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an express provision to the contrary) be payable out of the settled legacy or property in exoneration of the rest of the deceased’s estate; by section 24 (1) “ unless the context otherwise requires (o) this part of this Act shall come into operation on the lst day of July, 1896, which day is in this part of this Act referred to as the commencement of this part of this Act; and (b) the expression ‘deceased person’ means a person dying after the commencement of this part of this Act." By section 39 of the same Act it is enacted that “. . . Part IV. of this Act shall be construed together with Part I. of the Finance Act, 1894.” The above-named testator Gibbs died on the 31st of May, 1896 (that is to say, before the date fixed for the commencement of the Act of 1896), having by his will disposed of part of his personal estate upon trusts constituting a settlement within the meaning of the Act of 1894, and having bequeathed the residue of his personal estate in shares to a charity and to certain persons. The trustees had paid the estate duty payable in respect of the settled personalty out of the residuary estate. The action was brought to administer the trusts of the will, and upon the further consideration of the action, the point was taken on behalf of the persons entitled to the residue, that the trustees ought to have paid the above-mentioned settlement estate duty out of the settled funds, and not out of the residue, the contention being that the effect of the wording of the Act of 1896 was that it was retrospective in effect and abrogated the decision in Re Webber.

STIRLING, J ., held that the rule laid down in Ra Webber was binding on him, and applied to the present case, the testator having died before the commencement of the Act of 1896; and that the trustees had properly paid the duty in question out of the residue, —Coi'nsai., Buckley, Q.C., and illedd; Ljvjolm, Q.O., and Rashleigli; Sir R. E. Webster, A.G., and Ingk Joyce; Grosvmor Woods, Q.C., and R. J. Parker. Soaiciroas, Simpson <5(Jo. ; Smiles 5- Co. ; Treasury Solicitor.

[Reported by W. S0011‘ Tizioirrsos, Barrister-at-Law.]

Re KECK AND HABTS CONTRACT AND THE VENDOR. AND PURCHASER ACT, 1874. Stirling, _I. 23rd March.

Ss'i'rI.i:n LAND—COMPOUND SETTLEMl'-lNT—JOINTUll.E DEEDS-—A.PPOlINTMBN’l' or Tavsrsas or rim COMPOUND Sarrsananr roa was Poarosns or THE Suntan LAND Acr—Sar'i-i.sn LAND Aer, 1882 (45 & 46 Vxcr. c. 38), ss. 2 (1), 2° (1) (2) (i-) iii-) (iii)

This was a summons taken out by a vendor under the Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874, asking for a declaration that a requisition by the purchaser had been suificiently answered. The facts were as follow : By a will certain real estate stood limited to legal uses in iavour of Henry Littelton Powys Keck for life, with remainder to Harry Leycester Powys Keck for life, with reinainderto his sons in tail male, with remainder to Charles Powys Keck during life, with remainder to his sons in tail male, with remainder to Thomas Powys Keck for life, with remainders over. Henry Littelton and Charles Powys Keck were dead; Harry Leycester Powis Keck and Thomas Powys Keck were still living. Henry Littelton Powys Keck, Harry Leyoester Powys Keck, and Thomas Powys Keck had all executed jointure deeds under a power for that purpose contained in the will. In 1897 Harry Leycester Powis Keck entered into a contract with Sir Isaac Hart to sell, as tenant for life, a portion of the 61-1381168 devised by the will. The vendor required trustees to be appointed for the purposes of the Settled Land Acts of the will and all three jointure deeds, on the ground that they formed together a compound settlement. The vendor took out the present summons.

STIRLING, J .-—In the present case the purchaser has taken the objection that although there are existing trustees of the will for the purposes of the Settled Land Acts, it is necessary that they should be appointed trustees of the compound settlement created by the will and the three jointure deeds. The ground for the objection is to be found in the cases of Re Meada’s Ssltled Estates (1897, I Ir. Rep. 121) and Rs Tibbils’ Settled Estates (1897, 2 Ch 149). Now certainly in Re Tibbits and possibly in Re Meade, a question arose which I have not to consider. In Re Tibbits there were four deeds which created a charge on the interest of the tenant for life, and North, J ., was of opinion that having regard to section 4 of the Settled Land Act, 1890, he had power to appoint trustees of the compound settlement arising from the original settlement and those four deeds. Possibly that was also the point in Rs Meadfs Settled Estates. But here I have nothing to do with any charge on the estate of the tenant for life, nor have I to consider whether under section 38 of the Settled Land Act, 1882, there is or is not jurisdiction to appoint trustees oi the so-called compound settlement. The question is whether the tenant for life can make a good title to a purchaser without having trustees so appointed. There is no decision exactly in point, and it seems to me I must go to the Act itself. Now, here we have a will which constitutes a settlement within the definition contall)!-(1 in section 2(1), and the vendor is a tenant for life under that settlement. Then under section 20 (1) he can convey the land for the estate or interest which is the subject of the settlement—that is, in the fir-esent case, for the fee simple. By section 20 (2) he can convey the

nd discharged from all the limitations, powers, and provisions of the settlement, and from all estates and interests subsisting or to arise thereunder. Can the tenant for life convey the land freed from the jointnres?

It seems to me that he can, and I am confirmed in this view when I

examine the exceptions set forth in section 20 (2) (i.) (ii.) (iii.). It seems

to me that under section 20 the tenant for life can make a good title, and it equally follows that the trustees of the will may give a good discharge to the purchaser for the purchase-money. It seems to me that under those circumslances the vendor has made a good title, and I ought to declare that the requisition need not be answered.—Cot'xsa1., Buckley, Q,.O., and H'w5".-' Sampson. SOLICITORS, Prlafon, Sfow, §- Preston, for R. W. Berridge Q Sons, Leicester; Field, Roscoe, if Co., for Storey, Leicester. [Reported by J. I. STIRLING, Barrister-at-Law.]

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This was a case stated by an alderman of the City of London, and involved a question under section 9 of the Metropolitan Streets Act, 1867. That section provides as follows: “ N o picture, print, board, placard, or notice, except in such form and manner as may be approved of by the Commissioner of Police, shall by way of advertisement be carried or distributed m any street within the general limits of this Act by any person riding in any vehicle or on horseback or on foot. Any person doing any act in contravention of this section shall be liable for each offence to a penalty not exceeding 10s. This section shall not apply to the sale of newspapers.” The appellant was a lad in the employment of the proprietors of the Financial Times. An information was laid against the appellant for distributing, on the 19th of November, 1897, certain prints y way oi advertisement contrary to the section above set out. The appellant on the day in question stood opposite the entrance to the Stock Exchange in Throgmorton - street, and distributed the prints gratuitously to persons passing in and out of the Stock Exchange. He was told by the respondent that he must obtain the leave of the C0inmissioner of Police. He thereupon moved to a diiferent part of the street, and distributed the prints indiscriminately. The prints contained certain items of news from South Africa. Evidence was tendered by the appellant, but rejected by the alderman, that, after the Financial T imes of the 19th of November, 1897, was printed and issued, certain news arrived from South Africa, and that, it being too late to insert the news in the newspaper, the proprietors had it printed on a separate sheet, and distributed in the manner described. The alderman found that the print was distributed with the ob'ect of advertising the Financial Times newspaper, and that it was not itself a newspaper. He found also that the print had not been approved of by the Commissioner of Police. He convicted the appellant.

Tan COURT (Wmoi-ir and Dsnuxc, JJ.) allowed the appeal on the ground that the print was a publication of news, and was not in itself an advertisement. They said that it would be wrong to hold that merely because the object of distributing a print was to advertise a newspaper, that the print itself was a print carried or distributed by way of advertisement within the meaning of section 9. The words “ by way of advertisement” implied that the thing itself was an advertisement, and not that it was used for the purpose of advertising.--Cou1vsai., Danakwerts and Spemleg; W. H. Lsycestcr. Soucirons, J. E. Liclcfold; Tho (My Solicitor.

[Reported by G. G. WILBBABAI, Barrister-at-Law.)

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In this case a rule niai had been obtained calling upon the justice! of Staffordshire to show cause why an order of the justices dated the 29th of December, 1897, by which H. Corbishley was adjudged to be the pate!-We father of the illegitimate child of Annie Kirkham, and was ordered W P57 3s. a week towards the maintenance of the child, should not be quashed. The facts were as follows : The child was born on the 9th of Septelnbflfi 1896. On the 10th of October, 1896, the mother made an application $0 a magistrate for a summons for a bastardy order against Corbishley. The summons was issued and came on for hearing on the 21st of October, when no order was made, there being no proof of service. On the 2lst_of October, 1896, further applications were made to three separate ms8“' trates, Robinson, Philips, and Brierly, but no summonses were $11511 issued owing to the difficulty of effecting service. On the 28th of J1117 1 1897, a summons was issued based on the application to the magisfljlw Brierly. This summons was served on the defendant, and the hearing took place on the 3rd of November, 1897, when the justices disagreed I" t° whether there was any corroboration of the woman’s evidence. The chairman stated that the summons was not dismissed on its meritsi Pad the applicant was told that if she could bring further evidence _she m18ht apply again. On the 10th of November the applicant applied to the magistrate Robinson for a further summons, which was issu returnab 9 on the 17th of November, but no proof of service being given,_I10 °1d" was made. On the 17th of November a fresh summons was issued 11% Robinson which recited that it was based on the application of t-he 21st Q, October, 1896. This summons was heard on the 29th of Decembor,_139 1 when the order now sought to be quashed was made. By 35 & 36 \ ict. c65, s. 3, an application for a summons for a bastardy order must ll? ml? within twelve months of the birth of the child. If the application 15 11"‘ dg within the twelve months, the summons may be issued and an order m“ after the twelve months (see Reg. v. Justices of Lmmuhira, 38 J . P. 215)-,

Tan Conar (Lord Rosssn. or KILLOWEN, O.J., and Msraswi 5') ms‘ charged the rule.

Lord Russxu. or KILLO“'EN, C.J., said that the case in support of 9:9 order was put in two ways. First, it was said that what took plow B“ g

I hearing, on the 3_rd o_f November, of the summons issued in July W“? “P

a definite determination of that application, and that the case came ‘"t€.m the princi le of Reg. v. Justina of Lancsshire (ubi suyra), but his lords felt bountfto give effect to the decisions of Reg. v. Thomas (S 11- T-4 / and Staples v. Staples (41 L. T. 347), in which a distinction was dlfl“ between a case in which there had been a hearing on the facts, andfl (>55;

which had been dismissed without being heard on the preliminsri 81'°‘m

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that the summons was bad in form. This case did not come within Reg. v. Juuim of Lancashira, in which case the summons was wrong in form, and the justices, instead of amending it as they might have done, dismissed it, but it was held that that was not such a hearing as would exhaust the original application. The present case was governed by Staples v. Staples, and the last summons taken out could not be regarded as a continuation of the July summons. but as a fresh summons. That being so, it must be founded on an application made within the twelve months. As to that, it was contended that of the three applications made on the 21st of October, 1896, there was on the 17th of November, 1897, one still remaining unexhausted. That depended on whether those three applications could be regarded as three separate applications for all purposes, for if they were to be regarded as only one, then they were exhausted by the summons granted on the 28th of July. His lordship was of opinion that these three applications must be treated as one, except for the sole purpose of enabling the applicant, in case one magistrate was unable owing to death or other causes to issue a summons, to obtain the summons from one of the other magistrates to whom application had been made. For all other purposes they were merely duplicates, and _if one application was used the others were exhausted. In this case, after the summons of the 28th of July had been issued, there did not remain any application made within the twelve months, on which a fresh summons could be based, and therefore the order made on the summons of the 17th of November must be quashed.

Maruaw, J., concurred.-(.‘ou.\'snr., Jfoniague Lush; Hume Williams. Soucrroas, Chester Q Co ; Em-izt Q Hodgkinson.

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This was a special case stated by justices for the borough of the Southend-on-Sea. An information was preferred at a petty sessional court against the respondent by the appellant, who was an inspector of the Society for the Prevention of Crue ty to Animals, charging the respondent with cruelty to a mare by causing the same to be worked while in an unfit state on the 15th of October, 1897, contrary to 12 & 13 Vict. c. 92, s. 2. The only witness called was the appellant, who, having given evidence as to the condition of the animal on the day in question, tendered evidence as to the guilty knowledge of the respondent, consisting nf admissions made by him to the appellant. The evidence tendered was as follows: “I saw the defendant. I was in uniform. I said to him, ‘Is it true that your carman told the police you sent the animal out and knew it was lame,’ t/o which the defendant replied, ‘ Yes, I sent Yost out with it.’ I had said nothing whatever to the defendant as to the likelihood of proceedings.” It appeared that a police-sergeant had stopped the respondent s man Yost on the 19th of October, when driving the mare, and to him Yost had, in the absence of the respondent, made a statement implicating his master, the respondent. The police-sergeant was with the appellant on the 20th of October, when the appellant without any warning or caution confronted the respondent with the statement made by Yost, by means of direct questions; the replies thereto involved the whole issue against the respondent, and at the hearing constituted the whole case against him. The justices found as a fact that the respondent’s admissions were not voluntary, and held them inadmissible ; and as there was no other evidence against the respondent they dismissed the information.

Tns Cotar (Lord RUSSELL or Krnnowsx, C.J., and Maraaw, J .), allowed the appeal.

Lord Russsu. or Krnrowax, C.J., said that the observations of Cave, J ., in Reg. v. Hale (17 Cox O. C. 689), although perfectly justifiable in the circumstances of that case, could not be regarded as laying down the general proposition that statements of the accused made in answer to the questions of a police-constable, and not being induced by the hope held out of some advantage to the accused or by threats, were inadmissible in evidence. There was no rule of law excluding statements made under such circumstances. In the present case there was no ground for suggesting that the statement of the accused was not made voluntarily and it was therefore admissible. The case must go back to the justices for them to hear the evidence and adjudicate upon the case.

1!/Israsw, J ., concurred. Case 1‘€IDlll3€d.—-COUNSEL, Colam ; Grubbe. SOLICITORB, S. G. Polkill; Adolphus Maskell.

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This was an appeal by the plaintiff from the judgment of the judge of the Southwark County Court. The action was brought to recover £24 under the following circumstances. The plaintiff was the owner of two houses, Nos. 5 and 6, Vine-street, Southwark. The defendants served two notices under the Public Health (London) Act, 1891, ss. 2 and 4, one in respect of each house, addressed to the owner or occupier of the premises, stating that the board being satisfied of the existence of a nuisance at the premises arising from defective drainage, required the abatement of the nuisance by the removal of the defective drain, and the construction of a new drain into the common sewer. The plaintiff commenced the necessary work, and on the ground being opened up it was discovered that the two houses were drained into one drain. The plaintifi’s surveyor searched the records and found an order for a combined system of drainage, which he erroneously thought related to these

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premises, and the plaintifi accordingly completed the work at a cost of £24. After the work had been finished it was ascertained that there was no order authorizing the drainage of the two houses into one pipe. Consequently the defective pipe was a sewer for the repair of which the defendants were liable. The plaintiff then brought this action to recover the £24 paid by him for the execution of the work. The county court gave judgment for the defendants. On appeal it was contended for the plaintiff that the money spent by him was money which he had been compelled by law to pay in respect of work which the defendants were legally compellable to execute, and that, apart from the common law principle, the plaintiff was entitled to recover from the defendants under section 11 of the Public Health (London) Act, 1891. The plaintiff relied on Gebbardt v. Saunders (1892, 2 Q. B. 452).

Tr-is Oouar (Lord Russau. or KILLOWBN, C.J., and Msrnnw, J .) allowed the appeal.

Lord RUSSELL or Kn.r.owsx, C.J., said that at the time when the nuisance existed it was impossible to discover from a casual inspection whether the defective conduit pipe (to use a neutral word) was a drain for the repair of which the plaintiff was liable or a sewer for the condition of which the defendants were responsible. Under these circumstances the notice was addressed to the owner or occupier of the premises. The owner made enquiries, and thinking that he was liable, did the work, and spent money which, if the facts had been known, should have been expended by the defendants. The plaintiff now contended that he could recover that money from the defendants. The question turned on sections 4, 5, and ll of the Public Health (London) Act, 1891. [His lordship read the sections.] If a notice was served on a person under section 4 and not complied with, then under sub-section 4 the person was liable to a fine. It was contended for the defendants that the person served could not be fined unless that the nuisance was caused by the default of the person served with the notice. It was no doubt competent for the person to_g_ive evidence that he was not liable, but supposing that he was not in a positron to do so, his lordship was not convinced that the magistrate might not in the absence of such evidence give effect to the notice and require the person to comply with the order, not finally deciding the question _ of liability but making him primd faoie liable and leaving the further question of liability to be subsequently dealt with. That was the view of the court in Gab/lard! v. Saunders (ubi supra), and he was not prepared to differ from that view. Consequently, the plaintiff had been legally compelled to _do work which the defendants were liable to do. Moreover, section 1l,'wh1ch provided in effect that where no nuisance order was made but a nuisance existed when the notice was served, the cost of abating the nuisance should be deemed to be money paid for the use and at the request of the person by whose act or default the nuisance was caused. It was contended that section 11 was only intended to refer to cases under section 8, but his lordship thought it applied also to a case such as the present, The plaintiff was therefore entitled to succeed against the defendants 1n this action.

Marnaw, J ., concurred. Appeal allowed.—Cou1~<'ss1., Ball; Mamnorran, Q.C. Sonrcrroas, Andrew, Wood, §~ Purves ; Bayley, Adams, Hawkar, Q

Noble.
[Reported by F. O. Roms-sos, Barrister-at-Law.]

Solicitors’ Cases. Ra HAWKES, AOKEBHAN v. LOOKHABT. C. A. No. 2. 24th and 25th February; 23rd March.

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This was an appeal from a decision of Kekewich, J ., who had ordered Mr. John F. S. Cridland, a solicitor, to produce for inspection at his office certain documents upon which he claimed to have alien. Mr. Cndland appealed, and contended that he was not boimd to produce the documents until his bill of costs was paid. The appeal was argued on the 24th and 25th of February, and judgment was delivered on the 23rd of March.

Tun Couar (Lnvnnar, M.B.., and Rresv and Vacuum Wrnnnuas, L.JJ.), dismissed the appeal.

Lrivnnav, M.R., said: This is an appeal by a solicitor from an order of Kekewich, J ., ordering him to produce certain documents on which he has a lien. The facts are as follows: a person named Hawkes died in_August, 1895, indebted to his solicitor, Cridland, who had in his possession some deeds and documents belonginglto the deceased on which he, Crldland, had the ordinary solicitor’s lien. May, 1896, the executors _of the deceased employed Cridland to institute an action for the administration of the estate of the deceased ; and such action was accordingly commenced by the executors, G1-idland acting for them, and the usual administration judgment was pronounced. The action not being prosecuted with due d1l1gence,_an order was made on the 14th of May, 1897, giving the conduct of the action to aoreditor. The executors remained parties to the action, and Gndland continues to act for them. The estate of the deceased is not sufiicrent to pay his creditors. A question has arisen whether steps should be taken t_o get 1_n a debt said to be due to the estate of the deceased ; and to d8_l6l'n1l1].9 this question it is necessary to see some of the documents on which Crldlfllld had a lien, as before stated, before the action was commenced, and which are still in his osseesion. On the 7th of February, 1898, Kekewich, J ., ordered Cridlmd to produce the documents in question at his ofice to the solicitors of the creditor having the conduct of the action for

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their perusal. This order was made to enable them to Eplreparc and lay before counsel u. case for his opinion as to what steps, if any, ould be taken to get in the debt referred to. Cridland has appealed against this order ; the ground of his appeal being that the documents ordered to be produced came into his possession, not from the executors for the purposes of the action, but from the deceased in his lifetime, and that he, Cridland, had a. lien on them before and at the time of his original client’s death, and before any retainer by his executors. A great number of authorities were referred to by counsel, but none of them were exactly in point, and it is necei~"sai'y to consider the question for decision on principle. A solicitor's lien is simply a right to retain bis client's documents as against the client and persons representing him. As between tho solicitor and third parties, the solicitor has no greater right to refuse production of documents on which he has a lien than his client would have if he had tho documents in his own possession. This principle is as applicable at law as it is in equity. Accordingly, it has been long settled that if EL solicitor is required by his client to produce documents under a aubpwna duces tn-um, tho soli itor can refuse to do so if he has a lien upon them; but that the lien is no answer to a demand for their production by a third party. See Hope v. Liddell (3 W. R. 581 ; 7 De G. M. & G. 331), and Hunter v. Lea!/iley (l0 B. 8: C. 858). This doctrine is not confined to production under the exigency of a. subprrna dzwn tecum. The same principle applies to other applications for production by solicitors who are acting for their clients in litigation. Sec, at Law, Lcy v. Barlow (1 Ex. 800), and in Equity, Furlong v. Howard (‘Z Sch. & Lef. 115). Nothing can be clearer than Lord R-edesdale's judgment in this last case :— “ Though ii. solicitor may have a lien on a deed for his costs, yet, if his client is bound to produce it for the benefit of a third person, so also must the solicitor. I know this is not so understood in general; but the common opinion, that the solicitor may withhold it from all parties in such :1 case is erroneous. The right is only as between his client and him.” It is on this principle that Courts of Equity order solicitors acting for clients who are parties to actions to produce documents on which the solicitors have a lien, if their production is necessary for the purpose of doing jusiico to other persons besides their respective clients. Administrai ion actions are the most familiar instances of such actions; but the principle is not confined to them. As, however, we are dealing with an administration action, I will refer only to such actions It must not be forgotten that before the J u-iicature Acts a creditor could be restrained from enforcing his dobt at law after a decree for the administration of his debtor's estate, and a Court of Equity never allowed the creditors to be defeated by allowing the proceedings under the decree to be embarrassed by the liens of the solicitors of the parties. The solicitors of the parties to the proceedings arc not deprived of their liens, and treated as if t ey had none; but they are not allowed to render the proceedings abortive by refusing to produce documents in their possession which are wanted by other persons than their own clients, and which such other persons have a rig t to see. But oven as between solicitor and client, whore the client is a party to an action, his solicitor may be bound to produce, for the purposes of the action, any documents of the client which are wanted for the purporesof the action, and which have come into the solicitor-’s possession in tho course thereof, or for the purpose of co iducting the same. Sec Boas v. Laughton (1 V. and B. 349), and other cases collected in 2 Dun. Ch. Prac. 1717 (edition 5). This rule, however, docs not cover the point to be decided in the present case. To return, however, to administration actions. If a. creditor sued his debtor, or his executor, at law, and required the defendant's solicitor by a subprrna dunes mum to produce a document belonging to the defendant, but in the possession of the solicitor, who had a lien upon it, I take it to be plain that the lien would not justify tho solicitor in refusing to produce the document, and Lay v. Barlow (ubi supra) shows that an order for its production might be made, oven before trial, without a. subpmna. If these are the principles on which the Court acts in an administration action—-if the production is ordered in order to prevent the legal rights of creditors from being defcatcd—it cannot 1r'itter whether the documents which are wanted came into the hands of the solicitors of the parties before or after the death of the deceased, or before or after the commencement of the action for administration, nor can it matter whether the executors are plaintiffs or are defendants, nor who has the conduct of the action. Having regard to the nghts of the creditors, if Hawkes’s executors now had the cowduct of the action their solicitor could not, in my opinion, effectually i'- ly on their hen on the documents of the deceased to revent their production for the plurpose of enabling the executors to get in tlie assets of the deceased. The rig ts of the creditors under the administration judgment, and their inability to sue at law, explain the apparent anomaly that the executors should be entitled to obtain production from their own solicitor of documents op which he has a lien as against them. The fact that they hav_e.been deprived of the conduct of the action does not improve the solicitor‘ s position, so long, at all events, as his clients remain parties to the action, and ave not discharged him. See on this point Ilmnm v. Ilaxter (10 Sim. 417), and Simmonds v. Great Easurn Railway (l6 WV. R. 1100, L. R. 3 Ch. 797). Mr. Cridlund‘s clients arc still parties, and he acts for them. It is unnecessary, therefore, to consider what his right might be under other circumstances. The general rule of the Court, founded on the principles above referred to, is very emphatically stated in Belaney v. Ffrmcll (L. R. 8 Ch. 918). That was an administration suit, and it was the case of a solicitor who had acted for several of the parties to it, and had been discharged by them, and who refused to produce documents belonging to them, but on which he had a lieu. The receiver who had been appointed in the action wanted to see the documents. James, L.J., said :—“ A solicitor cannot embarrass a suit by keeping papers which belong to an estate which is being administered by the Court, and cannot use that means of obtaining payment.” Be Boughton, Bougliton v. Bougliton (31 L.J. 517 ; 23 Ch. D. 169) is another recent decision to the same effect, and Fry, J., there points out the importance of the rights of creditors. It is, however, true that the documents which were in question in these cases came into the solicitors‘ hands from the clients

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who discharged them. The point, therefore, made before us by the appellant's counsel hiul not to be considered. I proceed now toexamine the aiitlioritics n.ore pilillilllfl-Sly relied upon by the appellant in support of his contention. The first and most important is Warburton v. Edge (9 Sim. 503). The facts of that case are not very clearly stated; but, as I under.-tiiid them, there was an administratrix abroad. She had a solicitor hero, who had acted for her in a suit for the administration of her deceasedh estate, but who had been instructed by her to act for her no longer. A receiver had been appointed. The solicitor had some documents which came into his hands after tho death of tho deceased, and on which he claimed a lien, not only for the cost-i of the suit, but for other costs due to him from the admini-itiatiir before the commencement of tho suit. The plaintiffs .were creditors of the decease i, and they peiiiiincd for an order of a very unusual nature. They prayed for an order on the solicitor to deliver to the rcseivcr, or to deposit with the Muster, all deeds, &c., in his custody relating to the personal estate of the deceased subject to any lien the solicitor might have. and for an inquiry into the existcnce of any lien which the solicitor might claim, and as to the amount due to him in respect of it; and if necessary for a taxation of his bill of co.-ts, to the intent that it might be paid out of the estate of the deceased. Shadwell, V.C., refused to make any order on this pe‘iiion. Ho said the plaintiffs had no right to the production of ihe dcci1inen‘s, as some of them had come into the solicitor’s hands before the suit commenczd, and he had a lien on them for costs incurred in other business besides the conduct of the suit. The ViceGhancellor also said the p‘aintifl’s had no right to tax the sclicitor’s hill. The petition being r:slly a petition by a creditor for the taxation of the solicitor's costs and for payment of them by the adrninistratrix, the order of the Vice-Chancellor seems to have been right. But if he meant to say that the creditors had no right to have the documents produced for the purposes of tho action because of the lien, the Vice-Chancellor, in my opiuicn, want too fur. Having regard to what he said in Baker v. Hendmvon (4 Sim. 27), he may have meant to go this length. That case presents no difficulty, although the first few words of the judgment were relied upon by counsel for the appellant. In Re Capital Fire Inaurance Association (32 W.R. 260; 24 Ch. D. 408) an order was made to wind up a company. The company had employed a solicitor, who, when the petition for a winding-up order was presented had a lien on some documents which the liquidatcr wantedChitty, J ., made an order directing the solicitor to deliver these documents to the liquidator, but subject to the solicitor's lien. On appeal this order was discharged as to some of the document:-i—viz., those referred to in the sec‘nd order, on which the solicitor had ii lien before the petition was prempted. The ground of this decision, as I understand it, was that the solicitor never was the solicitor of the liquidstor in the winding-u prwfiedmgsi and was not acting for the Company in those proceedings (sec _p6l' Cotton, L.J., p. 417), the liquidator having employed another solicitorThe Court, moreover, pointed out that as to these documents the liquidatcr could obtain production of them under the winding up sections of the Conipanies’ Act, 1862, as decided in Ex parte Payne and Layton (L. R- 4 2l~?l (soc per Cotton, L.J., 24 Ch. D. 420). No doubt Cotton, L J., said (sift p. 420) that Boughton 12. Boughlon did not apply to “ such a case." By till! expression, I understand, was meant the case of documents in the hands of 8 solicitor before an administration suit commenced, the solicitor not 1181"! employed in that suit by the client against whom the lien could be assert/ed In such a case the solicitor would be a stranger to the litigation, and could not be compelled to produce documents except as a witness by subpwfia duo: mum. That was the sort of case which Cotton, L.J., had to consider. _I do not imderstand the observation to apply to the case of a sohcitor who IH employed in an administration suit by a party to the suit, and who could bi made by the other parties, or by creditors, to produce the documents otherwlit than by subpnrria. Baden 0. Hen-iby (40 W. R. 205 ; [i892] l Ch, 101) W553 partition action. The plaintiff had changed his solicitor, and it was held that the solicitor could not be compelled to produce documents on which ht had a. lien before the action was commence , although he could not withhold those which came into bis possession afterwards. North, -T-i W_h° decided this case, acted on tho authority of Re Capital Fire Insuranca Ammtion (ubi supra). If third parties were entitled to have the d0(l\l_Kl5nl5 produced, Baden v. Ilensby (ubi supra) wenttoo far in favour of the sQll<=1'_w{These were the principal authorities referred to, and the only ones which it '5 necessary to notice. None of them appear to mo to compel the C?l1Y_'l° reverse the order appealed from. That order seems to me right iu prI11°1Pl°i and the appeal therefore ought to be dismissed with costs.

RIGBY, L.J., delivered judgment to the same efiect. F,

VAUGKAN WILUAXS, L.J , said that he agreed in the result, but plate"? to give his own reasons, which differed considerably from those of the cilia!‘ members of the Court He thought that the solicitor’s duty to pl0d\1°9_“; cases like tho present arose from his duty to his client, and not to tlili persons. A solicitor, by accepting the client's retainer, must be taken 0 have waived his lien by implication, so far as the production of the Palm" might prove necessary in the suit. Even if this view was wrong‘, t_l1Q°bh$5' tionto produce might be held to arise in the case of an Qdmflllélllllolj action, or any action in which the rights of persons other than the Cllfillf were concerned, but he preferred to rest his judgment on the g1'0""dd,° obligation to the client. In the present case tho solicitor had not been _ charged, and the liability to produce could not be limited to p11pBY5 1‘°°°“e for the purposes of the a.ction.—-CoUNsaL, Slewart Smith; P. Rosa 1'1""SOLICITORS, 6'ridland§- Co. ; Frame g§- Son.

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originally coimter-claimed £49 12s. 8d., but subsequently withdrew an I item of £40, thereby reducing his counter-claim to £9 12s. 8d. After action brought, defendant paid into court a sum which, with the £9 12s. 8d. counter-claimed, exceeded the plaintiif’s claim for rent. On the trial, judgment was given for the plaintiff for £12 10.=., the amount admitted by defendant, and for defendant on his counter-claim. The deputy-judge gave plaintifi her costs on £12 10:. up to the date of defendant's payment into court, and ordered that defendant should have the costs of defending the action as from that date. The defendant‘s solicitor carried in his costs for taxation on the Scale B, applicable where the plaintiff claims between £20 and £50. The registrar (Mr. Hugh Bedwell), however, only allowed the costs on Scale A, applicable where the plaintifi claims between £10 and £20. The defendant's solicitor then appliedlto Mr. Harold Thomas, the deputy-judge, sitting on the 30th of December, for a review of the taxation, but Mr. Thomas confirmed tho regisirar’s decision. The matter being one of principle, and of much importance to solicitors generally, inasmuch as the solicitor was precluded from claiming against defendant any costs beyond those allowed on taxation, the Incorporated Law Society, on the matter being submitted to them, agreed to support an appeal to the Divisional Court. It was contended that the review of taxation was a matter in the discretion of the county court judge, and was not subjectto appeal.

Tim Coca": (Wiu.s and DARLING, JJ.), however, held that there had‘ been no exercise of discretion on the part of Mr. Thomas, but merely an application of the rules regarding costs, with which the court did not agree. The plaintiff's claim being for £27, it was clear that by the combined operation of the scales of costs and ord. 50a, r. 15, the defendant was entitled to have his costs taxed under Column B of the Higher Scale.Cocrrssn, R. W. Harper; Ernest Hatton. Soniciroas, A. Ll. Russell, lllalton ; A. E. B. Soulby, Malton and Pickering.

',' In the names of solicitors in the report of Re West London and General I’ermam-nt Bang/it Building Society (ante, p. 363) Messrs. Ward, Bowie, & Co. are incorrectly described, and for “ Vaizey & Riddell ” there should be read Riddell, Vaizey, & Smith.

LAW SOCIETIES. INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY. SPECIAL GENERAL MEETING. '

In pursuance of the resolution passed at the adjourned annual general meeting held on the 15th of July, 1881, a special general meeting of tho members of the society will be held in the Hall of the Society on Friday, the 29th of April, 1898, at two o'clock precisely.

Members who desire to move resolutions, or to ask questions, should‘ give notice of them to the secretary on or before the 7th of April, 1898, as it will be necessary to include them in the notice convening the meeting.

ATLAS ASSURANCE COMPANY.

Trix annual eneral court of proprietors of the Atlas Assurance Company was held on Friday, the 25th ult., at the Company's House, Cheapsido, Mr. C. A. PRESC011‘ (Chairman) presiding.

The ninetieth annual report, which was submitted to the meeting, stated that during 1897 there were issucd in the Life Department 534 policies, assuring £354,486, at annual premiums of £13,009 12s. 9J., of which £26,500 was reassured at annual premiums of £1,226 10s. 10d., leaving the net new sums assured for the year £327,986, with annual premiums of £11,783 ls. 11d., and single premiums of £l,75012s. 10d. There were issued in addition four leasehold policies for £2,350, at annual premiums of £98 13s. 10d. Proposals for £66,485 were declined. Claims arose under" 137 policies for £97,313 2s., including bonus additions, of which £7,500 12s. 6d. was ruissured, leaving the not claims £89,812 9s. 6d., a sum much within tho amount expected. The premium income amounted to £143,723 19s. 2d., being £4,062 145. 2d. more than that of 1896, and the funds were increased by £86,484 18s. 8d., amounting at the close of the year to £1,584,195 9s. 2d. In the Fire Dopirtment the net premiums were £357,520 12s. 11d., being £3,067 8s. 8d. more . than those of the preceding year, and the losses amounted to £205,017 13s. 0d., being 57'3 per cent. of the premiums. The surplus for the year, being balance of profit and loss was £45,870 ls. 1d., of which the directors have resolved to apply £28,800 in payment of a dividend of 24s. per share (being 2-! per cent. on the original paid-up capital) free of income tax; in adding £15,000 to the Fire Fund, bringing it up to £385,000; and £2,070 ls. ld. to the Reserve Fund, bringing it to £52,664 10s. The Fire and Reserve Funds would than stand at £437,664 10s. The total assets of the Company now amounted to £2,287,029 12s. 1d.

Mr. S. J . PIPKIN (Secretary) having read the notice convening the meeting,

The Chairman moved the adoption of the report and accounts. He said that before referring to the actual business of the report he could not but speak of the loss the Company had sustained by tho death of lho late Sir

William Baynes and Mr. Richard Blaney \Vudc. This had been mentioned from that side of the table before, but the directors had thought it more courteous and graceful to insert an allusion to it in tho first published report which was put before the shareholders. Coming to tho iigurci of the report he remarked with regard to the Life Department that he was happy to siy l-here had been a stead increase in the number of policies issued during ihe last three years, which was very satisfactory bearing in mind that the

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endeavour of the directors had been rather to obtain a larger number of .

policies even if the amounts were smaller than to obtain very large policies often involving a certain amount of outside risk which did not appear upon tho policies, and they had done this to a very considerable extent. They had also in doing this done something else which in the opinion of the Board was of much more importance , namely, they had widened the area of the Company's connection, that was to say they were tapping a great many more districts in order to secure life policies than was formerly the case, which h ! thought was n. very satisfactory feature. In the Life Department 534 policies had been issued, the net sum assured being £327,986. Claims had arisen under 137 policies, for £97,000 including bonus additions of £75,000 so assured, lciving tho net claims £89,000,a sum which was much within tho amount txpected. The premium income amounted to £143,000, being £4,000 more than that of 1896, and the funds were increased by £86,000, amounting at the close of the year to £1,584,000. He should like in this connection to bring before the meeting whit the figures to some extent were in 1887, that being a period of ten years, which he had taken to show the position of the Company now as compared with what. it was at that time. The claims in 1887 were £161,000 as against £137,000 in ihe year under review; but the policies issued were only 4'26 against the present issuo of 534, and the premium income for 1897 was £143,000 as against £93,000 in 1887. He thought this very satisfactory. Coming to tho Fire Department, it would be seen that the net(premiurns amounted to £357,000, which was £3,000 more than in the proce ing year. But the losses, he was sorry to say, had amounted to £205,000. As they perhaps knew already, there had been one or two very large fires during the year under review, notably one in Melbourne and another in Jcwin Street. It must, however, always be remembered that it was the Company’s business to provide for such contingencies, and they were not ull (evil, as they tended to increase care in selecting risks. Comparing the figures of the Fire Department, tho net premiums for the year under review amounted to £357,000, whilst in 1887 they were £104,000. This showed rather a startling rise. The losses, of course, were heavier. The surplus for the year 1897 amounted to £15,870, and the directors proposed to apply this first in payment of 3- dividend for the year of _24s. per share, and of this amount 5s. per share had already been paid, leaving to be paid 19s. per share. That would amount to £28,800. They also proposed to add to the Fire Fund £15,000, which was a very respectable sum, though it was not so large as last year; but last year was an abnormally success ul year-_. Still, the Board thought that £15,000 was a good amount, and this addition brought up _the Fire Fund to £385,000, which was considerably in excess of the premium income. There was a balance of £2,000, which was O.t!'l'1C(1 to the Reserve Fimd, and would bring it up to £52,000. That made the to'al amount of fire and rcserve funds the very considerable sum of £437,000, which he thought avery satisfactory figure, considering that the premium income was £357,000. But the Board did not want it to stop_at that; they wanted to build up tho reserves. He would not say how high they wished to go; but if he could be told to what extent the business was to increase, then he would say how much the reservts were to be raised to. 'l he (1ll'(Ci.0I‘B_ hoped to go on increasing the reserves as the business increased. The Fire and Rcsirve Funds in 1887 were £239,000; they were now £437,000, which was a very considerable increase. The total assets of the Company now amounted to £2,287,000, which compared very favourably with the amount in 1887, which was £1,855,000, showing that the total assets had increased by £430,000. In the statement of the assets of tho Company there

was an item of mortgages, and he was pleased to inform the meeting that the amount was not so great as it used to be. 'lhey were all good

mortgages, or else provided for. Wherever the company had any investments standing at a premium which were repayable at par at a future date tho premium was generally written oil’ out of the interest and ho might say that the investments if taken at tho market price of the day would show a considerable profit, and those that might have depreciated in value had been liberally provided for and written_ down. If any gentleman desired to make any comments or ask any questions he would be happy to answer.

Mr. J . 1‘. Cuniiia seconded the motion.

Mr. J OHN Comes said tho Chairman had stated that the Board were favouring ihe augmentation of the number of lifo_policies even if _for small amounts. He had nothing whatever to say against the Company increasing its~a.rea of operations, but at the same time ho thought that if the Company were fortunate enough to get policies for largo amounts other ofiices would be ready to take a part of the risks and would probably gi_ve some business to the Company in return. But he was sure the_ society was quite alive to all these points. Ho observed that the premiums income in the Fire Department was stagnating somewhat and he looked upon that as a somewhat favourable feature. The Ciggpany had got to £375,000. In 1895 it was £368,000 and in 1896 £354, . He gathered from $118-15 that the Board were rather looking to quality than quantity,_ and probably in the near future there mi ht be an even smaller l_oss ratio than at the

resent time. The total fund seemed to have grown in the last few years i)i'om £399,000 to £460,000. On the whole he considered the report a very excellent one, which reflected very great credit on the management of the Company.

The resolution was carried unaniiiiously. _ _

On the motion of the CHAIRMAN, seconded by Mr. CURBIB, the retiring dire;tors, Mr. H. Brooks, Mr. B. B. Greene, Mr. F. Greene and Mr. H. Moaenthal, were re-elected. _

Mr. Fox BATIBY moved the rc-election of the auditors, Messrs. Price, Watcrhouse, & Co., and that their remuneration he £250.

Mi. F. L. II. COLLINS seconded the motion, remarking that the Company cou‘d not be in better hands.

The motion having been agreed to, _

Ma. COLEB moved a vote of thanks to the directors, local directors,

THE SOLICITORS’ JOURNAL A ril 2 18

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managers, and stafi‘ in London, and the various oflicers throughout the country, so that they might express their obligation to those who were bearing the burden and heat of the day and upholding the position of the Company.

Mr. Cor.r.rxs seconded the motion. He was sure that all of those who had to transact business with the Company could bear testimony to the courtesy and prompt attention they received from the staff who conducted the operations of this large establishment. Doubtloss it would be the pleasure of all the proprietors to put on record that those who were in the country, the local boards and agents, were each and all deserving of a hearty vote of thanks for their services.

The vote having been carried,

The Ciuviuuiis returned thanks on behalf of the directors, observing that they always tried to do their best for the Company. They took a great interest in it, and he hoped the results were not unsatisfactory.

The GENERAL l\Isiuoi:a, in respunding for the managers and stafi‘, thanked the meeting for this vote, and said he was perfectly sure that when the report of the meeting went to the Company's representatives all over the world it would convey a feeling of very great gladness to the minds of those who had. worked so hard for the Company in foreign fields, and in very diflicult fields, especially during the last year or two. They would appreciate highly the fact that they had not been forgotten by the meeting.

SOLICITORS‘ MANAGING CLERKS' ASSOCIATION.

Mr. J . Austen-Cartmell delivered the eighth of the series of lectures in the Old Hall, Lincoln’s-inn, on Tuesday, to a very large audience on the “ Finance Acts, 1894-6.” Sir R. T. Reid, Q,.C., M.P., presided. The lecturer, in opening the subject, said the estate duty Was a tax of universal applicability. It was a charge upon all property “from or to what person soever it passed." The two Acts were of an extremely complicated character, and he could only endeavour during the time at his ' posal to place before them a comprehensive view of them. 'l‘he unhappy individual called the deceased was as safely encased in the Finance Acts as he was in his own coflin. Indeed, the ubiquity of the deceased turned the Acts into a veritable cemetery. In concluding his instructive exposition of the Acts, the lecturer said he had often been asked whether estate duty could be avoided, but he was afraid that there was only one way to ensure that result, and that was for a man to sell his goods and give them to the poor. But alas! the recipient of that advice would, he greatly feared (such was the nature of man), receive it in the same spirit as his prototype and depart sorrowing. No! the estate duty was a spectre that once raised could not be laid. \Vhen the poor deceased was, after life's fitful fever, sleeping well, the ghost would haunt his home, bringing terrors to his unhappy executor. At the conclusion Mr. A. Turner proposed a hearty vote of thanks to the lecturer and chairman, and spoke of the diflirulty he had experienced in understanding the provisions and intentions of the Acts. Mr. T. C. Tunstall, in seconding, said that in considering, as they had been doing, the most difiicult and complicated measure in regard to death duties that had ever been placed upon the statute book, they were to be congratulated in having had in their lecturer and chairman those who had been personally associated with its passing. The vote of thanks having been enthusiastically accorded, Sir Robert Reid, in acknowledging the same, expressed the great pleasure it had given him to be present and to hear Mr. Austen-Cartmell's admirable lecture, and observed that if the Acts were somewhat severe in their operation they should remember that the revenue which they produced he pod to enable our Navy to be put on a more eflicient and satisfactory condition.

LAW STUDENTS’ JOURNAL. LAW STUDENTS’ SOCIETIES.

BIRMINGHAM Law Srvnaxrs’ Socisrr.--ltlarch 29.—Mr. W. H. King, B.A., in the chair.—The moot point discussed was, “ Can a man who goes to a restaurant and orders a dinner for which he cannot pay, be convicted of obtaining goods by false pretences, or for obtaining credit by fraud, or on any other ground?” The speakers in the aflirrnative were Messrs. H. Eaden, J. C. Brookes, G. E. T. Edalji, S. J. Gateley, G. Thomas, and A. H. McBean; and in the negative, Messrs. W. Somers, A. H. Smith, T. P. Orwin, T. Priest, C. H. Smith, and G. Slater. The moot was decided in the afilrmative by 12 votes to 6.

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THE OPERATION OF THE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION ACT, 1897.

Ix the course of his address as chairman of the Law Accident and Contingency Insurance Society (Limited) on Wednesday, Mr. Richard Pennington said : It is desirable that I should say a few words about the WOTkmt'D'B Compensation Act of 1897, which comes into force on the lst of July this year. The Act involves an entirely new principle in British law; and it will most materially affect the fortunes of companies like ours, and we confidently look to the legal profession to interest itself in acquiring business on behalf of this society. Although we are aware _that employers of labour (particularly those connected with mining operations, and so forth) who are affected by the Act are naturally anxious as to the responsibilities of the new burden which has been imposed _up_on them, it is probably doubtful whether they have fully realized that it is a burden too dangerous for them to bear without the aid of insurance; mdeed, unless insurance is sought for and secured, disaster will overtake b_oth the employer and the employed. It has been stated that something like 6,000,000 of workpeople will be affected by the operation of the new Act, and, as there are some 13,000,000 or 14,000,000 of workpeople, there remains another 6,000,000 or 8,000,000 to be provided for hereafter, because the Legislature has not hesitated to admit that the present Act is but a stepping-stone, and its general application to all workpeoplc may therefore be expected; moreover, it may be taken for granted that those who are now outside the scope of the Act will strenuously press their claims for benefits similar to those which will be engoyed _by workmen to whom the Act applies, and an extension of the principle cannot be long withheld. At present there appears to be some difiiculty in interpreting certain clauses in the Act. The usual methods for arriving at decisions on these points will no doubt be adopted in due course. Unfortunately the indefiniteness leaves the question as to how much compensation is in certain accidents to be paid a doubtful matter; but we may feel sure that every care will be taken by our executive to see that adequate rates are secured, based upon the fullest information which can be obtained. At present accident insurance ofiices are threatened with new competitors in every direction in the shape of mutual societies for the protection of given trades. This is no new experience, and I do not think it need concern or trouble the ordinary insurance company, for it has generally been found that such societies arc unscientific in their construction, unsatisfactory in their application, and insufficient for protection. If experience may be relied upon, it may be anticipated that sooner or later they will collapsenlacking, as they do, those scientific methods which, coupled with security, ensure continuity and cohesion, which conditions can only be obtained from an _msur-ance company adopting the proved and accepted principles of in-urance. There must always be more or less danger to the assured in a _mutue.l society, and it becomes particularly pronounced when responsibilities are assumed in connection with businesses of magnitude involving liabilities arising from catastrophes such as occur in colliery industries. It is exceedingly doubtful whether any of the schemes which have hitherto been brought forward for the coal masters‘ consideration have represented true insurance, and if a catastrophe in a mine were to occur, involving great loss of life, the results might be exceedingly serious to the members of a mutual association. Of course, if coal masters can do better for themselves than by placing their risks in the hands of the accident companies they will be right in doing so ; but, as a matter of fact, there can be no doubt they will, in the long run, be better off with the strong and powerful accident companies than by adopting the alternative method. The ratio of claims—that is, the amount paid for compensation—must be the same, whichever plan is adopted, and the expenses of management will be approidmately the same in either case, because any mutual association will have to create a properly-organized establishment similar to that which the accident companies have already at hand, and it must be evident to anyone acquainted with the subject that the ratio of expenses of the accident companies in connection with this business must be less than the ratio which will be experienced by the mutual societies, inasmuch as all our expenses are borne by the various departments of business, and are not merely assigned to the special business which will have to be borne by the mutual societies. Moreover, mutual societies will have to immediately “ put up” a very large sum by way of capital account in order that they may be at once prepared to meet an event which must occur sooner or later, if any reliance is to be placed upon the experience of the

ast in connection with the mining interest. It is well known that the Ibading accident companies are prepared to take uphthis great business in a liberal and comprehensive spirit towards the co 'ery interests. Even if accident companies should charge a fraction more than mutual societies, it will be found that many coal masters will provide themselves with the absolute security afforded by a policy of a recognized insurance company, and will be gradually followed by others to the general weakening of mutual associations. The results which may be expected to flow from the operations of this Act will no doubt be grave in their nature and of considerable magnitude. According to the returns of the German state insurance for accidents to workpeople nearly 18,000,000 persons were last year interested in its operations, and over 500,000 benefited to the extent of over £3,000,000 sterling. If the experience of the Workmen’s Compensation Act is proved to be similar to that of the German state insurance as to the number of accidents occurring in proportion to the number interested, it may be anticipated that considerably over £1,000,000 sterling will have to be paid for the 6,000,000 persons who, it is assumed, will be benefited by the Act, inasmuchas the benefits provided under the English system are con

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