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Ord Ciaivrzs, Gaoiioa Hsxar, Derby, Grocer Derby Pet March 31 Ord April 1 Dxirnni. Gsoaoa, Brighouse, Yorlrs, Cooper Halifax Pet April 1 Ord April 1 Dnswi-rr, FRANK G1DSON', Gosport, Hunts. Cycle Maker Portsmouth Pet March 31 Ord March 31 Eimnsos, JL, Aldeishot Guildford Pet Jan 8 Ord April2 Evans-rr, G-norms EDWARD, Birmingham, Auctioneer Birmin%ham Pet March 12 Ord March 31 Ewiso, ASIL, Chesterfield, Corn Merchant Chester field Pet April2 om April2 Piss, Jscos, Abe:-dare, Olsnis, Furniture Dealer Alterdare Pet April 1 Ord April 1 GIPFOBD, Svnssr Haassar, Willesbornugh, Kent, Miller Canterbury Pet March 16 Ord March 31 _ Gaels. Bsasasn Jossrn, Wolverhampton, Architect, \Volverhampton Pet April 1 Ord April 1 Guns-r, Aarnon, and Wrr.r.i.\ir Paascorr, Bolherhsm, Builders Sheflield Pet April 2 Ord Arsril 2 Hliizoo, Fssni-zriicic, Crnnwick rd, Stamfo Hill, Cotton Broker High Court Pet April 1 Ord April 1 Husr, Au-issn, Plumstaad, Tailor Greenwich Pet March ao om March30 _ HUNTER, -Ions, Pwllheli, Camarvons, C.onti-actor Portmadoc Pet April 2 Ord April 2 Jonas, Cnslssr Ssurisir, Peckham, Furniture Dealer High Court Pet Feb 24 Ord April 1 Josss, Earn‘ Ei.i.ls Walsall, Milk Purveyor Walsull Pet March 31 Ord March 31 LOCK, Tuoius, Reading, Horse Dealer Reading Pet March 29 Ord March 29 MAssn.u.i., CIIAIILES Wrli.Knas', Oldhiim, Greengrocsr Oldham Pet April 1 Ord April 1 Moiirrz, Liossn, Bury st, General Merchant High Court Pet March 31 Ord March 31 lllIon.iisLi., Joiiir Wi|.i.i.in, Nidd, Yorks, Farmer York Pet March 31 Ord March 31 Mo\'r.niim, Hssar, Blackburn, Cabinet Maker Blackburn Pet March 29 Qrd March 29 Paorrr, Jous, Maindee, Newport, Mon, Boot Dealer Newpoi t, Mon Pet April 1 Ord April 1 PIBKIS, Mini‘ Jmis, Mil onl Haven, embroke, Draper Pembroke Dock Pet April 1 Oi-<1 April 1 Puonss, CLARA, Newport, I W, Schoolmistress Newport Pet March 30 Ord March 30 Po\vsr.i., J LIES, Felthim, Farmer Kingston, Surrey Pet Feb 12 Ord March 18 Rrur, Owns. Mom Side, nr Manchester, Grocer Salford Pet March 17 Ord April 1 SHIPPAID, Hsxav JAMES, Bedford, Florist Bedford Pet Mnrch 25 Ord March 30 Ssow, Air-ruon, Essex st, Strand, Solicitor High Court Pet Feb 14 Ord March 31 Srsvsss, As-rnna Horuicir, and Psiicr Cmzw H1mi.s\', Brockley rd, New Cross, Surrey,’Accountants High Court Pet April 1 Ord April 1 Tansor, Eu, Worle, Somerset, Baker Bridgwater Pet April 1 Ord April 1 Tsoiiss, Jorrx, Treorky, Glam, Licensed Victusller Pontypridd Pet April 2 Ord April 2 THOusLsY, Hssmi‘, Enington, nr Wolverhampton, Farmer Wolverhampton Pet April 2 Ord April 2 Trneirrs, Tnonss Winniau, Wednesbury, Staffs, Butcher West Brnmwich Pet March 31 Ord March :11 Tauscorr, ELIZABETH Amos HARRIS, Wadebridge, Cornwall Truro Pet Feb 17 Ord April2 Winnr/ms. Tiioinls, _Brixton, Baker High Court Pet April 2 Ord April 2 WILLIAMS, Wii.i.isi|, Portb, nr Pontynridd, Engine Driver Pontypridd _ Pet March 29 Ord March 20 Amended notice substituted for that published in the London Gazette of April 1 : w11.LXAIS, D.\vin, Hulme, Manchester Mliuchester Pet Match 28 Ord March R FIRST 1~GB. Asnnnis, RAISA, Plymou , ra Dealer April 14 at 11 Inw8ooiety's chmbrs, Athennsumln, Plymouth Annisrsnsv, Saunas, Tanshelf, Poiitefract, Glass Bottle
FARIIAN. HA1!-OLD Auousrus, Charing Cross, Solicitor High Caurt Pet March 11 Ord March 30
Fiss, soon, Aberdare, Glam, Furniture Dealer Aberdare Pet April 1 Ord April 1
Gassir, BERNARD Josicrn, Wolverhampton, Architect Wolverhampton Pet April 1 Ord April 1
Gnssr, Aarnua, and Wii.r.i1ni PRESCOTT, Itotherharn, Builders Shcffield Pet April 2 Ord Ag§il2
Horisa, Faenimicrr M, Regent st, Billiard able Manufacturer Hggh Court Pet Nov 23 Ord April 1
Joxizs, Eiiinr LLEN, Walsall, Milk Purveyor Walsall Pet March 31 Orll March 31
LABABD, Fiiirnsiiicrr, Gi-acecliurch st, Watch Maker High Court Pet Jan 26 _ Ord March 30 ,
Loon, Tnonss, Rendmg, Horse Dealer Reading Pet March 29 Ord Marc 29
Lusx, War.-rsa, Bellingham, Northurnberland, Innkeeper N ewcnstlc on Tyne Pet March 25 Ord April 1
M1liisii.\r.L, Cuaiiniis WALKDBN, Oldham, GreengrocerOldham Pet April 1 Ord Adpril 1
MORRBLL. Joirs \ ILLIAH, Nid , Yorks, Farmer York Pet March 31 Ord March31
Moai-iiiim, WILLIABI Hssar. Weston super Mare, Leather Merchant Bristol Pct Dec 22 Ord March 31
llioivnoim, Hsxizr, Blackburn, Cabinet maker Blackbum Pet March 29 Ord March 29
PEEL, Sir Ronairr, Drayton Manor, Warwick, Baronet High Court Pet Dec S Ord March 30
Pooirizs, CLARA, Newport, I W, Schoolmistress Newport Pet March 30 Ord March 30
Boivass, MA-rraaw Wir.r.isir, Waking, Surrey, Builder Guildford Pet Dec 1 Ord March 30
Eooiass, Tnoiiis, Bletchley, Bucks. Butcher Northampton Pet March 30 Ord April 2
S-ri:\'s.\*sor:, MA1‘Tl1EW BINCLAIR, Queen Victoria st, (iompany Promoter High Court Pet Feb 11 Ord
Trr.so'r, Em, \‘Vorle, Somarsets, Baker Bridgwater Pet April 1 Ord April 1
Tr-ions, Joax, Treorky, Glam, Licensed Victmiller Pontypridd Pet April 2 Ord April 2
Tl10RNL1-L1‘, Hi:i~uii', Essington, nr Wo1\'erhampton, Farmer Wolverhampwn Pet April 1 Ord April 2
TIDBITTS, THOMAS ‘VILLIAM, Wednesbury, Butcher West Bromwich Pet March 31 Ord March 31
Vans, Gsoaoa, Dunsmuie rd, Stamford Hill, Builder High Court Pet Feb 17 Ord March 31
WILLIAMS, Taurus, Brixwn, Baker High Court Pet April 2 Ord April 2
WILLIAMS, WILLIAM, Porth, nr Pontypiidd, Engine Driver Pontypridd Pet March 29 Ord March 29
Amended notice substituted for that published in the London Gazette of Feb. 18:
Dsviss, DAVID, Abergwilly, Carmarthens, Saddler Curmarthen Bet Feb 12 Ord Feb 14 Amended notice substituted for that published in the
London Gazette of April 1 :
w1LL1AlS, DAVID, Hulrne, Miinchcster Manchester Pet
March 25 Ord March 28
Psos, ‘vVii.i.i.\ii Gnssr, Leicester, Sliopkeeper Leicester.
Adjud Nov 27, 1894 Anmil March 31
AN IMPORTANT DECISION. s A. Csnsrov, M D
Cnsans . . . . ,
“Department of the Medical Oflicer of Health, and
“ Public Analyst. “ Public Health Oflice, “ Cork Hill, City Laborator , " 17, Castle-street, Illublin. -- rllarch 26:11, recs.
“I have examined specimens of Vi-Cocoa, and have obtained satisfactory results. I find it to consist of nutritive materials of high value, and possessing agreeable flavour. Vi-Cocoa is easily digested. It is not usual for preparations sold under the name of Cocoa or Chocolate to contain so much albuminons (muscle-forming) material as Vi-Cocoa contains—namely, the high proportion of 16¢ per cent. As the article is nutritious and well-flavoured, I have no hesitation in recommending it.
"CHARLES A. CAMERON, M.D.,
A httle book contalmng the reports of the very highest medical experts and analysts in the United Kingdom, showing the advantages of Dr. Tibbles’ Vi-Cocoa over all other food products, will be forwarded post-free on application (ii postcard will do) to any address. Also dainty sample tin. Address: Dr. Tibb_les‘ Vi-Cocoa (1898), Ltd., 60, 61, and 62, Bunhill-row, London, E.C.
Classes for Final Students are held at the Hall of the Society on four afternoons each week during the following periods: August to January;
Tm; Cocxcn. invite attention to tho following scheme of education, adopted n 1892 with the object of affording assistance to Articled Clerks.
For the benefit of Clerks resident in London or who are able to attend, these classes are held and Tutors give advice and assistance at the Hall of the Law Society.
To those Clerks who are articled at a distance from large towns systematic instruction with advice and help is given, and a course of preparation through the post has been formulated.
In the case of students who have not passed the Intermediate Examination the instruction is by means of monthly papers, and deals with the selected portions of Stephen’s Commentaries.
For those who have passed the Intermediate Examination instruction is afforded by fortnightly papers, and embraces the following subjects: Equity, Conveyancing, Common Law, Bankruptcy, Criminal and Magisterial Law, Probate, Divorce, Admiralty, and Ecclesiastical Law.
These papers both before and after the Intermediate Examinations are varied each year, so that students who may subscribe for more than one year's tuition receive additional assistance.
These courses may be commenced at any time, but the Tutors recommend that the Intermediate course should be commenced at an early stage of the Articles, and the Final course soon after the Intermediate Examination has been passed.
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January to J une.
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IFE ASSURANCE POLICIES EDE AND SON, ‘THE IIEVEIISIOIIAIIY INTEREST SOCIETY,
Considerabl over surrender value given
Purchase Reversiona Interests in Real and Personal
WANTED for large sums on lives past forty-five. LHHTED
y . Speedy settlements and highest references. Also Rcversions and Life Interests purchased.
NEWSPAPERS 8: PERIODICALS.
Printer! of THE SOLICITORS’ JOURNAL Newspaper. l
Authors advised with as to Printing and Publishing. I
Contracts entered into. |
Property, and Life rlnterests and Llft! Policies, and
CURRENT TOPICS. Ir nss this week been suggested as a solution of the present
difliculty with regard to the trial of patent actions, that they should be removed from the High Court entirely and submittrd for the decision of the ofiicials ol the patent office. It is needless to say that the suggestion is not likely to be entertained for a. moment, though the fact that it can be gravely made is a. significant indication of the state to which matters have been allowed to come. The granting 0! a. patent in the first instance is a question of administrative discretion, and in the exercise of the discretion by the patent oflice it is necessary to consider whether the applicant is primd facia entitled to the patent he is seeking. But this is a very different matter from deciding upon the validity of the patent when it has been formally put in issue by an opponent. The patent is a. species of property and its protection must be referred to a court of justice. Or if this reason is too technical, the interests which are at stake entitle the parties to such a hearing of the case as can only be obtained by reg'ular judicial methods. It may be predicted that it a special court were constituted for patent cases much of the present expense and waste of time would be avoided. Before a judge who was always dealing with this class of business.expert evidence, while not ceasing to be important, would probably be reduced in amount, and it would be easier to keep a. check both upon the “advocacy " of expert witneses and upon the length of the proceedings.
Tun PROBABLE outbreak of hostilities between the United States and Spain makes it important to notice that neither nation is a party to the article of the Declaration of Paris according to which “privateering is and remains abolished.” Privateering, or “cruising with private armed vessels commissioned by the State ” (Wheaton’s International Law, 3rd English ed., p. 488), was formerly sanctioned by the laws of every maritime nation as a legitimate means of destroying the commerce of an enemy, but, like the confiscation of private property taken at sea, it is a relic of barbarous modes of warfare, and as between nearly all the States of the world it has
now been abolished. The first efiort in this direction came, curiously enough, from the United States themselves, and Dr. FRANKLIN obtained the insertion in their treaty with Prussia of 1785 of a clause by which the two contracting Po were agreed to grant no commissions to private armed vessels; but the clause was omitted from the renewed treaty of 1799. Bcl1W60l1 1823 and 1830 the United States were in negotiation with Great Britain, France, and Russia to obtain treaties abolishing privateering, but these Powers were unwilling to enter into separate agreements, though they were in favour cf a general agreement of the chief maritime Powers to the same effect. Subsequently the United States altered their views on the subject, considering that privateering might be a useful means of making up for the smallness of their regular navy in the event of a conflict with a great European Power, while even with smaller Powers their widespread commerce and extended sea-coast would put them at a disadvantage ; and the honour of taking the real initiative in the abolition of privateering lies with the original parties to the Declaration of Paris, including Great Britain, France, Russia, and Prussia. All civilized states have since become signatories of the Declaration except the United States, Spain, and Mexico. The Declaration is only a compact between the signatories to it, and privateering is still possible, therefore, in a war between any of the signatories and one of these three states, or, of course, in a war between any of the excepted states themselves.
Tun ABOVE statement does not, however, represent fully the course taken by the United States with respect to the abolition of privateering by the Declaration of Paris. Asamatter of policy they were, as already observed, in favour of preserving privateering, but they had the enlightenment to be willing to consent to its abolition provided an article was added prohibiting the capture of all private property at sea not contraband. The Powers generally were in favour of this amendment, but according to Wheaton (8th ed., p. 45 l) it was defeated in consequence of the opposition of Great Britain. This was in 1856, and in the following year the offer of the United States to accede to the Declaration of Paris on the proposed terms was withdrawn. Upon the outbreak of the American Civil War an offer of unconditional accession was made to the European Powers by President Lmcomv, but the terms which Great Britain sought to impose in favour of the belligerent rights of the Confederacy prevented this offer from becoming effectual. By the constitution of the United States, Congress has power to grant letters of marque, and during the Civil lVar an Act was passed authorizing their issue by the President; but in fact they were never issued by either side. Should the existing dispute lead to war between the United States and Spain there can be no doubt that each side will be within its right in permitting privateering. It may be noticed that in the war between France and Spain in 1823 the belligerents at the outset issued declarations both against the comnfissioning of privateers and against the capture of private property at sea. Having regard, however, to the considerations which have influenced the policy of the United States with regard to privateering, it is unlikely that any such mutual deductions will be made on the present occasion.
AN ESTEEMED correspondent calls attention in another column to two matters in which a change is desirable. The first is the rule that the scale fee for a lease includes all charges for negotiating and for preparation of a preliminary agreement: Re Field (33 YV. R. 553, 29 Oh. D. 608); Ra Emanuel and Simmonds (34 W. R. 713, 33 Ch. D. 40); Savery v. .En_/told Local Board (1893, A. C. 218). As our correspondent says, there is cften as much trouble in settling the terms of a lease as of a sale and purchase, and it is unreasonable that anegotiation fee should be allowed in the one case and not in the other. No doubt, one difficulty in the way of the appellants in the above-mentioned cases was that they had to claim fees according to the old system for the preliminary agreement and negotiations, the result of this being considered by Lord HERSCHELL in Savory v. Enjield
Local Board (1893, A. C., at p. 225) to be that it “ would really leave it open to the solicitor, in addition to the scale fee, to make a further charge, in the ordinary fashion which was in existence before the scale fee was arrived at for a considerable number of things which are said to be outside it. It would leave it in every case open to dispute and discussion how much there was outside of it, and it would necessitate in all those cases a taxation. That is the very thing which it was sought to avoid by this legislation.” The obvious and best remedy is to make the negotiation fee extend to leases ; and in the meantime practitioners should be careful to expressly stipulate that the agreement and negotiations for a lease are to be paid for in addition to the scale charge. The second point mentioned by our correspondent is the hardship of throwing on a purchaser the cost of procuring evidence to establish the vendor's title, as to which we think no practitioner will differ from him. This practice has, as we all know, given rise to the common form answer to requisitions—“This can be done at the purchaser's cost.” No doubt the rule has the effect of choking ofi many requirements which would otherwise be made; but there are requirements which cannot be dispensed with, and our correspondent tells of a case in which the vendor purported to sell as heir-at-law, and the purchaser's solicitors had to make out at the purchaser’s cost a pedigree with about twenty certificates, besides statutory declarations. \Ve do not recall anything quite so unfair as this, but in a considerable proportion of purchases the result of the rule is to throw on the purchaser costs of making out the title which ought in fairness to fall on the vendor.
SOME INTERESTING observations on the effect of Allrn v. Flood (46 W. R. 258; 1898, A. C. 1) will be found in an article contributed by Sir FREDERICK Pontoon to the current number of the Law Quarterly Review. “There is no wrong,” says Sir FREDERICK, “ in persuading or inducing a man to do what he has a right or is lawfully free to do. The fact that such action may damage a third person can of itself no more give that person a right of action against the persuader than against the actor himself. And the precise point now decided by the House of Lords is that a cause of action cannot be made out of such facts by adding allegation and proof of malice, in the sense of actual evil motive, personal ill-will, or whatever term least favourable for the defendant can be found for the thing signified.” A definite limit is thus put to the relevance of malice as an element in civil actions, and it appears to be entirely discarded as affording in itself a cause of action, even though accompanied by actual damage. “We think,” continues the same writer, “it must be taken, on the whole, as part of the ratio decidandi, that in general the combination of damage and malice will not sufiice to make a cause of action (see especially per Lord Msosaoursn), but violation of some definite duty must be shewn; and that, on the other hand, the cases where malice is really essential to the cause of action are in some way exceptional.” The malice in these exceptional cases operates not directly as a violation of any right of the plaintiff, but indirectly as depriving the defendant of the benefit of a privilege which would otherwise make his conduct not actionable. Malice, for instance, forfeits the privilege which might have held the defendant harmless in an action for defamation. It has s similar operation in an action for malicious prosecution; such, at least, Sir FREDERICK Pontoon considers to be a proper inference from some of the judgments in Allan v.‘Flood. But, with these exceptions, motive does not seem to constitute an element in civil injuries. It is a further deduction from the judgments that there is no such thing as a right not to be hindered in one’s occupation, except so far as the offender may expose himself to an action for trespass, nuisance, defamation, or something in the nature of deceit. “There is no better or higher right to carry on one’s business than to do any otlwf lawful act, and no need to invent any such right." A man_h9-I to bear with the malice of his neighbours, unless effect is given to it in acts which violate his independent rights. The r_98l1lli Sir Fnnnsiucx POLLOCK observes, tends to the simplification of the law, and he expresses the hope that, so far as civil echo!" are concerned, it will enable us to get rid of the perplexed and perplexing word “ malice ” altogether.
THE rnmcrrnn of Allen v. Flood has been recognized and acted u on in an interesting case—Peo_ple, §ee. v. Dav1's—decided in the Criminal Court of Cook County, Illinois, in February, and reported in the National Corporation Reporter. The circumstances were very similar to those in_ the English case. The defendants, who were members of a trade union, threatened to call out the engineers of the Thomas Elevator Co. unless two workmen who were not members of the union were discharged. The threat was carried into execution, the works were stopped, and thereupon the obnoxious workmen were discharged. The defendants were indicted under the Illinois Conspiracy Statute, which provides that “ if any two or more persons conspire or agree together with the fraudulent or malicious intent wrongfully and wickedly to injure the person, character, business, or employment, or property of another . . . they shall be deemed guilty of a conspiracy” ; and the punishment is specified. The difiiculty with which the court had to contend was caused by the words “wrongfully and wickedly.” The mere agreement with a fraudulent or malicious intent to injure was under the statute not sufficient. There must also be a purpose to carry into execution the fraudulent or malicious intent “ wrongfully and wickedly ”—that is, it was held, by the use of wrongful and wicked means. But the means were those just described—namely, the calling ofi of the engineers, and the court declined to regard this as wrongful simply because of the malicious intent. There must, by the words of the statute, be malicious intent and also, as a separate matter, wrongful means, and for the means to be wrongful they must be wrongful in law. In a case like the present, where there was no suggestion of fraud, immorality, injury to the public, or violation of contract, it was held that wrongfnlness in law must import at least a civil wrong, and on the authority of Allen v. Flood no such civil wrong was constituted by mere malice. The legal principle settled by the case, said BAKER, J., is that the existence of a. bad motive will not convert an act which is not of itself illegal into a civil wrong. This states Allen v. Flood exactly, but it is curious to find the authority of the House of Lords invoked against the application of a criminal statute specially directed at malicious conspiracy.
Lasr WEEK, at the Kingston quarter sessions, a man was tried for larceny under circumstances which, if the newspaper reports are to be trusted, point to a case of great hardship. The prisoner was charged with stealing lead, the property of Her Majesty. It appears that he was arrested near one of the rifle ranges at Ash, near Aldershot, picking up spent bullets among the gorse, and it was for the larceny of these bullets that he was indicted. He was very properly acquitted, and, unless it were conclusively proved that these spent bullets are collected by the military authorities and that the accused knew that such was the fact, it is impossible to see how any jury could have found any other verdict. The essence of larceny is the animus /llramli, or the intention of depriving the owner of his property against his will. Hence a thing abandoned by its owner cannot be stolen, as the common law has for centuries recognized. Now, to the ordinary mind, nothing can appear to be more thoroughly abandoned by the owner than the bullet which is fired from a rifle, and it is difficult to see how magistrates could have brought themselves to send a man for trial under circumstances which of themselves raise a strong presumption of innocence, without the clearest proof of guilty intent. As Baron PARKE said in the case of Reg. v. Tkurborn (l Den. C. C. 387), “the guilt of the accused must depend on the circumstances as they appear to him, and the crime 0! larceny cannot be committed unless the goods taken appear to have an owner and the party taking must know and believe that the taking is against the will of the owner.” The worst feature, however, in this case is the fact th_at the accused person was kept three months in prison awaiting trial on this most trumpery charge. The judges have lately rnade some very severe comments on the conduct of magistrates Ill unnecessarily keeping accused persons in prison, but surely this case is a harder one than an of those which called f r
y o such comments, and the Surrey grand jury very properly made _
a presentment to the court as to the hardship inflicted. The learned chairman defended the conduct of the committing justices on the ground that the prisoner was given the option of having his case tried summarily, but preferred to be tried by a jury. No doubt there may have been something in what the chairman said, although it does not appear that the justices gave the prisoner any opportunity of finding bail. But the prisoner had a right to be tried by a jury, and most people will sympathize with him in his desire to avail himself of this right.
Tns EXCEPTIONS usually introduced into a bill of lading are wide enough to save shipowners from much of the liability which would fall upon them in consequence of loss or damage to the cargo in the course of the voyage, but, as several recent cases have shewn, they have not hitherto been extended to relieve the shipowner from providing at the outset proper accommodation for the safe keeping of the cargo. In Jloori I1’z'n._q v. Hughes (44 W. R. 2; 1895, 2 Q. B. 550) it was held that in a bill of lading stated to be for the carriage of frozen meat, there was an implied warranty that the ship was at the time of shipment fit to carry such cargo. Hence the shipowner would be liable if he did not start the ship with proper refrigerating machinery, although the exception in the bill of lading would relieve him in case of a breakdown of the machinery in the course of the voyage. An interesting case of a similar nature arose in Queenslarul National Ban]: v. Peninsular and Oriental Steam Nav1'_r/otion Co. (46 W. R. 324). Gold coins were hipped on board one of the ships of the defendant company under a bill of lading which contained an exception against loss by robbers or thieves. The box containing the gold was placed in the bullion-room of the ship, and during the voyage the room was broken into and the box stolen. The question arose whether there was any implied warranty that the bullionroom was fit to resist thieves, and the Court of Appeal held that there was. The gold was shipped on the understanding that it would be placed in a bullion-room, and the specific object of such a room is to prevent theft. The warranty applied to the soundness of the room at the commencement of the voyage, and was not excluded by the exception in the bill of lading in respect of loss in the course of the voyage. Hence the question of warranty was decided against the shipowners.
THE PRIORITY OF EQUITABLE INCUBIBRANCERS.
AN interesting example of the rule that as between successive incumbrances upon an equitable interest priority is gained by the incumbrancer who first gives notice to the trustees in whom the property is vested is afiorded by the decision of Ksxnwrcn, J., in the recent case of West v. W'illz'ams (46 VV. R. 362). Warren WILLIAMS, the elder, by his will dated in 1889, devised all his real and personal property to trustees upon trust as to the ultimate residue thereof to pay the income to his son, the defendant \V.u.rsa Wrnmsms, during his life, and after his death upon the further trusts declared by the will. The testator died in March, 1892. By a mortgage dated the 24th of December, 1895, W. WILLIAMS, the younger, assigned to the plaintiff Wssr all his interest under the will as security for an advance of £600, and he covenanted that during the existence of the security he would not further deal with such interest. So long as there was no breach of covenant, notice of the assignment was not to be given to the trustees of the will. On the same date W. Wxnnmus charged his interest under the will with the repayment of the sum of £150 to the defendant Tmrrns. This charge was expressly made subject to the mortgage just mentioned.
In 1896 further dealings with the lite interest took place. By a mortgage dated the 2nd of April in that year W. Wrnnrasrs assigned his interest under the will to the defendants P. A. Wrnuams and J . W. Wrr.L1.\1us as security for an immediate advance of £2,297 and for such further annual sums of £200 as should be advanced under a covenant contained in a settlement of even date with the mortgage. By this settlement W’. Wn.1.1Ans assigned the equity of redemption in his life interest