is appointed by them) by the Board of Trade, and shall, in the
absence of any agreement, be paid by the undertakers. Provided that
where the report of an electric inspector, or the decision of the Board
of Trade, shows that any consumer was guilty of any default or
negligence, such fees and expenses shall, on being ascertained as above-
mentioned, be paid by such consumer or consumers as the court or Board
of Trade, having regard to such report or decision, shall direct, and may
be recovered summarily as a civil debt.
The electric inspector
whose fees and expenses were the subject of inquiry was appointed by
the corporation at a salary of £250 a year. The items claimed as fees and
reasonable expenses included the rent of an electric laboratory, the gas,,
electricity, cleaning, coals, and insurance of the same, the wages of two
assistants, the depreciation in the value of instruments, furniture, fittings,.
&c., and the salary of the electric inspector, in addition to fees already
received by the inspector from the respondents. The alderman disallowed
all the items except the last.

THE COURT (DAY and RIDLEY, JJ.) dismissed the appeal. They said that the proviso to section 47 shewed that the words "fees and reasonable expenses "meant the fees and expenses which would be payable by a consumer in the event of a default by him; that was to say, the fees and expenses relating to the testing of meters, &c., on the consumer's premises. COUNSEL, P. Rose Innes; Roskill. SOLICITORS, The City Solicitor; Ashurst, Morris, Crisp, & Co.

[Reported by C. G. WILBRAHAM, Barrister-at-Law.]

Solicitors' Cases.

London and at Bushire in Persia and at Muscat, against the defendants, | be ascertained by a court of summary jurisdiction or where the inspector who were underwriters of two policies of marine insurance to recover a total loss caused by a capture at sea of the goods insured. The policies were dated respectively the 29th of November and the 6th of December, 1897. The first was described to be on four cases of cartridges valued at £215 per steamship Baluchistan, London to Bahrein and (or) other Persian Gulf ports; and the second policy on one case of rifles and one case of cartridges valued at £200 by the same vessel to Bunder Abbas and (or) other Persion Gulf ports. The bills of lading for the goods mentioned in the first policy described the goods as shipped for "Bahrein via Bushire, Muscat optional." That of the second parcel described the goods simply as shipped for Bunder Abbas. Neither Bahrein nor Muscat were ports in Persian territory, but Bushire and Bunder Abbas were. The vessel sailed from London in November, 1897, and on the 26th of January, when off Muscat, was intercepted by The Lapwing purporting to act on behalf of the government of the Shah of Persia, and these goods were seized and confiscated, the alleged ground of the confiscation being that the goods were intended for importation into Persian territory and that the importation of arms and ammunition was forbidden by Persian law. The plaintiffs thereupon claimed from the underwriters and the action was subsequently brought. The learned judge, in dealing with the question of concealment, said the evidence was to the effect that as long ago as July, 1881, the Persian Government had issued a decree that no arms or ammunition should enter Persian territory without permission of that government, and that if such goods arrived at Bushire the fact was to be reported to the authorities at Teheran. A copy of the decree was put in evidence. That there was in fact a qualified prohibition against the importation of arms and ammunition, passed really with a view of imposing a heavy duty, was clear, but he thought on the evidence that the plaintiffs believed it to be a dead letter, and that they had never heard of any attempt to enforce it or of any complaint by the Persian Government that it was being disregarded. If the so-called probibition was effective for any purpose at all it was merely for the purpose of enabling the representative of the Shah at Bushire, who apparently farmed his office from the government to levy heavy and arbitrary duties on the goods imported. There was no real prohibition at all; nor did anyone engaged in the trade imagine-and certainly the plaintiffs did not-that there was the least danger of interference so long as the duties were forthcoming in answer to the demands of the government officials. Now, in these circumstances were the plaintiffs guilty of any omission such as would invalidate their insurance? In his opinion they had acted honestly and could not be held in fault. He thought it doubtful if The Lapwing acted on the initiative of the Persian Government at all, and that more probably it was at this time suspected (probably wrongly) that the arms were destined for the Afghanistan frontier where the native tribes were giving trouble to the Indian Government. Whether that conjecture was right or wrong in his view of the facts there was nothing in the knowledge of the plaintiffs which could reasonably have affected the calculation of the risk and which they failed to disclose to the defendants. As to the second point taken by the defendants-viz., that the adventure was illegal because the import of arms was contrary to the law of Persia, and therefore the policy in respect of it was void, the learned judge was of opinion that there was nothing in it. The import of arms was not illegal, as the Persian law was administered in practice and enjoined, and the export of arms from England to Persia was certainly not contrary to our law.-COUNSEL, Pickford, Q.C., and Hollams; Joseph Walton, Q.C.; Carver, Q.C., and Scrutton; Cecil Chapman held a watching brief for Malcolm, Brunker, & Co. (Limited) who had also shipped arms by the same vessel as the plaintiffs and had insured with the defendants. SOLICITORS, Hollams, Sons, Coward, & Hawksley; Rowcliffes, Rawle, & Co., for Hill, Dickinson, Dickinson, & Hill, Liverpool; Baker & Nairne.

Re WHITE, PENNELL v. FRANKLIN. C. A. 5th July. SOLICITOR-EXECUTOR-WILL-POWER TO SOLICITOR-EXECUTOR TO MAKE PROFESSIONAL CHARGES-INSOLVENT ESTATE-CREDITORS' ACTION. This was an appeal from a decision of Kekewich, J. (46 W. R. 247; 1898, 1 Ch. 297), that a solicitor-trustee who was empowered by a will to make professional charges was not entitled, on the estate being found insolvent, to any profit costs of acting as solicitor to the estate as against creditors. The testator who died in 1891 appointed Mr. Franklin, a solicitor, with two other gentlemen trustees and executors of his will. By a clause therein Mr. Franklin was to be allowed all professional and other charges for time and trouble which as a solicitor he would have been entitled to make had he not been an executor. The testator's estate: was insolvent, and the will was proved by Mr. Franklin alone, the other two executors having disclaimed. An action being brought by creditors against Mr. Franklin as sole executor was defended by him in person, and he acted as solicitor for himself. A summons was then taken out by the creditors for a declaration that the testator's estate being insufficient to pay his debts in full Mr. Franklin was not entitled to any profit costs by reason of the declaration in the testator's will. Kekewich, J., following Re Thorley, Thorley v. Massam (39 W. R. 565; 1891, 2 Ch. 613), held that the power to make professional charges given by the will was a legacy, and that the executor was under the circumstances not entitled to profit costs. The executor appealed.

THE COURT (LINDLEY, M.R., CHITTY and COLLINS, L.JJ.) dismissed the appeal.

LINDLEY, M.R.-I do not see how we can differ judicially from the decision of Kekewich, J. In this case the trustee and executor happens to be a solicitor and he is the only trustee and executor. It is impossible to get over the previous decisions and the principle on which they are based. The estate is insolvent, and Kekewich, J., has decided that Mr. Franklin is not entitled to receive any profit costs out of the estate in competition with the creditors. It is impossible to differ from the declaration which he has made. It is hard upon the solicitor, but that cannot be helped.

CHITTY, L.J.-I am of the same opinion. No one can claim the bounty of a testator until his creditors have been paid. This rule applies not only to a solicitor-trustee but equally to a trustee who is an accountant, a surveyor, or an architect.

COLLINS, L.J., concurred.-CoUNSEL, Cozens-Hardy, Q.C., and J. G. Wood; Farwell, Q.C., and Chas. Church. SOLICITORS, S. Franklin; Maitlands, Peckham, & Co. [Reported by J. I. STIRLING Barrister-at-Law.]

July.

PRACTICE-COSTS-COUNTRY SOLICITOR-ATTENDANCE IN LONDON AT HEAR
ING-LONDON AGENT NOT EMPLOYED.

This was an appeal from the decision of an alderman of the City of London, sitting as a court of summary jurisdiction, upon an application made by the appellant, as representing the Corporation of the City of London, under section 47 of the Electric Lighting Orders Confirmation (No. 15) Act, 1890, to ascertain the amount of fees and reasonable expenses of an electric inspector, with which the appellant sought to charge the Re DIXON, TOUSEY v. SHEFFIELD. Byrne, J. 17th June and 1st respondents, who were the undertakers within the meaning of the Act. Section 35 of the Act referred to provided for the appointment of electric inspectors by the local authority, who were in this case the Corporation of the City of London. The duties of an electric inspector were to be: (a) The inspection and testing, periodically and in special cases, of the undertakers' electric lines and works, and the supply of energy given by them; (b) the certifying and examination of meters; and (e) such other duties in relation to the undertaking as might be required of him under the provisions of the order, or of any regulations under the order. It was also provided that the local authority might from time to time prescribe the fees to be taken by an inspector. Section 36 provided that the local authority might pay to an inspector such remuneration as from time to time they might determine, and such remuneration might be in addition to or in substitution for any fees directed to be paid to an electric inspector in respect of his duties under the order, or any regulations of the Board of Trade made in pursuance of the order. Section 47 is as follows: "Save as otherwise provided by this order, or by regulations under this order, all fees and reasonable expenses of an electric inspector shall, unless agreed,

Summons. This was an application to review taxation as between party and party in respect of allowances by the district registrar at Liverpool of attendances of Liverpool solicitors in London on the hearing of an originating summons, all the evidence having been by affidavit. The originating summons had been taken out in the Liverpool District Registry by persons entitled to one-fourth of the estate of John Dixon (deceased) under the Judicial Trustees Act, 1896, asking for the removal of the trustees of the estate, who were defendants, on the ground of misconduct, and was, in fact, a hostile action. It came on for hearing before Byrne, J., to whom the Chancery matters of the Manchester and Liverpool District Registry are specially assigned, on the 18th of February last and again on the 26th of February, and reserved judgment was delivered on the 26th of March, when the summons was dismissed with costs. During these proceedings Messrs. Tyrer & Co., of Liverpool, as agents

for Messrs. Donald & Co., of Carlisle, and Messrs. Norris & Sons, of Liverpool, acted as the solicitors for one or other of the defendants, and conducted the case themselves without employing a London agent, coming up to London to attend the hearing. Upon taxation of costs before the district registrar at Liverpool Messrs. Tyrer & Co. ɛent in their bill of costs, containing the following items: "161. Feb. 18-Attending court when case part heard and adjourned to 26th inst., £6 68.; 162. Feb. 18-Paid railway fare and expenses, £5 58.; 164. Feb. 26-Attending adjourned hearing, £6 63.; 165. Feb. 26-Paid railway fare and expenses, £5 58." Messrs. Norris & Sons sent in a bill containing similar items. These items were allowed by the registrar. The plaintiff objected to the whole of items 162 and 165, and to so much of items 161 and 164 as

exceeded the amount that would have been allowed had the solicitors instructed London agents to make the attendances to which these items related, and they now asked that it might be referred back to the registrar to vary his certificate accordingly. They contended that all solicitors who practised in the High Court must be placed on the same footing; one could not be allowed more than another merely because he resided farther away from the court; and that in any event there was no need for the solicitors in this case to attend the hearing, as all the

evidence was by affidavit.

2. All the words after "at liberty to do so" in Order XXI., Rule 18, are hereby repealed, and the following words shall stand in lieu "And shall not in any event be liable to pay the costs of the other side unless the Judge shall be of opinion that there was no reasonable ground for opposing the will."

ORDER LIV. Rule 1, A.

3. An application for the appointment of a new Arbitrator under paragraph 7 of the second schedule of "The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897," shall be made by summons.

BYRNE, J.-In my opinion, so far as the Chancery Division is concerned, the rules and practice in respect of the taxation of party and party costs are the same in the London taxing-masters' offices and in the offices of the district registrars of Liverpool and Manchester; and I consider that such rules and practice apply in respect of cases heard in London exactly as if proceedings had been initiated in any other district registry than those of Liverpool and Manchester and had been taxed in London. In other words, the district registrars in Liverpool and Manchester ought to act upon the same principles as the London taxing-masters act in taxing costs where the proceedings have been commenced in district registries in other parts of the country. I have given the matter careful consideration Appeals under Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897. 60 and 61 Vict. c. and have made inquiry of two of the London taxing-masters. In the result I am satisfied that there is no such hard-and-fast rule as that

suggested by the applicant's counsel-namely, that in no case where all the evidence is taken by affidavit ought the costs of the attendance of the country solicitor to be allowed. On the contrary, I believe it to be in accordance with the existing practice to allow such costs in certain rare and exceptional cases, in the exercise of the discretion of the taxing officer. This discretion ought to be, and is, exercised with the utmost care and caution. One of the London taxing-masters informs me that he does not think he has allowed such costs on a party and party taxation in more than about half-a-dozen instances. I can well understand that cases do occur where personal fraud or misconduct has been charged and has failed, where all the preliminary proceedings have been taken in the district registry, and where all the facts are known in the offices of the country solicitor that the taxing officer may fairly consider the presence in London of the country solicitor to be reasonably necessary for the conduct of the defendant's case. At the same time, it affords no reason at all for exercising the discretion that no London agent has been employed. If the charges for attendance of the country solicitor are allowed in the rare and exceptional cases referred to, it is not in accordance with the practice, as I understand it, to allow charges also for the attendance of the London solicitor. I have confined my remarks to cases arising in the Chancery Division, and I do not consider that I am departing from the general rule laid down in the case of The Soto (41 W. R. 479; 1893, P. 73). My view is that upon a party and party taxation the costs of an unsuccessful litigant are not to be increased simply by reason of the opponent client, or his local solicitor in Liverpool or Manchester, electing that such solicitor should attend in London instead of employing a London agent; that no different rule or practice ought to pre vail upon taxation before a Liverpool or Manchester district registrar than that prevailing upon taxation in London of the costs arising in any other of the numerous district registries throughout the country; and that the discretion of the taxing officer ought always to be exercised in such a matter (as I have no reason to doubt it is) with very great care and only in exceptional cases. The present case was a very exceptional one, and the discretion of the taxing officer having been exercised with care, and after consultation with a most experienced London taxing-master, I am not prepared to interfere with such discretion or to go into the question of the amount of the allowances complained of. I may add that the items 173 and 174 in Appendix N. to the R. S. C. 1883 (Annual Practice, vol. 2, p. 202), cited by the respondent's counsel, have no bearing upon the present case, inasmuch as they do not apply to cases heard in London or Middlesex. Summons dismissed.-COUNSEL, A. à B. Terrell; Rotch; Preston. SOLICITORS, J. F. Harrison & Burton, Liverpool; Tyrer, Kenion, Tyrer, & Simpson, Liverpool, for Donald, Ostell, & Lightfoot, Carlisle, Norris & Sons, Liverpo›l.

[Reported by N. TEBBUTT, Barrister-at-Law.]

On the 1st inst. the Royal Assent was given to a number of public and private Bills, including the Finance Bill, the Reserve Forces Bill, Public Record Office Bill, Suffragan Bishops Bill, and East India Loan Bill. The Church Gazette is responsible for the following: One of the learned judges has frequently the misfortune of having his judgments reversed by the superior court. But one afterncon his little daughter came rushing in in a most excited frame of mind. "Papa," she said, "may we have cake for tea? One of your judgments bas been upheld by the Court of Appeal."

ORDER LVIII. Rule 20.

37, Sched. 2, par. 4.

4. The following provisions shall apply to appeals to the Court of Appeal from decisions of judges of the county courts on questions of law under the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1897 :(a.) Every such appeal shall be by notice of motion in accordance with Order LIX., Rule 10; and such notice of motion shall be served and the appeal set down under Order LVIII., Rule 8, within the time limited by Order LIX., Rule 12.

(b.) It shall be the duty of the party appealing to apply to the judge of the county court for a signed copy of the note made by him of any question of law raised before him, and of the facts in evidence in relation thereto, and of his decision thereon, and of his decision on the question or matter submitted to him, and to furnish such copy for the use of the Court of Appeal; and such copy shall be used and received at the hearing of the appeal.

If such

notes are not produced the Court of Appeal shall have power to hear and determine the appeal upon any other evidence or statement of what occurred before the judge of the county court which the Court of Appeal may deem

sufficient.

(c.) Order LIX., Rules 14 and 16, shall apply to any such appeal, with the substitution of the Court of Appeal for the High

Court.

(d.) Subject to the foregoing provisions, the rules for the time being in force with respect to appeals from the High Court to the Court of Appeal shall, so far as practicable, apply to and govern appeals under the said Act to the Court of Appeal. 5. These Rules may be cited as the Rules of the Supreme Court, July, 1898, or separately, according to their respective headings, with reference to the Rules of the Supreme Court, 1883, and they shall come into operation on the 24th day of October, 1898. Copies may be obtained on application at the Lord Chancellor's Office, House of Lords.

TRANSFER OF ACTIONS.
ORDER OF COURT.

Thursday, the 30th day of June, 1898. Whereas, the Honourable Mr. Justice Bigham has at my request con sented to sit and act as an additional Judge of the Chancery Division from the 6th day of July, 1898, up to the 20th day of July, 1898, both inclusive. And, Whereas, it is expedient that the following Causes and Matters assigned to Mr. Justice North, Mr. Justice Stirling, Mr. Justice Kekewich, Mr. Justice Romer, and Mr. Justice Byrne, should for the purpose only of Hearing or of Trial be heard or tried before such additional judge; Now I, the Right Honourable Hardinge Stanley, Earl of Halsbury, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain (with the consent of the Lorl Chief Justice of England), do hereby Order that the several Causes and Matters set forth in the Schedules hereto, be accordingly Justice Kekewich, Mr. Justice Romer, and Mr. Justice Byrne to Mr. transferred from the said Mr. Justice North, Mr. Justice Stirling, Mr. Justice Bigham (as such additional Judge of the Chancery Division) for the purpose only of Hearing or of Trial, and be marked in the Case Books accordingly. And I do also Order that such of the said Causes and Matters as remain undisposed of at the close of such Sitting be re-trans ferred (without further Order) to the said Mr. Justice North, Mr. Justice

Stirling, Mr. Justice Kekewich, Mr. Justice Romer, and Mr. Justice
Byrne. And this Order is to be drawn up by the Registrar and set up in
the several Offices of the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice.
FIRST SCHEDULE.

From Mr. Justice NORTH.
1897.

Wemyss v Knollys 1896 W 1,109 Dec 16
In re Elliott Milnes v Hare
Kemp v Lowenfeld 1897 K

1897 E 366 Dec 17
700 Dec 29
1898.

Paukhurst v Reed 1897 P 2,041 Jan 4

defendants in Scotland, as compared with those possessed and exercised
by the Scotch courts to sue defendants resident in England or Ireland.
This matter was the subject of a report of the Council in the year 1885,
The
who reported in favour of an amendment of ord. 11, r. 1 (e).
Scotch courts make no distinction as to their jurisdiction between
residents in England and foreigners. An Englishman or a foreigner may
become subject to the Scotch jurisdiction (1) By residence in Scotland
for forty consecutive days prior to the action; (2) by prorogation, i.e.,
where he waives objection; (3) by possession of real estate in Scotland;
(4) by the arrestment (or attachment) of personal property there; (5) by
convention; and (6) by personal citation in Scotland when the cause of

The Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co, ld v Wedge Pneumatic Tyre Co 1897 action, whether contract or debit, arose there. If there be jurisdiction

D 1,462 Jan 4

Bolton v Hall 1897 B 4,277 Jan 6
Smith v Sharp 1897 S 4,068 Jan 10
Cox v Manuelle 1897 C 892 Jan 10

under any of these heads, the question of service of process arises, and by the Act 45 & 46 Vict. c. 77, s. 3, Scotch writ; may be served by sending to the known residence or place of business of the defendant, or to the last known address (if it continues to be his legal domicil), or to the

Urban District Council of Chiswick v Arnold (J Whitaker 3rd Party) Office of the Keeper of Edictal Citations, the process enclosed in a

1897 C 1,736 Jan 13

Maison Helbronner, ld v Daveen 1897 M 1,303 Jan 27
Curre v Chepstow Water Co 1897 C 785 Feb 8

SECOND SCHEDULE.

From Mr. Justice STIRLING.
1897.

Peters v Owen 1897 P 1,001 Nov 11

Owen v Peters 1897 O 355 May 21

Williams v London & North-Western Ry Co 1897 W 2,398 Nov 12
Barker v Oakden 1896 B 1,941 Nov 18
Terry v Brickwell 1897 T 334 Nov 25

registered letter by post containing the copy summons, and such posting constitutes a legal and valid citation, unless the defendant proves that it was not left at the place to which it was addressed. The regulations of the Scotch courts, with reference to such postal service on personus out of the jurisdiction, provide as follows-viz.: (1) That when a person has no dwelling-place in Scotland, he may be cited edictally-i.e., by lodging a copy at the keeper of the records of the Court of Session, and giving reasonable notice to his known agent in Scotland, or to himself at his residence or place of business in England or Ireland. (2) That a registered post letter addressed to the defender's residence or place of business shall be deemed reasonable notice. The Scotch courts have also a special mode of procedure by

English & American Machinery Co, ld v Hirshowitz 1897 E 621 Dec way of summary diligence on bills of exchange (see "Juridical Styles,"

10

In re W Owen's Patent, No 12,368 of 1896 Dec 18

5th ed., vol. ii., p. 17), by which the holder of a bill of exchange may cause it to be presented by a notary at the place when payable, and a

Doolette v The Coolgardie Mint & Iron King Gold Mines, ld 1896 D protest obtained within a reasonable time afterwards. Upon a protest 2,069 Dec 20

1898.

Simms v Solomons 1897 S 3 497 Jan 6
Russell ▾ Young 1897 R 1,810 Jan 13

THIRD SCHEDULE.
From Mr. Justice KEREWICH.
1898.

Sey v Griffith 1889 S 1,807 restored June 15

Remus & Temler v H Stevenson & Sons 1896 R 1,760 Oct 11

duly taken and recorded within six months in the books of session, or of an inferior court, summary diligence may proceed for the sum contained in the bill or note with interest. Under the Judgments Extension Act this summary diligence is enforceable as a judgment in England. The fourth head of jurisdiction of the Scotch courts-viz., arrest of property ad fundandam jurisdictionem, is unknown in England. In Scotland the ownership of any property, however small, is sufficient. If an Englishman or Irishman have left an umbrella in a hotel, jurisdiction would arise. In a recent case a commercial traveller, who had been discharged by an

The Castner Kellner Alkali Co ld v Commercial Development Corpn ld English firm, had in his possession, contrary to the wish of his late 1897 C 4,000 April 18

The Guthrie Hall Co ld v Samage 1898 G 700 April 25
Dewrance v Smith & Co 1897 D 1,614 May 7

masters, some valuable samples. With these he went to Scotland and sought to found on them an arrestment, so as to sue his masters in Scotland. The Court of First Instance upheld this exercise of jurisdiction, and it was only on appeal that the possession of defendant's property, taken by the defeudant himself to Scotland, was held not to come within the Scotch rule and the order reversed. On the other hand, the English courts are limited by ord. 11, rr. 1 and 2, to a peculiarly small number of actions, and have less jurisdiction to authorize the service of process in Scotland than in any other part of the world. Under sub-section (e) they have power, where the action is founded on a breach of contract which ought to be performed in England, to authorize service of process in any part of the world, except on defendants domiciled or ordinarily resident in Scotland or Ireland. Even in any of the limited cases, to which rule 1 applies, the courts are (as regards Scotland and Ireland) still further restricted, being bound by rule 2 to have regard to the comparative cost and convenience of proceeding in England or in the local courts of Scotland. How strictly the English courts construe this rule and how entirely differently from the arrestment ad fundandam jurisdictionem of the Scotch courts as shewn by the cases of Jones v. The Scottish Accident Insurance Co. (17 Q. B. D. 421) and Watkins v. Scottish Imperial Insurance Co. (23 Q. B. D. 285) where it was held that companies registered in Scotland but 1,345 carrying on business and having a chief office and many agencies in England, could not be served with process from the English courts, but that the claimant must sue in the Scotch courts, although the contract was made in England. It will be seen from these decisions that an English trading firm have only to register themselves as a limited company in Scotland or Ireland to exclude the jurisdiction of the English courts, and thereby put creditors to the great inconvenience of suing them in the Scotch or Irish courts. They may do this although their principal business may be carried on in England, and little or no business may be carried on in Scotland or Ireland, notwithstanding that the registered office is there. The committee have been informed of a case in which this has actually been done, and of several actions in the English courts against the company so registered having been stayed by the High Court in pursuance of the above decisions, although the business was mainly carried on in London. In some trades, such as the corn trade, in which Scotch dealers make contracts in England, the English traders have found it necessary to protect themselves against this state of the law by inserting a clause in their contracts that any claim should be within the jurisdiction of the English courts, and that service of a writ might be effected by leaving a copy at the office of the trade association, and posting it in a registered letter to the defendant in Scotland. The validity of this method was disputed in Montgomery v. Leibenthal (46 W. R. 292), but was held to be good by the Court of Appeal, though in the previous case of The British Wagon Co. v. Gray (44 W. R 113; 1896, 1 Q. B. 35) the court held itself precluded by the rules from giving leave to serve a writ in Scotland where the defendant, resident in Scotland, had agreed only to submit to the jurisdiction of the English court. The rules of November, 1893, introduced amendments in order 11, which in some slight degree tended to obviate the anomaly and injustice to English suitors. These amend..

2,983 Oct 28
522 Oct 30
1897 S 760 Aug 12
H 2,964 Nov 1
HALSBURY, C.
RUSSELL OF KN., L.C.J.

LEGAL PROCEDURE.

The following is the further report to the Council of the Special Committee on this subject, which was adopted by the Council on the 10th of June. The committee in their recent report, adopted by the Council on the 21st of January 1898, dealt with the recommendations of the Bar Council as to the conduct of civil business in the Queen's Bench Division. They now proceed to report on the other matters which have been referred to them by the Council.

Service of Process in English and Scotch Courts.-The committee have considered the letter of a member, referred to them on the 18th of Fet ruary, 1898, by resolution of the Council, with regard to the difference between the powers vested in the English and Irish Courts for suing