not served any customers on the morning of the 11th of January before he in the property, plant, and business of the American company to the was taken into custody. The whole of the milk, after it had been so respondent company. In order to avoid any difficulty in connection with watered, was, in fact, damaged and spoiled, and was thrown away, and the Illinois State laws, which prevented alien corporations and persons from the loss therein amounted in value to the sum of ten shillings and eight-holding real property in that State, it was agreed between the respondent pence. On behalf of the respondent it was contended that in view of the company and the vendors that the American company thould be kept on decision in Hall v. Richardson (54 J. P. 345), the respondent could not, foot, and that the whole of the capital stock of the American company, under the said circumstances, be convicted of the offence. On behalf of except three shares of 100 dols. each, should be acquired by the respondent the appellant it was contended that the decision in Hall v. Richardson only company, and as a consequence the respondent company became in subapplied to a case where the milk had been spilt accidentally. The stance owners of all the property and assets of the American company. magistrate was of opinion that the respondent acted in a fraudulent In 1895 the net profits amounted to £66,266, and in the following year to way, and that his object in adding water was to increase the bulk and to £63,970. According to the balance-sheet there was remitted to England put the money into his own pocket by selling and not accounting for the between the 8th of April, 1895, and the 3rd of February, 1896, the sum surplus, but there was no malice towards or intention to injure the of £2,561 18s., and, after paying the company's expenses, £1,936 18. of appellant, the owner of the milk. He was doubtful whether the section this sum was distributed as dividend among the shareholders. Between was intended to apply to such injury or damage at all; but, even if that the 13th of April, 1896, and March, 1897, the sum of £3,256 was was so, he felt himself bound by the decision in Hall v. Richardson, and remitted to England, and of this sum £2,481 128. was distributed as accordingly dismissed the charge. The question for the opinion of the court dividend. The business of the brewery was exclusively carried on in the was whether, upon the above facts, the respondent could legally be con- State of Illinois, U.S.A., and all the staff lived at Chicago. The sharevicted of the offence. For the appellant it was now contended that there holders were mostly persons resident in America, although some of them should have been a conviction, inasmuch as if the natural and obvious resided in England and elsewhere. The powers of management of the consequence of doing a particular act is damage to property it can be no London board were in fact delegated to the managers of the brewery at answer on behalf of the person who does the act to say that he has no Chicago, who were the directors of the American company. The board intention to injure the property. The following cases were cited: Hall v. of directors met in London and had the power to dismiss any cr all of Richardson (54 J. P. 345), Reg. v Pembliton (22 W. R. 553, L. R. 2 C. O. R. the managers, officials, and others carrying on the business in Chicago, 119), Hamilton v. Bow (52 J. P. 726). and had an absolute power to control not only the company's affairs generally but the business carried on in Chicago. The commissioners found the following on the facts: (1) That the business carried on at Chicago was carried on by, and was the business of, the respondent company, and that the profits made were their profits; (2) that the American company was the agent of the respondent company, who managed the business from their head office in London. The commissioners, however, considered themselves bound by the decision in Bartholomay Brewing Co. v. Wyatt (1893, 2 Q. B. 499), and they accordingly reduced the assessment to the amount of the remittances to Englandviz., for the year ending the 5th of April, 1896, the sum of £2,561 18s, and for the year following to the sum of £3,256. The surveyor of taxes Counsel on thereupon required the commissioners to state this case. behalf of the Crown contended that the commissioners were wrong; the company traded in England and was managed from a London office. He distinguished the case of Bartholomay Brewing Co. v. Wyatt (supra) from the present and submitted that on the authority of the San Paulo (Brazilian) Railway Co. v. Carter (1895, 1 Q. B. 580), affirmed by the House of Lords (44 W. R. 336), income tax was payable on the assessment as made. On behalf of the company it was argued that the inference drawa by the court in the Barthol may case, which was identical with the present, was not affected by the San Paulo case, since it was a question of fact which must be decided by the court in every case-namely, Where, during the year of the assessment, was the business of the company in que:tion actually carried on? THE COURT (Lord RUSSELL OF KILLOWEN, C.J., and DAY, WILLS, GRANTHAM, WRIGHT, KENNEDY, and CHANNELL, JJ.) allowed the appeal. Lord RUSSELL OF KILLOWEN, C.J., after stating the facts of the case, said: The result of the respondent's action was damage to his master's property. He acted with a fraudulent intention though he had no personal malice against the appellant. Under these circumstances can he be convicted of an offence within section 52 of the Malicious Injuries to Property Act, 1861. Section 51 deals with cases of injury, for which no punishment was before provided, to an amount exceeding £5 committed unlawfully and maliciously." Now, section 52 differs from this and any other section in the Act, for it says, "Whosoever shall wilfully or maliciously commit any damage, injury, or spoil to or upon any real or personal property whatsoever, either of a public or private nature, for which no punishment is hereinbefore provided" may be committed and compelled to pay a fine not exceeding £5. It is clear the Legislature intended to draw a distinction between an act done "unlawfully and maliciously," which might be wilful but not malicious, and an act done "wilfully or maliciously." Now, this is a case of injury on the findings of the magistrate. Was it wilful damage? The respondent committed the act charged to him intending to do so-that is, he did it wilfully. A man commits an act wilfully if he intentionally does a thing which causes an injury either with the intention of doing the injury or intentionally does it knowing it will cause the injury. Taerefore I think this is a case of wilful damage within the meaning of section 52. We have now to consider the case of Hall v. Richardson, on the authority of which the magistrate dismissed the charge. We cannot shrink from considering There the act of diluting the milk was done wilfully, though it was not done with a fraudulent intention but to prevent loss to the owner in respect of some milk that had been accidentally spilt. We do not approve of the decision in that case. The error there is a confusion between damage to the property and consequent loss to the owner. It does not matter if there is or is not loss to the owner. The question is, Was the damage done by an act wilfully committed? The next error is that Lord Coleridge, C.J., seems to have been of opinion that there must be evidence of an intention to deprive somebody of property. It is not necessary to shew that. Lastly, the learned judge seems to have thought that the section was limited to cases for which compensation may be REG. v. COTHAM AND ANOTHER, AND WEBB, Ex parte SAME. Div. awarded. The section, however, does not say so. I am of opinion that this appeal ought to be allowed and the case remitted to the magistrate. The rest of the learned judges concurred in the above judgment, WILLS, J., in his remarks referring to the case of Gardner v. Munsbridge (35 W. R. 809, 19 Q. B. D. 217). Appeal allowed.-COUNSEL, H. Avory. SOLICITORS, Young & Windsor. that case. [Reported by E. G. STILLWELL, Barrister-at-Law.] APTHORPE v. PETER SCHOENHOFEN BREWERY CO. Div. Court. 28th April. INLAND REVENUE-INCOME TAX-PROFITS AND GAINS OF ENGLISH COMPANY OWNING BREWERY ABROAD -CONTROL IN ENGLAND -PROFITS RECEIVED IN ENGLAND-INCOME TAX ACTS, 1842 (5 & 6 VICT. c. 35), s. 100, SCHEDULE D, CASES 1 AND 5; 1853 (16 & 17 VICT. c. 34), s. 2, SCHEDULE D. This was a revenue case stated by the commissioners for the general purposes of the Income Tax Acts for the City of London. The head offices of the company were in London, and the brewery was at Chicago. The question for the decision of the court was whether the company were liable to pay income tax upon the whole of its profits, or only upon such as were remitted to England. The company appealed against assessments mide upon them of £66,266 for the year ending the 5th of April, 1896, and of £63,970 for the year ending the 5th of April, 1897, under schedule D of 16 & 17 Vict. c. 31. The Peter Schoenhofen Brewery Co. (Limited) was an English company, registered under the Joint-Stock Companies Acts, with a memorandum of association, and with a registered office at 57, Old Broad-street, City, and was formed in 1889 to acquire the brewery company founded by Mr. Peter Schoenhofen at Chicago in 1860. The original company consisted of five persons, who, by contract dated the 25th of June, 1889, became vendors of all except three of the shares THE COURT (WRIGHT and CHANNELL, JJ.), upheld the contention of the Crown. It was clear that though the profits were earned in the United States the trade was carried on in England. The staff in America was appointed by the English company and the directors in England could dismiss any of the officials engaged at the brewery. In that state of things the observations in the judgments of the San Paulo case applied. The delegating of authority to persons in America was but an exercising by the English company of their supreme power. Execution stayed pending appeal.- COUNSEL, Sir R. Webster, A.G., and Danckwerts; Asquith, QC, and T. E. Scrutton. SOLICITORS, The Solicitor for Inland Revenue; Julius & Thomas. [Reported by ERSKINE REID, Barrister-at-Law.] Court. 26th and 27th April. JUSTICES-LICENSING APPEAL-TRANSFER OF LICENCE-CERTIORARI- In this case a rule nisi had been obtained for two writs of certiorari and for a writ of mandamus to the licensing justices of the Prescot Division of Lancashire, who had on the 21st of December, 1897, granted to one Webb the transfer under section 14 of the Alehouse Act, 1828, of a licence granted to J. Wallace on the 25th of August, 1897, to apply for and hold a licence to sell by retail at a house situate at Church-street, Farnworth, Widnes, beer to be consumed on or off the premises. For ten years Wallace had yearly obtained a certificate to hold such a licence in respect therein. The house in question had been used as a draper's shop, and of this house, but during the whole of that period he had not resided for thirteen years no beer or other intoxicating liquor had been sold therein. It was alleged that the justices had no jurisdiction to grant this transfer. One of the rules for a certiorari was to quash the grant dated the 25th of August and the other rule was to quash the transfer, and the mandamus was to hear and determine the transfer according to law. In support of the rule it was contended that the licence granted to Wallace was null and void because he was not, according to 3 & 4 Vict. c. 61, the resident, holder, and occupier of the premises, and that therefore the transfer of such a licence was also null and void. Further, it was contended that Wallace was not a person within the meaning of section 4 of 9 Geo. 4, c 61, from whom a licence could be transferred as he had never in fact theretofore kept" the premises as a licensed house, and therefore it could not be said he was a person "about to remove from such" licensed premises. The following cases were cited: Reg. v. King (36 W. R. 600, 20 Q. B. D. 430), Reg. v. Sharman (46 W. Ř. 367; 1898, 1 Q. B. 578), Reg. v. Bowman (1898, 1 Q. B. 663), Reg. v. Justices of London (43 W. R. 287; 1895, 1 Q. B. 214). Section 4 of the Alehouse Act, 1828 (9 Geo. 4, c. 61) provides that special sessions shall be held, at which "it shall be lawful for the justices there and then assembled in the case and in the manner and for the time hereinafter directed, to licence such persons intending to keep inns theretofore kept by other persons being about to remove from such inns as they, the said justices, shall deem fit and proper persons. Section 14 gives the cases in which a transfer may be granted and inter alia provides for the case where a duly licensed person shall "remove from or yield up the possession of the house." THE COURT (WILLS and KENNEDY, JJ.) discharged the rule for the writs of certiorari, but made absolute the rule for a mandamus. WILLS, J.—It is clear that the decision of the justices cannot be supported. The premises which Webb intended to keep as an inn have for over twelve years before the application for the transfer been licensed in the name of Wallace, but somebody else had occupied them as a draper's shop, and therefore they do not come within the words in section 4 as being premises "theretofore kept by other persons being about to remove from such inns"; and, moreover, Wallace was not about to remove from such inn"-he bas never resided there. Section 4 has not, therefore, been complied with, and the justices have clearly acted without jurisdiction. The certiorari, however, must be discharged, as it has been laid down by the Divisional Court that in such a case as this a certiorari is not the proper remedy. The rule for a mandamus must, however, be made absolute. The justices have not confined themselves to the construction of the section, but have clearly taken into consideration matters wholly outside their jurisdiction. This is not the case where there has been a misconstruction of a statute, as no possible construction can make Wallace out to be a person who has "theretofore" kept the premises as an inn. KENNEDY, J., in giving judgment, concurred on the same grounds, saying: It is clear Wallace does not come within section 4. That section provides that the justices may grant a licence "in the manner hereinafter directed." We are therefore referred to section 14 of the same Act, which stated the cases in which the grant may be made, and, amongst others, states that, where a duly licensed person shall "remove from or yield up the possession of the house." But it cannot be said that Wallace comes within those words. I am of opinion that the justices have not heard and determined the application according to law, and I think the mandamus should be made absolute. Mandamus made absolute; certiorari discharged. -COUNSEL, Avory and R. M. Montgomery; Mattinson, Q.C., and T. Swift. SOLICITORS, Lloyd-George, Roberts, & Co., for Lewis & Davis, Liverpool; J. Hands, for Edwin Berry, Liverpool. [Reported by E. G. STILLWELL, Barrister-at-Law.] CUCKFIELD RURAL DISTRICT COUNCIL v. GORING. Div. Court. 25th April. HIGHWAY-FOOT-BRIDGE-LIABILITY ΤΟ REPAIR-RATIONE TENUREACTION AGAINST OWNER NOT IN OCCUPATION OF LAND-LOCAL GOVERNMENT ACT, 1894 (56 & 57 VICT. c. 73) s. 25 (2). This was an appeal by the defendant from the decision of his Honour Judge Martineau, sitting at Worthing. The defendant, the Rev. John Goring, was the owner of certain land on which there were two footbridges over a stream. These bridges united the severed portions of two public footpaths which run over the said land. These footbridges became out of repair. The plaintiffs requested the defendant to place them in proper repair, but he failed to do so, and the present action was then brought against him under section 25 (2) of the Local Government Act, 1894, to recover £7, the expenses incurred by the plaintiffs in placing the bridges in proper repair. That section provides that: "Where a highway repairable ratione tenure appears on the report of a competent surveyor not to be in proper repair, and the person liable to repair the same fails, when requested so to do by the district council, to place it in proper repair, the district council may place the highway in proper repair and recover from the person liable to repair the highway the necessary expenses of so doing." The county court judge held that a liability ratione tenure to repair the bridges attached to the land, and that proceedings under the above section might be taken against the owner of the land, and he accordingly entered judgment for the plaintiffe. The defendant now appealed on the ground, principally, that proceedings under section 25 (2) could only be taken against the occupier of the land. THE COURT (WILLS and KENNEDY, JJ.) allowed the appeal. WILLS, J., in giving judgment, said that at the time of the passing of the Local Government Act of 1894 the law was that it was only the occupier of land subject to a liability to the repair of highways ratione tenure who could be proceeded against and compelled to carry out such repairs. In the case of Reg. v. Barker (25 Q. B. D) Lord Coleridge, C.J., Eaid, "From the date of Rolle's Abridgment to the present time, the placitum (B) 2, which lays down the law both in the affirmative and the negative that you must indict the occupier and cannot indict the owner." That passage had been held to refer to highways repairable ratione tenuræ although it did not in terms refer to such highways. There was, therefore, very ancient authority for saying that the occupier is the only person against whom the liability could be enforced, though no doubt the Occupier had a right to be re-imbursed by the owner. Section 25 (2) of the Local Government Act, 1894, does not bring in the owner of the land as a person liable to be proceeded against; it merely provides a simpler remedy and enables the local authority to do the repairs and recover the expenses of so doing from the person liable ratione tenure to repair. The proceedings in this case had been taken against the wrong person, and the appeal would therefore be allowed. KENNEDY, J., concurred. Appeal allowed.-COUNSEL, Marshall Hall and R. E. Moore; Dickens, Q.C., and Boxall. SOLICITORS, Buckwell, Brighton; C. H. Waugh, for E. Waugh, Haywards Heath. [Reported by E. G. STILLWELL, Barrister-at-Law.] REG. v. BIRD AND OTHERS. Ex parte NEEDES. Div. Court. 2nd May. LICENSING LAW-NEW LICENCE-CONFIRMATION-RIGHT TO OPPOSE-ReguLATIONS OF QUARTER SESSIONS-ULTRA VIRES-LICENSING ACT, 1872 (35 & 36 VICT. c. 94), ss. 37, 43. Rule nisi to the county licensing committee of the County of London to hold an adjourned sessions and hear and determine the application of V. Guidotti pursuant to section 43 of the Licensing Act, 1872, that a provisional grant of a victualler's licence for certain premises might be confirmed, and to hear the objections of the appellant Needes thereto. On the 25th of March, 1898, Guidotti applied to the licensing justices of the St. Margaret's Division, Westminster, for the grant of a new licence; the appellant appeared and opposed, and the provisional licence was granted. Rule 30 of the Standing Orders of the London Quarter Sessions provides "that every person (subject as hereinafter provided) intending to oppose the confirmation of any such provisional licence before the county licensing committee shall, within seven days after the grant of such provisional licence give notice to the applicant and to the clerk of the peace by registered letter of his intention to oppose the confirmation of such provisional licence." This notice was not given by the appellant; but on or about the 16th of April a notice of opposition wis tendered by the appellant at the Sessions House, and was refused, the application having then been entered in the unopposed list. On the 17th of April notice that the appellant intended to oppose and would apply for leave to be heard in opposition was served by registered post on Guidotti. On the 27th of April (the day fixed for the hearing by the county licensing committee of the application for confirmation) the application of the appellant to be heard in opposition was refused, and the grant of the licence was confirmed. The appellant then obtained this rule. Section 37 of the Licensing Act, 1872, enacts that "the justices in quarter sessions shall make such regulations with respect to the meetings of any such committee (viz., the county licensing committee) and the transaction of business thereat as they may think fit." Section 43 enacts that "any person who appears before the licensing justices and opposes the grant of a new licence and no other person may appear and oppose the confirmation of such grant by the confirming authorities in counties and boroughs. In a county the justices in quarter sessions assembled shall make rules as to the proceedings to be adopted for confirmation of new licences, and the costs to be incurred in any such proceedings, and the person by whom such costs are to be paid." It was contended by the appellant that the rule making the prescribed notice by a person who had appeared in opposition to the provisional grant a condition precedent to his right to be heard in opposition to the confirmation was cɔntrary to section 43, and was ultra vires. THE COURT (WILLS and KENNEDY, JJ.) allowed the appeal. WILLS, J.-At first sight nothing can appear more reasonable than that there should be a rule as to the hearing of these licensing cases by which a condition could be enforced that proper notice of opposition to the confirmation of a licence should be given. But is it within the power given by the statute to make rules as to the proceedings for confirmation? I think the power thus [His lordship read sections 37 and 43.] given must include power to make rules, consistent with the Act, dealing with the manner of opposing as well as with the confirming of the provisional grant; the opposition is part of the business relating to the confirmation. But that still leaves the real difficulty untouched. The Act of Parliament (eection 43) gives power in so many words to a person who has opposed the first application to appear aud be heard on the further application for confirmation. I think that the power to make rules, however wide, cannot give power to override the express power given by the statute to appear and oppose. The quarter sessions have made rules, some of which may be ultra vires, but we have only one to deal with here. Rule 34 expresses neatly the effect of what they have done-" any person who has appeared before the licensing justices and opposed a grant of a new licence, and who has complied with these rules, and no other person, may appear before the county licensing committee." That imposes a new condition not imposed by the Act of Parliament, and is ultra vires. I think it would be within the power of the sessions to say that a person whɔ has not given proper notice should have to pay the costs of any necessary adjournment or in imposing a condition of appeal which is not within section 43 they other costs; such a rule would certainly have my judicial sympathy; but have gone beyond their powers. No question arises here as to rule 31, which requires a surety to be found for the amount of the costs, but it seems clear that there is no power to impose such a condition as that. The rules require revision. The principle is that no regulation made under an Act of Parliament can abridge a power given by the Act itself. KENNEDY, J.-The county licensing committee treated themselves a bound by certain rules with which the person seeking to oppose the He had satisfied the confirmation of the licence had not complied. requirements of section 43, and had therefore entitled himself to appear To make an absolute and be heard in opposition to the confirmation. rule barring a person who is by the Act given a right to be heard from being heard unless he gives certain notices and does certain things is to go beyond the power to make rules as to the proceedings for confirmation. Had the rule been that the application should in the absence of notice of opposition be put in the unopposed list and so heard, unless there is an application, for good cause shewn and upon payment of costs, to transfer it to the opposed list I think it would have been good; but this rule is unconditional and is ultra vires. Rule absolute.-COUNSEL, Scrutton; Candy, Q.C., and Peter Grain. SOLICITORS, Percy Gates; Francis Rudall. [Reported by T. R. C. DILL, Barrister-at-Law.] REG. v. EDWARDS. C. C. R. 30th April. CRIMINAL LAW-OBTAINING CREDIT BY FRAUD-DEBTORS ACT, 1869 (32 & 33 VICT. c. 62), s. 13. The defendant Case stated by the recorder of Kingston-upon-Hull. was indicted under section 13 of the Debtors Act, 1869, for having obtained credit for a sum of £7 7s. 11d. for food and drink and sleeping accommodation supplied, and service rendered to him by a hotel proprietor. It was proved that the prisoner came to the hotel and engaged a bedroom which he occupied for about a fortnight, being during that time supplied with food and drink and other articles. When ordering some of these articles he said: "I will have that booked; the firm will pay for it, and it does not come out of my pocket"; and when bills were presented to him for payment he asked for time, and said that he was expecting remittances from his mother. Subsequently, when pressed for payment he said: "I am going to throw myself on your mercy; I had no money when I came, and I have no money now; I have no firm, and I cannot pay your bill unless the money is given me by someone." He was then apprehended. The recorder directed the jury that before they could convict they should be satisfied that the defendant was a person without sufficient means to pay the debt he had incurred to the prosecutrix, and that with the intention of cheating her he had obtained credit from her by means of fraud, the defendant not intending to pay the debt. The jury found the defendant guilty. The question was whether the conviction could be supported on the facts. There was no appearance in the court either by counsel or in person. THE COURT (Lord RUSSELL OF KILLOWEN, C.J., and DAY, WILLS, GRANTHAM, and KENNEDY, JJ.) affirmed the conviction. Lord RUSSELL OF KILLOWEN, C.J., in delivering the judgment of the court, after referring to the facts, said that there was no doubt that there was evidence of the prisoner's guilt to go to the jury; the case was on all fours with Reg. v. Jones (1898, 1 Q. B. 119). [Reported by T. R. C. DILL, Barrister-at-Law.j PRIOR v. THE SLAITHWAITE SPINNING CO. Div. Court. 29th April. FACTORY ACTS-MEAL-TIMES-EMPLOYMENT-FACTORY AND WORKSHOP ACT, 1878 (41 Vicr. c. 16), s. 17. Section 17 of the Factory and Workshop Act, 1878, provides (sub-section 2), with respect to the meals of persons employed in a factory or work shop, that: "A child, young person, or woman shall not, during any part of the times allowed for meals in the factory or workshop, be employed in the factory or the workshop, or be allowed to remain in a room in which a manufacturing process or handicraft is being then carried on." Section 19 provides for the times of meal-times being specified in a notice affixed in the factory or workshop, and that the times allowed for meals shall be deemed to be the times so specified. Section 94 provides: "A child, young person, or woman who works in a factory or workshop, whether for wages or not, either in a manufacturing process or handicraft, or in the cleaning any part of the factory or workshop used for any manufacturing process or handicraft, or in cleaning or oiling any part of the machinery, shall, save in so far as is otherwise provided by this Act, be deemed to be employed therein within the meaning of this Act." An information was laid against the respondents for that a young person was employed in their factory during the time allowed for meals. The young person, a boy named Garside, on the 13th of November, 1897, stayed inside the factory, a textile mill, during the time allowed for dinner. He did so of his own accord because it was warmer inside. Having finished his dinner before the dinner-time expired, in order to while away the time he set to work to oil the spindles. In doing so he was acting contrary to the rules made by the respondents and affixed in the mill. It was no part of Garside's duty to oil the spindles. His duty was to tie up broken threads. The justices before whom the information was heard dismissed it upon the ground that there was no evidence that the boy was employed by the respondents, but they stated a case for the opinion of the High Court. It was contended by the respondents that the acts done by the boy were not necessarily evidence that be "worked" within the meaning of section 94. These acts might have been mere mischief or done for the sake of amusement. It was further contended that the respondents were entitled to exemption under the terms of section 87. THE COURT (WILLS and KENNEDY, JJ.), allowed the appeal and remitted the case to the justices to convict. WILLS, J., said that under the words of the enactment extreme cases of hardship might arise from which the mind revolted. But those cases were not likely to be of frequent occurrence, and it was important to see whether it was necessary for the Legislature to cover such cases in order to attain the objects aimed at by the legislation. The policy of the enactment was to ensure that certain classes of persons employed in factories and workshops should have the hours allowed for their meals preserved intact. That policy could only be carried out in the manner provided in the Act, and it mattered not how rigorously it might work in some cases; if the case fell within the terms of the Act it must be dealt with accordingly. In the present case the boy was oiling spindles during the dinner-hour. He was none the less working in spite of the fact that he was doing what he did to amuse himself. Nor did the distinction avail that his doing what he did was contrary to orders. The magistrate did not find that the boy was not working. All he found was that he was not employed by the respondents. The respondents were not entitled to the benefit of the exemption contained in section 87 of the Act, for it was essential to that exemption that an information should be preferred against another person.-COUNSEL, Sutton; Rawlinson, Q.C., and Harper. SOLICITORS, Treasury Solicitor; Learoyd & Co. [Reported by C. G. WILBRAHAM, Barrister-at-Law.] Re THE ROYAL COLLEGE OF SURGEONS. Div. Court. 23th and 29th April. INLAND REVENUE-BODIES CORPORATE OR UNINCORPORATE-INCOME OR PROFITS OF PROPERTY-DUTY-EXEMPTION-PROPERTY APPROPRIATED FOR PROMOTION OF SCIENCE-CUSTOMS AND INLAND REVENUE ACT, 1885 (48 & 49 VICT. c. 51), s. 11 (3). 66 In this case the Royal College of Surgeons petitioned to be discharged from an assessment made under the Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1885, on the ground that the college is an institution for the promotion of 'education, literature, science, or the fine arts." The petition showed as follows: (1) That by the Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1885, it is enacted that there shall be levied in respect of all real and personal property which shall have belonged to or been vested in any body corporate or unincorporate a duty at the rate of £5 per centum upon the annual value, income, or profits of such property after deducting all necessary outgoings subject to exemption from such duty in favour of property of the description following-that is to say, property which, or the income or profits whereof, shall be legally appropriated and applied for the benefit of the public at large; property which, or the income or profits whereof, shall be legally appropriated and applied for the promotion of education, literature, science, or the fine arts; (2) that the petitioners are a body politic established by Royal Charter in the year 1800; (3) that the objects of the petitioners' incorporation, as specified in the said Royal Charter, are the benefit of the common weal of this kingdom by the promotion of the art and science of surgery and the due promotion and encouragement of the study and practice of the said art and science of surgery; (4) that further powers and privileges have from time to time been conferred upon the petitioners by subsequent Royal Charters with the object more effectually to promote and encourage the study and practice of the said art and science of surgery; (5) that by the charter divers obligations and duties are imposed upon the corporation for the benefit of the public at large and the promotion and encouragement of the said art and science of surgery; (6) that the petitioners are, under terms imposed by Government, the custodians at their own expense of the Hunterian collection, which is national property; (7) that on the 24th of June, 1894, the annual value of income from real property was £7,200, the total value of the personal estate was £187,195 178. 11d., and the income therefrom for the same yearly period was £5,833 5s. 7d.; (8) that the whole property was legally appropriated and applied for the benefit of the public at large or for the promotion of science, literature, or education; (9) that the petitioners were called upon by the Commissioners of Inland Revenue to deliver an account in accordance with section 17 of the Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1885, that they did deliver such an account claiming exemption; (10) that the petitioners were notwithstanding assessed by the Commissioners at £3,161, and required to pay as duty thereon the sum of £158 1s.; (11) that they had been compelled to pay the (12) The said sum of £3,161 included the following: The sum of £300, the annual value of that part of the library within the premises Nos. 40, 41, 42, Lincoln's-inn-fields; the sum of £250, the annual value of the official residence of the conservator of the museum which contains among other things the said Hunterian collection; £200, the value of 39, Lincoln's-inn, another portion of the library. (13) Apart from the general claim to total exemption the petitioners submit that, in any event, the above property comes within the provision for exemption." From various affidavits read it appeared that the college, in addition to performing the duties imposed upon them by the Charters, held examinations and granted diplomas to enable candidates to practice as surgeons and dentists. On application the public may obtain access to the library. For the petitioners it was contended that the whole college was exempt, and in the alternative that all or some of the separate buildings were exempt. The Crown exempted the museum, but claimed that none of the other buildings were exempt as they were not appropriated and applied for the promotion of science. The following cases were cited: Society of Writers to the Signet v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (2 Tax C. 257); Tailors of Glasgow v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (24 Scot L. R. 516); Re Bootham Ward Strays (40 W. R. 121, and in Court of Appeal, 1892, 2 Q. B. 152); Linen and Woollen Drapers Case (58 L. T. 949); Forrest v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (39 W. R. 33, 15 App. C. 334). same. THE COURT (WRIGHT and CHANNELL, JJ.) found in favour of the petitioners as regards the conservator's house, but against them in respect of the rest of the property. WRIGHT, J.-The Inland Revenue Act specially exempts from taxation, firstly, property which, or the income or profits whereof, shall be legally appropriated and applied for the promotion of education, literature, science, and the fine arts. No declaration of trust is required in such a case. The present case does not come within that class, for it cannot be said that the property of the petitioners is legally appropriated and applied for the promotion of science. The main object of the petitioners is the granting certificates or diplomas to persons intending to become surgeons, and the largest source of incoine arises from examination fees. Then, secondly, there is the class of property the income of which is not wholly devoted to the purposes of science, but to objects of a mixed character. In such cases each part of the property must be taken and examined separately to see if it has been legally appropriated and applied to purposes for which exemption can be claimed. The principles laid down in Forrest v. [Reported by E. G. STILLWELL, Barrister-at-Law.] Winding-up Cases. Thursday, the 28th day of April, 1898. I, Hardinge Stanley, Earl of Halsbury, Lord High Chancellor of Great Re WAVERLEY TYPEWRITER (LIM). D'ESTERRE v. WAVERLEY shall be transferred to the Honourable Mr. Justice Wright. COMPANY-WINDING UP-RETROSPECTIVE ACTION-Debentures-Prefer- Summons by the liquidators for directions. The debenture-holders' action and the winding up of the company both commenced before the Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy Amendment Act, 1897, came into force. Section 2 enacts "In the winding up of any company under the Companies Act, 1862, and the Acts amending the same, the debts mentioned in Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy Act, 1888, shall, so far as the assets of the company available for the payment of general creditors may be insufficient to meet them, have priority over the claims of holders of debentures or debenture stock under any floating charge created by such company, and shall be paid accordingly out of any property comprised in or subject to such charge." By section 1 (c) of the Act of 1888 workmen were given priority for the winding up. The question which arose in this case was whether the Act of 1897 was retrospective or not. WRIGHT, J., held that in this case the workmen were not entitled to priority over the debenture-holders, as (1) prima facie the Act was not retrospective although ambiguous, and also that, having regard to section 3 of the Act, prima facie that provision was prospective. In this case the Legislature had interfered with the rights of debenture-holders if they had not taken steps to realize their securities before the passing of the Act, but it had not gone so far as to interfere with their rights when they had already taken steps.-COUNSEL, C. T. Mitchell and Percy F. Wheeler. 8 LICITORS, Shain, Roscoe, Massey, & Co.; James Mote & Sons. [Reported by C. W. MEAD, Barrister-at-Law.] NEW ORDERS, &c. ORDER OF TRANSFER. Monday, the 2nd day of May, 1898. Re-transferred to Mr. Justice STIRLING. Croysdale v Sunbury-on-Thames, &c, Council 1897 C 498 De Young ▾ Chandler 1897 D 291 May 20 Pretcher v New Rio Tinto Copper Co, ld 1897 P 189 May 25 SECOND SCHEDULE. Re-transferred to Mr. Justice ROMER. Hetley v Webber 1896 H 4,067 May 11 Edison Bell Phonograph, &c ld v Rigg 1897 E 69 June 25 SCHEDULE. Mr. Justice STIRLING (1898-L.-No. 793). In re The Licensed Trades' Pretectorate Limited. Sir Raymond West (Knight) ▼ The Licensed Trades' Protectorate Limited. LAW SOCIETIES. A special general meeting of the Incorporated Law Society was held at the Society's Hall, Chancery-lane, on Friday, the 29th ult., the President (Mr. WILLIAM GODDEN, of London) taking the chair. The PRESIDENT: Before proceeding with the business upon the agenda I should like to mention first of all, what we all know, that the LAND TRANSFER ACT of last year comes into operation on the 1st of July, and that it is intended to apply it in London, as appears from the published accounts of the proceedings of the London County Council, progressively in portions. Mr. FORD: Moderately. The PRESIDENT: After July no conveyances on sale will pass the legal estate unless the purchaser puts his name on the register, which he will be able to do as with a possessory or a qualified or an absolute title. The rules under that Act have been prepared with enormous labour, and are now obtainable by the public for examination and criticism. Under these rules the Act will apply to leaseholds having more than forty years to run. Another subject I would also mention, with regard to the publication of rules under the WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT. These rules also are open to the public. Anyone can obtain a copy. which will be forwarded to the members. As you know, the digest Mr. F. ARMITAGE (London) asked if it was in order to inquire with reference to the Land Transfer Bill as to what part of London had been selected to begin with. The PRESIDENT: I do not think it would be quite in order. SOLICITORS TO GOVERNMENT OFFICES. Mr. HARVEY CLIFTON (London) moved, in accordance with notice: steps to obtain a repeal of section 47 of the Solicitors Act of 1813, which "That the Council of the Incorporated Law Society (U.K.) should take provides that this Act shall not extend or be construed to extend to the examination, admission, rights, or privileges of any persons appointed to be solicitors to the Treasury and other Government offices." The section in question provided "That this Act or anything herein contained ehall not extend or be construed to extend to the examination, swearing, admission or emolument or any rights or privileges of any persons appointed to be solicitors of the Treasury, Customs, Excise, Post Office, Stamp Duties, or any other branch of Her Majesty's Revenue, or to the Solicitor of the City of London, or to the Assistant of the Council for a class of members, and also to reduce the annual subscription payable by members or any class of members"; (2) that the following addition be made at the end of rule 4: " but such subscription may be reduced by the committee as before mentioned"; (3) that the words "if any" be inserted in rule 6 after the words "entrance fee," and in rule 7 after the words entrance fees." 66 Mr. C. MYLNE BARKER (London) moved the resolution at the request of Mr. Walters, who was unable to be present. The object was to extend the usefulness of the club by letting in country members at what amounted to a nominal subscription. It gave power to reduce the entrance fees, but no power to increase them. seconded the motion. It was a step in the right direction, and he Mr. J. T. ATKINSON (Selby), as a country member of the Council, the Affairs of the Admiralty or Navy, or to the Solicitor to the Board of Mr. FORD said this was shocking. Here were members of the Council who were most eager in the matter. It was the one ab orbing subject of consideration, this club, he was afraid. He wished the club at the bottom of the Atlantic. The original club was wound up and disposed of long ago, and this new club was no better. It was a mischievous thing for the society that there should be 200 or 300 out of the thousands of members of the society who absorbed and monopolized about a third of the society's property. Mr. Barker had put the matter in a very euphonious fashion. If the club paid the society £2,000 a year the members could get many more interesting volumes such as that promised by the president. By the first section of the motion the club might elect anybody, the Lord Chancellor possibly. He was glad to know there was a division amongst the Council in regard to the club. He hoped the Council would not encourage the club. If the society wanted a place for luncheon it should be open to every member of the society. There was no hope, however, of resisting the club members present to-day, who were a majority in the meeting. The club was like a barnacle on the bottom of a ship, a thing that ought to be removed. Mr. W. HASELDINE JONES (London) seconded the motion. Mr. CHARLES FORD (London) said he had felt for thirty years that the Act placed solicitors in a monstrous position. The Act was passed in 1843 in the interests of the bar. But he thought the meeting could hardly be asked to pass the motion, and he should like to move as an amendment, which perhaps Mr. Clifton would accept: "That it be referred to the Council to consider and report at the next general meeting on the question of modifying or repealing the section." It would be better to leave the matter in the hands of the Council rather than that it should be passed without a more full discussion. There was a good deal more in it than possibly Mr. Clifton imagined, because it extended to the Solicitor of the City of London, to the Solicitor to the Admiralty, and to all sorts of rubbish of that kind. Mr. ARMITAGE seconded the amendment. Mr. GRINHAM KEEN (London) said that during the twenty-one years he had been a member of the Council the Council had made numerous efforts in the direction pointed out by the motion when the Solicitorship to the Customs, the Admiralty Solicitorship, and the Queen's Proctorship were vacant. The PRESIDENT: The Post Office Solicitorship. Mr. GRINHAM KEEN said he was rather surprised at Mr. Ford's argu ments. He had thought Mr. Ford would have been an ardent supporter of a movement which would be very useful to the country members at large. That was all it came to. The reason for the Council being there was to be of service to the members of the society, and this proposal had for its object to make the club much more useful throughout the length and breadth of the land. He had been connected with the society for forty years and upwards, and he had always felt that the society had been the grandest thing for solicitors it was possible to imagine. He had always felt that he would do his level best to keep and conserve that which a bygone generation had created for solicitors, and hand it down to those who should follow without its being any worse than it was before. It has been the making of the solicitor branch of the profession, and what was the original prospectus that was put out when the society was contemplated? That there should be a law institution, and that there should be a club attached to it on the lines of the Athenæum and University Clubs, and the old club remained still and was a very great convenience to a great number of the profession. The object of the alteration of the rules now proposed was to make the club more useful throughout the country. Mr. Ford said that the club was done away with on a former occasion, but he (Mr. Keen) denied it altogether. It was not done away with. Technically there were originally two ballots, the ballot for membership of the society and the ballot for membership of the club. That was a mistake. He remembered that Mr. Lake pointed it out at a very early period, and it was seen at once that there was a technical objection to two ballots. This had been overlooked in forming the club. All that had been done was to get rid of one of the ballots. It was a little technical objection, which had been swept away and the old club remained. Mr. F. K. MUNTON (London) said he was not a member of the committee of the club, but he was a member of the club. Mr. FORD: You are going to help to pass the motion though. Mr. MUNTON said he had seconded a resolution ten years ago to enable the Council to elect honorary members to the club, and the meeting had carried the motion. The Council, however, had used the power given to them most honourably and sparingly, and had only nominated the secretary and the assistant secretary. He thought it very unfair that Mr. Ford Mr. KEEN said the Post Office Solicitorship also. The Council had had should bring the matter forward in this way, knowing that the statements committees sitting from time to time. He had had the pleasure, with he made would get into the Press. Still, it was a good thing that they others, of spending a day in the Council room helping to compose a letter should get into the papers so that the true state of the case might be to the Prime Minister on the subject, and they had never lost an oppor-known. But the statements Mr. Ford had made ought not to be allowed tunity of doing their utmost to put the right man forward from the ranks of the solicitor branch of the profession. To speak of it as a new thing, as far as the Council was concerned, was rather a mistake. He felt that to expect the Government to give up the right to appoint anybody they chose to a particular office was out of the question. They must keep on pegging away every time there was a vacancy, and get as many solicitors in as they could; and he claimed for the Council that they had done this invariably. The amendment was negatived, 6 votes being given in its favour, and 16 against. The motion was also rejected, the voting being-for, 6; against, 15. LAW SOCIETY CLUB. The following appeared on the agenda paper: "Mr. William Melmoth Walters will move that the following resolution, in reference to the Law Society's Club, passed at the special general meeting on the 28th of January last, be confirmed-viz.: (1) That the following addition be made at the end of rule 3: "but the committee shall have power at their discretion to suspend or reduce the entrance fee for any period or for any to go unchallenged. Mr. FORD asserted that the old club had been done away with. The resolution was recorded on the minutes of the society. The PRESIDENT observed that as a matter of history he might mention that when in 1825 their predecessors determined to revivify the Law Society each of the gentlemen who interested themselves in the work sent in to the Law Society a pipe of port wine. The motion was carried. The The PRESIDENT remarked that the object of the motion was to bring the country and London into closer harmony. The number of members of the society were at present greater than had ever been the case. membership of the society was more than 7,900, being in advance of the numbers on any previous occasion. LONG VACATION. Mr. FORD, in accordance with notice, asked the President what steps, it any, the Council have taken to give effect to the resolution of the society with regard to shortening the Long Vacation, and also whether the Council are taking any steps to secure the transaction of legal business the Long |
