 2 Q. B. 177), Hughes v. Percival (31 W. R. 725, 8 App. Cas. 443), Dalton v. Angus (30 W. R. 191, 6 App. Cas. 740), and Tarry v. Ashton (24 W. R. 581, 1 Q. B. D. 314). THE COURT (WRIGHT and DARLING, JJ.) allowed the appeal and gave judgment for the defendant, refusing leave to appeal. WRIGHT, J.-It is not at all clear that this case is covered by any of the authorities. The case stands in this way: The defendant was landlord of the premises, and he had the water supply of the cistern under his control. The plaintiffs were tenants from him of the lower part of the premises. On a certain Friday a leak was discovered and the defendant was given notice of it. The landlord employed a competent person to set it right, but this person did the work negligently and the consequence was that when the premises were opened on the Monday the place was flooded and the plaintiffs' goods damaged. The question now arises whether the landlord is liable for that damage. It is to be observed that the counsel for the plaintiffs has not put his case on any contractual obligation arising from the relation of landlord and tenant. Then, apart from contractual liability, the rule of the common law is that laid down in Rylands v. Fletcher, that if a person brings a dangerous thing them. WRIGHT, J., held if the question had arisen between the directors and those who applied for preference shares and debentures on the faith of the prospectus, there would be little doubt as to the liability of the directors and the company. But the question was between Mr. Bartholomew and the company, and the question to be decided was whether there was in the prospectus a representation of a contract to take shares on which he could be held liable. No estoppel arose between the directors and the company. But at the same time there was a ground on which Mr. Bartholomew could be held liable on the same principle as that on which it had been held that, although articles of association were not contracts themselves, directors, by acting on them, shew that they have entered into a contract on the terms of the articles, and a prospectus could be looked at in the same way. When, therefore, these directors put forward this document they must be taken to have consented to act as directors on the terms of that prospectus, one of which was that they were to take up all the ordinary shares. It was not necessary to say whether the directors could have made the company allot them all the ordinary shares-that was another question; but probably the company could have made them take up such of these shares as they were called on to take. The directors, therefore, including Mr. Bartholomew, were jointly and severally liable in respect of such ordinary shares as were not allotted to other members, and an order must be made against him with costs.-COUNSEL, Grosvmor Woods, Q.C., and Sheldon; Whinney; T. L. Wilkinson; Haldane, Q.C., and Gore-Brown. SOLICITORS, G. A. King; Taylor, Hore, & Pilcher, for Nodder & Trethowan, Salisbury; Long & Gardiner, for Arthur Whitehead, Salisbury. [Reported by C. W. MEAD, Barrister-at-Law.] Re AURIFEROUS PROPERTIES (LIM.). Wright, J. 9. June and 20th to award the scholarship to the person so selected by the trustees. The COMPANY-WINDING UP July. - CONTRIBUTORY ALSO A CREDITOR CALLS- testator empowers the examiners to decline to certify, the trustees to decline to recommend, and the Council to decline to award the scholarship without reason alleged. No scholarship is to be tenable for more than three months with any other scholarship or exhibition in the gift of the society. It is intended to award the first scholarship after the November examination of the present year. In connection with the subject of legal education, reference may be made to the following Bills now before Parliament-viz, the London University Commission Bill and the Solicitors' Final Examination Bill. The object of the London University Commission Bill is to provide for the appointment of commissioners to frame statutes and regulations for the University of London, in general accordance with a scheme set out in a schedule to the Bill. The scheme provides, amongst other things, that the society shall have two representatives on the senate of the university, and it is understood that one of the faculties to be established under the scheme will be a faculty of law. At the present stage of the Bill it is premature to express any opinion on the subject to which it relates, but it may be as well to state that the Council adhere to the views expressed in the evidence of Mr. B. G. Lake in 1888, and of Mr. Pennington in 1892, to the effect that mere theoretical and academical teaching in law should not qualify a person for admission as a solicitor; that a university degree alone without service under articles could not be accepted as a qualification to practise; and that the society ought not to part with the control of the The examination of persons prior to their admission as solicitors. Solicitors' Final Examination Bill has been introduced in the House of Commons by Mr. A. F. Warr, a member of the society. Its object is to enable the Council of the society to make regulations for the exemption in whole or in part from the final examination of students who obtain or have by examination qualified themselves to obtain law degrees at certain universities. The Council are unable to approve the scheme of the Bill, tending as it does to withdraw from the society's control examinations which, as before stated, they consider should remain under tutors on the 30th of March, 1898, was 255, as compared with 236 on the same date in 1897. An order was, on the 25th of April, 1898, made under the Solicitors' Act, 1877, exempting from the preliminary examination any person who has passed the matriculation examination of the University of Wales. The African Gold Properties (Limited) held shares in the Auriferous Properties (Limited). In January and June, 1896, two calls, amounting to £1,250, were made on these shares. In January, 1896, the Auriferous Co. became indebted to the African Gold Co. in a sum of £2,775. In December, 1896, a compulsory winding-up order was made against the Auriferous Co. In January, 1898, the African Gold Co. went into voluntary liquidation, and a supervision order was afterwards made by the court. On the 4th of May, Wright, J., held that the liquidator of the African Gold Co. could not set off this debt due from the Auriferous Co against the calls due to that company (42 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, 491). The Auriferous Co. was about to pay a dividend to its creditors, and the liquidator now asked for a declaration that he was entitled to hold the dividend due to the African Gold Co. against the liability of the latter company for calls in arrear on its shares in the Auriferous Co. WRIGHT, J., held that prima facie the African Gold Co. was entitled to take its dividend. Its claim as a creditor had been duly ascertained in the appropriate proceedings, and it was primâ facie immaterial that the creditor happened to be also a debtor of the Auriferous Co. There was no contract as to set-off, nor did the articles of association of either company contain any provision as to it, nor did the general statutes as to set-off apply, nor did the doctrine of set-off in bankruptcy, which under section 10 of the Judicature Act, 1875, was extended to the liquidation of companies, apply. That statute had been held to apply only to cross-rights existing at the commencement of the winding-up, but here the call was made in the liquidation. If the creditor contributory were allowed to take the dividend without paying the calls he would be receiving payment of a part of the debt which the company owed to him without making his contribution to the fund out of which the debt was to be paid. There must be an order as asked for by the liquidator.it. The number of students receiving instruction from the society's -COUNSEL, Howard Wright; George B. Northcote. SOLICITORS, Freshfields Williams; W. H. Hudson. [Reported by C. W. MEAD, Barrister-at-Law.] Judge's Chambers. IN THE MATTER OF A SOLICITOR and IN THE MATTER OF THE This was an application on behalf of a solicitor against whom proceed- LAW SOCIETIES. THE INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY. The following are extracts from the annual report of the Council: Victoria Pension Fund.-The total subscriptions to this fund, with the interest received while the money was on deposit, amounted to £8,585 19s. 7d., and this sum was delivered to the trustees of the Solicitors' Benevolent Association on the 30th of December, 1897, they having executed a trust deed providing, amongst other things, that the fund shall be called "The Victoria Pension Fund," and that the income shall be applied in providing pensions for necessitous solicitors of the Supreme Court of Judicature in England and Wales, and for their wives, widows, and members of their families. There were upwards of 850 subscribers to the fund, and, having regard to the numerous charitable appeals made during the year, there is every reason for being gratified with the result. Number of Members -The society now consists of 7,882 members, of whom 3,570 practise in town, and 4,312 in the country. 445 new members joined the society during the past year. The number of members is the highest that has hitherto been reached. Legal Education.-The late Mr. Joseph Travers Smith, of Throgmorton Avenue, in the city of London, who died on the 28th of May, 1897, by a codicil to his will bequeathed £6,500 stock in trust to provide three scholarships of £50 each, one to be granted in each year, and to be held for three years, and to be in the gift of the Incorporated Law Society by its Council. The scholarships are to be awarded according to the following scheme of the testator-viz., the examiners are to certify to the testator's trustees the three candidates who, being under the age of twenty-six years, have passed the best examination at the last Final Examination of the year-the names of such candidates to be in alphabetical order; the trustees are to select from such three candidates the one whom in their discretion they shall deem to be the best qualified by personal character, general intelligence and cultivation, and the nature and class of his attainments to do credit to their selection and to the scholarship. The Council of the society are Solicitors' Remuneration Act, 1881.-The last edition of the digest of decisions and opinions under the Solicitors' Remuneration Act being out of print, it was decided by the Council to issue a new edition, consolidating the earlier edition and the supplements thereto, and bringing down the information to the end of Hilary Term, 1898. The new volume is in the press, and it is expected that it will be in the hands of members very shortly. Companies Act (1867) Amendment Bill.-A bill prepared on the instructions of the society has been introduced in the House of Commons by Sir John Lubbock, and if passed as amended in consultation with the President of the Board of Trade, will enable the court to grant relief from penalties for non-compliance with section 25 of the Companies Act, 1867, relating to contracts for the issue of fully-paid shares, recent decisions of the courts having given rise to doubts as to the sufficiency of contracts in a form that has been generally adopted. The leading bankers and insurance companies, as well as many merchants, brokers, and solicitors, have signed petitions in favour of the Bill. The Bill was read a second time on the 15th of June. Colonial Solicitors' Bill.-At the request of the Secretary of State for the Colonies a Bill, approved by him, was introduced at the instance of the society, for the purpose of consolidating and amending the law relating to the admission of colonial solicitors in England, and of English solicitors in the colonies. No progress having been made with the Bill up to the 7th of June, it was dropped. Conveyancing Bill.-The Conveyancing Bill of last year, which was read a second time in the House of Lords, was resettled by Mr. Wolstenholme and Mr. Cherry, on the instructions of the Council, with the intention of reintroducing it in the present session. The Bill of the present year also provided for various amendments of the law rendered advisable by reason of decisions of the court on the subject of compound settlements, the acknowledgment of deeds by married women trustees, and other matters. The Bill as resettled was submitted for the consideration of the provincial law societies, the Institute of Conveyancers, the General Council of the Bar, and the officials of the Land Registry. It did not, however, receive any considerable measure of approval, and the Council have decided not to proceed with it during the present session. County Courts (Right of Audience) Bill.-In the autumn of last year the Council held a conference with the General Council of the Bar, in the endeavour to obviate the opposition of the bar to this Bill. The conference, unfortunately, led to no agreement. A Bill having for its object both to enable managing clerks who are duly qualified solicitors to appear for their principals in county courts and to enable one solicitor to act as advocate for another in a county court has been prepared by the Council and introduced by Mr. A. F. Warr. Solicitors' Magistracy Bill.-A Bill to enable solicitors of the High Court to become county justices, notwithstanding that they carry on business in the county, has again been prepared by the society, and introduced by Mr. A. F. Warr. The Bill contains a clause prohibiting a solicitor appointed a county justice from practising before any bench of magistrates in the county. Ilford Improvement Bill.-The Council hat g made representations as to a clause originally inserted in this Bill purporting to authorize certain officers of the Ilford District Council, not being qualified practitioners, tɔ institute and carry on proceedings before a court of summary juris |