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decision of the Court of Appeal in Radohfiix v. Bewes (40 W. R. 323; 1892, 1 Ch. 277). There the plaintiff had, under his marriage settlement a life interest in certain trust funds, with a power of appointment among his children, and in default of appointment the funds were to go equally to the children of the marriage who should attain twenty-one. Two children lived to obtain a vested interest in the funds, and one of them died intestate. The father, as administrator to the deceased child, was entitled to his reversionary interest in a moiety of the trust funds in default of appointment, and in order to obtain the benefit of this interest he executed a deed by which his power of appointment was extinguished. The Court of Appeal, however, declined at this stage of the affair to direct the trustee to pay over to the plaintiff a moiety of the trust funds. His life interest was still in existence, and, before he could be allowed to have control over the trust funds, it was considered that the life interest must be got rid of, so far as concerned a moiety of the trust funds, by merger. “The only difficulty in principle,” said LINDLEY, L J., “in assenting to the application of the father is, that there is as yet no merger. That ditficulty could be got rid of at once by a surrender by the father of his life interest so as to extinguish it, the effect of which would be that the two interests would coalesce.” Accordingly, upon the plaintifi undertaking to surrender his life interest in a moiety of the trust funds to the intent that the life interest might merge in the interest in remainder vested in him as administrator of his son, the trustee of the settlement was directed to pay over t_o him a moiety of the funds. It would be difficult to find a clearer illustration than this of the etlicacy of the doctrine of merger.

As appears from the passage already quoted from the judgment of Cnrrrr, L J., the Court of Appeal, in Attorney-General v. Buck, have shewn no such distrust of the doctrine as operated upon the members of the Divisional Court. The doctrine of merger is accepted, as it was bound to be, as a well-settled principle of law, and the only question is whether the provisions of the Finance Act imposes estate duty under the circumstances resulting from the application of the doctrine. It is sufiicient to apply the rule laid down by Lord WENSLEYnun in Ra M1'c]cle!Izwz1it (11 Ex., 456), and quoted with approval by Lord Hanssnnr, L. ., in Tnmant v. Srnitb (1892, A. C., p. 154), and by A. L. SMITH, L.T., in the present case: “It is a well-established rule that the subject is not to be taxed without clear words for the purpose ; and also, that every Act of Parliament must be read according to the natural construction of its words.” As already stated, the provision of the Finance Act on which reliance was placed by the Crown brings in for the purpose of estate duty property in which the deceased or any other person had an interest ceasing on the death of the deceased. Frequently the settled property is so dealt with as to keep in existence the life interest, even though it has passed away from the tenant for life, and then, of course, this provision applies. “ The provision,” said RIGBY, L.J., in Rs Earl Cowley (46 W. R., p. 228), “would include a life interest of the deceased, even though he might have assigned or mortgaged it to any other person, or even a life interest in which he never had a beneficial right, as in the case of an estate for his life originally limited to another person.” In that case the life interest of the second Earl Cowmsr had been kept alive through a complicated series of dealings with the settled estates, and upon his death accordingly it was held that estate duty became payable. _

But in the present case the life interest had ceased to exist long before the death of the former tenant for life, and the Court of Appeal held that this was a suflicient reason for excluding it from the operation of section 2 (1) (b). The duty is imposed upon property in which there is an interest which ceases on the death of the deceased. The language of the section requires that before it can be applied there must actually he an interest ceasing on the death, and this condition precedent was not fulfilled. The life interest, said A. L. Smrrr, L.J , had been extinguished and annihilated twenty months before the death of the owner of the life interest, upon which event it is that the estate duty attaches upon the property which then passes. The doctrine of merger, which is superior to con

veyancers, and which even judges are bound to recognize, had

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stepped in and removed the life interest from the sphere of taxation. The date of the surrender by Mrs. Baron of her life interest forbade any suggestion that the surrender was a gift inter vwos, s_o as to make the property taxable under section 2 (1) (0). For this purpose the gift must be within twelve months of the death. It appears, indeed, to have been stated by the AttorneyGeneral as a reason for upholding the decision of the Divisional Court that under the circumstances the time limit was not material, and that a reversal of the decision would “ knock the bottom out of the Finance Act” by enabling a tenant for life to evade the estate duty by a death-bed surrender. It is not hkely, however, that the authorities will adopt this view in practice, and its correctness is, to say the le ist, doubtful. But a surrender more than twelve months before the death of the tenant for life is clearly efieotual.

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W1-3 record, with deep regret, the death, on the 29th of April, of Mr. NATHANIEL Taarms LAWRENCE, one of the most valued members of the Council of the Incorporated Law Society. There have been few men who have exercised a greater influence in the deliberations of that body, not merely with reference to questions of real property law and conveyancing practice--in which he was pre-eminent—but also on all matters touching the standing of the profession and the affairs of the society. The reason for this was that, although he said comparatively little, what he said had invariably upon it the impress of knowledge. calm reflection, and sound judgment, and was pervaded with the most genuine courtesy to, and consideration for, those who took the opposite view. He had strong opinions, in particular in regard to the preservation of rights of property and of the profession against invasion, but they were coupled with an enlightened sense of the responsibilities of property owners and the profession to the public, and so, although conservative to the backbone, he became the pioneer of some of the most beneficial reforms which have ever been brought about in the system of conveyancing"!

Mr. LAWRENCE was admitted in 1848, and joined the 1ong-estahlished firm of which, under the style of Lawrence, Graham, 8: Co., he was at his death the senior partner. We believe that the firm dates back to at least the middle of the last century. In his earlier years he devoted himself with great energy to acquiring the mastery of real property law and conveyancing which afterwards stood him in such good stead. He j Jillfld the Council of the Incorporated Law Society in 1869, and became president in 1878-9.

At the annual provincial meeting, held in that year at Cambridge, he delivered a carefully-prepared and admirable address on the defects in real property law and the practice of conveyancing, which tended to impede the free dealing with land; suggesting, amon other things, that the powers usually inserted in mortgages should be made incident by law to every mortgage transaction, subject to such modifications as might be specially expressed by deed, and that both mortgagor and mortgagee, while in possession, should have by law the full powers of leasing usually given by settlements to tenants for life; that the mortgagor should have the right of access to his title-deeds, and that there should be an ad valorem scale of remuneration for solicitors in conveyancing matters. He also suggested that the powers of leasing and sale, and other powers usually inserted in settlements, should be made by law incident to every settlement, without power in the settler to control them ; and that power should be given to the court to order sales at the request of the tenant for life alone. These suggestions, which contained the germs of subsequent reforms, were adopted, and developed and extended, by Lord Camus, and we believe that Mr. Lswnmvcs took an active part in the drafting and revision of the drafts of the Conveyancing Acts, 1881 and 1882, and the Settled Land Act, 1882.

To the end of his life Mr. LAWRENCE was prominent as a reformer of conveyancing upon the old lines. We believe that he rendered great assistance in moulding and working out the suggestions made by Mr. J OHN HUNTER in his presidential address delivered at Bristol in 1894, which resulted in Mr. WOLSTENHOLME'8 Bill, now proposed to be introduced by the Incorporated Law Society. He was to the last strenuously opposed to the system introduced by the Land Transfer Act, 1897, and was one of the members of the staunch minority of the Council who declined to sanction the fatal compromise. No suggestions of the hopelessness of further opposition, and so forth, could induce him to assent to a measure which he was convinced would not be advantageous to the public, and would ultimately result in disaster to solicitors.

Mr. LAWRENCE was for many years solicitor, and latterlyadirector, of the Legal and General Life Assurance Society, and was one of the trustees of the United Law Clerks’ Society. He married the daughter of Vice-Chancellor Bacon, who survives him.

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REVIEWS.
THE LAW or BANKRUPTCY.

THE Law AND Piuicrica IN Bsnxaurrcv, COMPRISING run Baux-
RUPTCY Acre, 1883 TO 1890; TIIE BANKRUPTCY Roms AND
Foams, 1886, 1890; THE DEBTORS Acrs, 1869, 1878; THE BANK-
RUPTCY (DISCHARGE AND CLOSURE) Ac'r, 1887 ; THE DEEDS or
ARRANGEMENT Aer, 1887; AND run RULES AND FORMS Tunas-
UNDEB. By the Right Honourable Sir ROLAND VAUGHAN
WILLIAMS, Knt., aLci-d Justice of Appeal. SEVENTH EDITION. By
EDWARD WILLIAM HANSELL, M.A., Barrister-at-Law. Stevens &
Sons (Limited); Sweet & Maxwell (Limited).

The interval of four years which has elapsed since the appearance of the previous edition of this useful compendium of bankruptcy law has not seen any considerable changes in the law. An Act of minor importance apparently relating to the subject has been added to the statute book in the Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy Amendment Act, 1897, and has been incorporated by Mr. Hansell. but in fact the new provision does no more than give to debts which, under the Act of 1888, have preference in bankruptcy a like preference‘over the claims of debenture-holders under a floating charge in the winding up of a company, and it touches bankruptcy only in name. The alteration of rules also has been very slight, being, we believe, confined to rule 271A of 1895 éerroneously referred to "1875" in the margin of the present e ition), regulating the procedure in bankruptcy where any debtor or creditor is a lunatic not so found, and rule 1121; of 1896, allowing an additional fee for attending on the hearing of the petition to a petitioning debtor’s solicitor residing at a distance. With these slight exceptions, the task of Mr. Hansell appears to have been confined to incorporating in the notes the effect of the recent decisions, and this, as might have been expected, has been carefully done. Instances of such decisions will be found in Re Clayton and BarcIay’s Contract (1895, 2 Ch. 212), accordingto which a bankrupt has power to dispose of after-acquired leasehold property before the trustee has intervened to claim it, though he has no such power with respect to freehold property; Re Ginger (46 W. R. 1-14; 1897, 2 Q. B. 461), by which trade goods mortgaged to a bill of sale holder, but left in the possession of the bankrupt, fall within the reputed ownership clause and pass to the trustee; the well-known case of Re Carter and 1i'enderd1'nc’s Contract (45 W. R. 484 ; 1897, 1 Ch. 776), which overruled Re Briggs and Spz'cer(lS9l, 2 Ch. 127), and made it possible for a title to be made under a voluntary settlement within ten years of the date of the settlement ; New, France, it Garrard’s Trustee V. Hunting (4.3 W. R. 577; 1897, 2 Q. B. 19), which illustrated the principle that a payment will not be a fraudulent preference when made from motives other than a desire to prefer the particular creditor; and Re Walker (72 L. T. 330), which for practical purposes deprives of its eificacy section 13 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1890, enabling a vesting order to be made upon a disclaimer of leaseholds of the bankrupt on the terms of the person in whose favour it is‘ made assuming only the liabilities of an assignce. The present edition appears to have been accurately brought up to date.

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the Laws of England in the University of Cambridge. Cambridge: The University ress.

Professor Maitland has here produced a most interesting work on the growth of the English corporate borough, and in particular of the shire borough or county town, illustrated by the history of Cambridge as it appears in the maps and terriers of its common fields, its charters, its litigation, and in Domesday Book and the Pipe Rolls. The book is as full of modesty as it is of learning: in fact, we fear that most readers would prefera more definite dogmatism. In the lectures, which constitute rather less than half the book, Mr. Maitland puts forward certain propositions by way of pleading. The rest of the volume contains in an appendix the principal portion of the evidence in support of the pleading. The reader is left to form his own judgment.

The main propositions advanced are the following: The borough is only a more highly developed form of the ordinary vill, township, or village community, and is, no less than the other, an agrarian unit. The shire borough is especially important as the locus of the shire moot, with especial privileges of markets, fairs, courts, &c.; and to aid its independence and impartiality is, in point of jurisdiction, external to all the neighbouring hundreds, as the District of Columbia iwhich contains Washin ton) is apart from all the individual States of merica. Its land is aglso in an exceptional position, in

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that it has practically no lord, at any rate at first, and nevertheless is not strictly terra regis. Manors grow up within it; but it is not itself manorial, and no manorial courts are held. The borough court has very wide jurisdiction, even in matters affecting the surrounding country ; but does not regulate the use or alienation of strips in the commonable fields. Incidentally it is suggested that the old agrarian or village community, of which the borough is only an advanced type, was highly automatic and individualist in its operation, and by no means the victory of Collectivism which the modern Socialist dreams.

On a point of ecclesiastical history, too, the research_throws considerable light-viz., on the relative antiquity of townships and parishes, suggesting that the township is immeasurably the older. The township of Cambridge contains more than a dozen parishes, and in the earlier terriers it appears that the strips in the commonable fields lying side by side paid tithe to as many different parishes; supporting the theory that formerly owners paid their tithe whatever parish they chose. So that, as Professor Maitland says, in walking across one of these commonable fields you change your parish every minute. _ _

A charter of John gives the town to the men of Cambridge in fee farm, and the “ iuen of Cambridge ”—lcng before the legal person of a corporation was defined or definable—work out the grant in their own way. It is not surprising that, when the charter has come before the courts, it has been diificiilt to find rights ‘_‘ known the law ” to correspond to the actual position : only one instance, in all probability, of a number of public rights which have been lost because lawyers on the bench and at the bar have been too narrow in their training and terminology to admit or understand the real history of the property of which they handle the alleged la_ws. The difliculty works out in both directions. For instance, in the nineteenth century the courts decided that the corporation was lord of the manor and owner of the wastes, although there was no manor ; and i_n the fourteenth century the corporation itself admitted, by a petition to the Crown, that it could not approve the wastes without leave of the kin .

Igrofessor Maitland, as we have said, is not dogmatic : all his points are delicately put forward by way of suggestion, with hints that the materials yet to be examined are too many to allow of definite opinions. But the mass of evidence he has collected is extremely weighty and interesting, and should command a large supply of readers wherever the origins of legal history interest students. W6 fear that they will be found in Germany more largely than in England.

We have but one criticism to make. The whole plan of the work would be clearer if each of the propositions were isolated, and the evidence bearing upon it were also isolated. But this was, perhaps. hardly possible in lectures, and would involve much repetition. We can heartily recommend the book as a model of erudition and sobriety in the way of theorizing.

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The new edition of Pratt on Highways comes fully up to the high standard of excellence attained in previous editions. The law on _the subject with which it deals may be said to be in a state of transition, for the important changes which the Local Government Act, 1_8Q4, was inten ed to effect in the authorities charged with the administration of the highway law have not yet come into full operation. In some parts of the country the control of the highways has not yet passed to the district councils, and parish surveyors continue to exist, advantage having been taken of the power of postponement given to county councils by the Act referred to. It is necessary, therefore, to deal in a work of this kind with the powers and duties of the surveyors as existing highway authorities ; and, even when they have ceased to exist, the powers of their successors will remain so bound up with and dependent on the powers given to the surveyors by the Highway Act, 1835, that that Act must form the groundwork of any work on highway law until some consolidating Act gives the necessary powers to the more modern bodies by direct enactment instead of by reference to the powers of the old parish authorities. Mr. Mackenzie starts with a treatise on the law of highways independent of statute. 1" which the difiicult questions of dedication, common-law liability to repair, rights of user, removal of obstructions, and the like are ably dealt with. The cases cited both in this and the subsequent portion of the work have been brought thoroughly up to date. The second. and by far the larger part of the work, deals with the statute law_s»9 to highways, and consists of the text of the statutes themselves with exhaustive notes and cross-references. Some idea will be formed of the magnitude of the work from the fact that the Acts set out and annotated in Part II. comprise the important Highway Acts of 1830.

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1898 THE SOLICITORS’ JOURNAL [Vol 4"]

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Mr. Stone in this essay points out a few of the imperfections which have made the Parish Councils Act one of the most difliciilt pieces of legislation with which the practitioner has had to cope in recent years. In so far as the amendments which he proposes would remove or abate the epresent confusion or simplify the working of the Act, we are sntir y at one with Mr. Stone. But when he goes further and desires to place in the hands of parish councils “ much more power ” in the management of their local parish affairs, we hesitate ; the scanty powers which these bodies now possess are often not very highly prized and are sometimes by no means wisely exercised; we do not think that a case has been made out for an extension of those powers. Mr. Stone pays a well-merited tribute to the Local Government Board, whose painstaking energy has been of the greatest assistance in oiling the wheels of the cumbrous machine of the Legislature.

THE MERCHANDISE MARKS AC1‘.

THE MERCHANDISE Manna Aer: TEN Yams’ EXPERIENCE. By G. B. ELLIS. Spottiswoode & Co.

This is a reprint of a paper read by the author before the Chartered Institute of Pats nt Agents, together with the Acts of Parliament and an epitome of the decisions, in nearly all instances given by London magistrates. This epitome of decisions is interesting and instructive, though it is difiicult to deduce from it any very distinct idea of the view which any particular magistrate is likely to take in any particular case, and still less of the probable result of a prosecution where the personality of a particular magistrate is excluded. Even the Custom House authorities appear to have somewhat modified the views which they formerly held—-and for the better—seeing that their present instructions to their ofiicers provide that trade descriptions in the English language applied to foreign goods imported for home consumption from non-English-speaking countries are not to be regarded as indirect indications that the goods are of British origin, in the absence of special circumstances. This is distinctly an advance, for it was very oppressive to treat it as an offence on the part of foreign merchants or their British correspondents to tell the intended British consumers in the only language which many of them understood what was the nature or the quantity of the goods offered to them for purchase. The general impression produced by the perusal of these pages is that, whilst the Act of 1887 is one designed to produce considerable benefits to English manufacturers and traders, while worked with moderation and common sense, it is one capable of producing much hardship and leading to almost grotesque results if over-stringently interpreted and driven to extremes. It is not necessary to particularize instances, but that there have been such can hardly be doubted after looking through this little book.

THE PROLONGATION OF LETTERS PATENT. NOTES on nu: PROLONGATION or LETTERS PATENT ron INVENTIONS. By G. J. WHEELER, Barrister-at-Law. Eyre & Spottiswoode.

Of the 300 pages or thereabouts of which this hook consists, some thirty are devoted to a short but convenient summary of the principles which govern the prolongation of patents, with references to

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some of the leading cases; the remainder contain a reprint of the Acts, rules, and forms now in force which relate to the allied subjects of patents, designs, and trade-marks. The summary appears to be quite suflicient to enable patentees and their advisers to form a fairly accurate idea of their chance of obtaining prolongation and cf what must be done to secure it, but it will hardly, in a doubtful case, relieve them of the necessity of referring to the decisions or to more extended treatises. However, the object which the author set ggfope himself appears to have been attained, and the book should 0 use.

BOOKS RECEIVED.

Hints on the Legal Duties of Shipmasters. By BENEDIU1‘ W. GINSBURG, M.A., LL.D. (Cantab.), Barrister-at-Law. Charles Griffin & Co. (Limited). Price 4s. 6d.

The Workmen’s Compensation Act. 1897 (60 & 61 Vict. c. 37). With Copious Notes and an Appendix containing the Employer's Liability Act, 1880 (43 & 44 Vict. c. 42). By W. Amunoroir WILLIS, LL.B. (L0nd.), Barrister-at-Law. Fourth Edition. With Analysis of a Proposed Scheme to be Certified Under the Act, and Form of Application for a Certificate. Butterworth & Co.; Shaw & Sons.

Maritime Warfare and Merchant Shipping. A Summary of the Rights of Capture at Sea. By DOUGLAS OWEN, Barrister-at-Law, Secretary of the Alliance Marine and General Assurance Co. (Limited). Stevens & Sons (Limited).

The Law Magazine and Review. A Quarterly Review of Jurisprudence and Quarterly Digest of Reported Cases. May, 189$. Stevens & Haynes. .

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Sir,--I notice in your issue of the 23rd ult. that you quote an extract from a letter of an opponent of Mr. Warr's Solicitor's Final Examination Bill. Many men who, like myself, have recently taken a class in the Jurisprudence School at Oxford, will find some of his remarks rather hard to understand.

First, he says, “ If the Bill passes and is adopted, the Council must be prepared to welcome as so icitors a large number of men with no adequate guarantee of proficiency in the practical work of their calling." We were under the impression that one of the great objects of the Bill was to enable students to dispose of their examination work as quickly as possible in order to give them more time, during the remaining portion of their articles, to master the practical work of their profession. _ _

Secondly, he says, “True the examination, whatever it may be, will be succeeded by three years’ articles.” Might one venture to point out two things with regard to this statement? (1) That it is highly improbable, taking into consideration the_ comparatively small amount of English Law read in the Jurisprudence Schools at our Universities, that the Council of the Incorporated Law Society will exempt a student who has gained a class in those schools from the whole or part of the Final Solicitors’ Examination. (2) That the examination at Oxford which in all probability will exempt an articled clerk from the whole or any part of the Final Examination will be the examination for the degree of B.C.L. Now, as matters stand at present at the Universities, this examination cannot be passed till at least a year from the date of the B.A. degree, and probably would not be passed by the articled B.A. till two years from that date. So that your correspondent’s statement that the exempting examination will be succeeded by three years’ articles is manifestly incorrect. As a matter of fact, assuming that the B.A. is articled directly after his degree (cs generally happens), the exempting examination will be passed possibly at the end of the first year’s articles, probably at the end of the second.

Lastly, your correspondent’s remarks seem to be solely based on the assumption that all Oxford and Cambridge men are an idle set of fellows, who do not work while at the Universities, and do not intend to work during their articles. Of course it is hardly necessary to point out the manifest ii-justice of such an assumption. The unfairness of it is amply demonstrated by the achievements and successes of Oxford and Cambridge men, both in the solicitors’ profession, and indeed in all branches of the other great professions.

The object of Mr. Warr’s Bill seems to be a simple and commonsense one—viz., that if a man has passed a stiff examination paper at one of the Universities on common law, equity, real property law, evidence, or procedure, he need not be compelled to go through _such an ordeal again in a very similar examination paper in the Solicitors’ Final, B.A. (OKON).

April 30.

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CASES OF THE WEEK.

Court of Appeal.

ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. BEECH AND ANOTHER. No. 1. 30th April.

Bsvnru'a— Earns Durv —Ts.\'.\s'r FOE Lira AND Rnnsrnnsurrsrv — Suaunxnsn. or Lira ESTATE rro Rsnarrvnsaulw--Pnorsirrr Passrsc AT Dani-1 or Tssaxr ron. L1E‘B—FlNAl\'CE Acr, 1894 (57 8: 58 Vrcr. c. 30), ss. 1, 2 (1) (b).

An appeal by the defendants from the judgment of a Divisional Court (Pollock, B., and Bidley, J .) upon an information by the Attorney-General claiming estate duty under the Finance Act, 1894 (reported 46 W. R. 222 ; 1897, 2 Q. B. 535). By a marriage settlement certain property was conveyed to trustees, upon trust to pay the income thereof to the wife for life for her separate use, without power of anticipation, and, after her decease, upon trust for the children of the marriage, with a power to the wife to appoint to one or more of them by deed or will after her husband’s death. The husband died in 1885. By an indenture dated the 21st of December, 1836, the wife appointed the property to her son, subject to her life interest-. By an indenture dated the 18th of December, 1894, the wife surrendered to the trustees of the settlement her life interest in the property as specified in the schedule thereto, to the end and intent that such _life interest might merge in the interest in remainder of the son. The wife died on the 27th of August, 1896. The information claimed that upon the death of the wife estate duty became payable under section 2, sub-section 1 (b), of the Finance Act, 1894, upon the principal value of the trust property comprised in the schedule to the indenture of the 18th of December, 1894, as property passing on her death. The Divisional Court gave judgment for the Crown.

Tun Gouar (A L Sums, Can-rs’, and Courss, L.JJ.), having taken time to consider, delivered judgment allowing the appeal. They said that the life estate having been extinguished by the surrender in December, 1894, no property passed on the death of the tenant for life within the meaning of section 2, sub-section 1 (b), of the Finance Act, 1894. Her life interest did not cease on her death, and to no extent whatever did a benefit accrue or arise to any person upon her death by the cesser of her life interest. Therefore, as the surrender took place more than twelve months before she died, no estate duty was payable on her death in respect of the property.—Oouusar., Cozenr-Hardy, Q.G., Levett, Q,.C., W. M. Spence, and Austen-Cartmall; Sir Richard IVebste1', A.G., Sir R. T. Reid, Q,.G., and gaughara Haw/aim. SOL1c1'r0ns, W. Carpenter §- Sons; Solicitor of Inland

evmue.

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This was an appeal by the trustee in the administration of the estate of Cronmire, deceased, from a decision of Wright, J . (reported ante, p. 291), admitting the proof of Alfred Edward Waud. The facts were as follows: Cronmire had carried on business as an outside dealer in stocks and shares under the style of Gregory 8.: Co. He died insolvent in April, 1897, and his estate was now being administered in bankruptcy under an administration order. Wand had had considerable dea ings in stocks and shares with Cronmire, and on the 1st of February, 1897, the accounts shewecl a

large balance owing to Wand. On the 8th of February \Vaud directed Oronmire to purchase £200 Great Eastern Railway Stock for investment, and on the 9th of February Wand directed Cronmire to apply the balance owing on the previous transactions in payment of the stock. Cronmire sent to Wand a contract note siaiing that he had sold to Wand the stock in question "to be taken up," but the stock was never delivered. Upon the 3rd of April the account bad been further increased in Waud’s favour, there being new due to him £375 (including therein a sum of £49 3s. 94. which Wand had deposited with Cronmire as “ cover "). On this date \Vaud directed Cronmire to purchase for him a small amount of Dover “A” Stock, which was also to be paid for out of Waud’s winnings. This stock was purchased but not delivered. Wand tendered a proof for the £375, but t was rejected by the trustee on the ground that the transactions were gambling transaclions, and, upon appeal, Vaughan Williams, J ., directed an issue to be fried by a jury as to whether they were gambling transactions. The jury found that the transactions were gambling transactions, but that the purchases of the Great Eastern Railway and Dover "A ” Stocks were for investment and were real transactions. The trustee applied to Wright, J., sitting as bankruptcy judge, for judgment upon the verdict of the jury, when the proof was taken as having been amended by being turned into a proof for damages for non-delivery of the railway stocks. Wright, J ., held that Wand was entitled to prove against the estate for damages for the non-delivery of the railway stock-1, and also for the amount of the “cover.” The trustee appealed.

Tun Conar (A. L. Smrn, Currrr, and Vworrau WILLIAMS, L.-IJ.) reversed the decision of Wright, J ., save as regards the claim for the

‘ccver.”

A. L. Surrn, L.J., said that it was now admitted that the transactions between Wand and Cronmire, with the exception oi". the purchases of the two sets of railway stock were gambling transactions, the result of which was that Wand won from Oronmire a certain sun: Wand carried in a proof in the administration of Cronmire’s estate, and h had made an aflldavit

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which showed clearly how the case stood—namely, that the railway stocks were to be paid for out of Waud’s winnings in the gambling transactions which Cronmire retained in his hands. It was contended for the trustee that \Vaud's claim to prove could not be shaped in any way so as to get quit of that fact. An ingenious argument had been addressed to this court and to Wright, J ., in the_court below, which had induced _WVright, J ., to drsbelieve Waud’s affidavit showing what the real transaction was. It was raid on behalf of Wand that there had been a settlemenft of accounts between Wand and Gronmire and that that was evidence 0 an account stated shewing that the railwhy stocks had been paid for. An account stated _was only evidence of payment, and was not conclusive; bl]11l7l10{:vC0glq ithbe sagidi thpt 31;!‘-is tiger: ‘bfen Z payment in tl]18I cage, w en r an in is s evi s a ere a een none. n is lordship’s opinion, therefore, Wright, J., was wrong in holding that 2rXuI'ldflCOtlldtP1‘(;7e B$§8ll.;€]li the estpte for damrzgefilfogpon-de,live&yho: e ra way s oc . no er ques ion arose as o e cover. a was money deposited with Cronmire to secnfie himdagainst loss in the tfth tkflli eLordHerche’sju mentinU'erl ‘ilifr _Z~..r.‘Z.,i °$. s.?..r“.§.,‘i§96, A. 0. 165, at P. 113)? But rs. Zlisil and wagering transactions in the present case had come to an end and no part of the " cover" had been used. Why, then, could not World claim it back? No answer could be made to that claim, and it was unnecessary to O0n.~id8I‘ the question of appropriation or when the demand ought to be made. As to that part of the care Wand was therefore entitled to succeed. Currrr and Vsucrrarv Wrrtmus, L.JJ., concurred. Order varied.COUNSEL, Robsan, Q,.C., and Ma-mskie; H. Reed, Q,.O., and Israel Davie. Soucxrons, II. H. Booms ; Atlrinson §- Dreuer.

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The teststrix died domiciled in the island of St. Vincent leaving a will appointing English executors and giving legacies to some persons in England and some in the West Indies. Most of the assets were in this country, and the executors proved the will here and registered the probate in sr. Vincent. By the law of St. Vincent an ad oalorem stamp duty is imposed upon receipts for legacies, and the executors took out this summons to ascertain whether they were bound to demand from the legatees receipts stamped as required by the law of St. Vincent. No penalty is imposed by the law of St. Vincent for not taking such a receipt, but unstamped receipts for legacies would not be admissible in evidence in legal proceedings in St. Vincent.

N on-rrr, J . , held that he could not compel the stamping of the receipts in ac;ordance with the law of St. Vincent.—Cocussr., H. Terrell, Q.O., and Jllamler; Swiri/‘en Eady, Q.O., and Wilkinson. Soucrrons, Manda Q Son; Oardew.

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This was a summons taken out by a vendor under the Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874, asking for a declaration that certain objections and requisitions bya purchaser had been sufficiently answered. The facts were as follow : In 1885 certain estates stood limited under the will of P. du Cane to the use of Sir Chas. du C1116 for life with remainder to his eldest son, the vendor, in tail, subject to a j ointure of £500 in favour of Lady du Cane. By a disentailing assurance made in September, 1885, the estates were limited to such uses as Sir Chas. du Cans and the vendor should jointly appoint, and with remainder in default of appointment to the existing uses. By a dead of the 22nd of April, 1886, Sir Chas. du Cane and the vendor, in exercise of the power reserved to them by the said disenfailiug assurance, jointly appointed ta the use of Sir Chas. du Cane for life (by way of restoration and confirmation of his former life estate under the will), with remainder to the vendor for life, with remainder to his first and other sons in tail with remainders over, and trustees of the settlement created by this deed were appointed trustees for the purposes of the Settled Laud Acts. By a deed of the 23rd of March, 1887, Sir Chas. du Cane and the vendor, in exercise of the power contained in the settlement of 1886, jointly appointed the estates to uses to secure Lady du Cane a yearly rent-charge of £300, in addition to the £500, and subject thereto to the use of trustees during the life of the vendor upon certain trusts for the benefit of the vendor, his wife, and children. This appointment was made subject and without prejudice to all estates having 'priority under the settlement of 1886 over the vendor's life estate and all powers attaching to such estates, and without prejudice to all powers which, but for the present deed, would have been exarciseablo by the vendor under the Settled Land Act. By subsequent deeds, including a deed of the 11th of August, 1887, certain further charges were created on the property. Si!‘ Chas. dn Cane died in 1889. In 1897 the vendor contracted to sell B portion of the estates. The purchaser required trustees to be appointed for the purposes of the Settled Land Acts of the compound settlemeni

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created by the deeds of the 22nd of April, 1886, the 23rd of March, 1887, and the llth of August, 1887. The vendor declined, and as the requiiition was insisted on the present summons was taken out.

Sriiiiixo, J .—The objection here raised by the purchaser is, not that the vendor is unable to exercise the powers of a tenant for life under the Settled Land Acts, but that there are no proper trustees in existence to accept the notice required by the Acts and to receive and give receipts for the purchase-money. This case appears to me ti differ from Rs Tibéits’ Sellh-d Estates (1897, 2 Ch. 149), Re Mazda's -S'¢'Hl:d Estates (ISUT, 1 Ir. Rep. 121), where the question simply was whether a reasonable case had been made for the exercise of the ‘urisdiction conferred on the court for the appointment of new trustees. in order that the vendor may make out his title there must, in the first place, be a settlement. A settlement is defined by section 2 (l) of the Act of 1882. Now, is the dced of 1886 a settlement under which the vendor can sell, and does it fall within the meaning of the Act ? It appears to me that under that deed tho eetite or interest in the land other than the fee simple itself became on the execution of the deed limited to the vendor and others by way of succession. Consequently it satisfied the requirements of section '2 (l). Now, it was admitted on the authority of Re l'I"1-i'_r,-h¢’.r Tmits (2~i Ch. D. 662) that the effect of the deed of the 23rd of March, 1887, was not oiilv to reserve to the vendor t-he powers conferred under the settlement of tho 22nd of April, 1886, by the Settled Land Acts, but at the same time to eifect an assignment of the lite estate by way of family arrangement within section 4 of the Settled Land Act, 1890. This bring so, it is not disputed that the vendor is tenant for life within the meaning of section 2 (5) of the Act of 1882. He can, therefore, sell under section 3 and under section 20 sell the estate or interest subject to the settlement. So far there is no diiilculty. But by the Act the purchase-money must be paid into court or paid to the trustees of the settlement, to whom notice must be given of the intended salc under section 45. The trustees are defined in section 2 (8). By the deed of 1886 the persons therein naincd are trustees for the purposes of the Acts, and they will concur l'l tho rule and give receipts. The purchaser, however, contends that they are trustees only by reference ti tho deed of 1886, and that the deeds of tl.e 27th of March and the llth of August, 1887, must be regarded as consiit iiing with the deed of 1886 the settlement of which trustees are to exist. The question I have to consider is, whether or no trustees must be appointed whenever a deed is cxccuted affecting interests under the original settlement so that that settlement is no longer the only instrument by which land stands limited to persons byway of succession. As a general rule, in my opinion, this question must be answered in the negative. Suppose real estate is settled by a deed, dated the lst of January, on A. for life with remainder to B. in fee, and B. by a deed, dated the lst of February, conveys his remainder in fee to C. for life with remainder to D. in fee, and by the J anuiiry deed trustees are appointed for the purposes of the Settled Land Acts. I do not think that the powers of those trustees are affected by the February deed, though reclian 38 of the Act of 1882 doubtless enables the court to appoint trustees of the other instruments. But I can find nothing in the Act of 1882 which would dcbar the trustees of the January deed from receiving and giving receipts for the purchase-money. This view is supported by Ra1i'nau-In (33 \V. R. 364, 27 Ch. D. 707). I may also point out the inconvenience of its b. ing neceisary to appoint trustees of the settlement made up of the original settlement and other instruments whenever dealings other tlan those of the tcniint for life had been effected. This ditiiculty does not arise when the dr ii.'ing is effected by the tenant for life, as in the case of a charge of p<rti-ans. But there is notl ing in the Act which rays that the trustees oi the settlement for the purposes of the Acts are to be deprived of their power of receiving and giving receipts for purchase-money by a charge of prrtions. In fact I have already so decided wiih regard to jointiires in Kerk and Hart‘; Contract (46 W. R. 389, W‘. N. 1898, p. 29), and on consideration I adhere to that decision. Then by section 50 (3) of the Act oi 1882, a tenant fcr lifo cannot €K('I(.lS8 the powers given him by the Act without the consent of his ussignee for value. It appears to mo that the ins rument of 1887 contains this consent on behalf oi the trustees in whose favour the assignment was made. But "the important point hero is that, whether this be so or no, there is nothing in the Act of 1882 to shew that the powers of trustee; for the purposes of the Acts are affected or contemplated to be affected by the assignment. It simply seems to impose on the tenant for life the dut-y of obtaining the consent of his assignee. But the provisions of the Act of 1882 have been somewhat modified by section -1 of the Act of 1890. Now the operation of that section is limited to assignments or charges made in consideration of mani 'ge or by way of family arrangement. Consequcntl y, as regards all other asiignments for value the law still is as I have itated it, and the powers of the trustees still remain unaffected by the obligation imposed on the tenant for life to procure the assent of an assignee for value. There is, however a change made as regards assignments by way of family arrangemmt. If the section is to be read as providing that under a settlement such an instrument of assignment is to be deemed one of the inst ruments creating the iettlemerit for a‘l purposes, it does seem to me to be a necessary consequence that trustees should be appointed of the settlement made by the original settlement and that instrument. But the vendor contends that the section is limited to excluding the operation of section 50 oi the Act of 1882. That contention is borne out by the concluding words of the scciion. It seems to me that the language of the Act is satisfied by the limited construction placed on it by the vendor, and that the section does not make any assignment to which it refers an instrument for all the purposes of the Act. In coming to that conclusion I found myself on the last words of t-ie section and on the cuusidera ion that that appears to me to bc the difiiculiy which was intended to be mct by tho scction as a whole, and the only dificulty so far as I can see. I cannot

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This was an action for the rescission of a contract for the sale of certain. property advertised for sale as a freehold house, being No. 46, Westminster-bridge-road, London. The facts were as follow : The property was put up for sale on tho 29th of October, 1896, at the Mart, Tokenhouseyard, E C. The particulars and conditions represented the property as freehold. The conditions provided that it any objection or _requisition not precluded by the conditions should be made and insisted on which the vendor should be unable or unwilling to remove _or comply with, the vendor should be at liberty, notwithstanding any intermediate negotiation in respect thereof or attempts to remove or comply with the same, by notice in writing to the purchaser_ . . . to rescind the sale, in which case the purchaser should receive back his deposit without interest or costs. The pl8.ll1lifi_ attended at the sale and became the purchaser of the property i-n question for the sum of £460. The vendor produced evidence at the hearing to the effect that the title, though not freehold, was practically as good, and that the purchaser bought after sufiicient notice. On or about the 5th_ of November the vendor delivered to the purchaser an abstract of title from which it appeared that the vendor held the premises (save a small portion thereof) by way of imderleuse only for a term of which about thirty-seven years only remained unexpired. The vendor was unable to comply with the purchaser's requisitions, and on the 30th of November the purchaser issued his writ. The writ was retained by the _vendor’s solicitors for some days, who, on the 3rd of December, gave notice of rescission under the condition. It was submitted on behalf o_f_the purchaser, partly on the ground that nothing was said in the conditions as to any right of the vendor to rescind while litigation was pending, that the vendor had lost his right under the condition.

Bi-LYNE, J., held that the vendor had not lost his right to rescind, because litigation had commenced before h_e exercised it. It could not be said that he had waived his right by acquiescence in the litigation, and such acquiescence would be necessary to _de(prive him of his right under the contract. N0 general rule could be laid own as to the time at which the right to rescission was lost, and it was not necessary to make a specific reference to litigation in a condition of _sale to retain the right to rescmd after litigation had commenced. On view of the whole circumstances of the case, his lordship dismissed the action, with costs as from the date of the notice to rescind, deducting costs to the date of tho l10lil.C6.—COUNBBL, Ere, Q,.G., and J. M. Gaoer ; Astbury, Q.O., and lVheel¢r. Soniciroiss, 0. §- E. Woodrvfe ; W. B. Fairbrotlier.

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Case stated by a metropolitan police magistrate. Upon the hearing of a charge made by the appellant, Roper, against the respondent, that the respondent did wilfully commit damage, injury, or spoil to_four gallons of milk, the property of the appellant, contrary to the provisions of section 52 of the Malicious Injuries ta Property Act, 1861 (24 20 Vict. c. 97). The following facts were proved : The appellant was a milk salesman carrying on business at 29, Howard-road, South Hornsey, and the respondent, who was a milk carrier in his employ, was in the habit of coming to the place of business every morning to fetch milk which he subsequently sold to the appellaut’s customers. On the morning of the llth of January, 1898, the respondent was seen at 5.25 a.m. by the appellant and a policeronstable, who were watching him, to conceal a three-pint can ull of water in a garden of a. house near the said premises. The respondent was then seen to fetch four gallons of milk in a barrow from the appellant’s premises (which, in the ordinary course, would be sold and delivered by him to the appellant's customers), and bring it opposite the said garden, and then was seen to pour the three pints of water o_ut of the can into the said milk. The respondent had been seen ona previous morning going into the same garden, and was being watched on account of_complnints from customers of the appellant. The respondent was immediately taken into custody, the appellant saying to him, “ You villain, what do you mean ?" and the respondent thereupon said, “I um very sorry. I hope you will forgive me l " The respondent stated that he_ had on previous occasions becn obliged to make good to his master in money i-he value of milk that he had lost, but there was no evid.euca_o_f this,_aud it was contradicted by the appellant. The appellant, in_giving_evid_el10f_‘» said that he was in the habit of allowing each of the milk carriers 111 his employ (including the respondent) two quarts of milk a day to cover any loss that might arise from accidental spilling of the milk they took out, or from the same being stolen from the custciners’ do ir-, _aii I also stared tliat he would have allowed a greater quantity had the milk carrier oomplaiued that he had lost more than the two quarts. The respondent had

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