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decision of the Court of Appeal in Radcliffe v. Bewes (40 W. R. stepped in and removed the life interest from the sphere of 323; 1892, 1 Ch. 277). There the plaintiff had, under his taxation. The date of the surrender by Mrs. Beech of her life marriage settlement a life interest in certain trust funds, with a interest forbade any suggestion that the surrender was a gift inter power of appointment among his children, and in default of vivos, so as to make the property taxable under section 2 (1) (c). appointment the funds were to go equally to the children of the For this purpose the gift must be within twelve months of the marriage who should attain twenty-one. Two children lived to death.

It appears, indeed, to have been stated by the Attorneyobtain a vested interest in the funds, and one of them died General as a reason for upholding the decision of the Divisional intestate. The father, as administrator to the deceased child, Court that under the circumstances the time limit was not was entitled to his reversionary interest in a moiety of the trust material, and that a reversal of the decision would “knock the funds in default of appointment, and in order to obtain the bottom out of the Finance Act" by enabling a tenant for life to benefit of this interest he executed a deed by which his power of evade the estate duty by a death-bed surrender. It is not appointment was extinguished. The Court of Appeal, however, likely, however, that the authorities will adopt this view in declined at this stage of the affair to direct the trustee to pay practice, and its correctness is, to say the le ist, doubtful. But over to the plaintiff a moiety of the trust funds. His life a surrender more than twelve months before the deaih of the interest was still in existence, and, before he could be allowed tenant for life is clearly effectual. to have control over the trust funds, it was considered that the life interest must be got rid of, so far as concerned a moiety of the trust funds, by merger. The only difficulty in principle," said LINDLEY, LJ., "in assenting to the application of the father

THE LATE MR. N. T. LAWRENCE. is, that there is as yet no merger. That difficulty could be got We record, with deep regret, the death, on the 29th of April, of Mr. rid of at once by a surrender by the father of his life interest 80 NATHANIEL TERTIUS LAWRENCE, one of the most valued members of as to extinguish it, the effect of which would be that the two the Council of the Incorporated Law Society. There have been few interests would coalesce." Accordingly, upon the plaintiff men who have exercised a greater influence in the deliberations of undertaking to surrender his life interest in a moiety of the trust that body, not merely with reference to questions of real property funds to the intent that the life interest might merge in the law and conveyancing practice--in which he was pre-eminent -- but interest in remainder vested in him as administrator of his son, affairs of the society. The reason for this was that, although he said

also on all matters touching the standing of the profession and the the trustee of the settlement was directed to pay over to him a moiety of the funds. It would be difficult

comparatively little, what he said had invariably upon it the impress

to find a of knowledge, calm reflection, and sound judgment, and was perclearer illustration than this of the efficacy of the doctrine of vaded with the most genuine courtesy to, and consideration for, merger.

those who took the opposite view. He had strong opinions, in parAs appears from the passage already quoted from the judg- ticular in regard to the preservation of rights of property and of the ment of CHITTY, LJ., the Court of Appeal, in Attorney-General profession against invasion, but they were coupled with an env. Beech, have shown no such distrust of the doctrine as operated profession to the public, and so, although conservative to the back

lightened sense of the responsibilities of property owners and the upon the members of the Divisional Court. The doctrine of bone, he became the pioneer of some of the most beneficial reforms merger is accepted, as it was bound to be, as a well-settled which have ever been brought about in the system of conveyancing principle of law, and the only question is whether the pro Mr. LAWRENCE was admitted in 1848, and joined the long-estabvisions of the Finance Act imposes estate duty under the cir- lished firm of which, under the style of Lawrence, Graham, & Co., cumstances resulting from the application of the doctrine. he was at his death the senior partner. We believe that the firmi It is sufficient to apply the rule laid down by Lord WENSLEY- dates back to at least the middle of the last century: In his earlier DALE in Ro Micklethwait (11 Ex., p. 456), and quoted with years he devoted himself with great energy to acquiring the mastery approval by Lord Halsbury, L.C., in Tennant ... Smith in such good stead. He j sined the Council of the Incorporated Liw

of real property law and conveyancing which afterwards stood bim (1892, A. c., p. 154), and by A. L. SMITH, LJ., in the Society in 1869, and became president in 1878-9. present case : "It is a well-established rule that the subject is At the annual provincial meeting, held in that year at Cambridge, not to be taxed without clear words for the purpose ; and also, he delivered a carefully-prepared and admirable address on the that overy Act of Parliament must be read according to the defects in real property law and the practice of conveyancing, which natural construction of its words.” As already stated, the pro- tepded to impede the free dealing with land; suggesting, among vision of the Finance Act on which reliance was placed by the other things, that the powers usually inserted in mortgages should Crown brings in for the purpose of estate duty property in which be made incident by law to every mortgage transaction, subject to the deceased or any other person had an interest ceasing on the such modifications as might be specially expressed by deed, and that death of the deceased. Frequently the settled property is so law the fuil powers of leasing usually given by settlements to tenants

both mortgagor and mortgagee, while in possession, should have by dealt with as to keep in existence the life interest, even though for life; that the mortgagor should have the right of access to his it has passed away from the tenant for life, and then, of course, title-deeds, and that there should be an ad valorem scale of remuthis provision applies. “The provision,” said RIGBY, L.J., in Ré neration for solicitors in conveyancing matters. He also suggested Earl Cowley (46 W. R., p. 228), “would include a life interest that the powers of leasing and sale, and other powers usually inserted of the deceased, even though he might have assigned or mort- in settlements, should be made by law incident to every settlement, gaged it to any other person, or even a life interest in which be without power in the settlor to control them; and that power should never had a beneficial right, as in the case of an estate for his be given to the court to order sales at the request of the tenant for life originally limited to another person.” In that case the life

life alone. These suggestions, wbich contained the germs of subse interest of the second Earl CoWLEY had been kept alive through CAIRNS, and we believe that Mr. LAWRENCE took an active part in

quent reforms, were adopted, and developed and extended, by Lord a complicated series of dealings with the settled estates, and the drafting and revision of the drafts of the Conveyancing Acts, upon his death accordingly it was held that estate duty became 1881 and 1882, and the Settled Land Act, 1882. payable.

To the end of his life Mr. LAWRENCE was prominent as a reformer But in the present case the life interest had ceased to exist of conveyancing upon the old lines. We believe that he rendered long before the death of the former tenant for life, and the great assistance in moulding and working out the suggestions made Court of Appeal held that this was a sufficient reason for in 1894, which resulted in Me. WOLSTENHOLME's Bill, now proposed

by Mr. JOHN HUNTER in his presidential address delivered at Bristol excluding it from the operation of section 2 (1) (b). The duty to be introduced by the Incorporated Law Society. He was to the is imposed upon property in which there is an interest which last strenuously opposed to the system introduced by the Land ceases on the death of the deceased. The language of the section Transfer Act, 1897, and was one of the members of the staunch requires that before it can be applied there must actually be an minority of the Council who declined to sanction the fatal cominterest ceasing on the death, and this condition precedent was promise. No suggestions of the hopelessness of further opposipot fulfilled. The life interest, said A. L. SMITH, L.J, had tion, and so forth, could induce him to assent to a measure which been extinguished and annihilated twenty months before the he was convinced would not be advantageous to the public, and death of the owner of the life interest, upon which event it is would ultimately result in disaster to solicitors.

Mr. LAWRENCE was for many years solicitor, and latterly a director, that the estate duty attaches upon the property which then of the Legal and General Life Assurance Society, and was one of the passes. The doctrine of marger, which is superior to con- trustees of the United Law Clerks' Society. He married the daughter voyancers, and which even judges are bound to recognize, had of Vice-Chancellor BACON, who survives him.

new

no

more

that it has practically no lord, at any rate at first, and nevertheless REVIEWS.

is not strictly terra regis. Manors grow up within it; but it is not

itself manorial, and no manorial courts are held. The borough court THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY.

has very wide jurisdiction, even in matters affecting the surrounding THE LAW AND PRACTICE IN BANKRUPTCY, COMPRISING THE BANK-country; but does not regulate the use or alienation of strips in the

RUPTCY Acts, 1883 to 1890; THE BANKRUPTCY RULES AND commonable fields. Incidentally it is suggested that the old agrarian
FORMS, 1886, 1890 ; THE DEBTORS ACIS, 1869, 1878; THE BANK- or village community, of which the borough is only an advanced
RUPTCY (DISCHARGE AND CLOSURE) Act, 1887; THE DEEDS OF type, was highly automatic and individualist in its operation, and by
ARRANGEMENT ACT, 1887; AND THE RULES AND FORMS THERE- no means the victory of Collectivism which the modern Socialist
UNDER. By the Right Honourable Sir ROLAND VAUGHAN dreams.
WILLIAMS, Knt., a Lord Justice of Appeal. SEVENTH EDITION. By On a point of ecclesiastical history, too, the research throws
EDWARD WILLIAM HANSELL, M.A., Barrister-at-Law. Stevens & considerable light-viz., on the relative antiquity of townships and
Sons (Limited); Sweet & Maxwell (Limited).

parishes, suggesting that the township is immeasurably the older. The interval of four years which has elapsed since the appearance and in the earlier terriers it appears that the strips in the commonable

The township of Cambridge contains more than a dozen parishes, of the previous edition of this useful compendium of bankruptcy fields lying side by side paid tithe to as many different parishes ; law has not seen any considerable changes in the law. An Act of minor importance apparently relating to the subject has been added supporting the theory that formerly owners paid their tithe to to the statute book in the Preferential Payments in Bankruptcy walking across one of these commonable fields you change your

whatever parish they chose. So that, as Professor Maitland says, in Amendment Act, 1897, and has been incorporated by Mr. Hansell, but in fact the

provision
does

parish every minute. than give to debts which, under the Act of 1888, have farm, and the "men of Cambridge”—long before the legal person of

A charter of John gives the town to the men of Cambridge in fee preference in bankruptcy a like preference'over the claims of debenture-holders under a floating charge in the winding up of a company,

a corporation was defined or definable—work out the grant in their and it touches bankruptcy only in name. The alteration of rules before the courts, it has been difficult to find rights" known to the

own way. It is not surprising that, when the charter has come also has been very slight, being, we believe, confined to rule 2714 law” to correspond to the actual position: only one instance, in all of 1895 (erroneously referred to “ 1875" in the margin of the probability, of a number of public rights which have been lost present edition), regulating the procedure in bankruptcy where any because lawyers on the bench and at the bar have been too narrow debtor or creditor is a lunatic not so found, and rule 112B of 1896, in their training and terminology to admit or understand the real allowing an additional fee for attending on the hearing of the history of the property of which they handle the alleged laws. The petition to a have been confined to incorporating in the notes the effect of the and owner of the wastes, although there was no manor; and in the With these slight exceptions, the task of Mr. Hansell appears to difficulty works out in both directions. For instance, in the nineteenth

century the courts decided that the corporation was lord of the manor recent decisions, and this, as might have been expected, bas been fourteenth century the corporation itself admitted, by a petition to carefully done. Instances of such decisions will be found in Re the Crown, that it could not approve the wastes without leave of the Clayton and Barclay's Contract (1895, 2 Ch. 212), according to which a

king. bankrupt has power to dispose of after-acquired leasehold property before the trustee has intervened to claim it, though he has no such

Professor Maitland, as we have said, is not dogmatic: all his points power with respect to freehold property; Re Ginger (46 W: R. 144; materials yet to be examined are too many to allow of definite

are delicately put forward by way of suggestion, with hints that the 1897, 2 Q. B. 461), by which trade goods mortgaged to a bill of sale opinions. But the mass of evidence he has collected is extremely holder, but left in the possession of the bankrupt, fall within the weighty and interesting, and should command a large supply of reputed ownership clause and pass to the trustee; the well-known readers wherever the origins of legal history interest students. We case of Re Carter and Kenderdine's Contract (45 W. R. 484 ; 1897, 1 Ch. fear that they will be found in Germany more largely than in 776), which overruled Re Briggs and Spicer (1891, 2 Ch. 127), and made it possible for a title to be made under a voluntary settlement within

England. ten years of the date of the settlement ; New, Prance, de Garrard's would be clearer if each of the propositions were isolated, and the

We have but one criticism to make. The whole plan of the work Trustee v. Hunting (45 W. R. 577; 1897, 2 Q. B. 19), which illus- evidence bearing upon it were also isolated. But this was, perhaps, trated the principle that a payment will not be a fraudulent prefer- hardly possible in lectures, and would involve much repetition. We ence when made from motives other than a desire to prefer the

can heartily recommend the book as a unodel of erudition and particular creditor; and Re Walker (72 L. T. 330), which for practical purposes deprives of its efficacy section 13 of the Bank

sobriety in the way of theorizing. ruptcy Act, 1890, enabliog a vesting order to be made upon a disclaimer of leaseholds of the bankrupt on the terms of the person in whose favour it is made assuming only the liabilities of an

HIGHWAYS. assigne. The present edition appears to have been accurately brought up to date.

PRATT'S LAW OF HIGHWAYS, MAIN ROADS, AND BRIDGES. FOUR

TEENTII EDITION. By WILLIAM MACKENZIE, M.A., Barrister-at

Law. Shaw & Sons; Butterworth & Co.
TOWNSHIP AND BOROUGH.

The new edition of Pratt on Highways coines fully up to the high TOWNSHIP AND BOROUGH. BEING THE FORD LECTURES DELIVERED

standard of excellence attained in previous editions. The law on the IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD IN THE OCTOBER TERM OF 1897. subject with which it deals may be said to be in a state of transition, By FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, LL.D., Downing Professor of for the important changes which the Local Government Act, 1894, the Laws of England in the University of Cambridge. Cambridge: tration of the highway law have not yet come into full operation:

was intended to effect in the authorities charged with the adminisThe University Press.

In some parts of the country the control of the highways has not yet Professor Maitland has here produced a most interesting work on passed to the district councils, and parish surveyors continue to exist, the growth of the English corporate borough, and in particular of advantage having been taken of the power of postponement given to the shire borough or county town, illustrated by the history of county councils by the Act referred to. It is necessary, therefore, to Cambridge as it appears in the maps and terriers of its common deal in a work of this kind with the powers and duties of the surfields, its charters, its litigation, and in Domesday Book and the veyors as existing highway authorities; and, even when they have Pipe Rolls. The book is as full of modesty as it is of learning: in ceased to exist, the powers of their successors will remain so bound fact, we fear that most readers would prefer a more definite dogmatism. up with and dependent on the powers given to the surveyors by the In the lectures, which constitute rather less than half the book, Mr. Highway Act, 1835, that that Act must form the groundwork of any Maitland puts forward certain propositions by way of pleading. The work on highway law until some consolidating Act gives the necessary rest of the volume contains in an appendix the principal portion of powers to the more modern bodies by direct enactment instead of by the evidence in support of the pleading. The reader is left to form reference to the powers of the old parish authorities. Mr. Mackenzie his own judgment.

starts with a treatise on the law of highways independent of statute, in The main propositions advanced are the following: The borough which the difficult questions of dedication, common-law liability to is only a more highly developed form of the ordinary vill, township, repair, rights of user, removal of obstructions, and the like are ably or village community, and is, no less than the other, an agrarian dealt with. The cases cited both in this and the subsequent portion unit. The shire borough is especially important as the locus of the of the work have been brought thoroughly up to date. The second, shire moot, with especial privileges of markets, fairs, courts, &c.; and by far the larger part of the work, deals with the statute law as and to aid its independence and impartiality is, in point of jurisdic- to highways, and consists of the text of the statutes themselves with tion, external to all the neighbouring, hundreds, as the District of exhaustive notes and cross-references. Some idea will be formed of Columbia (which contains Washington) is apart from all the individual the magnitude of the work from the fact that the Acts set out and States of America. Its land is also in an exceptional position, in annotated in Part II. comprise the important Highway Acts of 1835,

1862, 1864, and 1878, together with portions of the Public Health some of the leading cases; the remainder contain a reprint of the Act, 1875, the Local Government Acts of 1888 and 1894, and a Acts, rules, and forms now in force which relate to the allied subnumber of minor enactments relating to roads and bridges, tramways jects of patents, designs, and trade-marks. The summary appears and locomotives. The task of annotating these statutes has been to be quite sufficient to enable patentees and their advisers to form well carried out, and the result is a book which is almost indispen- a fairly accurate idea of their chance of obtaining prolongation and sable to those concerned with local government law. The index, of what must be done to secure it, but it will hurdly, in a doubtful moreover, is full and accurate, and the printing and "get-up" of case, relieve them of the necessity of referring to the decisions or to the book is all that can be desired,

more extended treatises. Howerer, the object which the author set before himself appears to have been attained, and the book should

be of use.
ELECTRIC LIGHTING.
THE LAW RELATING TO ELECTRIC LIGHTING. By JOHN SHIRESS

BOOKS RECEIVED.
WILL, Q.C. Butterworth & Co.

Hints on the Legal Duties of Shipmasters. By_BENEDICT W. This book contains the Electric Lighting Acts of 1882 and 1888, GINSBURG, M.A., LL.D. (Cantab.), Barrister-at-Law. Charles with the regulations of the Board of Trade thereunder, a form of pro- Griffin & Co. (Limited). Price 4s. 6d. visional order, and various statutory forms and publications relating The Workmen's Compensation Act, 1997 (60 & 61 Vict. c. 37). to electric lighting. The statutes are fully and correctly annotated, With Copious Notes and an Appendix containing the Employer's and the form of provisional order is likely to be of great service to Liability Act, 1880 (43 & 44 Vict. c. 42). By W. A

INGTON the draftsman. Mr. Shiress Will is a master of his subject, and has WILLIS, LL.B. (Lond.), Barrister-at-Law. Fourth Edition. With produced a book giving all the information upon it which can be Analysis of a Proposed Scheme to be Certified Under the Act, and desired.

Form of Application for a Certificate. Butterworth & Co.; Shaw &
Sons.

Maritime Warfare and Merchant Shipping. A Summary of the
PARISH COUNCILS.

Rights of Capture at Sea. By DOUGLAS OWEN, Barrister-at-Law, PARISH COUNCILS. SOME NOTES ON THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT Act, Secretary of the Alliance Marine and General Assurance Co. (Limited).

1894, AND SUGGESTIONS FOR AN AMENDMENT ACT. By J. HARRIS Stevens & Sons (Limited). STONE, M.A., Barrister-at-Law. Reprinted from the Law

The Law Magazine and Review. A Quarterly Review of JurisQuarterly Review, April, 1898. Stevens & Sons (Limited).

prudence and Quarterly Digest of Reported Cases. May, 1898. Mr. Stone in this essay points out a few of the imperfections which Stevens & Haynes. have made the Parish Councils Act one of the most difficult pieces of legislation with which the practitioner has had to cope in recent years. In so far as the amendments which he proposes would remove or abate the present confusion or simplify the working of the Act,

CORRESPONDENCE. we are entirely at one with Mr. Stone. But when he goes further

MR. WARR'S FINAL EXAMINATION BILL. and desires to place in the hands of parish councils “much more power” in the management of their local parish affairs, we hesitate;

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] the scanty powers which these bodies now possess are often not very Sir,-I notice in your issue of the 23rd ult. that you quote an highly prized and are sometimes by no means wisely exercised; we extract from a letter of an opponent of Mr. Warr's Solicitor's Final do not think that a case has been made out for an extension of those Examination Bill. Many men who, like myself, have recently taken powers. Mr. Stone pays a well-merited tribute to the Local a class in the Jurisprudence School at Oxford, will find some of his Government Board, whose painstaking energy has been of the remarks rather hard to understand. greatest assistance in oiling the wheels of the cumbrous machine of First, he says, “ If the Bill passes and is adopted, the Council must the Legislature.

be prepared to welcome as solicitors a large number of men with no

adequate guarantee of proficiency in the practical work of their THE MERCHANDISE MARKS ACT.

calling." We were under the impression that one of the great

objects of the Bill was to enable students to dispose of their examinaTHE MERCHANDISE MARKS ACT: TEN YEARS' EXPERIENCE. By tion work as quickly as possible in order to give them more time, G. B. ELLIS. Spottiswoode & Co.

during the remaining portion of their articles, to master the practical This is a reprint of a paper read by the author before the Chartered work of their profession. Institute of Patent Agents, together with the Acts of Parliament and Secondly, he says, “True the examination, whatever it may be, an epitome of the decisions, in nearly all instances given by London will bə succeeded by tbree years' articles.” Might one venture magistrates. This epitome of decisions is interesting and instructive, to point out two things with regard to this statement ? (1) That though it is difficult to deduce from it any very distinct idea of the it is highly improbable, taking into consideration the comparaview which any particular magistrate is likely to take in any par- tively small amount of English Law read in the Jurisprudence ticular case, and still less of the probable result of a prosecution Schools at our Universities, that the Council of the Incorporated Law where the personality of a particular magistrate is excluded. Even Society will exempt a student who has gained a class in those schools the Custom House authorities appear to have somewhat modified the from the whole or part of the Final Solicitors' Examination. (2) views which they formerly held-and for the better-seeing that their That the examination at Oxford which in all probability will exempt present instructions to their officers provide that trade descriptions in an articled clerk from the whole or any part of the Final Examinathe English language applied to foreign goods imported for home tion will be the examination for the degree of B.C.L. Now, as consumption from non -English-speaking countries are not to be matters stand at present at the Universities, this examination cannot regarded as indirect indications that the goods are of British origin, be passed till at least a year from the date of the B.A. degree, and in the absence of special circumstances. This is distinctly an probably would not be passed by the articled B.A. till two years advance, for it was very oppressive to treat it as an offence on the from that date. Se that your correspondent's statement that the part of foreign merchants or their British correspondents to tell the exempting examination will be succeeded by three years' articles intended British consumers in the only language which many of them is manifestly incorrect. As a matter of fact, assuming that the B.A. understood what was the nature or the quantity of the goods offered is articled directly after his degree (as generally happens), the to them for purchase. The general impression produced by the exempting examination will be passed possibly at the end of the perusal of these pages is that, whilst the Act of 1887 is one designed first year's articles, probably at the end of the second. to produce considerable benefits to English manufacturers and Lastly, your correspondent's remarks seem to be solely based on traders, while worked with moderation and common sense, it is one the assumption that all Oxford and Cambridge men are an idle set of capable of producing much bardship and leading to almost grotesque fellows, who do not work while at the Universities, and do not intend results if over-stringently interpreted and driven to extremes. It is to work during their articles. Of course it is hardly necessary to not necessary to particularize instances, but that there have been such point out the manifest injustice of such an assumption. The uncan hardly be doubted after looking through this little book. fairness of it is amply demonstrated by the achievements and

successes of Oxford and Cambridge men, both in the solicitors' pro

fession, and indeed in all branches of the other great professions. THE PROLONGATION OF LETTERS PATENT.

The object of Mr. Warr's Bill seems to be a simple and common

sense oue-viz., that if a man has passed a stiff examination paper at NOTES ON THE PROLONGATION OF LETTERS PATENT FOR INVENTIONS.

one of the Universities on common law, equity, real property law, By G. J. WHEELER, Barrister-at-Law. Eyre & Spottiswoode.

evidence, or procedure, he need not be compelled to go through such Of the 300 pages or thereabouts of which this book consists, some an ordeal again in a very similar examination paper in the Solicitors' thirty are devoted to a short but convenient summary of the prin- Final.

B.A. (Oxon). ciples which govern the prolongation of patents, with references to April 30.

which showed clearly how the case stood-namely, that the railway stocks CASES OF THE WEEK.

were to be paid for out of Waud's winnings in the gambling transactions

which Cronmire retained in his hands. It was contended for the trustee Court of Appeal.

that Waud's claim to prove could not be shaped in any way so as to get

quit of that fact. An ingenious argument had been addressed to this ATTORNEY-GENERAL v. BEECH AND ANOTHER.

No. 1.

30th court and to Wright, J., in the court below, which had induced Wright, April

J., to disbelieve Waud's affidavit showing what the real transaction was.

It was raid on behalf of Waud that there had been a settlement of REVENUE - ESTATE DUTY – TENANT FOR LIFE AND REMAINDERMAN

accounts between Waud and Cronmire, and that that was evidence of an SURRENDER OF LIFE ESTATE TO REMAINDERMAN-PROPERTY PASSING

account stated shewing that the railway stocks had been paid for. An AT DEATH OF TENANT FOR LIFE-FINANCE ACT, 1894 (57 & 58 VICT. C.

account stated was only evidence of payment, and was not conclusive; 30), ss. 1, 2 (1) (6).

but how could it be said that there had been a payment in this case, An appeal by the defendants from the judgment of a Divisional Court when Waud in his affidavit stated that there had been none. In his (Pollock, B., and Ridley, J.) upon an information by the Attorney-General lordship's opinion, therefore, Wright, J., was wrong in holding that claiming estate duty under the Finance Act, 1894 (reported 46 W. R. Waud could prove against the estate for damages for the non-delivery of 222; 1897, 2 Q. B. 535). By a marriage settlement certain property was the railway stock. Another question arose as to the £49 “ cover.” That conveyed to trustees, upon trust to pay the income thereof to

was money deposited with Oronmire to secure him against loss in the the wife for life for her separate use, without power of antici. event of the stock falling (see Lord Herschell's judgment in Universal pation, and, after her decease, upon trust for the children of Stock Exchange v. Strachan, 1896, A. C. 166, at p. 173). But the gaming the marriage, with a power to the wife to appoint to one or and wagering transactions in the present case had come to an end, and no more of them by deed or will after her husband's death. The husband part of the cover” had been used. Why, then, could not Waud claim died in 1885. By an indenture dated the 21st of December, 1836, the it back? No answer could be made to that claim, and it was unnecessary wife appointed the property to her son, subject to her life interest. By to con:ider the question of appropriation or when the demand ought to an indenture dated the 18th of December, 1894, the wife surrendered to be made. As to that part of the cake Waud was therefore entitled to the trustees of the settlement her life interest in the property as specified succeed. in the schedule thereto, to the end and intent that such life interest CHitty and VAUGHAN WILLIAMS, L.JJ., concurred. Order varied.might merge in the interest in remainder of the son. The wife died on COUNSEL, Robson, Q.C., and Macaskie ; H. Reed, Q.O., and Israel Davis. the 27th of August, 1896. The information claimed that upon the death SOLICITORS, H. H. Boorne ; Atkinson g Dresser. of the wife estate duty became payable under eection 2, sub-section 1 (b),

(Reported by F. 0. ROBINSON, Barrister-at-Law.] of the Finance Act, 1894, upon the principal value of the trust property comprised in the schedule to the indenture of the 18th of December, 1894, as property passing on her death. The Divisional Court gave judgment for the Crown. The Court (A. L SMITH, CHItty, and COLLINS, L.JJ.), having taken time

High Court-Chancery Division. to consider, delivered judgment allowing the appeal. They said that the life estate having been extinguished by the surrender in December,

Re REINA. FROST v. LUCAS. North, J. 21st April. 1894, no property passed on the death of the tenant for life within the

WILL-FOREIGN STAMP DUTY-ENGLISH EXECUTORS. meaning of section 2, sub-section 1 (), of the Finance Act, 1894. Her

The teetatrix died domiciled in the island of St. Vincent leaving a will life interest did not cease on her death, and to no extent whatever did appointing English executors and giving legacies to some persons in a benefit accrue or arise to any person upon her death by the cesser of England and some in the West Indies. Most of the assets were in this her life interest. Therefore, as the surrender took place more than twelve country, and the executors proved the will here and registered the probate months before she died, no estate duty was payable on her death in respect in St. Vincent. By the law of St. Vincent an ad valorem stamp duty is of the property.-Counsel, Cozens-Hardy, Q.C., Levett, Q.C., 9; M. Spence, imposed upon receipts for legacies, and the executors took out this sumand Austen-Cartmell; Sir Richard Webster, A.G., Sir R. T. Reid, Q.O., and

mons to ascertain whether they were bound to demand from the legatees Vaughan Hawkins. SOLICITORS, W. Carpenter & Sons; Solicitor of Inland receipts stamped as required by the law of St. Vincent. No penalty is Revenue.

imposed by the law of St. Vincent for not taking such a receipt, but (Reported by W. F. Barry, Barrister-at-Law.]

unstamped receipts for legacies would not be admissible in evidence in

legal proceedings in St. Vincent. Re CRONMIRE. Ex parte WAUD. No. 1.

6th May.

NORTH, J., held that he could not compel the stamping of the receipts GAMING AND WAGBRING-PURCHASE OF STOCKS_PAYMENT OUT OF Proceeds in accordance with the law of St. Vincent.–Counsel, oH. Terrell, Q.O., OF GAMBLING TRANSACTIONS-DAMAGES FOR NON-DELIVERY-MONEY De- and Mander ; Swinfer Eady, Q.C., and Wilkinson. SOLICITORS, Mander ý Cover"-RIGHT TO RECOVER.

Son ; Cardew.

[Reported by G. B. HAMILTON, Barrister-at-Law.] This was an appeal by the trustee in the administration of the estate of Cronmire, deceased, from a decision of Wright, J. (reported ante, p. 291), R. DU CANE AND NETTLEFOLD'S CONTRACT. Stirling, J. 29th and admitting the proof of Alfred Edward Waud. The facts were as follows:

30th March ; 30th April. Cronmire had carried on business as an outside dealer in stocks and shares under the style of Gregory & Co. He died insolvent in April, 1897, and his Vendor AND PURCHASER-SETTLED LAND-COMPOUND SETTLEMENTestate was now being administered in bankruptcy under an administra

TRUSTEES FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE SETTLED LAND Acrs--SETTLED tion order. Waud bad had considerable dealings in stocks and shares

LAND Act, 1882 (55 & 56 Vocr. c. 13), ss. 2 (1) (5) (8), 3, 20, 38, 50 with Cronmire, and on the 1st of February, 1897, the accounts shewed a

-SETILED LAND Act, 1890 (53 & 54 Vict. c. 69), s. 4. large balance owing to Waud. On the 8th of February Waud directed This was a summons taken out by a vendor under the Vendor and PurOronmire to purchase £200 Great Eastern Railway Stock for investment, chaser Act, 1874, asking for a declaration that certain objections and and on the 9th of February Waud directed Cronmire to apply the balance requisitions by a purchaser had been sufficiently answered. The facts owing on the previous transactions in payment of the stock. Cronmire were as follow : In 1885 certain estates stood limited under the will of sent to Waud à contract note stating that he had sold to Waud the stock P. du Cane to the use of Sir Chas. du Cane for life with remainder to his in question “ to be taken up," but the stock was never delivered. Upon eldest son, the vendor, in tail, subject to a jointure of £500 in favour of the 3rd of April the account had been further increased in Waud's favour, Lady du Cane. By a disentailing assurance made in September, 1885, the there being now due to him £375 (including therein a sum of £49 3s. 93. estates were limited to such uses as Sir Chas. du Cane' and the vendor which Waud had deposited with Cronmire as "cover"). On this date should jointly appoint, and with remainder in default of appointment to Wand directed Cronmire to purchase for him a small amount of Dover the existing uses. By a dead of the 22nd of April, 1886, Sir Chag. da "A” Stock, which was also to be paid for out of Waud's winnings. This Cane and the vendor, in exercise of the power reserved to them by the stock was purchreed but not delivered. Waud tendered a proof for the said disentailing assurance, jointly appointed to the use of Sir Chas. du £375, but it was rejected by the trustee on the ground that the transac-Cane for life (by way of restoration and confirmation of his former life tions were gambling transactions, and, upon appeal, Vaughan Williams, estate under the will), with remainder to the vendor for life, with J., directed an issue to be tried by a jury as to whether they were gambling remainder to his first and other sons in tail with remainders over, transactions. The jury found that the transactions were gambling tran- and trustees of the settlement created by this deed were appointed sactions, but that the purchases of the Great Eastern Railway and Dover trustees for the purposes of the Settled 'Land Acts.

By a deed “A” Stocks were for investment and were real transactions. The trustee of the 23rd of March, 1887, Sir Chas. du Cane and the vendor, applied to Wright, J., sitting as bankruptcy judge, for judgment upon in exercise of the power contained in the settlement of 1886, the verdict of the jury, when the proof was taken as having been amended jointly appointed the estates to uses to secure Lady du Cane a yearly by being turned into a proof for damages for non-delivery of the railway rent-charge of £300, in addition to the £500, and subject thereto to the stocks. Wright, J., held that Waud was entitled to prove against the use of trustees during the life of the vendor upon certain trusts for the estate for damages for the nondelivery of the railway stocks, and also for benefit of the vendor, his wife, and children. This appointment was the amount of the “cover.” The trustee appesled.

made subject and without prejudice to all estates having priority under The Court (A. L. SMITH, CHITTY, and VAUGHAN WILLIAMS, L.JJ.) the settlement of 1886 over the vendor's life estate and all powers attaching reversed the decision of Wright, J., save as regards the claim for the to such estates, and without prejudice to all powers which, but for the

present deed, would have been exerciseable by the vendor under the A. L. SMITH, L.J., said that it was now admitted that the transactions Settled Land Act. By subsequent deeds, including a deed of the 11th of between Waud and Cronmire, with the exception of the purchases of the August, 1887, certain further charges were created on the property. Sir two sets of railway stock were gambling transactions, the result of which Chas. du Cane died in 1889. In 1897 the vendor contracted to sell a was that Waud won from Cronmire a certain sum Waud carried in a proof portion of the estates. The purchaser required trustees to be appointed in the administration of Cronmire's estate, and l hood made an amidavit for the purposes of the Settled Land Acts of the compound settlement

POSITED AS

cover."

created by the deeds of the 22nd of April, 1886, the 23rd of March, 1887, say that everything for the purposcs of the Act is to be read into the and the 11th of August, 1887. The vendor declined, and as the requisi section.-COUNSEL, Butcher, Q.C., and Spencer Buller; Buckley, Q.O., and tion was insisted on the present summons was taken out.

Clausen. SOLICITORS, Nicholl, Manisty, f: Co.; E. Bromley. STIRLING, J.-The objection here raised by the purchaser is, not that the

[Reported by J. I. STIRLING, Barrister-at-Law.] vendor is unable to exercise the powers of a tengut for lise under the Settled Land Acts, but that there are no proper trustees in existenco to

ISAACS v. TOWELL, Byrne, J. 27th April. accept the notice required by the Acts and to receive and give receipts | Vendor AND PURCHASER - MISDESCRIPTION-CONDITION OF SALE-RIGHT TO for the purchase-money. This case appears to me to differ from R:

Rescind-Right To RESCIND AFTER LITIGATION COMMENCED. Tibbits' Settled Estates (1897, 2 Ch. 149), Re Meade's Settled Estates (1897, 1 Ir. Rep. 121), where the question simply was whether a reasonable case

This was an action for the rescission of a contract for the sale of certain had been made for the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred on the court property advertised for sale as a freehold house, being No. 46, Westminfor the appointment of new trustees. In order that the vendor may make ster-bridge-road, London. The facts were as follow : The property was out his title there must, in the first place, be a settlement. A settlement put up for sale on the 29th of October, 1896, at the Mart, Tokenhouseis defined by section 2 (1) of the Act of 1882. Now, is the deed of 1886 a yard, E C. The particulars and conditions represented the property as settlement under which the vendor can sell, and does it fall within the freehold. The conditions provided that if any objection or requisimeaning of the Act? It appears to me that under that deed the estate tion not precluded by the conditions should be made and insisted on or interest in the land other than the fee simple itself became on the which the vendor should be unable or unwilling to remove or comexecution of the deed limited to the vendor and others by way of ply with, the vendor should be at liberty, notwithstanding any succession. Consequently it satisfied the requirements of section 2 (1). intermediate negotiation in respect thereof or attempts to remove or Now, it was admitted on the authority of Re Wright's Trusts (24 Ch. D. comply with the same, by notice in writing to the purchaser

to 662) that the effect of the deed of the 23rd of March, 1887, was not only to recind the sale, in which case the purchaser should receive back his reserve to the vendor the powers conferred under the settlement of the 22nd deposit without interest or costs. The plaintiff attended at the sale and of April, 1886, by the Settled Land Acts, but at the same time to effect an became the purchaser of the property in question for the sum of £460. assignment of the life estate by way of family arrangement within section The vendor produced evidence at the hearing to the effect that the 4 of the Settled Land Act, 1890. This being so, it is not disputed that the title, though not freehold, was practically as good, and that the purchaser vendor is tenant for life within the meaning of section 2 (5) of the Act of bought after sufficient notice." On or about the 5th of November the 1882. He can, therefore, sell under section 3 and under section 20 sell vendor delivered to the purchaser an abstract of title from which it the estate or interest subject to the settlement. So far there is no appeared that the vendor held the premises (save a small portion difficulty. But by the Act the purchase-money muet be paid into court thereof) by way of underlease only for a term of which about thirty-seven cr paid to the trustees of the settlement, to whom notice must be given of years only remained unexpired. The vendor was unable to comply with the intended sale under section 45, The trustees are defined in section 2 the purchaser's requisitions, and on the 30th of November the purchaser (8). By the deed of 1886 the persons therein named are trustees for the issued his writ. I'he writ was retained by the vendor's solicitors for purposes of the Acts, and they will concui i'u the sale and give receipts. some days, who, on the 3rd of December, gave notice of rescission under The purchaser, however, contends that they are trustees only by reference the condition. It was submitted on behalf of the purchaser, partly on the to the deed of 1886, and that the deeds of the 27th of March and the 11th ground that nothing was said in the conditions as to any right of the of August, 1887, must be regarded as cons:it uing with the deed of 1886 vendor to rescind while litigation was pending, that the vendor had lost the settlenient of which trustees are to exist. The question I have to his right under the condition. consider is, whether or no trustees must be appointed whenever a deed is

BRYNE, J., held that the vendor had not lost his right to rescind, executed affecting interests under the original settlement so that that because litigation had commenced before he exercised it. It could not be settlement is no longer the only instrument by which land stands limited said that he had waived his right by acquiescence in the litigation, and to persons by way of succession. As a general rule, in my opinion, this such acquiescence would be necessary to deprive him of his right under question must be answered in the negative. Suppose real estate is the contract. No general rule could be laid down as to the time at which kettled by a deed, dated the 1st of January, on

A. for life the right to rescission was lost, and it was not necessary to make a specific with remainder to B. in fee, and B. by a deed, dated the reference to litigation in a condition of sale to retain the right to rescind 1st of February, conveys his remainder in fee to "C. for life

after litigation had commenced. On view of the whole circumstances of with remainder to D. in fee, and by the January deed trustees are the case, his lordsbip dismissed the action, with costs as from the date of appointed for the purposes of the Settled Land Acts. I do not think that the notice to rescind, deducting costs to the date of the notice.-Counsel, the powers of those trustees are affected by the February deed, though Kve, Q.C., and J. M. Gover , Astbury, Q.C., and Wheeler. SOLICITORS, C. section 38 of the Act of 1882 doubtless enables the court to appoint 4 E. Woodroffe ; W. B. Fairbrother. trustees of the other instruments. But I can find nothing in the Act of

(Reported by J. ARTHUR Price, Barrister-at-Law.] 1882 wbich would debar the trustees of the January deed from receiving and giving receipts for the purchase-money. This view is supported by Re Knowles (33 W. R. 364, 27 Ch. D. 707). I may also point out the inconvenience of its b.ing necer sary to appoint trustees of the settlement made up of the original settlement and other instruments whenever

High Court-Queen's Bench Division. dealings otber tłan those of the tenant for life had been effected. This

ROPER v. KNOTT. Div. Court. 30th April. difficulty does not arise when the dealing is effected by the tenant for life; CRIMINAL LAW-WILFULLY OR MALICIOUSLY COMMITTING DAMAGE TO PRO: as in the case of a charge of portions. But there is notling iu the Act wbich says that the trustees of the settlement for the purposes of the Acts

PERTY-DILUTING MILK-MALICIOUS INJURIES TO PROPERTY ACT, 1861 are to be deprived of the ir power of receiving and givicg receipts for

(24 & 25 Vict. c. 97), s. 52-HALL 0. RICHARDSON (54 J. P. 345) Dis. purchase-money by a cbarge of portions. In fact I have already so decided with regard to jointures in Keck and Hart's Contract (46 W. R. 389, Case stated by a metropolitan police magistrate. Upon the hearing of W. N. 1898, p. 29), and on consideration i adhere to that decision. Then a charge made by the appellant, Roper, against the respondent, that the by section 50 (3) of the Act of 1882, a tenant for life cannot exercise the respondent did wilfully commit damage, injury, or spoil to four gallons powers given bim by the Act without the consent of his assiguee for of milk, the property of the appellant, contrary to the provisions of secvalue. It appears to me that the ins rument of 1887 contains this consent tion 52 of the Malicious Injuries to Property Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c. on behalf of ihe trustees in whose favour the assignment was made. But 97). The following facts were proved : The appellant was a milk salesman the important point here is that, whether this be so or no, there is ncthing carrying on business at 29, Howard-road, South Hornsey, and the responin the Act of 1882 to shew that the powers of trustees for the purposes of dent, who was a milk carrier in his employ, was in the habit of coming to the Acts are affected or contemplated to be affected by the assignment. the place of business every morning to fetch milk which he subsequently It simply seems to impose on the tenant for life the duty of obtaining the sold to the appellant's customers. On the morning of the 11th of January, consent of his assignee. But the provisions of the Act of 1882 have been 1898, the respondent was seen at 5.25 a.m. by the appellant and a policesomewhat modified by section 4 of the Act of 1890. Now the operation of constable, who were watching him, to conceal a three-pint can full of that section is limited to assignments or charges made in consideration of water in a garden of a house near the said premises. The respondent mani.ge or by way of family arrangement. Consequently, as regards all was then seen to fetch four gallons of milk in a barrow from the appel, other serignments for value the law still is as I have stated it, and the lant's premises (which, in the ordinary course, would be sold and delivered powers of the trustees still remain unaffected by the obligation imposed by him to the appellant's customers), and bring it opposite the said on the tenant for life to procure the assent of an assignee for value. garden, and then was seen to pour the three pints of water out of the can There is, however a change made as regards assignments by way of family into the said milk. The respondent had been seen on a previous morning arrangement. If the section is to be read as providing that under a settle- going into the same garden, and was being watched on account of comment euch an instrument of asignment is to be deemed one of the instru- plaints from customers of the appellant. The respondent was immediately ments creating the settlement for a'l purposes, it does eeem to me to be a iaken into custody, the appellant saying to him, “You villain, what do necesrary consequence that trustees ehould be appointed of the settlement you mean ?" and the respondent thereupon said, “I am very sorry. I made by the original settlement and that instrument. But the vendor hope you will forgive me!” The respondent stated that he had on precontends that the section is limited to excluding the operation of section vious occasions been obliged to make good to his master in money the 50 of the Act of 1882. That contention is borne out by the concluding value of milk that he had lost, but there was no evidence of this, and it words of the section. It seems to me that the language of the Act is was contradicted by the appellant. The appellaut, in giving evidence, satisfied by the limited construction placed on it by the vendor, and that said that he was in the habit of allowing each of the milk carriera in bis the section does not make any assignment to wbich it refers an instrumeut employ (including the respondent) two quarts of milk a day to cover any for all the purposes of the Act. În coming to that conclusion I found loss that might arise from accidental spilling of the milk they took out, or myself on the last words of the section and on the considera ion that that from the same being stolen from the customers' doors, ani also stared appears to me to be the difficulty which was intended to be met by the that he would have allowed a greater quantity had the milk carrier com; ecction as a whole, and the only difficulty so far as I can see. I cannot | plained that he had lost more than the two quarts. The respondent had

APPROVED.

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