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lute than in the recent case, and it is possible that they may be the Acts. Thus, it at the time of registration the legal estate distinguished. Alty v. Farrell (1896, 1 Q. B. 636) was a de- were outstanding in an incumbrancer, it would appear to remain cision of the Lord Chief Justice and WRIGHT, J. (two members in him until reconveyed, unless perhaps, in the case of an of the majority of the court in Kruse v. Johnson); here a bye- absolute title, a subsequent registered transfer for value operates duwuh law, made under the Weights and Measures Act, 1889, as to to got it in. We venture to think, therefore, that it would the weighing of coal in course of delivery to a purchaser, was have been better if the Rule Committee had devised some

170 held to be unreasonable and bad on the ground that it entrusted expedient for getting in outstanding, legal estates in the excessive power to a single constable ; but the terms of the registered proprietor ipso facto on the discharge of the incumpower of making bye-laws given by the Act in question in that brances entered on the register. The Acts, it should be observed, case were more specific than in the present case, and the do not give the registered proprietor any leasing powers by bye-law was hardly consistent with the Act itself. Without registered disposition, and it seems to us, therefore, that the referring further to cases, it may be said that Kruse v. Johnson legal estate must still be of importance for the purposes of leases does not supersede all previous decisions, and that local and other unregistered dispositions. Why the Acts do not authorities would be acting rashly if they regarded it as giving confer any power to lease is by no means clear, and we think them an absolutely free hand as to their local legislation; it that such a power ought to have been given. This omission does, however, lay down general principles for their guidance, appears to be one of the principal defects in the Acts. Suband makes difficult the task of anyone who desires to impeach section 3, above set out, has the effect, we conceive, of preserving the validity of their bye-laws.

the rights of a cestui que trust of the registered proprietor as
against himself and his voluntary transferees, and is not con-
fined merely to the case where a mero nominee is registered. It

is clearly of the utmost importance to determine the effect of

first registration with an absolute title, inasmuch as the effe ct II.

of first registration with a possessory title is determined by Part 11.-- First Registration (continued).- Absolute title. The reference thereto. most noticeable feature under this heading in the rules is the

Possessory title.-Section 8 of the Act of 1875 is as follows : power for the registrar to refer the titles of applicants for The registration of any person as first registered pr registration with an absolute title to the conveyancing counsel prietor of freehold land with a possessory title only shall of the court (rule 31). The registrar may act on their opioion. not affect or prejudice the enforcement of any estate, right, We conceive that the effect of this provision will be probably

or interest adverse to or in derogation of the title of sucı to encourage application for registration with absolute title, as first registered proprietor, and subsisting or capable of the registrar may, in the exercise of his discretion under section arising at the time of registration of such proprietor; but, 17 of the Act of 1875, accept a good holding title for registra save as aforesaid, shall have the same effect as registration tion as absolute where the conveyancing counsel to whom the of a person with an absolute title. title is referred advises that a good holding title is shown. Registration with a posse:sory title seems therefore also to Moreover, the provisions contained in the Act of 1897 for indem- confer a statutory fee simple as in the case of an absolute title, nifying persons whose interests are affected by reason of and the effect of first registration with a possessory title is registration will all tend in the same direction.

similar in every respect to the effect of first registration with an The mode of application for an absolute title is prescribed absolute title, save that the estates, rights, and interests men(rule 25). An abstract of title is to be delivered in the usual tioned in the above section are paramount to the statutory fee form, together with all such deeds and documents relating to simple conferred by first registration. The paramount estates the title as the applicant has in his possession or under his and interests are those which are adverse to the title of the first control, including opinions of counsel, conditions of sale, old registered proprietor; his own estate is, therefore, it seems, requisitions, and the like (rule 29). The registrar may ap- merged in the statutory fee. There is, however, no machinery point an agent to make searches and inquiries in relation in the Acts or Rules for afterwards merging an estate, which to the title (rule 30). This will be a useful power, particularly is originally a paramount estate, in the statutory fee. in country cases.

Thus, suppose the legal estate is outstanding at the time of first Advertisements of the application are to be inserted in certain registration, then it is clearly a paramount estate. Does it for newspapers (rule 32), and advertisements may be grouped to over after remain a paramount estate, requiring to be conveyed sare expense (rule 33). Notices of the application are to be if need be by deed off the register, or is it capable of passing by served on tenants and such other persons as the registrar shall a registered transfer for value after it has once been reconveyed deem necessary (rule 34).

to the registered proprietor for the time being? Probably the The rules do not, however, throw any light on the effect of latter will be held to be the case in order to give effect to the first registration with an absolute title. Section 7 of the Act of scheme of the Acts. No immediate benefit is conferred on a 1875 is as follows:

landowner who registers with a possessory title, as the abstract The first registration of any person as proprietor of free- of title to all estates, rights, and interests which are paramount hold land in this Act referred to as first registered pro- to the statutory fee simple will be required by a purchaser, and prietor) with an absolute title, shall vest in the person so such estates, rights, and interests, unless previously got in or registered an estate in fee simple in such land, together released, will have to be conveyed by unregistered disposition. with all rights, privileges, and appurtenances belonging or If they have been got in by a previous registered proprietor the appurtenant thereto, subject as follows:

verdor must shew how they were so got in, and that the person (1) To the incumbrances, if any, entered on the register; who got them in was the then registered proprietor. It has, and

however, been contended that registration will operate as a (2) Unless, under the provisions of this Act, the filter so as to clear the muddy stream of title as from the date contrary is expressed on the register, to such liabilities, of registration ; this appears to be only true in the very simple rights, and interests, if any, as are by this Act declared not cases.

In other words, where no simplification of title is really to be incumbrances; and

required the register will work, but where there are complica(3) Where such first proprietor is not entitled for his own tions registration will merely be relied on to confirm the title off benefit to the land registered as between himself and any the register. persons claiming under him to any unregistered estates,

The statutory declaration required for the purposes of rights, interests, or equities to which such persons may be registration with a possessory title should in practice never entitled, but free from all other estates and interests what- omit a statement of the title, in order that, after a certain soever, including estates and interests of her Majesty, her number of years, contracts for sale may stipulate that the heirs and successors.

declaration shall form the root of title. First registration with an absolute title appears, therefore, to

The section above set out may, however, be read in two ways confer a statutory estate in fee simple subject as mentioned in thus, either “The registration

shall not affect this section. The legal estate appears to have been ignored by

." and "shall not


any estate

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The remainder of the County, not including 1st January, 1900.


the enforcement of any

right .." or "The This Order may be amended or added to or repealed by Order in registration. shall not affect or projudice the enforce- Council. mont of The first reading actually preserves the

THE SCHEDULE. estate which is adverse to the title of the first registered proprietor, while the second merely enables the paramount

Days on and after which Portions of the County.

Registration of title to land owner to enforce his rights so long as they are subsisting.

is to be compulsory on sale. Thus, if the second construction be correct, it would not, perhaps, be necessary for a paramount mortgages when paid off by the proprietor to reconvey the legal estate to him ; The parishes of Hampstead, Saint Pancras, whether the latter construction was intended or not, it will not Saint Marylebone, and Saint George's, 1st September, 1898. be safe to act on it. Assuming that the first construction is

Hanover-square adopted, it seems to follow that a bare outstanding legal estate The paris c of Shoreditch, Bethnal-green,

Mi's End Old Town, Wapping, Saint would not in the case of a possessory title be got in by means

George's in the East, Shadwell, Ratcliff,

1st January, 1899. only of a registered transfer for value.

Limehouse, Bow, Bromley, and Poplar ,
The remainder of the County (not includ-

ing the City of Londo 1) North of the
centre line of the River Thames except

1st October, 1899.

North Woolwich

the City of London. The Law of Employer's Liability and Workmen's Compensation. The City of London

1st July, 1900.
By THOMAS BEVEN, Barrister-at-Law. Waterlow, Bros. & Layton


Saturday, the 14th day of May, 1898.

I, Hardinge Stanley, Earl of Halsbury, Lord High Chancellor of Great LIFTS FOR THE OFFICES AT THE ROYAL COURTS. Britain, do hereby order that the actions mentioned in the Schedule hereto

shall be transferred to the Honourable Mr. Justice Wright.
[To the Elitor of the Solicitors' Journal.]

Sir,- It surely must be in every one's experience from the time the
Royal Courts building was opened, that the profession has suffered

Mr. Justice Romer (1898-A.-No. 569). both bodily and mentally (for whatever affects the body must in some In re The Arbey Wood Wool Manufacturing Company Limited way affect the brain) by reason of the absence of lifts at the Royal George Shears and Frank Shears v. The Arbey Wood Wool Manufacturing Courts.

Company Limited. Take, for instance, the Chancery taxing-master's offices at the top

Mr. Justice Kekewich (1898 –T.-No. 745). of the building, and to which clerks have to carry up large bundles In re The Tom Tit Cycle Company Limited of papers day by day; and also the Lunacy office.

Alfred Love v The Tom Tit Cycle Company Limited, George Pulgrave My experience extends from the time the building was opened, Simpson, and Samuel Studd.

HalsBURY, C. and I should say the number of persons ascending the stairs is “legion.” I have known cases of rupture, besides other complaints, oc zasioned by the exertion.

HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE. May we hope that the matter of the provision of lifts will not fall

Whitsun Vacation, 1898. through on the ground of expense. Is not the Government still in

Notice. possession of some millions of unclaimed money which can never be Claimed ?


There will be no sitting in court during the Whitsun Vacation.

During Whitsun Vacation, all applications which may require to be May 18.

immediately or promptly heard,” are to be made to the Vacation Judge [See observations under head of “Current Topics.”—ED. S.J.] for the time being.

Mr. Justice Phillimore will act as Vacation Judge (for Mr. Justice Ridley) from Saturday, May 28th, to Tuesday, May 31st, both days inclusive.

Mr. Justice Ridley will act as Vacation Judge from Wednesday, June NEW ORDERS, &c.

1st, to Monday, June 6th, both days inclusive.

Mr. Justice Ridley will sit in Queen's Bench Judges' Chambers on THE LAND TRANSFER ACT, 1897.

Thursday, June 2nd, and (if necessary) on Friday, June 3rd. On other Notice is hereby given that, after the expiration of forty days days within the above period, applications in urgent matters may be made from the date hereof, it is proposed to submit to Her Majesty in to the Vacation Judge personally or by post. Council, in pursuance of the above-mentioned Act, the draft of an In any case of great urgency the brief of counsel may be sent to the Order in Council declaring that Registration of Title to Land is to be judge by book post, or parcel, prepaid, accompanied by office copies of the compulsory on sale in the County of London.

affidavits in support of the application, and also by a minute, on a And notice is hereby further given that, in accordance with the separate sheet of paper, signed by counsel, of the order he may consider provisions of the Rules Publication Act, 1893, copies of the proposed papers, addressed as follows :-" Chancery oficial Letter: To the

the applicant entitled to, and also an envelope capable of receiving the draft Order in Council can be obtained by any public body, within Registrar in Vacation, Chancery Registrers' Chambers, Royal Courts of forty days of the date of this notice, at the Privy Council Office, Justice, London, W.C.”. Whitehall.

On applications for injunctions, in addition to the above, a copy of the Privy Council Office, May 17th, 1898.

writ, and a certificate of writ issued, must also be sent.

The papers sent to the judge will be returned to the Registrar. The following is the Draft Order referred to in the above notice : The address of the Vacation Judge for the time being can be obtained At the Court at

on application at the Chancery Registrars' Chambers, Room 136, Royal The 1898.

Courts of Justice. Present, The Queen's Most Excellent Majesty in Council. Pursuant to the 20th section of the Land Transfer Act, 1897, Her In the House of Commons on the 12th inst. Mr. Lewis asked the Majesty, by and with the advice of Her Most Honourable Privy Attorney-General whether, having regard to the recent rapid growth of Council, is pleased to order and declare, and it is hereby ordered and the practice of legislating by reference, and to the diMculty of underdeclared, with respect to the County of London, as follows:

standing the scope and effect of Bills which amended or repealed sections · Registration of Title to Land is to be compulsory on sale in the of Acts by reference to such sections, the Government would, for the several portions of the County mentioned in the first column of the information of the House, cause copies of the sections referred to in Schedule hereto, on and after the respective days mentioned in the question is not one on which I can give any general undertaking, as it

Government Bills to be printed in full. The Attorney-General said : The second column of the same Schedule. In this Order “Parish ” means a place for which a separate poor- in charge. Her Majesty's Government fully appreciate the objections to

must depend upon the nature of the Bill and the discretion of the Minister rate is or can be made, or for which a separate overseer is or can be legislation by reference, but, in my opinion, the House of Commons must appointed, and the boundaries of each such parish shall be those bear more responsibility for the change thun the Ministers who have constituted and limited at the date of this Order.

introduced Bills, to whatever Government they may have belonged.

day of

with the luggage and its escort to Shorncliffe Railway Station. CASES OF THE WEEK.

Sergeant Killen was to direct Lieutenant Roberts to take the plaintiff with

the baggage guard to the railway station and there keep him until the Court of Appeal.

D (plaintiff's) Company arrived. By the further orders of Captain Foote,

conveyed through Serjeant Killeu, the plaintiff, after his arrival at the CHINA TRADERS INSURANCE CO. (LIM.) v. ROYAL EXCHANGE railway station, was to be taken in military custody in the special military ASSURANCE CORPORATION No. 1, 17th May.

train which was then about to start for the conveyance of volunteers to PRACTICE DISCOVERY MARINE INSURANCE Ship's PAPERS RE

Watford, Boxmoor, and other stations to which the plaintiff and other INSURANCE.

members of his volunteer corps belonged; and on his arrival at Boxmoor

(the railway station, about two miles distant, for Hemel Hempstead, where Appeal by the defendants from the refusal of Mathew, J., sitting at the plaintiff lived) the plaintiff was to be taken by his escort to the policechambers and taking commercial summonses, to order the plaintiffs to station at Hemel Hempstead, and then handed over to the civil authority: produce ship's papers. The action was brought under two policies of Captain Foote at the same time directed that information as to what had marine insurance to recover for loss of goods per ship Conqueror. The happened should be given at Hemel Hempstead to Captain Smeaton, the plaintiffs were the insurers of goods shipped for a voyage on The officer in command of the plaintiff's company. These orders were carried Conqueror, and they had effected re-insurances with the defendants. The out. After the plaintiff had reached Shorncliffe Station with the baggage plaintiffs, in their points of claim, alleged that the sbip and cargo were guard, under Lieutenant Roberts, and the train was ready to receive her lost on the voyage by the perils insured against, and that they had paid passengers, the defendant Cooper selected, in the usual way, from the the assured for a total loss. Upon a summons for directions, the defen- ranks of the volunteers who were drawn up in the railway station, his two dants applied for an order that the plaintiffs and all persons interested in co-defendants Lovelock and Short to form the prisoner's escort on the the proceedings and in the insurance should jroduce on oath all ship's journey to Boxmoor and Hemel Hempstead. The plaintiff was then papers (following the terms of Form 19. in Appendix. K. to the Rules of placed in a compartment with these defendants, and the four so travelled the Supreme Court, 1883, with the additions specified in the case of China together in the train to Boxmoor (a journey of about 3 hours). On the arrival Sleamship Co. v. Commercial Union Assurance Co., 30 W. R. 224, 8 Q. B. D. of the train at Boxmoor the prisoner, under the charge of his escort, was 142). Mathew, J., refused the application upon the ground that an directed by the defendant Cooper to remain in a waiting-room while order for production of ship's papers would not be made in a case of the rest of the volunteers, other than certain persons who would be re-insurance, but ordered lists of documents to be exchanged and inspec- required as witnesses in the plaintiff's case, were formally dismissed. tion given.

The defendant Cooper directed Corporal Young to keep these witnesses THE COURT (A. L. SMITH, CHiri Y, and VAUGHAN Williams, L.JJ.) together, and with them to follow the prisoner's escort to the police-station allowed the appeal.

at Hemel Hempstead. The defendants then marched with the plaintiff, A. L. SMITH, L.J., said that, though in this case it seemed to him that who was placed between the two privates, to the police station, and he the order made by Mathew, J., for the exchange of documents and

was charged before the defendant Frogley with the offence of larceny. inspection was sufficient, get the parties and the learned judge desired to After inquiry, and after hearing the evidence of some witnes zes, the have the question whether an order for production of ship's papers should defendant Frogley took the plaintiff into custody. The defendants and be made in a case of re-insurance cettled by this court. The rule as

the witnesses are then formally dismissed. On the 16th of May to ship’s papers was an old one, as seen from the case of Goldschmidt v. Frogley applied to the magistrates at Hythe for a warrant for the arrest Marryat (i Camp. 559), decided in 1809, and was a rule peculiar to marine of the plaintiff, who was accordingly arrested, and the plaintiff remained insurance. It was a common order to make as between the original in custody until the 20th of October, when he was put on bis trial at the assured and the underwriter. Then in 1890, in the case of Nord Deutsche quarter sessions at Canterbury and was honourably acquitted on the Versicherungs Gesellschaft v. Merchants' Marine Insurance Co. (not reported), charges made against him. Kenncdy, J., held that the plaintiff and the a Divisional Court composed of Mathew and Cave, JJ., decided that an defendants, after leaving the camp at Shorncliffe, were no longer being order for production of ship’s papers would not be made in a case of re

trained or exercised with the regular forces within section 176, sub-section insurance. In 1892 tbat decision was referred to in Willis & Co. v. Badde- (a), of the Army Act, 1881, they ceased therefore to be subject to military Icy (40 W. R. 577; 1892, 2 Q B. 324) in this court, and Bowen, L.J., and law, and that the subsequent detention of the plaintiff in military custody be (the Lord Justice) said that the question must be left open. ' In 1897 it by the defendants was not justifiable under sections 41, 45, and 158 of the was said that Collins, J., at chambers, in Royal Exchange Assurance Cor- | Act. The defendants appealed. poration v. Faber, made an order for production of ship’s papers in a case

The Court (A. L. SMITH, Chitty, and Collins, L.JJ.), after taking of re-insurance. Wby bad not the re-insurer the same rights against the time to consider, allowed the appeal. They said that, by virtue of the original underwritar as the latter had against the original assured? All War Office order of the 22nd of April, 1896, under which the volunteer the defences open to the original underwriter as against the assured were regiment had gone into camp, and section 176, sub-section 8 (a), of the open to the re-insurer. It seemed right that the re-insurer should see Army Act, 1881, the volunteer battalion, of which the plaintiff and the all the documents which might shew a defence by the original under- defendants were members, did not cease to be trained or exercised with Tiiter as against the assured. It was said that the underwriter a portion of the regular forces" until the battalion and its component would have no documents to produce. But the same observation parts were dismissed from being any lovger under arms on the 8th of would apply to an insurance on goods, where the assured would probably August, and that the plaintiff and the defendants were not dismissed have no ship's papers, and yet the rule applied equally to an insurance on

until the plaintiff had been handed over to the police at Hemel Hempgoods. The assured might have access to the papers. In his opinion the stead. The plaintiff and the defendants, therefore, remained subject to rule as to production of ship's papers applied to a case of re-insurance.

milita law until that time, and the action would not lie. Secondly, the Chitty and VAUGHAN WILLIAMS, L.JI., concurred. -Counsel, Joseph defendants were protected by section 158 of the Army Act, 1881, because Walton, Q.C., and F. IV. Hollams ; T. 4. Hamilton. SOLICITORS, Hollans, tbat section, upon its true construction, authorized the detention in Sons, Coward, f. Hawksley; Waltons, Johnson, Bubb, 8 Whatton.

military custody of a person where an offence was alleged to have been

committed by him while subject to military law, although he or his corps (Reported by W. F. BARRY, Barrister-at-Law.]

had ceased to be cubject to military law, and the plaintiff had here bein MARKS v. FROGLEY AND OTHERS. No. I.

kept in military custody. Further, by section 43 of the Army Act, 1881, 7th May.

the only redress (if any) which the plaintiff had was by complaint to his ARMY-VOLUNTEER—“ Person SUBJECT TO MILITARY LAV"-TRAINING superior officer (per Lush, J., in Dawkins v. Lord Paulet, 18 W. R. 336, at WITH REGULAR Forces-- BREAKING-UP or Camp-SUBSEQUENT DETENTION p. 343, L. R. 5 Q. B. 94, at p. 121), and upon this ground also the action IN MILITARY CUSTODY-ARMY Act, 1881 (44 & 45 Vict. c. 58), ss. 43, 158, failed.-COUNSEL. A. J. Tassell; J. Inwson Walton, Q.C., and R. D. Muir. 176.

SOLICITORS, H. W. Lathom; J. N. Mason g: Co., for Sworder f. Longmore,

Hertford. Application by the defendants, other than Frogley, for judgment or a new trial in an action tried by Kepvedy, J., with a special jury, reported

[Reported by W. F. BARRY, Barrister-at-Law.] in 46 W. R. 249; 1898, 1 Q. B. 396. The action was brought by a member of the Bedfordshire Volunteer Corps to recover damages for

THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. STRANGE. No, 2. 16th May. assault and false imprisonment. The jury found a verdict for £300 ESTATE DUTY-EXEMPTION-HUSBAND AND Wire-LIFE INTEREST, SOLE OR damages agaiost three defendants-Arthur Cooper, a sergeant, and JOINT-SURVIVOR-FINANCE Act, 1894 (57 & 58 VICT. C. 30), 8. Thomas Lovelock and George Albert Short, privates in the same corps as 21 (5). the plaintiff. The defendant Frogley was a superintendent of the Herts county police, and upon the findings of the jury judgment was given in

This case raised a question as to the construction of section 21 (5) of his favour, and no quertion arose as to him. The facts, as stated by the Finance Act, 1894, whereby, in certain events therein specified, estate Kennedy, J., in his judgment in the court below, were as follows: The duty is not to be payable until the death of the survivor of husband and plaintiff and the three defendants, with other members of the corps, were

wife. By an indenture dated the 14th day of January, 1846, and made in August, 1896, in military training with a portion of the regular forces between James N. Strange of the first part, the defendant Charlotte M. at Stojncliffe. The camp was broken up on the morning of the 8th of Strange, then C. M. Eyre, of the second part, Dame Louisa Strange of August. Early on that morning, and whilst the preparations for the the third part, and certain trustees of the fourth part (being the settlereturn of the volunteers to their respective homes were proceeding in the ment made in contemplation of a marriage then intended and shortly camp, a disturbance took place in and around the tent in which the afterwards solemnized between the said J. N. Strange and C. M. Strange), plaintiff and others had been lodged, in consequence of some of certain sums of consols and personal property, partly reversionary and the plaintiff's comrades accusing him of having stolen and hidden partly in poseession, were settled upon trust to pay the income thereof to in his kit bag a number of articles which beionged to them. The the said James N. Strange for life, and after his decease to the said adjutant of the corps, Cap'ain Foote, having been informed as to Charlotte M. Strange for life, with remainder as to the capital of the trust the disturbance, came to the spot, and ultimately ordered Sergeant funds for the children or child of the marriage as therein mentioned ; and Killen to form an escort and take the plaintiff to the guard tent, in the said indentre was contained a covenant by the said James N. where he would find Lieutenant Roberts on the point of proceeding | Strange and the defer:dant Charlotte M. Strange to vest any personal pro

perty which the said Charlotte M. Strange was then or should during the

RUSSIAN intended coverture, or the said James N. Strange in her right should at Re RUSSIAN SPRATT'S PATENT (LIM.), JOHNSON any one time by gilt, bequest, or otherwise become entitled, of the value

SPRATT'S PATENT (LIM.). No. 2. 9th and 10th May. of £200 or upwards, other than a life interest only, and other than specific COMPANY-DEBENTURES-CHARGE ON PRESENT AND FUTURE PROPERTY chattels not producing income, and besides the trust premises therein UNCALLED CAPITAL-COMPANIES Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 89), ss. before settled, in the trustee or trustees for the time being of the now

38, 75. stating indenture upon trust and to the intent that the same might be

This was an appeal from a decision of Stirling, J., and involved the laid out by such trustees upon some of the stocks, funds, and securities question whether debentures which charge present and future property prescribed by the said indenture, and that the stocks and securities upon of a company give a charge on the uncalled capital. The facts were as which the game might be so laid out, and the dividends, interest, and follow : The company was incorporated in 1891 with a capital of £120,000, annual produce thereof might be held by such trustees upon trust to pay divided into 100,000 ordinary and 20,000 preference shares, all of £l each. the income thereof unto the said James N. Strange or his assigns during Shares of both classes had been issued, but the capital was not fully his life, and after his decease to the said Charlotte M. Strange or her paid up. In 1892 the company issued 193 debentures of £10 each. assigns during her life, and from; he decease of the survivor of them, upon These debentures charged with payment of principal and interest “ the trust, if the defendant Charlotte M. Strange should survive the said undertaking of the said company and all the property to which it now is James N. Strange, then after his decease in trust for the defendant

or shall at any time hereafter become entitled, and all the estate, right, and Charlotte M. Strange, her executors, &c., but, if she should die in his life

The company time, then after bis decease upon such trusts and purposes as the said title of the company in, to, and upon the said premises."

subsequently borrowed further sums, which were secured, subject to the Charlotte M. Strange should by will appoint, and in default of appointment debentures, by a charge on all its property, the uncalled capital being upon trust for berstatutory next-of-kin. The defendant C. M. Strange became expresely included. A debenture-hciders' action was commenced in 1896 entitled at different dates during the said coverture to personal property and a receiver was duly appointed by an order dated the 14th of April, within the meaning of the covenant as to after-acquired property above set 1896. On the 21st of April, 1896, a resolution was passed for the volunforth, and such property was got in by the trustees of the settlement and tary winding up of the company, and the receiver in the debentureduly invested by them. James N. Strange, the husband, died on the 1st holders' action was appointed liquidator in the voluntary winding up. of November, 1894, whereupon the defendant Charlotte M. Strange became An order was made for the usual accounts and inquiries, and the master's absolutely entitled to the investments representing such after-acquired certificate in March, 1897, found that the property charged in favour of property, and she accordingly required the trustees to transfer the same to the debenture-holders consisted of the particulars set forth in the second her. The case caine before the court upon an information by the Attorney- schedule thereto and did not include the uncalled capital. A summons General. The information stated that estate duty under the Finance Act,

was then taken out on behalf of the debenture-holders to vary tha 1894, became payable in respect of the said after-acquired property as

certificate by including the uncalled capital. Stirling, J., was of opinion property passing on the death of the said James N. Strange, but she and that he was bound by the decision of Chitty, L.J. (then Chitty, J.), in her trustees refused to pay, contending that no estate duty had become

Re The Streatham and General Estates Co. (Limited) (45 W. R. 105; 1897, 1 payable in respect of the property bound by the said covenant to settle

Ch. 15), and declined to vary th certificate The plaintiff appealed on other or after-acquired property by reason of the provisions of section 21 (5) of the said Act, but the informant charged that the last-mentioned that of the Court of Appeal in Re The Pyle Works (Limited) (38 W. R. 674,

the ground that the decision in the last-named case was inconsistent with section did not apply, the defendant having become entitled, not to the 44 Ch. D. 534). income only, but to the capital of the property in question. The information prayed that it might be declared that upon the death of James N.

THE COURT (LINDLEY, M.R., Rigby and Collins, L.JJ.) dismissed the Strange estate duty became payable upon the principal value of all appeal. property coming within the terms of and bound by the covenant to LINDLEY, M.R., said that, having regard to the long line of decisions settie after-acquired property of the defendant Charlotte M. Strange from Stanley's case (12 W. R. 891, 4 De G. J. & S. 407) down to the as property passing on the death of the said James N. Strange. By Streatham and General Estates Co. (Limited), it was impossible for the court section 21 (5) of the Finance Act, 1894, it is enacted that, “Where a to hold that the word “property" in the debentures included uncalled husband or wiie is entitled, either solely or jointly with the other, to the capital. It would also be an injustice to the second debenture-holders to income of any property settled by the other under a disposition which has accede to the appellant's contention. taken effect before the commencement of this part of this Act, and on his RIGBY and COLLINS, L.JJ., concurred.-COUNSEL, Dunham; W. F. or her death the survivor becomes entitled to the income of the property Hamilton ; Lavington. Solicitors, Snell, Sons, f Greenip; Wilson, Bristows, settled by such survivor, estate duty shall not be payable in respect of f. Carpmacl. that property until the death of the survivor." T'he case came before

[Reported by J. I. STIRLING, Barrister-at-Law.] Vaughan Williams and Kennedy, JJ., sitting as a Divisional Court, on the 12th of August, 1897, when their lordships held that the case fell within the exemption, and that estate duty would not be payable until the death of Mrs. Strange. Against this deci-ion the Attorney-General appealed. The Court (LINDLEY, M.R., Rigby, and COLLINS, L.JJ.) allowed the

High Court-Chancery Division. appeal, and held that the wife having become entitled, not to the income only, but also to the capital of the fund, section 21 (5) did not apply. Re RUSSELL LITERARY INSTITUTION, FIGGINS BAGHINO. Throughout the Act the "income" of property was always used in

North, J. 11th May. contradistinction to the property itself. It was true that in a sense upon COMPANY-LITERARY Society-LITERARY AND SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTIONS the death of the husband the wife became entitled to income, but that

Act, 1854, ss. 30, 31. was a mere play upon words.-Counsel, Sir R. E. Webster, A.G., Sir R. Finlay, S.G., and Vaughan Hawkins ; Dicey, Q.C., and Butcher, Q.C. This was an adjourned summons to determine in what way the surplus SOLICITORS, Solicitor to the Inland Revenue.

assets of the Russell Literary and Scientific Institution should be dealt [Reported by W. Scott THOMPSOX, Barrister-at-Law.]

with. The institution was established in 1808 as a library for literary

works, English and foreign journals, and for the delivery of lectures. BAXTER 1. MIDDLETON. Re MIDDLETON AND BAXTER. No. 2. The capital consisted of 700 shares of twenty-five guineas each, and there 16th May.

were to be subscribing members, and also life members on terms to be Lis Pendens-REGISTRATION OF Action for Specific PERFORMANCE AS, arranged. A deed was executed vesting the property in trustees, and ACTION DISMISSED - ORDER VACATING REGISTRATION UNLESS APPEAL

rules were made as to the division of shares, the expenditure upon the PROMPTLY SET Down–30 & 31 Vict. c. 47, s. 2.

purchase of books, and the payment of dividends. The shares of proThis was an appeal from a decision of Kekewich, J. (reported ante, p. the payment of dividends was abolished in 1847 and in 1887 new rules

prietors were saleable by executors on their deaths. The rule authorizing 253, and 46 W. R. 350), who had dismissed the plaintiff's action for specific performance, and, the action having been registered as a lis pendens, and the vesting the property in trustees for the benefit of tho proprietors.

were passed as to the payment of subscriptions, the transfer of shares, had directed that unlees an appeal was eet down within a fortnight the It was resolved to close the institution at meetings held on the 25th of registration should be vacated. The plaintiff, the purcha er of certain April and the 16th of May, 1896, as from the 1st of May, 1896. The property, brought an action against the vendors to obtain specific per- lease was surrendered and all liabilities discharged, and there was a 1ormance of a contract for the sale of a business together with the surplus of £1,600. The question was whether this sum should be divided business premises and goodwill. Subsequently to the issue of the writ among the existing proprietors or whether the Literary Institutions Act the defendants, the vendors, touk out an originating summons under the of 1854, ss. 29 and 30, applied, and the property ought to be given to some Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874, to have declared that the contract kindred institution.' Re Bristol Atheneum Society (43 Ch. D. 236) was was not binding upon them. Immediately after the issue of the writ the cited. For the proprietors it was said that the institution was a jointplaintiff registered the action as a lis pendens. Upon the action and stock company, and that therefore the Literary and Scientific Institutions summons coming on by order for trial and hearing together, Kekewich, J., Act, 1856, did not apply. dismissed the action with costs, and made no order on the summons. The plaintiff declaring his intention to appeal, Kekewich, J., further directed,

North, J., held that the provisions of the Literary and Scientific under section 2 of 30 & 31 Vict. c. 47, that unless an appeal was set down Institutions Act, 1854, did not apply to the distribution of assets because within a fortnight the registration of the action as a lis pendens should be of the proviso in section 30 " that this clause shall not apply to any vacated. The plaintiff appealed.

institution which shall have been founded or established by the contri. The Court (LINDLEY, M.R., and RigBY and Collins, L.JJ.), dismissed held that the institution was in the nature of a joint-stock company

butions of shareholders in the nature of a joint-stock company.' He the appeal against the orders of Kekewich, J.; and directed that the and that the fund was divisible among the proprietors in proportion to registration of the action as a lis pendens should be vacated.--Counsel, the shares held by them. - Counsel, Swinfen Eady, Q.C., and Elgood; H. Renshaw, Q.C., and Martelli; Warrington, Q.C., and Ingle Joyce. Solicitors, Terrell, Q C., and Douglas. Solicitors, 8. B. Moyle ; Carthew f'Wheel=r. Poole & Robinson ; Donald McMillan. [Reported by R, C, MACKENZIE, Barrister-at-Law.]

[Reported by G. B. HAMILTON, Barrister-at-Law.]

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10th agreement of the 24th of June, 1896, does not interfere with the plaintiffs' May.

rights, and that it is void as against them.-COUNSEL, Renshaw, Q.C., and

Rowden; Arthur Powell ; A. Cartmell. SOLICITORS, Lewis of Lewis ; Foster, Patent—REGISTRATION-NOTICE_EQUITABLE INTEREST-PATENTS, Designs, Grave, Co. ; Foss f Ledsam. AND Trade-Marks Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 57), s. 87.

[Reported by C. C. HENSLEY, Barrister-at-Law.] John Forrest Walters, on the 24th of June, 1896, entered into an agreement with the plaintiffs in this action, the New Ixion Tyre and Cycle Co. (limited), to transfer to them certain letters patent in respect of pneumatic tyres, of which he was the registered proprietor. The agreement was not, however, registered until the 27th of September, 1897,

High Court-Queen's Bench Division. although the plaintiffs were in possession of the letters patent from the

KRUSE v. JOHNSON. Div. Court. 141h May. date of the agreement. Walters assigned the letters patent to the plaintiffs on the 20th of October, 1897, when the assignment was duly


REASONABLENESS. registered. Before the registration of the agreement, Walters, on the 16th of September, 1897, granted a licence for valuable consideration to Case stated by justices of the county of Kent and argued before a full Spidsbury and three other defendants in this action to make and sell tyres court of the Queen's Bench Division last month, when judgment was under the letters patent, and notification of the licence was entered in the reserved. The facts are stated in the judgment of patent register on the 18th of September, 1897. Spilsbury and the three

Lord Russell, C.J.-The County Council of Kent, claiming to act other defendants had express notice of the agreement and of the plaintiffs' under their statutory powers, made the following bye-law : "4. Playing equitable title to the letters patent thereunder prior to the granting of musical instruments, &c.—No person chall sound or play upon any the licence to them.

On the oth of October, 1897, Spilsbury and the musical or noisy instrument or sing in any public place or highway three other defendants transferred their rights under the licence to the within fifty yards of any dwelling-house after being required by any conLicensed Tyre Syndicate (Limited), who were also defendants in the action. stable, or by an inmate of such house personally, or by his or her servant, The plaintiffs asked for a declaration that the licence or alleged licence to desist.' The appellant was summoned before the magistrates for was invalid and void as against them, and that they were entitled to the offending against this bye-law, when it was proved that on the 17th of letters patent free from any right or interest of the defendants as licensees October, 1897, he persisted in singing in a public highway within fifty or otherwise; delivery up of the licence to be cancelled, and an injunc- yards of a dwelling house, after having been required by a policetion. Spilsbury and the three other defendants alleged that their constable to desist. It was further proved by the occupier of the rights under the licence were not subject to any rights or equities of the dwelling-house that the singing of the appellant and those with him was plaintiffs, and the defendant company claimed the right to work the patent an annoyance to such occupier. The occupier had not, on the day in under their title.

The principal question which arose was whether, question, set the constable in motion, but he had on previous occasions as the defendants bad express notice, the plaintiffs could insist on complained to the police of the appellant's singing. The magistrates contheir equitable rights under their agreement, although it was not picted the appellant, and against that conviction the present appeal is registered until after the registration of the licence. This depended brought. The question reserved for this court is whether the bye-law is on the consideration of the Patents, Deeigns, and Trade-Marks Act, valid. If valid the conviction is to stand. It is objected that the bye-law is 1883, s. 87, which provides that “Where a person becomes entitled ultra vires on the ground that it is unreasonable, and, therefore, bad. It is by assignment, transmission, or other operation of law to a patent necessary, therefore, to eee what is the authority under which the bye

the comptroller shall, on request and on proof of title to his law in question has been made, and what are the relations between its satisfaction, cause the name of such person to be entered as proprietor of framers and those affected by it. But firat it seems necessary to conthe patent in the register of patents

The person for sider what is a bye-law. A bye-law of the class we are here considering the time being entered in the register of patents as proprietor I take to be an ordinance affecting the public or some portion of the of a patent

hall, eubject to any rights appearing from such public, imposed by some authority clothed with statutory powers orderregister to be vested in any other person, have power absolutely to assign, ing something to be done or not be done and accompanied by some grant licences as to, or otherwise deal with the same, and to give effectual sanction or penalty for its non-observance. It necessarily involves receipts for any consideration for such assignment, licence, or dealing. restriction of liberty of action by persons who come under its operation Provided that any equities in respect of such patent

as to acts which, but for the bye-law, they would be free to do or not enforced in like manner as in respect of any other personal property.'

to do, as they pleased. Further, it involves this consequence-that, il KEKEWICH, J:- I think that the plaintiffs are entitled to judgment. validly made, it has the force of law within the sphere of its legitimate It is necessary in the first place to consider the meaning of section 87 of operation (eee Edmonds v. The Water men's Co., 24 L. J. M. C. 124, 1855). the Patents, Designs, and Trade-Marks Act, 1883, in order to see how it In the present case we are dealing with a bye-law made by a local repreaffects the title of the plaintiffs and the defendants respectively. For seatative body-namely, the county council of Kent, which is that purpose one must see what the section requires to be done and what created under the Local Government Act, 1888, and which' is endowed it allows to be done. Section 23 of the Act provides that there is to be a

with the powers of making bye-laws given to municipal corporate bodies regieter of the title to patents, including equitable as well as legal under the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882. Section 16 of the Local interests, and then section 87 protects the interest of the person who has Government Act, 1888, provides that a county council shall have the same put bis title on the register so as to prevent a person who has not power of making bye-laws in relation to their county as the council of a registered from asserting a legal or equitable title against the person who borough have in relation to their borough ; and it further provides that has registered. That is the general principle. Anyone, therefore, who section 187 of the Public Health Act of 1875 shall apply to such byeregieters any instrument under that section must register it subject to laws. I will take these statutes in the order of time. Section 182 of the any rights which may appear by the register to be already vested in any i Act of 1875 provides that all bye-laws made by a local authority under one other person. It is therefore plain that when the plaintiffs registered that Act shall be under their common seal and may be altered or repealed their agreement after the defendants bad registered their licences, so far by a subsequent bye-law, but no bye-law shall be repugnant to the as the registered title was concerned they took subject to that licence ; laws of England or to the provisions of the Act. Section 183 gives power to and it is because their agreement and the assignment which followed it impose penalties. Section 184 provides that bye-laws shall not take effect are subject to that licence that the plaintiffs came here to insist that as

until confirmed by the Local Government Board, which may allow or disagainst them the licence is invalid. Is it, then, competent to the plain- allow them, and, before their confirmation, notice of intention to apply for tiffs to insist upon the equitable right which is the foundation of their confirmation must be advertised, and for a month at least before such appliclaim? There might be other equities brought forward with reference to

cation a copy of the proposed bye-laws must have been kept at the office of other facts. The equity which the plaintiffs ineist on here is that at the the local authority for the inspection of ratepayers, and the clerk of the local time the defendants took the licence they had, not constructive merely, authority is bound to furnish on application à copy of the proposed but express notice of the agreement under which the plaintiffs afterwards bye-laws, or a part of them, to any rate payer on certain payment being took their assignment, and that the defendants cannot therefore insist wade. Section 23 of the Act of 1882 provides that the council of a on their registered licence as against the agreement of which they bad borough may from time to time make such bye-laws as to them seem notice. Tbat is the plaintiffo' point, and I take it that the defendants meet for the good rule and government of the borough and for the premust shew that there is, by language of which there can be no doubt, a

vention and suppression of nuisances not already punishable in a summary provision excluding such title as that alleged by the plaintiffs. The manner, and they may by such bye-laws appoint such fines, not exceeding provision at the end of section 87 is at any rate not in favour of the £5, as they deem necessary for the prevention of offences against the defendants. If the subject matter of the agreement were a leasehold bye-laws. It is under this authority that the bye-law in question was there can be no doubt that the defendants, having notice of the agree- framed. What are the checks or safeguards under which this very wide ment, could not take a title so as to defeat the plaintiffs, and that is a authority of making bye-laws is exercisable ? The same section 23 species of personal property assignable at law as letters patent are further provides that no bye-law can be made unless two-thirds of the assignable at law, and it seems to me that what is applicable to the one

whole number of the council are present, and, when so made, it shall not is necessarily applicable to the other. At any rate I think the proviso at

come into force until the expiration of forty days after a copy thereof has the end of section 87, even if not in favour of the plaintiffs, is not in been fixed on the town-ball, and it shall not come into force until the favour of the defendants, and in the absence of any proviso in the Act, or expiration of forty days after a copy sealed with the corporate seal has of any decision of the courts in their favour, I think the proper con

been sent to the Secretary of State ; and if within those forty days the struction of the Act is that such an equity as the plaintiffs allege is open | Queen, with the advice of her Privy Council, dieallows a proposed byeto them as an argument with reference to their title. Having disposed law, or part thereof, such bye-law or such part shall not come into of that, the next question is whether the plaintiffs have established their force, and the Queen may within the forty days enlarge the time within equity. [Bis lordship then considered the evidence and came to the which the bye-law shall not come into force. We thus find that Parliaconclusion that the defendants had express notice of the agreement, and ment has thought fit to delegate to representative public bodies in towns continued :], I must therefore hold that this licence, although on the and cities, and also in counties, the power of exercising their own register, and although on the register prior to the registration of the judgment as to what are the bye-laws which to them seem proper to be

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