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REVIEWS.

STATUTE LAW.

BEING SPECIALLY THE FINAL AND THIRD EDITION.

GIBSON AND WELDON'S STUDENT'S STATUTE LAW.
INTENDED FOR THE USE OF CANDIDATES AT
HONOURS EXAMINATIONS OF THE LAW SOCIETY.
By the AUTHORS. The "Law Notes" Publishing Offices, 25 and
26, Chancery-lane, W.C.

The activity of the Legislature has compelled Messrs. Gibson and Weldon to make considerable changes in this useful compilation; and, in order to secure room for new statutes, such as the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, and the Trustee Act, 1893, statutes of less general interest or suitable rather for special treatment have been excluded. The present volume accordingly omits the subjects of company law, county courts, ecclesiastical law, inclosure of commons, and shipping law. The chief statute under the last head is the Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, and, from the student's point of view, this Act, with its 748 sections, is well out of the way. The treatment of the statutes which have been included is marked by great thoroughness-thoroughness in some cases, we should have thought, almost beyond the needs of the student, though it gives the volume a greater chance of serving as a compendium for the practising lawyer. The Agricultural Holdings Act, 1883, is an Act to which specially detailed consideration has been given. The statutes are grouped under headings according to their subjects, and the subjects are arranged in alphabetical order. Headings which contain collections of statutes of special importance are Conveyancing and Law of Property," "Inland Revenue,' "Landlord and Tenant," and "Trustees.' As a guide to statute law the student will find the book ample for his requirements, and to the practitioner it will serve as a handy book of reference.

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BOOKS RECEIVED.

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BILL OF SALE TO LIMITED COMPANY.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.]

Sir,-Permit us to call attention to the decision last week of a Altree; in which it was held, on appeal from a county court, that a Divisional Court (Day and Lawrance, JJ.) in a case of Altree v. bill of sale in favour of a limited company was void, as not being in accordance with the statutory form, because the company was described by its corporate name only, without any statement of its office or place of business.

We think this decision, if upheld, must invalidate the great majority of bills of sale given to joint-stock companies, as the general practice of conveyancers is to describe such companies by name only, and, so far as our experience goes, it has never hitherto been supposed that any further description is required when they happen to be grantees under a bill of sale. For our own part we are satisfied that, both on principle and on authority, the decision is wrong, and we are strongly urged by counsel to appeal further; but unfortunately the court would only give permission on condition of our paying in any event the costs than the sum at stake, we are practically compelled to submit to of both sides, and, as these could easily be made to amount to more what we feel to be an erroneous and mischievous decision.

June 13.

[See "Current Topics."-ED. S. J.]

CLAIMANTS' SOLICITORS.

CASES OF THE WEEK.
Lunacy,

Re THE EARL OF SEFTON. C. A. No. 2. 14th June.

Ruling Cases. Arranged, Annotated, and Edited by ROBERT CAMPBELL, M.A., Barrister-at-Law, Advocate of the Scotch Bar, and LUNATIC-DIRECTING COMMITTEE TO ELECT TO ACCEPT A DEVISE TO LUNATIC late Fellow of Trinity Hall, Cambridge; assisted by other Members of the Bar. With American Notes by IRVING BROWNE. Vol. XV. : Judge-Landlord and Tenant. Stevens & Sons (Limited). Price

25s.net.

The Law Relating to the Administration of Charities under the Charitable Trusts Acts, 1853-1894, and Local Government Act, 1894. By THOMAS BOURCHIER-CHILCOTT, Barrister-at-Law. Stevens & Haynes.

A Handy Book on the Law of Master and Servant, Employer and Employed, chiefly as Regards their Civil Rights. By JAMES WALTER SMITH, Esq., LL.D., Barrister-at-Law. New Edition. By GEORGE FREDERICK EMERY, Esq., LL.M., Barrister-at-Law. Effingham Wilson.

Gibson and Weldon's Aid to Equity. Intended as a Guide to that difficult but essential work, Snell's Principles of Equity (12th edition). Sixth Edition. By the Authors. The "Law Notes" Publishing Offices.

CORRESPONDENCE.

PARTICULARS OF TESTATORS' DISPOSITIONS.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.]

Sir,-It has been for a long time now the practice for the proprietors of newspapers to obtain from the Probate Court and publish particulars of the dispositions made by testators, and it has now assumed such proportions that we think it is time to consider whether it should be allowed to continue.

We all know that if there is one thing more than another that clients desire it is privacy, and it seems to us to be very wrong that in order to gratify public curiosity the papers should have the liberty of extracting from the office where wills are proved, and publishing to the world, information relating to the most private affairs of life. We have known cases where the utmost pain has been caused, and actually in a recent case under our notice a paper commented on the legal effect of certain bequests (about which there was not, and would not be, any litigation or question), saying (from a garbled extract from the will) that it ought to have said so-and-so. That report was copied into numberless other papers verbatim, and so was published over and over again all over the counties in which the testator was known, and to such an extent that it was quite impossible to have it corrected, and has caused much annoyance and pain to relatives.

It is easy to suggest a remedy for all this, if what we call attention to is known in legal circles to be an evil that ought to be checked,

UPON CONDITION (F RESETTLING OTHER PROPERTY-JURISDICTION OF COURT-BENEFIT OF LUNATIC-PECUNIARY BENEFIT-STAT. PREROGATIVA REGIS (17 E. 2, STAT. 1.) c. 10-LUNACY ACT, 1890 (53 & 54 VICT. c. 5).

In this case a devise of land had been made to the lunatic on the condition that within a year after the death of the devisor the devisee should execute a resettlement of certain family estates; and the question now to be decided was whether the court had jurisdiction to direct the committee of the lunatic to elect on behalf of the lunatic to accept the devise and to execute the resettlement. The Earl of Sefton had become a lunatic in consequence of a serious accident which he sustained, and was not likely to live long. His father, the previous Earl of Sefton, who died in June, 1897, was tenant for life of settled estates producing a net rental of about £30,000 a year, and was also absolute owner of estates producing about £21,000 a year. The present earl had, before he became a lunatic, and before his father's death, barred the entail, but without the consent of his father as the protector of the settlement, and had therefore acquired only a base fee. By his will the late earl gave his unsettled estates, subject to a term of 1,000 years given to trustees for certain purposes, to the present earl for life, with remainder to his issue in tail male; and then for similar estates to a younger son of the late earl and his issue, with remainders over. The will directed that every person who should thereunder become entitled (subject to the term of 1,000 years) as tenant for life or tenant in tail male by purchase to the possession of the devised estates, and who should also become entitled as tenant in tail male or in tail, whether by purchase or descent, to the possession of the settled estates should, within one year after becoming so entitled under both the will and the settlement (or, if he was an infant, within a year after attaining twenty-one), disentail the settled estates and resettle them on the same trusts as the devised estates. If the person so becom ing entitled did not do this, the estate devised to him was to cease and determine. The testator also bequeathed a sum of £10,000 to the present the present earl's debts (which were stated to amount to £31,000) should earl if he should execute the resettlement, and directed that in that event be paid by the executors. Some of the next-of-kin of the present earl took out a summons asking that the committee might be directed to execute, in the name of the lunatic and on his behalf, a resettlement in accordance with the testator's will. The Master refused the application, which was then made to the Lords Justices in Lunacy. It was opposed by the present earl's next younger brother, who would be a loser if it were successful.

THE COURT (LINDLEY, M R., and CHITTY and COLLINS, L.JJ.) granted the application.

should have liked to do-take a little more time to consider this case. LINDLEY, M.R., said: I do not think we are in a position to do what we Time presses. If this election is to be made at all, it must be made prac tically at once; and, having had an opportunity of considering the matter, I have come to a tolerable clear opinion that we have jurisdiction to make this order, and that we ought to exercise that jurisdiction. I will not go through the whole of this very long will. In substance the case stands

thus. The court has to consider what ought to be done under the following circumstances. Lord Sefton is unfortunately a lunatic. He is entitled to certain settled estates of considerable value. Then there is a will-the will of his father-which leaves him another large property, called the Sefton estates, on condition that he resettles, and thereby cuts down-not destroys, but only cuts down-his interest in the settled estate. Bearing in mind that under his father's will he gets not only a large estate, but also other benefits-the legacy of £10,000 and the payment of his debts-it is obvious that from one point of view, and that one which the court will take into consideration, it is to his advantage to accept this devise. What, then, ought to be done? If this gentleman is in the least degree likely to live, and is actuated by the feelings by which sons usually are or ought to be actuated, there can be no question that he would accept the Sefton estates on the conditions stated in the will. There are obvious family advantages in so doing. I am not at all prepared to say that it is the duty of the court to look only to the question of the lunatic's pecuniary benefit. It is for his benefit to do what his father wished, and to keep the two estates together. It is in this case for his pecuniary interest, because he will get a great deal more money if he accepts the devise. It is for the benefit of the lunatic that he should perform the condition upon which alone he can obtain, or at least can keep, the Sefton estate. I say keep it rather than get it, because under the will he has got it, and he will lose it if he does not resettle it. Let us look at the matter, first, apart from the Lunacy Act, 1890. I go by steps. Speaking generally, and without reference to the statute De Prerogativa Regis, I take it that these propositions are elementary and indisputable: first, a lunatic can accept a gift of property, or a bequest or a devise of property; second, a lunatic can accept a gift or legacy upon conditions provided that the gift and those conditions are for his benefit; thirdly, if a lunatic is entitled to property upon conditions, it is the duty of his committee to do all that is necessary to preserve the property by performing the conditions. Authority for the last of these propositions will be found in Collinson's Lunacy, vol. i., p. 294: "If any part of the estate be liable to forfeiture, or held upon conditions, it is his (the committee's) duty, if possible, to protect it from the forfeiture, to satisfy the conditions, and, when necessary, to apply to the Chancellor for directions." All that I take to be perfectly settled law. Now, suppose one of the conditions is that the lunatic shall give up some interest in real property to which he is entitled, the general principle just laid down will apply to that case. There is nothing I know of in the statutory law contrary to that view, except the provision in the old statute De Prerogativa. That Act has been construed in such a way as to prevent the court from selling or mortgaging the estates of lunatics for the purpose of raising money, even when the lunatic was in danger of arrest under a ca. sa., or was in prison. That was rather a narrow construction, perhaps. But the language of the Act is important. The purpose of the enactment is, that if the lunatic recovers what is not required for his maintenance will be handed over to him, and if he dies it will go as his property ought to go. In no way is it to be aliened. The courts have held that they had no power to alien the lunatic's property, even for the lunatic's benefit, the object of the Act being to preserve the property for him or his representatives. But it seems to me that we shall be producing for the first time a still narrower construction, if we say, under the stress of this Act, which was passed for a totally different purpose, that we are incompetent to sanction giving up a small part of the lunatic's real estate for the purpose of saving for him a far larger part of it. I agree it would not do to say that because we think our predecessors made a mistake we are going to construe the Act differently. But I am not disposed to press a narrow construction beyond what is necessary. It seems to me we should be making a very bad precedent if we were to hold that this statute of Edward 2, passed to preserve the property of lunatics, prevented us doing what is for the advantage of the lunatic, even in relation to property, and also in other ways. If, then, we have jurisdiction in the matter, it seems to me it follows as a matter of course, in these circumstances, without invoking the Act of 1890 at all, that we ought to exercise that jurisdiction. I will now say a word or two about the Lunacy Act, 1890. It was very strenuously contended by Mr. Farwell that certain sections in that Act authorized the court to make the order here asked for. I think we should be making a bad precedent if we were to say that. We cannot, I think, bring this case within the language of the Act of 1890 without unduly straining that language; and I base my judgment upon the inherent jurisdiction of the court, which is not bounded by the cases enumerated in that Act. With respect to section 124, of which we heard so much, and which enacts that "the committee of the estate, or such person as the judge approves, shall in the name and on behalf of the lunatic execute and do such assurances and things for giving effect to any order under this Act as the judge directs, and every such assurance and thing shall be valid and effectual, and shall take effect accordingly "-I do not invoke that at all. That section, I think, is put in to supply a possible defect or remove a possible doubt. That view does not, however, prevent the court from doing the very same thing under its general jurisdiction. I look upon that section simply as an enabling clause. I cannot help thinking that we should be doing quite wrong were we to give effect to any contention which cuts down the power of the court in this matter. If the case had been pressed I should have liked to look at some authorities, to make sure that I have not made any mistake. As to the principles upon which I have proceeded I do not feel the slightest doubt. I think this application ought to be granted.

CHITTY and COLLINS, L.JJ., delivered judgment to the same effect.COUNSEL, Farwell, Q.C., and W. H. Cozens-Hardy; Warrington, Q.C., and Arkle; P. O. Lawrence, Q.C., and Sargant. SOLICITORS, Gedge, Kirby, & Millett; Field, Roscoe, & Co., for Gibbons & Arkle, Liverpool.

[Reported by R. C. MACKENZIE, Barrister-at-Law.]

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This was an action by the plaintiff company asking for a declaration that they were entitled to erect an engine-house and any other buildings they might think fit upon a piece of land purchased by them at Upper Sunbury-road, Hampton, within the defendants' district, without the consent of the defendants. The plaintiffs were a waterworks company constituted under an Act of 51 Geo. 3, c. 169 and other Acts mentioned in the preamble to their Act of 1852, to supply water to a large district on the western side of London. By the Grand Junction Waterworks Act, 1852, the plaintiffs were empowered to make and maintain certain works therein described. In 1853, under the powers of the Act of 1852, they acquired the piece of land in question at Upper Sunbury-road, and built waterworks thereon. In 1897 the plaintiffs desired to extend their works and to erect an engine-house on the said piece of land in connection with their existing works. A dispute arose between the plaintiffs and the defendants as to whether the plaintiffs could erect an engine-house without the consent of the defendants. At defendants' request copies of the plans and sections of the engine-house were sent to the defendants. On the 20th of October, 1897, the plaintiffs gave the defendants notice that they intended to proceed with the engine-house, and commenced the work. On the 11th of November, 1897, the defendants' clerk wrote to the plaintiffs' solicitors that if the work was proceeded with he was directed to take proceedings against the plaintiffs for contravening the Public Health (Building in Streets) Act, 1888. On the 15th of December, 1897, the plaintiffs gave the defendants rotice that they intended to proceed with the building, and they actually did so and spent a considerof March, 1898, the plaintiffs received notice from the defendants that the able sum of money before the writ in this action was issued. erection of the building was contrary to section 3 of the Public Health (Building in Streets); Acts, 1888, and requesting a discontinuance of the offence. The plaintiffs issued their writ in this action on the 12th of March. On the 15th of March the defendants laid an information before the Middlesex magistrates against the plaintiffs for contravening the Public Health (Building in Streets) Act, 1888, and a summons was issued summoning the plaintiffs to appear before a court of summary jurisdiction. This summons was heard on the 9th of May, and the magis trates' decided adversely to the plaintiffs. The magistrates' decision was capable of revision by a Divisional Court and the defendants contended first, that the Chancery Division had no jurisdiction to make the declaration prayed for in the action; and, secondly, that the court in the exercise of its discretion ought not to make any such declaration, but that the plaintiffs ought to be left to make their defence before the tribunal which was the proper one under the statutes involved to deal with the question.

On the 7th

STIRLING, J.-The question is, ought I to allow this action to go on? The statement of claim and writ simply ask for a declaration, and the form of the action is justified by an appeal to ord. 25, r. 5. The last section of that rule is expressed in the widest terms, but it is contended on the other hand that these wide words must be read with some limitation. It does not seem to me that I am called on to decide whether the words ought to be limited or no. I am not satisfied that in this case there is an entire absence of jurisdiction to give relief. The material authorities seem to me to be three. The first is Lord Auckland v. Westminster Local Board of Works (20 W. R. 845, 7 Ch. App. 597). That was a case on the Metropolis Management Amendment Act, 1862, and the Court of Appeal held that the District Board of Works ought to have given an owner of land compensation under section 74 of that Act, and that the threat under section 75 to demolish houses erected on the land was ultra vires, and that the Board might accordingly be restrained by the Court of Chancery. This case was criticized by Sir George Jessel sitting as Master of the Rolls in Kerr v. The Corporation of Preston (25 W. R. 265, 6 Ch. D. 463), who there refused to grant an injunction to restrain the local authority from taking summary proceedings before the magistrates for the recovery of penalties for an offence against the Public Health Act, 1875. The third case is Stannard v. Vestry of St. Giles, Camberwell (30 W. R. 693, 20 Ch. D. 190). That case was a dispute about a drain. The defendants gave notice to the plaintiff that they would enter on his land to reinstate the drain, but abandoned this intention and took proceedings against him before the magistrates. The plaintiff claimed an injunction to restrain both the intended trespass and the proceedings. It was held that as no intention to commit a trespass had been proved or alleged, the plaintiff had not made out his case for an injunction against the trespass, and that being so the court had no jurisdiction to restrain the proceedings before the magistrates. That being the state of the authorities I do not think it would be right for me to say that there is absolutely no jurisdiction in this court to restrain the proceedings before the magistrates. In this case, as in Stannard's case, there is no evidence that the local board intend to commit any trespass, and there is therefore no ground for the interference of the court on the footing that the defendants threaten or intend to commit any illegal act. Now, whether or no there be jurisdiction in the court to restrain by injunction in such a case as the present, it seems to me that this power should be exercised with the greatest caution, and I respectfully adopt the words of Jessel, M.R., in Stannard's case: "Where the Legislature has pointed out a mode of proceeding before a magistrate it is not, as a

general rule, for another court to interfere to stop that proceeding by injunction.' And I desire to add that in conflicts between local bodies and private individuals I think that rule ought to be applied very strictly. I think therefore that in the exercise of the discretion which is vested in the court it ought to be very slow to grant an injunction to restrain proceedings before the magistrate where the Legislature has pointed that out as the proper mode of proceeding. A fortiori it will be still less likely to make such a declaration as is asked for in the present case in the absence of special circumstances. That brings me to the question whether upon the materials before me there are any such circumstances shewn. In my judgment there are not. It seems to me therefore that this is a case in which the court ought not either to interfere by way of injunction or to make the declaration asked for.-COUNSEL, Bosanquet, Q.C., Macmorran, Q.C., and R. C. Glen; Jenkins, Q.C., and H. Courthope Munroe. SOLICITORS, Bircham & Co.; Kent & Son.

[Reported by J. I. STIRLING, Barrister-at-Law.]

TOMS v. CLACTON URBAN DISTRICT COUNCIL. Romer, J. 8th June.
LOCAL GOVERNMENT-BURIAL-VENDOR AND PURCHASER-BURIAL GROUND
-FURCHASE OF LAND BY DISTRICT COUNCIL FOR-ACTION TO RESTRAIN
BURYING WITHIN PROHIBITED DISTANCE FROM DWELLING-HOUSE

BURIAL Acr, 1855 (18 & 19 VICT. c. 128), s. 9.

This was an action for an injunction to restrain the defendants from using land in their possession for the purposes of a cemetery, except beyond a radius of 100 yards from the plaintiff's dwelling-house. It appeared that the vendor of the land had sold the fee simple to the defendants for the purposes of a cemetery, and the conveyance contained a covenant by them not to use the land for any other purposes except with the vendor's consent. The plaintiff was the occupier of a small cottage close to the land. This cottage belonged to the vendor, and the plaintiff was in his service as gardener. The tenancy appeared to be a weekly one. By 18 & 19 Vict. c. 128, s. 9, no ground not already used as or appropriated for a cemetery shall be used for burials within the distance of 100 yards from any dwelling-house without the consent of the owner, lessee, or occupier of such dwelling-house. The plaintiff was crossexamined with the object of extracting from him the admission that he was plaintiff in name only, and that the real, although not nominal, plaintiff was bis employer, the vendor of the land. ROMER, J.-I will assume for the purpose of my judgment that the land is subject to the restrictions imposed by the Burial Act, 1852 (15 & 16 Vict. c. 85), and the Burial Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 128), or to analogous restrictions. The vendor granted the land in order that every part of it should be used for the purposes of a cemetery. He then placed his gardener in a cottage near it for the purpose of bringing this action and preventing in effect any of it being so used. There is no doubt that the action in substance is the vendor's action, and the costs of the action will have to be provided by him. Could be then bring an action to prevent its use for the express purpose for which he sold it? That would be derogating from his grant to the defendants. It must be remembered that the defendants are doing nothing illegal. Only they have under the Burial Acts to obtain the statutory consent of the owner to what they are doing. The vendor, therefore, could not bring an action. person in the position of the plaintiff, and acting bonâ fide, do so-that is to say, a lessee or occupier, after and with full knowledge of the vendor's grant and its purpose? Such a person could not be in any better position than his own grantor, or acquire a right which his own grantor had not. In fact the plaintiff is a weekly tenant only of the vendor, and he could give a week's notice to the plaintiff at any time. Other grounds might be stated for dismissing the action. But on the above ground alone the The defendants asked for costs as between solicitor and client under the Public Authorities Protecion Act, 1893, citing Harrop v. Ossett Corporation (46 W. R. 391; 1898, 1 Ch. 525). The plaintiff submitted that the action was not, within the words of section 1, brought against the defendants" for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act of Parliament or of any public duty or authority," the cause of action being one of private right. His lordship reserved his judgment on this point.-COUNSEL, Levett, Q.C., and C. E. Jones; Neville, Q.C., and Ingpen. SOLICITORS, Jones & Son, Colchester; Chamberlayne & Short.

action fails. I dismiss the action with costs.

[Reported by J. F. WALEY, Barrister-at-Law.]

High Court-Queen's Bench Division.

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Could a

BE TAXED

BAILEY v. WATSON. Div. Court. 10th June. COUNTY COURT-ACTION COMMENCED IN HIGH COURT-JUDGMENT AS TO PART OF CLAIM-DISPUTED AMOUNT REMITTED BY REGISTRAR FOR TRIAL TO COUNTY COURT-SCALE ON WHICH COSTS WERE COUNTY COURT ACT, 1888 (51 & 52 Vier c. 43), s. 65. This was an appeal of the defendant from the decision of the county court judge of Swansea as to the scale on which certain costs should be taxed. The action was brought in the Swansea Registry of the High Court to recover some £44 and a summons for judgment was taken out under Order XIV. On the hearing of the summons the district registrar made an order that the plaintiff should be at liberty to sign final judgment for £27 18s. 5d. with costs; that the defendant might defend as to £2 03. 6d. (the remainder of the claim being abandoned), and that the action should be remitted to the Swansea County Court The defendant paid the £27 183. 5d. with taxed costs, aud ultimately the plaintiff recovered judgment for the disputed balance of £2 Os. 6d. in the county court, and

he claimed that these costs should be taxed upon the scale applicable where the amount recovered was between £20 and £50, on the authority of Kemble v. Bennett (1894, 2 Q. B. 329). The registrar held that the cost: should be taxed on the scale applicable to where the amount sought to be recovered was between £2 and £5. The county court judge reversed that decision and directed that the costs should be taxed on the higher scale. The defendant appealed.

THE COURT (DAY and LAWRANCE, JJ.) allowed the appeal. In the case of Kemble v. Bennett the whole of the action was remitted to the county court although only a portion of the claim was in dispute. There rightly the costs were taxed on the higher scale. In this case judgment in the High Court had been given as to part of the claim, and the only sum sought to be recovered in the county court at all was this sum of £2 03. 6d. That was the only sum which could be said to have been recovered in the county court and the costs on the scale applicable to the recovery of a sum between £2 and £5 was the scale under which the defendant's costs ought to be taxed.- COUNSEL, R. O. B. Lane; Villiers Meager. SOLICITORS, Riddell, Vaizey, & Smith, for Viner, Leeder, & Morris, Swansea; Richard White, for Lawrence Richards, Swansea. [Reported by ERSKINE REID, Barrister-at-Law.]

Div

REG. v. SHARPE AND OTHERS (JUSTICES). Ex parte ELLIS.
Court. 8th June.
ADDITIONAL
LICENSING ACTS-JUSTICES-NOTICE OF APPLICATION FOR
EXCISE LICENCE-HOUSE BEING UNFINISHED NOTICE AFFIXED TO FLOOR
-SUCH NOTICE SUFFICIENT.

In this case a rule for a mandamus had been granted calling upon certain justices of Brentford to shew cause why they should not hear and determine an application by H. W. Ellis for licences to sell wine, spirits, and beers. No one was instructed by the justices to shew cause, and Master Mellor read the following affidavit filed by two of the said justices, which was as follows: An application was duly made before us and certain other justices of the Brentford Division, at the adjourned general annual licensing meeting at the Town-hall, Brentford, on the 4th of March last, by Mr. Charles Robinson, solicitor, for Mr. H. W. Ellis, of Clovelly, Lampton-road, Hounslow, wine merchant, for a beer-dealer's additional licence, a spirit-dealer's additional licence, and a wine off-licence, in pursuance of 26 & 27 Vict. c. 33, s. 1; 24 & 25 Vict. c. 21, s. 2; and 23 Vict. c. 27, e. 3. It was proved before us that the said H. W. Ellis had given the necessary notices to the police and to the overseers, and had duly advertised his application in a local newspaper and had properly posted his notices on the door of the church of the district. A preliminary objection was taken by Mr. Lay, solicitor, appearing on behalf of Messrs. Moss Bros., of the Broadway, St. Margaret's, and Mr. Wicks, publican, of the Turk's Head, St. Margaret's, who were opposing the application, that the statutory notice was not complete, as it had not been posted on the door of the house proposed to be licensed, inasmuch as the house was not completed. The parish constable who had posted the notices having proved on oath to the satisfaction of the justices that the notice was affixed to floorboards in the doorway of a building not complete, the justices thereupon found there was no door in fact on which the notice could be posted as directed and required by the statute. Mr. Grain, counsel on behalf of Mr. Ellis, applied to the licensing justices on the adjourned licensed day-viz., the 31st of March, for the justices to re-hear his application on the ground that the justices were mistaken in their decision, and still had full powers to hear Mr. Ellis's application on its merits, but the justices declined to re-open the case, having once decided that the notice was bad." Counsel in support of the rule contended that the justices were mistaken and that the notice affixed to the floorboards in the doorway of the uncompleted building was sufficient to satisfy the THE COURT (DAY and LAWRANCE, JJ.), made the rule absolute.COUNSEL, Grain. SOLICITOR, Charles Robinson, Brentford and London.

statute.

[Reported by ERSKINE REID, Barrister-at-Law.]

When the seeds sent grew

HOWCROFT v. LAYCOCK. Div. Court. 8th June. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-CABBAGE SEEDS-USUAL TRADE DISCLAIMER OF ANY WARRANTY-SEEDS TURNED OUT TO BE THOSE OF A DIFFERENT KIND OF CABBAGE TO THAT ORDERED-ACTION BY VENDOR. Appeal by defendant from a judgment of his Honour Judge Lumley Smith, sitting at the County Court, Westminster. The plaintiff had supplied some seeds to the defendant's order. up, they proved to be those of another species of cabbage, and valueless for the purpose for which the purchaser required them. The plaintiff sought to recover the price of the seeds; the defendant counter-claimed for breach of contract. The county court judge held that a disclaimer of warranty at the head of the invoice sent when the seeds were delivered, to the effect that the seller gave no warranty, express or implied, as to description, quality, productiveness, or any other matter connected with the seeds he sent out, that he would not be responsible in in any way for the crop, and that, if the purchaser did not accept the seeds on those terms, they were at once to be returned, protected the plaintiff, and he gave judgment in his favour accordingly. No suggestion of fraud was raised.

DAY, J., in giving judgment, said the defendant asked to be supplied with seeds of a kind of cabbage called Couve Tronchuda. When the seeds sent grew up, they turned out to be Jersey kale, a species of cabbage tree only suitable for making into walking-sticks. The notice very commonly put at the head of seed merchants' bills that they gave no warranty with the seeds did not entitle the seller to deliver something perfectly different to the thing asked for, and which he undertook to supply. It had been

argued for the plaintiff that, the defendant having accepted the goods, he must pay the agreed price unless he could shew that the goods had been warranted and had not come up to the warranty. The custom of the trade might qualify a contract, but it could not destroy it. A rational construction must be put upon the words relied upon. The construction desired by the plaintiff to be established by custom of the trade was unreasonable. LAWRANCE, J., concurred. Appeal allowed; leave to appeal granted. COUNSEL, A. T. Lawrence, Q.C., and G. B. Hamilton; Earle. SOLICITORS, G. E. Webb; E. F. & H. Landm.

[Reported by ERSKINE REID, Barrister-at-Law.]

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business carried on by him, whether alone or in partnership with others, and whether personally or by an agent, &c.,' and that he did not mean to say, 'for the purpose of any trade or business carried on by him, or for the purpose of any other business."" His lordship did not say whether that suggested interpretation was the correct one, but he agreed with Cave, J.'s decision that the section did not apply when the money was lent by the wife for purposes other than those of the husband's trade or business. It was said that Ex parte Tidswell was in conflict with Re Tuff, Ex parte Nottingham (35 W. R. 567, 19 Q. B. D. 88), but that was not so, because in the latter case the wife's proof was admitted, not against her husband, but against a firm of which he was a member.

ALTREE v. ALTREE (STAFFORDSHIRE FINANCIAL CO., Claimants). COUNSEL, C. A. Russell, Q.C., and Hansell; Upjohn, Q.C., and Frank Div. Court. 8th June.

BILL OF SALE-VALIDITY-ADDRESS OF GRANTEE-BILLS OF SALE ACT, 1882 (45 & 46 VICT. c. 43), s. 9.

This was an appeal from a county court, and the question was whether a bill of sale was void by reason of the address of the grantees being omitted. The material words of the bill of exchange were as follows: "This indenture made the 12th day of March, 1898, between John Altree, of Triangle Farm, Chase Town, in the parish of Hammerwich, in the county of Stafford, farmer, hereinafter called 'the borrower,' of the one part, and the Staffordshire Financial Co. (Limited), hereinafter called ⚫ the lenders,' of the other part." Section 9 of the Bills of Sale Act, 1882, provides that a bill of sale “shall be void unless made in accordance with the form in the schedule." In the form referred to a blank is left for the address of the grantee. The county court judge held that the bill of sale was void. It was contended, on behalf of the appellants, that though it was necessary in a bill of sale to give the address and description of the grantor there was no need to give the address or description of the grantee, and further, that even if an individual grantee had to give an address it was not necessary in the case of a limited liability company, because a company could be identified without an address. The following cases were cited to shew that, as long as the variation from the form in the schedule was not a material variation, the bill was not invalidated: Ex parte Stanford (17 Q. B. D. 259), Thomas v. Kelly (13 App. Cas., at p. 311), Lindfoot v. Pottett (1895, 5 Ch. 825), Simmons v. Woodward (1892, App. Cas. 100), Murray v. Mackenzie (L. R. 10 C. P. 625), Maugham v. Sharpe (34 L. J. C. P. 19), Parsons v. Brand (25 Q. B. D. 110), Simmons v. Trollope (1897, 1 Q. B. 24), Dolcini v. Dolcini (1895, 1 Q. B. 898), Smith v. Hammond (1896, 1 Q. B. 571), Shears v. Jacob (L. R. 1 C. P. 513). It was contended that the address in the case of a company was mere surplusage inasmuch as it was not required for the purpose of identification. It was also contended that the use of the words "in accordance with" the form, in section 9, instead of the word "in," indicated that all that was required was that the bill should be substantially in the form provided.

THE COURT (DAY and LAWRANCE, JJ.) dismissed the appeal, on the ground that the provision of section 9 of the Bills of Sale Act, 1882, together with the fact that in the form therein referred to a blank was left for the address of the grantee as well as for that of the grantor shewed that the address of the grantee should appear in the bill.-COUNSEL, J. B. Matthews; Disturnal. SOLICITORS, Smiles & Co.; L. W. Lewis & Sons, Walsall; Pitman & Sons, for Barnes & Son, Lichfield.

[Reported by C. G. WILBRAHAM, Barrister-at-Law.]

Bankruptcy Cases.

Re CLARK, Ex parte SCHULZE. C. A. 10th June. BANKRUPTCY-PROOF-LOAN BY WIFE TO HUSBAND-MARRIED WOMEN'S PROPERTY ACT, 1882, s. 3. This was an appeal from the judgment of Wright, J., holding that the wife of the debtor was entitled to prove against the debtor's estate for money lent by her to her husband. The case turned on the construction to be placed on section 3 of the Married Women's Property Act, 1882, which enacts that "any money or other estate of the wife lent or entrusted by her to her husband for the purpose of any trade or business carried on by him, or otherwise, shall be treated as assets of her husband's estate in case of his bankruptcy, under reservation of the wife's claim to a dividend as a creditor for the amount or value of such money or other estate after, but not before, all claims of the other creditors of the husband for valuable consideration in money or money's worth have been satisfied." The money in question was not lent by the wife to her husband for the purpose of his trade or business. The wife's proof was admitted for voting purposes by the chairman at the first meeting of creditors. Wright, J., held that the proof was rightly admitted. One of the creditors appealed.

THE COURT (A. L. SMITH, RIGBY, and VAUGHAN WILLIAMS, L.JJ.) dismissed the appeal.

A. L. SMITH, L.J., said that the appellant's contention in effect was that whenever a wife lent money to her husband and he became bankrupt her claim must be postponed until all the other creditors had been satisfied. That construction of the section entirely ignored the words, "for the purpose of any trade or business carried on by him, or other wise." The words "or otherwise" did present a difficulty, but whatever their true meeting might be, it could not be that the limitation as to trade or business was to be cut out. In Ex parte Tidswell (35 W. R. 669) Cave, J., had to consider the meaning of the section, and he said: "I guess, rather than conclude, that the draftsman meant to say, ' any money of the wife lent by her to her husband for the purpose of any trade or

RIGBY and VAUGHAN WILLIAMS, L.JJ., concurred. Appeal dismissed.— Mellor. SOLICITORS, F. W. & H. Hilbery; Arnold & Henry White. Reported by F. O. ROBINSON, Barrister-at-Law.]

SOLICITORS ORDERED TO BE STRUCK OFF THE ROLLS. 14 June.-RICHARD ARMSTRONG (155, Fenchurch-street, London). 14 June-WILLIAM NORTH (Pudsey, Yorkshire) [facts to be submitted by solicitor in affidavit to Incorporated Law Society for reconsideration].

NEW ORDERS, &c.

TRANSFER OF ACTIONS.
ORDER OF COURT.

Thursday, the 9th day of June, 1898.

I, Hardinge Stanley, Earl of Halsbury, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, do hereby order that the action mentioned in the Schedule hereto shall be transferred to the Honourable Mr. Justice Wright. SCHEDULE.

Mr. Justice Romer (1898-T.-No. 530).

In re Thom, Baker & Company Limited
Beatrice Huxtable (Widow) v. Thom, Baker & Company Limited and
Harry Maconochie.
HALSBURY, C.

LAW SOCIETIES.

SOLICITORS' BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION.

ANNIVERSARY FESTIVAL.

Association was held on Wednesday at the Whitehall Rooms, Hôtel The thirty-eighth anniversary festival of the Solicitors' Benevolent Métropole, Mr. JOSEPH ADDISON taking the chair. Among the guests were Mr. Reginald Brown, Mr. Henry Kueeshaw, J.P., Mr. G. Buckston Browne, M.R.C.S., Mr. W. Allen, M.P., Mr. C. Bill, M.P., Mr. T. SkewesCox, M.P., Mr. E. A. Goulding, M.P., Mr. C. J. Blagg (Cheadle), Mr. Sidney Smith, Mr. C. E. Jones, Mr. H. Manisty, Mr. H. Morten Cotton (chairman of Board of Directors), Mr. W. Melmoth Walters, Mr. Henry Power, F.R.C.S., Mr. George P. Allen (Manchester), Mr. B. F. Hawksley, Mr. C. G. Boxall, C. B., Mr. J. Roger B. Gregory, Mr. Samuel Harris (Leicester), Mr. Alexander Neilson, Mr. Richard W. Tweedie, Mons. Rusteyko, Mr. H. J. Osborne (president Shropshire Law Society), Mr. Thomas Eggar (president Sussex Law Society), Mr. W. C. H. Cross (president Bristol Law Society), Mr. J. Prior, Mr. J. A. C. Tanner, Mr. James Turner, Mr. C. D. Kimber, M.A., Mr. L. F. Cotton, Mr. M. H. Cotton, Mr. S. G. Spreat, Mr. A. J. Vere Bass, Mr. A. S. Massey, Mr. R. S. Taylor, Mr. Joseph Soames, Mr. F. Sheffield, Mr. G. Carrick (Wisbech), Mr. N. Goddard Jackson, Mr. M. F. Monier-Williams, Mr. J. W. Howlett (Brighton), Mr. J. W. A. Calkin, Mr. Grantham R. Dodd, Mr. A. E. Timbrell, Mr. Wm. Addison, Mr. H. Bevir (Wootton Bassett), Mr. C. L. Smiles, Mr. W. J. Boycott, Mr. Harry Woodward, Mr. W. B. Harrison, Mr. Archibald Hanbury, Mr. G. Roddam Burn, Mr. Roddam W. Burn, Mr. Frank M. Crisp, Mr. J. W. Crisp, Mr. W. J. D. Andrew, Mr. R. H. Purves, Mr. Henry Tyrrell, Mr. H. R. Tyrrell, Mr. G. E. Tyrrell, Mr. A. J. Harris, Mr. J. A. Collins, Mr. Charles Burgin, Mr. E. Lambert Burgin, Mr. W. Howard Gray, Mr. E. Cleave, and Mr. J. E. Stephenson.

The loyal toasts having been given from the chair and duly honoured, The CHAIRMAN proposed "The Solicitors' Benevolent Association, and may prosperity continue to attend it." He said he was proposing that which was the chief toast of the evening-indeed, it was the real occasion of their meeting, and he thought that this meeting spoke well for the merits of the charity, and for the generous support which it received. The association, in choosing its chairman on such occasions, differed from most societies. With its influence and with its objects, it would have no difficulty in placing in the chair one of great name or of distinguished attainments which might add power to the words he should utter. But it chose one of its own members, thinking-and perhaps wisely-that one who had toiled in the ranks with their comrades who had fallen by the way might be best acquainted with the dangers and difficulties that beset the legal path, and the sad results that awaited upon early death or failure. It might be that to some-he hoped to many-that legal path might have been made smooth by those who had gone before; but to most of them it had not been so, and those of them to whom some measure of success had been accorded, how well they knew the difficulties and dangers

The toast was drunk upstanding and with enthusiasm. The SECRETARY (Mr. J. T. Scott) announced subscriptions and donations amounting to £892, amongst which were the following: The Chairman, £105; Mr. H. Morten Cotton (chairman of the Board of Directors), £50; St. Geo. H. Lewis, £50; Mr. J. W. Howlett (Brighton), £50; Mr. C. S. Clarke (Brighton), £25; Mr. W. Melmoth Walters, £21. Mr. C. J. BLOGG proposed the health of "The Housos of Parliament." He said that there was no question there were some drawbacks in connection with the Houses of Parliament. Outsiders could not help seeing some slight imperfections, just as there were spots upon the sun; but he thought they would all agree that the Houses of Parliament would compare favourably with any representative body in the world, not only because it comprised great talent, not only hat it was an assembly of a representative character, but for its generous appreciation of opponents, of which there was an example in the tribute paid by both Houses on the death of a great statesman a few weeks ago. There was another point which among lawyers it was legitimate to mention, and that was that the legal element was particularly strong, as he hoped it always would be, in both Houses of Parliament. History recorded that there was one occasion when a Parliament was tried without any lawyers, but the result of that experiment was well known, and he thought it would never be tried again. As lawyers they were indebted to the parliamentary labours of our legislators, for a part of their business would not exist if it were not for the extreme ingenuity with which the statutes were enacted. If it were not for the puzzles which were set by our legislators a good deal of the business of lawyers would not be; therefore they were in a position to drink the toast. The House of Lords acted as a drag which was occasionally very useful, and there were people sufficiently old-fashioned to say "Thank God we have a House of Lords." The House of Lords was certainly strengthened, and its life was prolonged, by the accession of fresh blood which it continually received from the learned professions, and from the legal profession in particular. But for this he thought there would be a danger of the House of Lords stagnating; but it contained an immense amount of talent and it did an occasional signal service to the country. Mr. T. SKEWES-Cox, M.P., in returning thanks, said that the longer he was in the House of Commons the more he was impressed with the dignity of the House of Lords and the absolute necessity of having a second chamber. With regard to the House of Commons, of which there were three members present, it consisted of 670 members, of whom 139 were barristers, and, he regretted to say, only twenty-seven solicitors. This was far too few. If the House of Commons was to pass just, intelligent, and easily construed laws there must be more solicitors as its members.

which they had to go through, how easy it was to take the wrong turning, achieved the thought of which would be most pleasant to them, but the what care was needed, how often that which looked tempting might lead occasions when it had been in their power to help some struggling or to loss, how often that which had promised brightly had turned out to be fallen brother, to bring some help to a stricken home or to those left an absolute failure. And when they thought of the young beginners who desolate, and the recollection that of those amongst whom they had lived started upon that difficult path, inexperienced, eager to work, anxious per- and laboured there were some, he hoped it might be many, who would haps to surround themselves with the comforts of a home, how could they bear them in kindly memory. but sympathize when in that struggle something which seemed tempting in business was entered upon and then the result was failure, something which promised them well but had not fulfilled that promise. Even with the best of efforts misfortune came, and came sometimes quite undeserved, and even when there had been no want of care. Then, too, there was the sad failure of health-want of strength to fight the battle of life. Or it might be that silent messenger which came to all, came all untimely to some new home and left, not only the vacant place, but left also wretchedness and want to those who remained. Those who administered this charity knew, as he thought all those who were present knew, that there was no sadder lot in life than that of the widow and family of the young professional man left unprovided for. He had no doubt that the appeals which reached the directors of the association wrung their hearts, and that were their resources many times what they are they would be all insufficient to reach the needs of the deserving applicants for help. He looked back now nearly to forty years when, emerging from his articles, he, with many young friends, looked upon an uncertain future, and it had been one of the pleasures of his life to meet in some corner of the country, in some old town, or it might be in some provincial president coming up year by year to join the Council of the Incorporated Law Society, and to grasp again the hand of those old friends made some thirty years ago, and to find that he had prospered. But there was a note of sadness-success had not been the lot of all one's friends. Some were poor and stricken, and that which had been his experience he knew had been the experience of nearly all who had reached his years. To turn to the object of this society, and the efforts which it made to reach those who were in need: it was founded forty years ago by those whose motives and whose labours entitled them to a just meed of applause at the hands of the profession. It had always grown and prospered. In 1868, ten years after it was founded, there were 1,927 solicitors who were members of the association. In 1878 the number had grown to 2,489. In 1888 there were 3,198 members, and in 1898 there were 3,425 members. There were, how ever, 16,000 solicitors upon the roll, and he should greatly like to see that number extended. Then, in 1868 all the society was able to grant was £490. In 1878 that had grown to £2,445; in 1888 it had increased to £3,704, and last year the amount was £4,702. These figures, gratifying as they were, were not too large. He was sure it would be the wish of those present that he should tender a word of hearty thanks to their country friends. With all their local burdens, and the many claims upon them, they did most ungrudgingly and liberally support the association. He should like, too-and there he knew he should have their sympathy entirely-to say how much they were indebted to their directors and officers, and those by whom the affairs of the association were carried on. Their directors were among the busiest members of the profession, and they devoted to the work of this charity their time, their energy, their experience in the most ungrudging and unselfish manner. The charity was administered by them as he believed no other body of men could administer the charity of their profession. Their hearts, he had no doubt, were often troubled that they could do no more, but he was sure that those he was addressing would join with him in a hearty expression of gratitude to them all for the kind and excellent work they were doing. He did not expect that this year the usual level attained at this festival as regarded donations and subscriptions would be reached. Last year all ranks laid upon themselves heavy taxes and burdens, and this year he would not be surprised to find that the friends of the association were not able to support it to the extent they had done in other years. But a great debt of gratitude was due to those who had attended the festival to give the association their support. And here, again, he wished to say how much they were indebted to their country friends, many of whom had come with great inconvenience to themselves. And, amongst others, he was sure they would not think him invidious if he mentioned the name of their dear old friend Mr. Howlett as being one of their longest and best supporters. Even when he had been suffering from ill-health he had always thought of the society, and it was a great pleasure to see that he had gained a measure of strength. He (the chairman) trusted that all whom his words reached would, as far as they could, endeavour to induce tuore who did not already subscribe to the association to become annual subscribers, giving something yearly, however small an amount it might be. Because it was the steady, unfailing income which was derived from subscriptions upon which the directors felt that they could really rely which was the mainstay of the association. It was the fashion to say that we live in a cold and selfish world, but this association and its objects and many similar societies were standing protests against that slander, and he for one declared that throughout all his life he had enjoyed the greatest help and kindness, often unsought and unexpected, and he was sure his lot had been the lot of most of them. And that help and support was in their hearts, he was sure, to-night when they were thinking of the objects of the association. Not alone was it to those upon whom misfortune and sorrow might fall that disappointment came, but with each and all of them many bright hopes failed and many pleasing illusions were dispelled and much which seemed of fair promise turned out an empty show. But there was one light which shone upon our path which would never fail us and that was the light which shone through the good works and kindly purposes they were met to-night to support. It might be when they came to cease from their labours, and looked upon their past, that it would not be the victories they had won or any material success they had

Mr. H. MANISTY gave the toast, "The Bench and the Bar." He said this was peculiarly appropriate, because as solicitors they knew more about the subject than those whose health he was proposing knew about it themselves. Solicitors were the constant critics of the bench and the bar, and everything they did was done in front of solicitors. He was sorry there was no member of the bench present; but that presented no difficulty, because every member of the bench was a member of the bar, and continued a member of the bar. It was a fortunate thing for the public and for solicitors and for the bar itself that this was so, because every member of the bench knew from his own experience the difficulties which were felt and had to be dealt with by both solicitors and barristers. It was not, as was the case in foreign countries, where a man commenced his career on the bench, and knowing the difficulties, the occupants of the bench refrained from making observations such as one heard of in connection with other countries. The bench and bar would compare with any bench and any bar in the whole world. But they were present as members of the Solicitors' Benevolent Association, and he should like to say one word upon that point with regard to the bar. The Barristers' Benevolent Association was not so old as this, and he was not sure that its annual income was as large, but they might take a lesson from the bar in individual kindness, individual benevolence, and individual liberality, in which respect solicitors could not compare with the bar. He had been brought up in the atmosphere of the law from his earliest years, and he knew of cases where barristers had individually given their money and time and everything that was required to assist members of their own profession who were in need. He knew of instances where they had given' liberally and, outsiders might think, with almost too lavish a hand. Although the Barristers' Benevolent Association was not so old or so wealthy as was the 'Solicitors' Benevolent Association, more had been done by the bar possibly, until late years, for those in need than by the solicitors' branch. He had the greatest feeling of respect for the liberality of the bar. He had said that every member of the bench was a member of the bar, and every member of the bar carried in his brief bag the possibilities of the bench, and so every member of the bar could respond for the bench.

Mr. REGINALD BROWN, in returning thanks, regretted that, owing to the dinner to the judges at the Mansion House, there was no member of the bench present. He considered the bar a noble and useful profession-it was certainly one of the most enlightened and learned of the professions. Its members possessed great privileges, the privilege of defending those who were in any way oppressed, the privilege of seeing that one's party rights were adjusted in accordance with the laws of the country. It was also a splendid profession in that it opened great possibilities of success to every member. He was afraid there were few who attained to them, but they had the chance of positions of great success both socially and financially, At the same time, although it was a profession meriting that encomium, it was not all couleur de rose. The bar did not number, like the solicitors, 16,000

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