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UNWIN, Esriisa, Coggeshall, Essex Dec 18 Beaumont 62 Son, Coggeshall v1LE,C11ABLEI Evaar, Hatch, Beauchamp, Somerset, Innkeeper Doc 8 Goode, North Woonulm, Janus, Hove, Sussex Dee 24 Hardwick, Brighton

Youso, RICHARD, Matlock Moor, Derby Dec 1 Potter, Matlock Bridge

ZINCK, HENRI, Notting Hill

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ADJUDICATIONS. Aiisv, Ton, Leicester Leicester Pet Nov 8 Ord Nov B

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Busciiiair, Joan FINLAY, Gt James st, Bedford row, Journalist Nov 26 at 12 Bankruptcy bldgs, Carey st

Russr:i.i., F A, Streathsm Nov 2i at 11.30 24, Railway app, London Bridge

STANWAY, Tnoiiis, Biriiiingham, Draper Nov 25 at 11 23, Colinorc row, Birmingham

Tuoaxa, A, and S Taoima, Brastcd, Kent, Butchers Nov 23 at 11.3) 21. Railway app, London Bridge

Tuiunm, Auirnr, Brighouse. Commercial Traveller Nov 26 at 11 Ofl’ Rec, Townhall chmbrs, Halifax

Tuiisim, Anniirir Eowiao, Burnleg Grinder Nov 26 at 1 Exchange Hotel, Nicholas st, urnley

Von Vairii, Mix, Aldehurgh, Suflolk Nov 25 at 11 Bankruptcy hldgs, Carey st

Warn, Anrnua Ansorr, Burnley, Insurance Agent Nov 26 at 1 30 Exchange Hotel, Nicholas st, Burnley

Wmra, CHARLES EDWARD, Handswortli, Stuffs, Grocer Nov 28 atll 23, Colmoro row, Birmingham

Yarns, CHARLES Mouruiso, New Crofton. Yorks, Butcher Nov 23 at 2 90 OE Rec, 6, Bond tcr, \Valrctield

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5 CURRENT TOPICS.

Tun FOLLOWING are the names and dates of call to the bar of the new Queen’s Counsel : Mr. RICHARD Lovnnam) LOVELAND (Assistant Judge, London Sessions), 1865 ; Mr. Wrnnrm Emmsn HARRISON, South-Eastern Circuit, 1867; Mr. REGINALD Moan BRAY, South-Eastern Circuit, 1868 ; Mr. Tnoms Gxnsnar Canvas, Northern Circuit, 1873; Mr. J orm Annnasos Foors; Western Circuit, 1875; Mr. HENRY Tsassnn, Chancery Bar and South Wales Circuit, 1882; and Mr. J orm FREDERICK PEEL Rawnmsos, South-Eastern Circuit, 1884.

THE nnsrn of Baron POLLOCK removes from the bench a capable and highly-esteemed judge. His title indicates the length of his service in that office. He was appointed a Baron of the old Court of Exchequer in 1873, and practically he was at work to the last. But, though he was the senior j udge—his appointment being three years prior to that of Mr. Justice H_AWI{INS—h9 had shown no indication of declining powers, and when it was announced that he was returning from the Essex Assizes on account of indisposition it was not anticipated that his illness would assume a serious aspect. The announcement on Monday of his death on the previous day came as a painful shock to the many who had loarned to appreciate his sterling qualities. With his early associations and training it was natural that he should attain to judicial ofiice. His father, Chief Baron PoLLocK, was one of the most noteworthy judges of the middle of the century, and the son-—though he was by no means the only son-—has carried on in a less conspicuous way the same vocation. To the vast majority of present day lawyers his career at the bar is known only by hearsay. His early diligence is shown by the reports and by the work on merchant shipping with which his name was associated. Diligence, with such opportunities as he possessed, materially led to professional advancement. But as a judge he has been well known and universally respected. In trying prisoners he spared no pains to ensure that his sentences should be justto the prisoner as well as to the public; to the consideration of civil cases he brought a judicial mind and a competent knowledge of law; and in his treatment of all who had business before him he was kind and courteous. He was a judge who worthily maintained the traditions of his order.

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Wn no nor understand all this mighty hurry about bringing f country certificate, but the magistrate, Mr. D’EYsconar, though the Land Transfer Act, 1897, into force. Section 25 of the ' at first he was against the country solicitor, and adjourned the Act provides that it shall come into operation on the lst l case, on the following day allowed it to proceed, holding that, of January next; and until that day, there is, of course, no iprovided the_ solicitor was properly qualified, it was not for the

power to make an Order in Council under section 20. Nor, it would a pear, can the formal notice under sub-section 5 of that section go sent to the county council or the accompanying draft Order be formally served before that day. But someone seems to have discovered that there is no objection to sending a draft of the proposed Order to the county council before that day, and getting them to decide beforehand whether they will accept compulsory registration. Accordingly, we learn that an intimation has been given to the London County Council that it is proposed to make an Order applying Part III. of the Land Transfer Act to the county of London, and that the Order will declare that, “As respects the county of London, on and after the lst of July, 1898, registration of title to land is to be compulsory on sale. This order may be amended or added to, or repealed by Order in Council.” This notice is dated the 19th of November, and it seems to be concluded that if the county council does not before the 19th of February, at a meeting specially called for the purpose, at which two-thirds (ninety-two) members shall be present, resolve and communicate to the Privy Council their resolution that, in their opinion, compulsory registration of title would not be desirable in their county, the Order will be made. We should be glad to know how this notion is reconciled with the provisions of the Act. It is, no doubt, highly desirable for the Land Registry to “nobble” the existing county council, before a new election has taken place, but how can any notice be validly given under the Act before it has come into operation ? A still more serious matter appears to be the letter from the Lord Chancellor to the Court of Common Council of the City of London “with reference to the Land Transfer Act of last Session, and the desirability, or otherwise, of extending its provisions to the City.” As our readers all remember, a solemn sledge was given in the House of Commons by the Attorney

eneral, and assented to by Mr. Bsnrona, that the first county to be selected should “ be the administrative county of London, excluding the City.” Now we hear of a letter, in efi'ect, asking the City of London to apply to be included in the first compulsory order. If this is done, a very grave _breach of faith will be committed with the solicitors to whom the pledge was practically given—namely, those opposing the Bill. These strange proceedings, however, are of a piece with the whole course of the manoeuvres by which the Bill was carried through Parliament, and they give a pleasing foretaste of the despotic sway which will be exercised when the compulsion clause has been put into force.

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W1: nsvn considerable sympathy with the members of the profession who have urged, and are urging, op osition on the part of solicitors to the selection of London as the first district to be put under compulsion, but we do not think it would be advisable for members of the profession to associate themselves together, in their capacity of solicitors, for that purpose. Let them do all in their power, as individual citizens, to enlighten the Committee of the London County Council upon the matter, and especially to point out to them that they ought not to be called on to express an opinion as to compulsion until the Act has come into operation. But for solicitors to organize themselves to oplpose the a plication of compulsion to London would, we t ink, be likelly to defeat the object in view. The county council would be told that the opposition simply arose from the irreconcilable hostility of solicitors, who desired to deprive their clients of the priceless boon which compulsion will bestow. Solicitors generally have done quite enough in the way of opposition to the measure to clear their consciences of any complicity in the scheme, and we think that, while exercising all their rights as citizens, they should rather carefully

stand aloof from organized opposition to the application of the Act to London.

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court to inquire whether he had a London or a country certificate. If the country solicitor was in the wrong, it would seem that the law is quite strong, enough to deal with the case, without the necessity for magisterial interference. Under section 43 of the Stamp Act, 1891, a person who “ acts or practises ” as a solicitor in any court without having in force at the time a duly stamped certificate incurs a penalty of £50, and is also incapable of maintaining any action for the recovery of his costs. In the case of a person who has no solicitor’s certificate at all, it would seem that a single appearance in court would constitute acting as a solicitor, which would bring him within the section and make the penalty recoverable. But in the case of a certificated solicitor it is necessary to refer to the schedule in order to discover whether he is entitled, under his certificate, to appear in the court in question, and the wording of the schedule differs slightly from that of the section. If the solicitor “practises or carries on his business” within ten miles from the General Post Ofiice he has to pay, after three years, a duty of £9 ; elsewhere in England, a duty of £6. The effect of these enactments was considered by a Divisional Court (FIELD and Cave, JJ.) in Re 1T0r!0n (8 Q. B. D. 434), where a Birmingham solicitor had attended a taxation in London, and it was held that a single appearance did not disqualify him from recovering his costs. Stress was laid upon the phrase “ carries on his business,” and FIELD, J., intimated that the intention of the Legislature was, not to strike at one particular transaction within the ten-mile radius, but at the general carrying on of business and practising. So CAVE, J ., was of opinion that the words “ practises or carries on his business ” pointed to a series of actsand not to an isolated transaction.

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THE cmcuusrsncss under which a solicitor who is acting for trustees may make himself liable for a breach of trust are clearly defined in the judgment of Lord Ssnnormn, C., in Barn-es v. Addy (L. R. 9 Ch., p. 251). “Strangers ”—that is, persons other than the trustees-—“ are not to be made constructive trustees merely because they act as agents of trustees in transactions within their legal powers, transactions, perhaps, of which a court of equity may disapprove, unless those agents receive and become chargeable with some part of the trust property, or unless they assist with knowledge in a dishonest and fraudulent design on the part of the trustees.” Where, however, the solicitor has simply failed in his duty to the trustees, or where he has omitted to inform them that a proposed investment would be a breach of trust, it seems clear that the solicitor is not liable for the breach of trust, whatever may be his liability for negligence. Nor, as appears from the judgment of SrinLING, J., in the case of Sta/was v. Prams Sreported elsewhere), will the negligence interfere with any col ateral rights which the solicitor may have acquired in the course of the transaction. In that case the solicitors acting for the trustees took a transfer of a mortgage for £6,000, one-half the amount being advanced by the trustees and one-half by the solicitors themselves. The security was insuflicient for the advance, but the solicitors omitted to advise the trustees of this. It did not appear that the solicitors obtained any indirect benefit by the transaction, so that they could not, upon the principles of Barnes v. Addy, be held liable for a. breach of trust, but it was contended that, under the circumstances, their moiety of the security ought to be postponed to the moiety held by the trustees. The solicitors had become bankrupt, so that if the trustees failed to secure themselves in this way, their only remedy would be by proof in the bankruptcy for such claim as they might have against the solicitors personally. But though, under certain circumstances, a solicitor may doubtless prejudice his own position by omitting to give his client proper advice, this result only seems to follow where the neglect to give advice secures some consequent advantage to the solicitor. A solicitor, for instance, who takes a security from a client is not allowed to profit by an unusual power of sale the effect of which is not explained to the client (C'oclcl>urn v. Edwards, 18 Ch. D. 4-19). Where, however, the solicitor, as in Stoker v. Pram, is interested jointly with his

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client in the transaction, both standing on the same footing in the matter, this principle does not apply, and STIRLING, J., held accordingly that the trustees had no priority over the solicitors in regard to the security.

IT arrnans from the decision of NORTH, J. , in Paggc v. Neath Ilvtmways Co. to be oi comparatively slight importance whether an intending debenture holder actually gets his debentures from the company or not, provided he obtains an undertaking from the company to issue them. This result follows from the cases in which incomplete debentures have been held to constitute a good equitable security, though the principle does not seem to have been applied hitherto in a case where no debentures at all have been issued. In Re Strand Jlfasic Hall Co. (3 De G. J. 8: Sm. 147) bonds were issued as security for advances, the name of the obliges being left blank, and in the liquidation of the company it was contended that the bonds were invalid, and that the lender could only rank as a simple contract creditor. But the Court of Appeal held that, though the bonds were invalid, the intention to create the security was sutficient to make it good in equity. “Where this court,” said TURNER, L.J., “is satisfied that it was intended to create a charge, and that the parties who intended to create it had the power to do so, it will give effect to the intention, notwithstanding any mistake that may have occurred in the attempt to effect it.” And so in Ross v. Army and Navy Halal Co. (35 W. R. 40, 34 Ch. D. 43), where a covering deed was assumed to be void for want of registration under the Bills of Sale Acts, it was held that a good security was created by the contract in the debentures to give such a security as was intended to be given by the deed. Another instance of the invalidity of instruments in consequence of their being issued in blank occurred in Re Queensland Land anrl Coal Co. (42 W. R. 600; 1894, 3 Ch. 181), where debentures were issued in this manner. That at law they were ineffectual until the blanks had been filled in and the debentures redelivered there was no doubt (Powell v. Landon and Provincial Bank, 41 VV. R. 545; 1893, 2 Ch. 555), but NORTH, .T., held that they were good in equity. “Assuming,” he said, “a clear, definite contract that debentures are to be issued in respect of a loan, the [lender] has as good a claim as if the debentures had been actually issued, the only difference being that the claim is equitable and not legal, and he is entitled to hold these debentures in the same manner as if the name of the person to whom payment is to be made had been filled up before execution.” This passage expressly states that the actual issue of the debentures is immaterial, provided a contract to issue them exists, and it covers, therefore, the circumstances of Pegga v. Neath T/'(lnzzt'a_z/s Co. The plaintiff had advanced money to the defendant company on the security_of promissory notes and of an undertaking

y the company to issue to him at any time debentures to a corresponding amount of a series then being issued. It was held by NORTH, J ., that, although no debentures were ever issued to the plaintifi, he was entitled by virtue of the undertaking to ran pari passu with the actual debenture-holders.

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THE DECISION in Iiatton v. Treaty (1897, 1 Q. B. 452), that 8, constable has no power to stop abicyclist riding at night without a light, has given rise to a misapprehension in some quarters. It has been thought that the decision applies to cases of furious riding as well as of riding without a light. But a glance at the case, and the enactments upon which it turned, easily disposes of this notion. The section which requires bicyclists to carry lights after dark is section 85 of the Local Government Act, 1888. That section begins by declaring that bicycles and other similar machines are “carriages within the meaning of the Highway Acts,” and it goes on to provide that “the following additional regulations shall be observed by any per-son or persons_ riding or being upon such carriages ” ; then follow the regulations as to carrying lights and sounding bells or whistles, and the penalty for breach of these regulations. It will at once be observed that the regulations thus prescribed rest upon their own authority alone, and are in no way dependent upon the Highway Acts, or upon the fact that bicycles ave been declared by the earlier part of the section to be “ carriages.” To hold that

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the section by implication applied to the case of a breach of these regulations the provisions of the Highway Acts as to the apprehension of persons guilty of offences under those Acts, would have been to distort the language of a very plain section. The Legislature has not thought fit to provide any special means of apprehending ofienders against the regulations as to bicycles contained in section 85, and if the result is to make these regulations very difficult to enforce, the remedylies with the Legislature aloneAs to furious riding the case is very different : the law on this subject, as applied to bicycles, depends upon the earlier part of section 85 and upon the Highway Acts there referred to. Bicycles are carriages within the Highway Acts, and therefore the law as to carriages contained in those Acts is applicable to them. Turning to section 78 of the Highway Act, 1835, it is found to be an offence if a person drives any sort of carriage furiously so as to endanger the life or limb of any passenger, and every such ofiending driver may, by the authority of the Act, with or without warrant, be apprehended by any person who shall see such offence committed; and section 79 contains further provisions enabling the otficers of the highway authority to seize any unknown person whom they have seen committing an offence against the Act, and to take him before a justice. That the rider of a bicycle is “ driving a carriage,” and may be convicted of furious driving under the Highway Act, 1835, was actually decided by Mannon and Lusii, J.I., nearly ten years before the Local Government Act, 1888, was passed (Taylor v. Goodwin, 4 Q. B. D. 228), so that the declaration, contained in section 85 of that Act, that a bicycle is a carriage was almost superfluous. It is thus abundantly clear that the provisions of sections 78 and 79 of the Act of 1835 as to the apprehension and punishment of offenders are applicable to furiously-riding bicyclists, for they are guilty of an oifence under that Act; and

. it is equally clear that bicyclists riding at night without a light,

or failing to give audible warning of their approach, are not amenable to the provisions of that Act, but are guilty only of a breach of the regulations contained in section 85 of the Act of 1888, which section does not provide for their summary arrest by the casual constable or other onlooker.

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LAST warm, at the London Sessions, a young man was convicted upon an indictment for obtaining the sum of one penny by a false pretence. He was selling newspapers in the street, and by crying false news of a sensational character induced the prosecutor to buy one of his papers. This is certainly acommon offence in the Metropolis. At night certain streets are full of men and boys shouting false news. Undoubtedly steps should be taken to punish such offenders, but it will probably strike most persons as rather strange that there is no summary method of dealing with them. To set in motion the elaborate and costly procedure by indictment in order to punish a wretched boy who sells a halfpenny journal by telling some trumpery lie as to its contents, is very like using a steam-hammer to crack a walnut. It seems, however, that there is no other way of attaining the desired end, and that even this heavy engine ca_n be used only where the person defrauded of his halfpenny is willing to undergo all the trouble and loss of time of appearing before a magistrate, grand jury, and petty jury. Surely it ought to be made an ofience, punishable summarily with some small penalty, for newsvendors to cry news which they have no reason to believe is contained in their papers, whether they obtain money thereby or not. The very wide powers, however, which magistrates and police ossess in some directions, especially in London, are as remarkable as their limitations in other directions. It will surprise many people (even lawyers) to learn that there is any restriction upon the distribution in the streets of inofiensive handbills. Nevertheless, at the Guildhall policecourt a few days ago a boy was convicted of distributing handbills outside the Stock Exchange without the permission of the Commissioner of Police. This conviction was under section 9 of the Metropolis Streets Act, 1867, which provides that “no picture, print, board, placard, or notice, except in such form and manner as may be approved of by the Commissioner of Police, shall, by way of advertisement, be carried or distributed in any street ” within four miles of Charing Cross by any person riding in a vehicle or on horseback or on foot, under pain

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