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The choicest roasted nibs (broken-up beans) of the natural Cocoa on being subjected to a powerful hydraulic ggessure, give forth their excess of oil, leaving for use a

ely-flavoured powder—“Cocoaine,” a product which, when prepared with boiling water, has the consistence of tea, of which itis now, with many, beneficially taking the place. Its active principle being a gents nerve stimulant supplies the needed energy wit out unduly exciting the system. Sold only in labe ed Tins. If unable to obtain it of your tradesman, a tin will be sent post-free for 9 s_tam%s‘.J-JAMES EPPS & 00., LTD., Homoeopathic Chemists, ndon.

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12, LOWER GROSVENOR-PLACE, (nr VictoEia“Station),

And at Lowndes-street. Telephone, “Westminster 40."

MESSRS. H. GROGAN & CO., 101, Park

street, Grosvenor-square, bcgto call the attention of intending Purchasers to the many attractive West-End Houses which they have for Sale. Particulars on application. S ys and Valuations attended to

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G. F. BOX 8i CO., AUCTIONEERS, VALUERS, ESTATE AGENTS, RENT RECEIVERS, AND BAILIFFS.

Auction Room for Sale of Furniture and every description of Property. [Esta bliahril 1885.] Oflices: 227, Lowiiu CLAPTON-ROAD, N.E., and at 66, Guariiouso-Lass, S-rass-ru.ur, S.W.

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Mr. J . \V. Sibley has a large Estate Agency, and give special attention to this branch of the Business. References to Principals and Bankers.

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AUCTION SALES. \),lESSRS. FIELD & SONS’ AUCTIONS L ' take place MONTHLY, at the MART, and include every description of House Property. Printed terms can be had on application at their Oflices. Messrs. Field & Sons undertake surveys of all kinds, and give special attention to Rating and Compensation Claims. Offices 51, Borough High-street, and 62. D-ili‘lBGl'Y-18.20, W.C. CENTRAL LONDON RAILWAY.-Shep herd‘s Bush, Notting-hill, West Kensington "Park, and District.—Owners Wishing to Sell or Let roperty in these districts should send to . Rrwcsv Caoss & Co., who ave more applications than they can suit ; particulars inserted intheir Western Suburbs Register free. Rent collections undeitaken (large or small), and Property of all kinds managed on inclusive terms; punctual payments guaranteed; referencesto clients of 20 years’ standing. - Ollices, “Ilchester House," (facing) Uxbridge-road_ Station, W. Established 1877). Telephone No. 669, Kensington.

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HARLOW, ESSEX.

On the borders of Hertfordshire, about 13 miles from Harlow Station on the Cambridge Main Line of the Gt. Eastern Railway, 6 miles from Bishops Stoitford, 7 miles from Epping. and about 23 miles from London. In a good Residential district within eisy reach of n. number of well-known country seats. and in a first-class hunting centre withina mile of the Kennels of the Es-sex Hunt. A Valuable Freehold Residential Property known as Moor Hall, comprising a veiy substantially built and most comfortable Family Mansion. containing ‘Z0 bed and dressing-rooms; a very flue library, communicating with n. bed-room, dressing-room, bathroom, and w.c., thus forming a convenient suite; housemaid’s-room, 2 w.c.’s, lavatory, entrance and inner halls, handsome dining-room, with sirving room adjoining, billiard-room, Smoking-room with Lavatory and W.C., Double DrflWiD}{- Room, Boudoir, inuseum, with strong-room, girdcn entrance, lavat"ry, late closets, 2 w.c.’s. ample and wellarrangeddjoniesiic ollioes, having six servants‘ bedrooms, over and good cellarnge. The pleasure grounds are of a delightful character, being richly timbered with ornamental and other trees, and include flower gardens, lawns, rosery, lake, &:c., and a walled-in kitchen garden. The modern stabling contains acciinmodation for 14 horses, and there are two large coachhouses, &c., with groom’s rooms over, forming three sides of a square with granite-paved yard in centre. It is approached by a carr'age drive, having a lodge at entrance and overlooking picturesque park and woodland. The whole embracing an area of about 123:1. 3r. 20p. In a Separate Lotis a large kitchen and fruit garden, with numerous lasshouses, forcing pits, &c., and a small b1'iGl{-l)\1illZ§10l.l5€.

MESSRS. ALFRED SAVILL & SON are

instructed to OFFER the above for SALE by AUCTION, at the MART, Tokenhouse-yard, London, E.C., on MONDAY, JUNE 20, 1898, at ONE o'clock precisely, in Two Lots.

Particulars, with lans and conditions ot'_sale, may be obtained of Messrs. £E7llbEl'i.0ll 6: Cope, Solicitors, 5, Newcourt, Lincoln's-inn, W.C. ; at the Mart; and at the Auctioneers’ Oflices, 39, New Broad-street, London, E.C.

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Sale days for the Year 1898. Messrs.

FAREBROTHER. ELLIS, EGERTON,

BREACH, GALSWORTHY, & C0. beg to announce that the following days have been fixed for their SALES at the AUCTION MART, Tokcnhouse-yard, during the year 1898:

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Tiiesday, May 17. Thursday, August ll. Thursday, June 9. Thursday, September 22. Thursday, Juno 23. Thursday, OCt)l)8l‘ 13. Thursday, J uno 30. Thursday, October 27. Thursday, July H. Thursday, November 10. Thursday, July Zl. Thursday, November 24. 'l‘liiirsdsy, July 28. '1‘hursday, December 1. Thursday, August -L. Thursday, December 15.

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No. 29, Fleet-street, Temple-bar, and 18, Old Broadstreet, 19.0.

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MESSRS. EILOART will SELL by AUC

TION, at the MART, City, on MAY '26, 1898, at TWELVE or ONE o’clock, in Three Lots, the three valuable sets of FREEHOLD CHAMBERS on the second, third and fourth ti >ors, situate in No. 8, NEW-SQUA RE. Ths accommodation comprises four rooms on the seconl floor, five rooms on the third floor, and three rooms on the top fluOl'. They are situated on the west side of the square, and only a few yards from the paisage-way leading through to the Law Courts. The second-floor chambers are let on lease at a low rental, and vacant possession may be had of the other sets.

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ROYAL ASSURANCE.

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Oua nswsns will see from the draft Order in Council, which we print elsewhere, that the information we were enabled to give last week as to postponement of the coming into plperation of the Land Transfer Act, 1897, was correct; and 0 draft order further shows that compulsory registration is to be gradually applied. On and after the _lst of September next, it is to take efiect with regard only to the parishes of Hampstcad, St. Pancras, St. Marylobone, and St, Qe_orge’s, Hanover-square; on and after the 1_st__o£ January, 1899, most of the parishes in the cast of London are to come with-iii the operation of the Act; on and after lst of October, 1899, the remainder of the county of London (not including the City of London) north of the centre line of the Thames (except North Woolwich) is to be brought under the Act; on and after the lst of January, 1900, the remainder of the County of London (not including the City of London) is to be brought under the Act; and, finally, on and after the lst of Ju_ly,,19,0Q, the Cit of _London__is_to_ come within its operation. There can Be no doubt as to the wigdom oi this course.

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FORMAL NOTICE, dated the 17th of May, appeared in the London Gazette of Tuesday last of intention, after the expiration of forty days from the date of the notice, to submit the draft of an Order in Council declaring that registration of title to land is to be compulsory on sale in the coimty of London. It will be remembered that on the 26th of November last notice was given that a draft order had been prepared, a copy of which was appended to the notice, declaring that “ as respects the county of London, on and after the 1st day of July, 1898, registration of title to land is to be compulsory on sale,” but adding that the order might be “amended, or added to, or repealed by Order in Council.” Section 20 (6) of the Land Transfer Act, 1897, provides that “In the case of every ordor proposed to be made under this section, notice shall, six months before the order is made," be given to the county council, and a draft of the pro

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posed order is to accompany the notice and is to be published in the Gazetle. It does not appear that notice of the new draft order, which differs from the former one, has been given to the London County Council. How is this reconciled with the provision of section 20, above quoted ?

WE CALLED attention some time since to the excellent working of the new method of disposing of the special list of actions sent from chambers, under order 14, for immediate trial. Mr. Justice PIHLLIMORE proved himself so thoroughly acquainted with the practice as to be able to finish his chamber list in time to sit on two or three afternoons in the week in court to try cases in the special list. It is only fair to supplement our previous remarks by aying that Mr. Justice DARLING has, if anything, “ gone one better.” Chamber work is a great test of many qualities which are not brought out in the more formal and less rapid work of the trial of actions in court, and Mr. Justice DARLING has proved himself an extremely good chamber judge. He has disposed of heavy daily lists with such promptitude that he has been enabled to sit in court on most days at two o’clock, and has, during these afternoon sittings, managed to dispose of the short causes in the special list within a few days of their entry for

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QUITE A flutter of excitement is ruflling the general calm of official life in the Law Courts building. The beginning of it was the appearance of a man and a boy engaged in elaborate proceedings with tapes and strings measuring the staircases, or rather the shafts round which the stairs are built. We are informed, moreover, that during the last week or so all persons who commenced to climb any of the staircases in the building have been dotted down as ascending units on a tally kept by some person presumably commissioned to do so by the proper authority. By dint of inquiry conducted on the spot, we have ascertained that these proceedings are designed to determine two questions—viz., whether there is need of passenger lifts at the Law Courts, and if so, what would be the cost of fitting them. As to the cost of lifts, we leave that to be determined by the man and boy aforesaid, but as to whether there is need of lifts at the Law Courts, we unhesitatingly give our evidence without waiting to be asked. First, let us state the undeniable facts of the situation. The Law Courts building has five floors and several miles of corridors. Business transactions connected with litigation have to be conducted in all the rooms or departments in the building, numbering no less than 750, and situated on one or other of the several floors of this vast “rabbit warren,” as it has been not inaptly called. Every such transaction has to be paid for in stamps, which have to be purchased on the ground floor. We need not say that these fees are in many cases complicated, so that it is not always possible for a solicitor’s clerk to know just what stamps he will require for his business. When fees are charged, as they are in some cases, ad valorem, this must always be the case. During the seventeen years since the building has been in use, probably not a week-day has passed without some members of that hard worked body, the solicitors’ clerks, having to take their documents from the upper to the lower regions of this building to buy stamps, and having to climb up again to complete their task. lf these facts are still unknown to the Government authority which now seeks to know “if there is any need of passenger lifts,” all we can say is that it is not our fault. Not once, but many times, we have called attention to this point.

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necessitates a weary climb up those huge staircases. Qur evidence, therefore, may be summed up in this saying—_-vi_z., that the absence of passenger lifts in the Law Courts building has always been a serious hardship to solicitors’ clerks, and that there has been a real and crying need of these lifts ever since the building was erected. lt is said that the architect estimated for them in the original specification, and that the item was struck out by Her Majesty’s Commissioner of Works of that day. It is certainly a fact that several of the staircases are specially designed for lifts, and considering that no large building is considered complete in these days without them, and every other large building has them, it does seem extraordinary that they should have been considered all these years to be unnecesary for the legal public. We understand that the Incorporated Law Society and the Managing Clerks’ Association have the matter under consideration, and also that there is a movement on foot inside the building to secure the erection of passenger lifts.

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Ir HAS been sometimes said that a proviso for re-entry is to be construed strictly (Dos v. Jllarclietti, 1 B. & Ad., p. 720), but it may be doubted whether this canon of construction has any practical meaning, and the true view seems to be_ that a fair construction is to be put upon the proviso according to the apparent intent of the contracting parties (see per Lord EspritBOROUGH in Goodtitls v. Savills, 16 East, p. 95). Although it is a question of forfeiture, said Corroiv, L.J., in Corporctwfl Qf Bristol v. Wastcott (12 Ch. D., p. 467), we must construe the covenant fairly, ascertain its meaning without regard to forfeiture, and then see whether, upon that ascertained meaning, a forfeiture has been incurred. This principle has been applied by HAWKINS, J ., in Hm'seyEstata(Lz'1m'ted) v. Stsiger and Patrzfita (Lamited) in construing a proviso for re-entry by the lessor upon the winding up of a lessee company. A lease to A., an ii111lVld-1151: and to B., a registered company, contained a proviso for_reentry, “ if the lessees shall become bankrupt or_ enter_ into liquidation for the benefit of, or compound with, his creditors, or, being a company, shall enter into liquidation, whether compulsory or voluntary.” The lessees, with the assent _of__ the lessors, assigned to the defendants, who also were an individual and a registered company—Petrifite (Limited) —and in Jaililfl-1')‘, 1897, the latter company went into voluntary liquidation for the purpose of reconstruction. This liquidation was relied on as a ground of forfeiture. The argument for excluding it from having this efiect appears to be that in the case of an individual lessee the proviso contemplates re-enty only when th_e lessee is in pecuniary difliculties, and a corresponding restriction might possibly be introduced into the contingency of th_e winding up of a company lessee. The argument, however, omits to_not1o_e that the cases of an individual and a company are quite distinct. Winding up, as Mr. Justice Hiiwiiiivs pointed out, puts anend to the existence of the company, and it has this effect whatever be the cause of the winding up. It would be an_undue straining of the language of the proviso to import into it a restriction for which the parties have not provided, and it was held that a forfeiture had been incurred. Such a proviso, according to the decision in Genera-l Share Co. v. lVetl¢_1/ Brick 00- (29 011- D260), works a forfeiture immediately upon the making of the winding-up order, and the lessor’s right of re-entry is_ not postponed till the winding up is complete. To avoid forfeiture of a lease by a company under such circumstances as the _above, the proviso should expressly except the case o_f a winding up for the purpose of reconstruction or amalgamation.

UNTIL A few years ago it was thought to be _an important principle of our law that a man is answerable criminally for his own acts only, and not for those of his servant, or of any other person, committed without his acquiescence or knowledge. This principle has, however, been very much encroached upon, and the lit of exceptions to the general rule grows larger every year. Thus it has been held that, where a barmaid supplied liquor to a constable on duty without her master’s knowledge, the master was liable to punishment for this offence against the

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‘provisions of the Licensing Act, 1872. Under the same Act,

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also, it is now well established that a publican may be convicted of an offence where his servant sells liquor to a drunken person without his knowledge. Again, it has been held under the Food and Drugs Acts that an innocent master may be convicted where his servant has fraudulently adulterated his master’s milk and sold it in that condition. And an exceptionally strong Divisional Court, consisting of six judges, has now decided unanimously, in the case of Coppen v. Moore, that, under the Merchandise Marks Act, a master may be convicted of having sold goods to which a false trade description was applied, although the act. was done without the master’s knowledge and against his orders. It is very difficult indeed to extract from these and other similar decisions any general rule as to when a master may be convicted for his servants’ act committed without his authority or knowledge. In all these cases it seems that the act was done by the servant within the scope and in the course of his employment. It cannot be said generally, however, that a master is criminally liable for the acts of his servant within the scope of his employment. If it could, a milkseller would be I liable to indictment for obtaining money by false pretences ii his servant sold watered milk alleging it to be pure. It is, therefore, clear that all cases which establish this liability of the master must depend entirely on the construction of the particular statute by which the ofience is defined. The statutes under which these cases have been decided are all for the protection of the public from some form of evil; and the courts seem to have construed them on the principle that unless the master were made liable for his servant's act, the public would not be protected as the statute intended. Thus one statute forbids a licensed person to sell liquor to a drunken person. This is obviously to protect public order. The act of selling is, however, rarely performed by the publican himself, it is generally performed by a servant. Is, then, the master to be allowed to excuse himself by putting the blame on his servant ? Clearly, if this were allowed, the statute would, to a large extent, fail in its object. The courts have, no doubt, decided these cases on a sound principle, but, nevertheless, it would be more satisfactory if such important exceptions to the general law could be made expressly by statute, and not by decision.

Tnn PROVISIONS of section 59 (1) of the Stamp Act, 1891, are not very clearly expressed, but apparently the correct interpretation has been placed upon them by the Divisional Court (Wiuour and Prnnnmoas, J J .) in Farmer §' Co. v. Com»:-imonera of Inland Revenue. The section provides for the payment of ad valonm duty upon a contract for the sale of property in two classes of cases—first, upon a contract for the sale of “any equitable estate or interest in any property whatsoever”; and, secondly, upon a contract for the sale of “any estate or interest in any property except” (inter alia) lands or property locally situate out of the United Kingdom. The exception engrafted upon the second category is apparently at variance with the first category, for an equitable estate in lands or in property situate out of the United Kingdom is equally within the first category and within the exception to the second category. The question is specially important in the case of an equitable interest in property situate out of the jurisdiction, for, since the conveyance will take efiect according to the foreign law, the transaction will escape ad -valorem duty in this country unless such duty is payable on the contract. In the present case a contract had been made in England for the sale, at the price of £98,000, of land situate in New South \Vales which was subject to a legal mortgage for £58,000, and the Inland Revenue Commissioners claimed the ad vale-rem duty on the contract on the ground that the contract was for the sale of i an equitable interest in property. It is to be noticed that the word “ whatsoever” which occurs in the first part of section 59 (1) was first introduced in the Act of 1891, and seems designed to prevent the possibility of contracts for the sale of equitable j estates in the classes of property excepted in the second part being exempted from ad valorem duty, and this view has now p been taken by the court. Contracts for the sale of equitable interests in all kinds ot property are subject to the duty; and ‘

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the exceptions only operate in the case of the salo of legal,

interests. In the present instance the property was sold subject to the mortgages. Hence, according to English law, it was only an equitable interest that was sold, and the duty would attach upon the contract. Under a statute of New South Wales an attempt has been made to turn the equity of redemption of a mortgagor into a legal interest, but the legal rights of mortgagees are at the same time expressly saved, and the Divisional Court held that the mortgagor had still in eifect only an equitable estate. In the result, therefore, the ad calormn duty was payable.

Ir IS PERIIAPS hardly creditable to our law that cruelty to animals is no offence at all unless the animal which is said to have been ill treated is a domestic animal. A charge was made against a. man this week at the Westminster police court of cruelty to a rat which he had caught. It was clear that he had treated the creature in a most brutal manner, but the magistrate held that he had no power to punish him, as the rat was obviously not a domestic animal, and therefore not protected by the Cruelty to Animals Acts, 1849 and 1854. The leading case on this subject may be said to be Ilarper v. Mm-cl.-s (42 W. R. 605 ; 1894, 2 Q. B. 319), which decided that a lion is not a domestic animal—a decision which has provoked countless jeers from unappreciative laymen. It was pointed out in that case that wild animals in confinement are not in any sense domestic animals, in which term are included only such animals as have been tamed for the use of man. It does not make an animal domestic merely to cage him and compel him by fear to go through some performance. An animal can only be regarded as domestic when it is either of a kind which is ordinarily domesticated, or when it has itself been, in fact, domesticated. It follows, therefore, that the law is in general powerless to prevent the ill-treatment of a wild animal which has been captured. Strange to say, however, the Cruelty to Animals Act, 1876, forbids vivisection of any vertebrate animal whatever, except under certain stringent regulations. Hence a scientific man may be punished heavily for performing a painful experiment upon a living rat in the cause of science, but a labourer may inflict just as severe pain upon the rat out of mere wantonness with impunity. This seems absurd, and it is to be hoped that before long Parliament may find time to pass a short Act making it penal to inflict unnecessary pain or sufiering upon any animal, whether domestic or wild. There can be little doubt that public sentiment has greatly changed upon this subject since the Act of 1849 was passed, and that it is at present favourable to the suggested change in the law.

Tun romr decided by the Court of Appeal in Attorne_:/- General v. Strange hardly admits of any doubt. By a marriage settlement, made in 1846, the husband and wife covenanted to settle the after-acquired property of the wife upon trusts under which the husband was entitled to the income for his life, and if the wife survived the husband, the trusts were for the wife absolutely. The husband died in November, 1894, and the after-acquired property, amounting to some £17,000, thereupon passed to the wife. The Inland Revenue authorities claimed estate duty upon it, on the ground that it was property which passed on the death of the husband within the meaning of section 1 of the Finance Act, 1894 ; but a defence to the claim was set up under section 21 (5) of the Act. This provides that, where a husband or wile is entitled, either solely or jointly with the other, to the income of any property settled by the other under a disposition which has taken efiect prior to the 1st of August, 1894, and on his or her death the survivor becomes entitled to the income of the property settled by such survivor, estate duty shall not be payable in respect of that property until the death of the survivor. In the present case, it was urged, the wife became, upon the death of the husband, entitled to the income of the settled property, and the clause therefore applied. In the Divisional Court (VAUGHAN \V1LL1A1us and KENNEDY, JJ.) the argument succeeded; but though the wife certainly became entitled to the income of the settled property, and so the case in a sense fell within the provision, she became at the same time entitled to the corp-us as well; or rather, it was only by virtue of her becoming entitled

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to the corpus that she became entitled to the income. This does not appear to be a case within the purview of the section, and so the Court of Appeal have held. The section contemplates a succession of life estates, first in tho husband and then in the wife ; and in settlements executed before the commencement of the Act it saves the estate duty which would be payable on the death of the husband. But the case is different where the property vests absolutely in the wife, and the estate duty then becomes payable.

WE uncanny referred (ante, p. 393) to a case of _Dzmoom.be v. Hicks, in which a decision was given by a Divisional Court (Wmorrr and DARLING, J J .) on the subject of “ walkin-_q possession,” and where it was held that, in respect of such a possession by a county court bailifi levying a distress for rent, full p')E89S8lon fees could not be charged against the tenant. The Court of Appeal have now held, in another case, namely—Lumsdon v. Bennett, in accordance with the view previously expressed by the county court judge, but dissented from by a Divisional Court (DAY and LAWKANOE, J J .), that where income taxis distrained for, and full possession fees are levied, and paid under protest, in respect of mere “ walking possession,” an action is maintainable to recover from the tax collector damages for illegal distress, together with the sum so paid to him under protest in respect of the walking possession. The lengthy judgment of A. L. Siuirn, L.J., in this case emphasizes the distinction between actual and constructive possession of goods distrained—namely, that the former is a reality while the latter is not, and states that consequently, in the absence of all events of any agreement to substitute the one possession for the other, full possession fees are not recoverable and should not be charged when only “ walking possession ” was taken.

COUNTY BYE-LAWS.

Tun decision of the full Court of the Queen’e Bench Division in Kruse v. Johnson (reported in another column) has been anxiously awaited by local authorities throughout the country. We have no doubt that, not only the authorities, but a large majority of their constituents, will be satisfied with the result. Technically, no doubt, a full court is of co-ordinate jurisdiction with an ordinary Divisional Court; but having regard to the composition of the court in question, which represented, not the Queen's Bench Division only, but all the Divisions of the High Court, its almost unanimous decision cannot fail to carry great weight; in fact, it would not be too much to say that the decision of the Lord Chief Justice, the President of the Probate Division, Ciiirrv, L.J., and WRIGHT, DARLING, and CHANNELL, JJ., must, in practice, be treated as a decision of the Court of Appeal, notwithstanding the fact that MATHEW, J ., dissented from their view.

The question was as to the validity of a bye-law made by a county council under section 16 of the Local Government Act, 1888, and section 23 of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882, and aimed at suppressing nuisance by street music; but the grounds of the decision are far-reaching, with the consequence that its importance is general and cannot be regarded as confined to cases of bye-laws couched in similar terms to those which were directly under the consideration of the court.

The principle which underlies the judgment of the Lord Chie_f Justice is a political, rather than a legal, principle; he apphes to tlie_determination of the question of the reasonableness and validity of the bye-laws of a local representative body the democratic principle of “trust in the people.” Bye-laws made by such a body under powers conferred on them by the Legislature ought, he says, “to be benevolently interpreted, and credit ought to be given to those who have to administer them that _ they will be reasonably administered.” Local representative bodies, and the constituents who elect them, are the best judges of what are the requirements of the locality in purely local matters; the enactment and administration of byelaws made to inset these requirements are subject to safeguards which, in ordinary cases, are sufficient to ensure that nothing unreasonable will be enforced. In all cases, these bye-laws

require to be submitted to, and approved by, a central department before they have any validity, and opportunity is given to persons concerned to object to their confirmation before it is actually given. Further, the bye-laws can be altered or repealed by the authority which has made them if they are not found to work satisfactorily; they are administered by officers under the control of that authority; the authority itself, and therefore its officers, are responsible to the electors, who have frequent opportunities of imposing their will upon the candidates who seek their sufirages, and would not be slow to express their disapproval, and require"the alteration, of a local law which was in itself oppressive or was harshly administered.

These are some of the considerations which, in the opinion of the Inrd Chief Justice and the judges who agreed with him, ought to have weight with the courts in considering whether the bye-law of a representative body is reasonable or not ; and he points out the important distinction between such a bye-law and the bye-laws or regulations of a corporation formed for purposes of profit to shareholders and not subject to popular control. Railway companies cannot derive any assistance from .Zl'7"u8a v. Johnson in endeavouring to enforce their regulations. Even in the case of bye-laws of the former class, it is not to be assumed that they can in no case be set aside by the courts as unreasonable. They might, says the Lord Chief Justice, be held to be unreasonable “if, for instance, they were found to be partial and unequal in their operation as between different classes, if they were manifestly unjust, if they disclosed bad faith, if they involved such oppressive and gratuitous interference with the rights of those subject to them as could find no justification in the minds of reasonable men ”-in such aoase “the court might well say that Parliament never intended to give authority to make such rules; they are unreasonable and ultra sires.”

In the case of Ii’;-use v. Jolmson the bye-law prohibited a person from playing on musical or noisy instruments, or singing in any public place or highway within fifty yards of any dwelling-house, “after being required by any constable, or by an inmate of such house, personally or by his or her servant, to desist.” The main objections taken to it were, that it did not make it necessary to prove that any annoyance was actually caused, and that it placed excessive power in the hands of a single policeman. The latter objection was pressed by MATHEW, J ., and certainly the fact that the zeal of an ofiicious policeman can ultimately be checked by his superiors is a poor consolation to an individual whom he has haled before the magistrates and put to expense and inconvenience. But the over-zealous policeman, although perhaps not a purely imaginary individual, is certainly a ram avis; very definite instructions from his superiors are generally required to set this guardian of the peace in motion. Isolated cases of hardship may possibly arise, but we are inclined to assume with Lord Russrzni. that such control will be exercised over the rural policeman and such instructions given to him as will make the danger to which MATHE\V, J ., alludes very remote. The decision of the majority of the court is founded upon broad and statesmanlike views on an important and difiicult subject, and it will meet with general acceptance.

It would have been satisfactory if the court had stated the effect or their decision upon some of the numerous cases as to bye-laws which have come up for adjudication in recent years. Upon the general principle enunciated by him the Lord Chief Justice rightly relied upon the authority of the Privy Council in Slatlery v. Naylor (13 App. Cas. 446), an Australian case. Some of the cases as to English local bye-laws will no doubt be afiected by the recent decision; in Stricklanrl v. Hayes (1896, 1 Q B. 290, 44 W. R. 398), for instance, LINDLEY and KAY, L.JJ., (sitting as a Divisional Court) refused to uphold a bye-law as to the singing oi obscene songs, on the ground, amongst others, that it did not require that annoyance should be caused to anyone. This decision seems to conflict with the decision in 1Yi~use v. Johnson, and it is doubtful whether it can now be considered good law. In Johnson v. T/to Jlayor of Croydon (16 Q. B. D. 708), and in Munro v. Watson (57 L. T. 366) bye-laws directed against noisy street music were held to be unreasonable. In these cases the terms of the prohibition were certainly more abso

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