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wife's right of indemnity does not arise. In the latter case the wife was entitled under the will of her grandfather to a life interest in considerable property for her separate use without power of anticipation. Under a settlement made on the marriage, the husband was entitled to an annual income of £2,000, subject to its passing to the wife on his bankruptcy or attempt at alienation. In 1882 an order was made under section 39 of the Conveyancing Act, 1881, whereby the wife’s life interest was mortgaged to secure the sum of £23,000, and in 1887 a similar order was made for the purpose of raising a further sum of £22,000. The money was required to enable the husband to pay debts for which he was personally liable, but which were contracted, as the Court of Appeal held, for the joint purposes of the husband and wife in order to enable them to indulge in an expensive mode of living. The orders of 1882 and 1887 were made by OHITTY, J ., and they did not express that the husband was to be subject to liability to indemnify the wife, an omission which Ksicnwicn, J., held to be equivalent to an exclusion of such liability. But, as we pointed out at the time (ante, p. 92), the omission of an express indemnity is not inconsistent with the preservation of an implied indemnity, and the Court of Appeal have held that the silence of the order of the court as to the liability of the husband does not necessarily exclude the ordinary rule. “ VVe are not prepared,” said LINDLEY, M.R., “to say, asa matter of law, that an order silent as to the wife’s rights against her husband is fatal to the existence of such rights.” Apart, however, from this consideration, there was sutficient in the circumstances of the case to prevent the inference that it was the intention of the

arties to give the wife a right of indemnity against her husband, and on this ground the decision of Ksicnivnrii, J ., was aflirmed. One matter which influenced the Court of Appeal in arriving at this result was that, since the right of indemnity was assignable, it might in the hands of an assignee have been used against the husband and so have produced the bankruptcy which it was the object of the applications under the Conveyancing Act to avoid. But it seems to have been snflicient for the decision that the debts were substantially the joint debts of husband and wife.

AT run annual meeting of the Law Accident Insurance Society on Wednesday, a very interesting statement was made by the chairman, Mr. RICHARD PENNINGTON, as to the prospects of insurance business under the Employers’ Liability Act, 1897. It appears that according to the returns of the German state insurance system for last year, nearly 18,000,000 workpeople were interested, and 500,000 were actually benefited, the compensation paid amounting to over £3,000,000. The figures anticipated for this country are not so large, but they are large enough to shew that the Act will impose on employers a burden which it will be very dangerous for them to accept without the help of insurance. Mr. PENNINGTON adopts the statement that something like 6,000,000 of workpeople will be afiected by the Act, and that since the benefits provided under the English system are considerably in excess of those provided under the German system, the sum that will be paid annually as compensation is not likely to fall far short of £1,000,000. Until the nature of the risk is better understood the - terms on which it can be covered by insurance will be necessarily experimental, but the Law Accident Society has, it seems, not been slow to make preparations for the access of business which is to be expected under this head. A considerable part of Mr. Pi=:ivisixc'i"oiv's speech was devoted to the comparative advantages of mutual insurance and insurance in the regular societies, and he naturally argues in favour of the latter form of insurance. This is a matter which the employers will have to settle for themselves. The regular societies are more convenient to do business with, and their employment is purely a question of probable expense. Mutual insurance clubs involve an element of risk which the employers will or will not undertake, according as they think the rates of premium charged by the insurance societies reasonable or no. In the club the membersbetween them have to provide for any losses which may fall upon any of them, while in ordinary insurance the loss is limited to the amount of the premiums. In marine insurance the two systems flourish side by side, and in employers’ liability

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insurance the societies, as Mr. PENNINGTON foresees, will have to take account of the competition of mutual insurance. But if, as he says, the leading accident societies are prepared to take up the matter in a liberal spirit towards the colliery interests they will be pretty sure to get the greater share of the new business.

Tun CASE of lhownscomlle v. Johmon, in which the Lord Chief Justice and MATHEW, J ,, gave judgment on Tuesday last, adds another to the already long list of cases in which the validity of a bye-law made under section 23 of the Municipal Corporations Act, 1882, has been called in question. The bye-law in question was made by the Kent County Council, and provided that “ no person shall sound or play on any musical or noisy instrument or sing in any public place or highway within fifty yards of any dwelling-house after being required by any constable or by an inmate of such house or his or her servant to desist.” The main obj eclions taken to the bye-law were,first, that it was not made an ingredient of the ofience thereby created that the act should be done “ to the annoyance ” of some person; and secondly, that it gave a very arbitrary power to a single constable. The decisions on local bye-laws have been so diversified that it is not surprising that the learned judges difiered in opinion, Lord Russsni. C.J., upholding the bye-law, Whll9MATHEW, J., held it to be unreasonable and bad. The validity of bye-laws as to unseemly noise has been discussed in several cases, thanks mainly to the activity of the Salvation Army, and on comparing the cases it will be found that the bye-laws on this subject which have been upheld have been of a more restricted character than that in B:-oimsozmbe v. Johnson, while those which have been condemned have been of a wider scope : the precise words here adopted by the Kent County Council seem to lie in media. Thus in Reg. v. Powell (-51 L. T. 92) a bye-law was upheld which forbade playing or singing in a street after being required to desist by a resident or by a constable on account of the illness of an inmate of a house, or for any reasonable cause. Here the objectionable power given to any constable was present, but his action was restricted to cases where there was reasonable cause for interference : the justices, it was held, were to decide whether there actually was reasonable cause. In Booth v. Howell (53 J. P. 678) a bye-law prohibiting the use of a noisy instrument in the street to the annoyance of any of the inhabitants was held reasonable ; and Irmes v. Newman (42 W. R. 573) is a very similar decision. On the other hand, where a bye-law absolutely forbade anyone (except certain military persons) to play on any musical instrument in a street on Sunday, it was held to be bad: Johnson v. Mayor of Croydon (16 Q. B. D. 708).

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THE NECESSITY for words importing that the act must be done so as to cause annoyance is brought out by the two cases of Strickland v. Hayes (44 W. R. 398) and llfrmlle v. Jordan (1897, 1 Q. B. 248). In the former a bye-law directed against the use of obscene language and the singing of obscene songs in any street or public place or on land adjacent thereto was held bad for the want of words of such import as well as for other reasons ; in the latter a bye-law directed to the same end but containing the words “ to the annoyance of persons in the street” was held to be good. As to the power given to a single policeman, this was not held to invalidate the bye-law in Reg. v. Powell (supra), but as already observed, his power was there restricted within reasonable limits; and in Ally v. Farrell (1896, 1 Q,. B. 636)véa case relating to a bye-law under a very special power in the sights and Measures Act, 1889, and notmade “ for good rule and government ” under the wideterms of the Municipal Corporations Act) an obj eotion was successfully founded (amongst other grounds) on the power given to a constable to insist arbitrarily on the weighing of coal in course of delivery to a purchaser. The tendency of the courts at the present day is to uphold bye-laws made by a representative body for the government of their area of jurisdiction, and authority is on the whole in favour of the bye-law in question in Brownscombe v. Johnson. But the whole question of the limits to be imposed on this local legislation needs discussion, and it is satisfactory that an opportunity is_to be given for an authoritative pronouncement on this subject by the consideration of ]i'1-use v. Jolmson (a case arising under the same Kentish bye-law

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as that in Broumscomba’s case) by a full court of the Queen's Bench Division. Apart from the questions to which we have alluded, the makers of bye-laws would be glad to hear the correct solution of the following dilemma—a bye-law must not be contrary to the ordinary law of the land; if it deals with what is already an offence by the ordinary law it will be either superfluous or ultra vires; if it creates a new ofience it is in great danger of being held to be bad for variance with the law.

Tnonerr SEUEION 4 of the Statute of Frauds requires a guarantee to be in writing, and no action is therefore maintainable on a verbal guarantee, nevertheless parol evidence is admissible to prove that a guarantee in writing was in fact given, where the document itself is missing and cannot therefore be produced. Obviously, however, there is great risk in admitting such evidence, and, save under very exceptional circumstances, it ought not, we submit, to prevail. That such circumstances, however, existed in the very recent case of Barrasa v. Read is indisputable. There the missing guarantee sued upon was given to secure payment of £100 damages and costs by the defendant in a libel action which, at the trial, was settled on the terms (amongst others) that such a guarantee should be given. That a guarantee of some sort had been given was admitted, but its precise terms were in controversy, and the surety moreover alleged that she had signed it in ignorance of what she was doing and of the liability thereby undertaken. On behalf of the plaintiff in the action on the guarantee, evidence was given by the defendant’s counsel in the libel action, and also by the plaintiff's solicitor, whose respective statements as to the contents of the guarantee and also as to the circumstances under which it was given, substantially agreed. It was accordingly held, upon this evidence, that there must be judgment for the plaintiff on the guarantee.

SECTION 25 OF THE COMPANIES ACT, 1867.

WE are glad to see that an attempt is being made to procure without further delay the repeal of section 25 of the Companies Act, 1867. Such repeal is one of the proposals of the Companies Bill introduced by the Government, but the protracted proceedings before the House of Lords Committee make it unlikely that any speedy legislation will result. The Council of the Incorporated Law Society have issued a report on the operation of the section as affected by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Ra Kharaakhoma S3/nrlicate (46 W. R. 37; 1897, 2 Ch. 451), and it is at their instance that the Companies Act (1867) Amendment Bill, which has for its object the repeal of the section, has just been introduced in the House of Commons by Sir J OHN Lnnnocx. Within the last few days the Council have issued also a further report calling attention to the latest decisions on the section.

By the section it is enacted that “ every share in any company shall be deemed and taken to have been issued and to be held subject to the payment of the whole amount thereof in cash, unless the same shall have been otherwise determined by a contract duly made in writing, and filed with the Registrar of JointStock Companies at or before the issue of such shares.” The wording of this provision has often been criticized, and in particular the use of the expression “ the same ” is a striking instance of loose drafting; but the idea which the draftsman had in view is sufficiently clear, and, had it been properly carried out. there would have been no reason to quarrel with the section. It was intended to provide a safeguard against the issue of a. company’s capital in the form of paid-up shares without giving the public an opportunity of discovering that the capital or some part of it was not represented by cash payments. But the proper way of doing this would have been to require that returns of shares issued as fully or partly paid should be made to the registrar, and in default to inflict a penalty upon the ofiicers of the company. Instead, the Legislature called for the filing of a contract, which was quite unnecessary, and in case of default visited the shareholder with a penalty measured by the full nominal value of the shares. It was a clumsy piece of legislation which has led to results of extreme injustice, and

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even where these results have been avoided by the courts-as in the recent cases of lllomrier (Vauve) at sea File (45 W. R. 449) and Ibbotaon v. lblzotson Bros. Co. (Lz'mt'terl) (ante, p. 340), shareholders who have acted bond fida have been placed in a position of extreme peril.

But, apart from cases where the omission to comply with the requirements of the section has arisen from oversight, there is the still more important class where the vagueness of the section has proved a trap to persons who had every desire and intention to comply with it. The section calls for the filing of “ a contract duly made in writing.” To secure perfect safety it was wise to assume that this referred to the original contract providing for the issue of the shares; but such contracts are often lengthy, and contain matter which there is no occasion to make public, and the practice soon became prevalent of supplementing it by a subsidiary contract providing specifically for the issue of the shares, and then filing the subsidiary contract. The technical correctness of this expedient was, however, doubtful. Assuming the second agreement to be a contract at all, it was made upon no new consideration, and the want of actual consideration was not very satisfactorily met by afixing to the agreement the seal of the company.

The question of the validity of this procedure was raised in the recent case of Re Kharaskhoma Syndicate (Limited) (supra), and its discussion resulted in a difference of opinion betweeu Lord Justice (then Mr. Justice) VAUGHAN WILHAM8 and the Court of Appeal. The syndicate had entered into an arrangement with the Concessions Development Co., under which the company was to give the syndicate financial assistance and take part in its management. As remuneration for these services certain preference shares in the syndicate were to be allotted to the company, and an agreement of the 17th of August, 1892, in which the terms of the arrangement were embodied, provided that the “allotment was to be protected by a duly-registered agreement under the 25th section of the Companies Act, 1867.” The contract actually filed was dated the 31st of August, 189 2. and recited that by the former agreement the syndicate had “ for the considerations therein mentioned ” agreed to allot the shares. VAUGHAN WILLIAMS, J ., held that since the company were, under the terms of the first contract, not bound to accept the shares until a further contract had been made, the second contract was good as a contract—tha.t is, it was an independent contract, and he considered that the consideration was sufficiently identified by reference to the first contract, especially since the entering into the first contract was in itself a consideration for the second.

But the Court of Appeal took a stricter view of the requirements of the section. Possibly the second contract would have been enough had it stated specifically the consideration for the issue of the shares, though there would still have been the objection that it was simply a repetition of the first contract, and the safe course would have been to register the two contracts together. It was held, however, that the disclosure of the real consideration was essential in order to make such a document as would satisfy the section. “The registered document," said LINDLEY, L.J., “ must be a contract in writing, and the thing registered must disclose the consideration, whether it is a deed or a simple contract.” The court carefully abstained from saying with what particularity the consideration must be stated, but it follows from the decision that sufficient must be said to show, without reference to any unfiled document, what the consideration really is, and this effect was given to it by KEKEWICH, J ., in Ra Mag/nards (Limited) (ante, p. 3081. There the filed agreement recited in full the price to be paid and the manner of payment, but it described the property sold as “the businesses and property” mentioned in the first part of the schedule to the principal contract, and “the leasehold hereditaments, short particulars of which " were set out in the second part of the schedule. Kaxnwxcn, J ., held that this gave no real information as to the subject-matter of the purchase, and that the filed contract was insufficient.

The above decisions have naturally created a feeling of great insecurity with regard to the numerous issues of paid-up share! which have been made of recent years in reliance upon the filing of supplemental contracts, and legislation is urgently required both to remove doubts as to past transactions and to

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place the matter upon a more satisfactory footing for the future. The Incorporated Law Society’s Bill deals with both these points. The second clause provides that whenever any contract or other document relating to the issue of paid-up or partly paid-up shares has already been filed with the registrar with a view to complying with the requirements of section 25, "it shall be no objection to such contract or other document, so far as regards the said section, that it does not disclose or sulficientl y disclose the consideration for the issue of such shares, or that it only contains a part of the contract relating to the issue of such shares, or that it does not in law constitute such a contract in writing as the said section requires."

This clause will provide against any further decisions such as those in Re K/mras/thoma Synzlicate and Ra Maynarda, but for the future it is necessary to get rid altogether of the necessity for filing a contract, and to provide simply for a return to the registrar of such information as is really required. This the Bill does by clause 3, which is in the following terms :

“ (1) Whenever, after the commencement of this Act, a company limited by shares makes an issue of shares in its capital, such company shall, within one month thereafter, send to the Registrar of Joint-Stock Companies a notice in writing, stating

“ (a) The number, class, and nominal amount of the shares comprised in such issue; and

“ (6) How many of the said shares were issued on the footing that they were to be paid up in cash ; and

“ (c) How many of the said shares were issued on the footing that they were to be credited as paid up, or partly paid up, for some consideration other than cash.

“ (2) If default is made in complying with the requirements of this section, every director, manager, or other oficer of the company who knowingly and wilfully authorizes or permits such default, shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding five pounds for every day during which such default continues.”

It is to be noticed that the above clause differs in an important point from the proposal contained in the Government Bill. Under clause 7 of that Bill the company will be bound within seven days after any allotment to make a return to the registrar stating (inter alfa) “ the number and amount of shares allotted as fully or partly paid up otherwise than in cash, and in the latter case the extent to which they are so paid up, and in either case tho consz'1leratz'on for which such shares have been allotted." The Incorporated Law Society’s Bill requires only a statement of the fact that the shares are issued as fully paid up and does not call for a statement of the consideration. If the Bill can be got through in this form it will be an advantage, for the statement of the consideration is sometimes a matter of difficulty, and the requirement of such statement still renders possible the contention that the consideration has not been properly set forth. The really important matter is to know whether the shares have been paid up in cash or no, and practical convenience points to the acceptance of the proposal of the Incorporated Law Society. But the form of the measure in this respect is less material than to secure in some way the repeal of section 25, and the Government will give a useful indication of their desire for the reform of company law if they secure facilities for getting this urgently-needed measure passed.

REVIEWS. QUARTER SESSIONS.

Ancunomfs PRACTICE or run Connr or QUARTER SESSIONS, AND ITB Civ1L, CRIMINAL, AND APPELLATE JURISDICTION; Wirn TABLES or ALLowANcss TO W11‘NESSES, Cosrs or APPEAL, Paocnmmn oN Arrzans, AND or THE PaiNcii>AL INDIUIABLE QFFENCES TRIABLE AT Qoaarna SESSIONS. Frrrn EDITION, Tnonononnv Bsvisan AND 1N MANY PARTS REWBITTEN. By Sir G. SHERSTON gonna, Bart., Barrister-at-Law. Shaw & Sons; Butterworth & A new edition of this standard work should prove acceptable to the

profession, especially as since the publication of the last previous

edition the long interval of thirteen years has elapsed, during which many important decisions have been given and enactments passed affecting the subject-matter. The editor of the present edition is to

be congratulated on having reduced the bulk of the work from 1005

pages to 655 without having impaired its value or sacrificed anything of real importance. On the contrary,_ h_e has been able to strepgahein

the portion of the work relating to criminal procedure and to inc u e other information of a practical character concerning those questions, whether of law or of practice, with which persons frequenting quarter sessions should make themselves acquainted. In its main features the old arrangement has been preserved. We notice, however, that what were formerly Chapters 1 and 2 have now been combined, so as to form together Chapter 1 of the new edition, and bearing the title " Of Sessions and the Commission of the Peace" ; while the chapter on “ The Criminal Jurisdiction of the Quarter Sessions " (Chapter 9), instead of being the last chapter of the work, as heretofore, has, very properly, been given precedence over those chapters which deal with the “ Appellate Jurisdiction of Quarter Sessions." The scope of Chapter 7 (Proceedings of the Court of Quarter Sessions generally) forming Chapter 6 of the present edition, has been considerably enlarged, and now covers twenty-six pages instead of two. On the other hand, the chapter on “ Civil and Administrative Jurisdiction of Quarter Sessions ” (Chapter 8 of the new edition) has been reduced from 377 to 69 pages, by judicious pruning. The new

edition is well up to date, both as regards the citation of statutes and cases. Amongst the former, such recent statutes as the Oaths

Act, 1888, the Lunacy Act, 1890, the Summary Jurisdiction (Mari-1 Women) Act, 1895, the Larceny Act, 1896, the Quarter Sessions (London) Act, 1896, the Burglary Act, 1896, the Juries Detention Act, 1897, and the Infant Life Protection Act, 1897, are now duly noticed; while, amongst the latter, the very recent case of Bouller v. Kent Justices (46 VV. R. 114; 1897, A. C. 556), overruling Reg. v. Glamorga-nshire Justices (1892, 1 Q. B. 621), is cited in its proper place. The following cases, however, seem to have escaped the editor’s vigilance—namely, Reg. v. Burton, Ex parts Young (46 W. R. 127; 1897, 2 Q. B. 468), King v. Reg. (61 J. P. 663), and Sufolk County Lunatic Asylum v. Stow Union (45 W. R. 620). The appendices (three in number) comprise certain matters of practical importance, such as tables of allowances to witnesses and of the principal indictable offences triable at quarter sessions, together with skeleton bills of cost on appeal and some forms of indictment. An index of forty-eight pages, containing a variety of suggestive titles, concludes the work.

COMMON LAW.

A MANUAL or Common LAW roa PRACTITIONERS AND STUDENTS, COMPRISING THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, WITH Usaror. PaAci"ioAL Runes AND DECISIONS. By JOSIAH W. SMITH, B.C.L., Q.C. ELEVENTH EDITION. By Curnsnar SPURLING, Barristerat-Law. Stevens 8: Sons (Limited).

This work has long been a favourite text-book with law students, to whom it still primarily appeals. Founded upon a number of standard works, it comprises a great deal of information, specially valuable to students preparing for examinations, or endeavouring to fit themselves for either branch of the profession. In the present edition the somewhat elaborate arrangement of the contents of the work previously adopted has been abandoned in favour of a more

' 1 ne That is to say the various topics are now dealt with

simp e o . under the two great divisidns of Torts and_Contracts. There_are altogether three parts, each of which is sub-divided into appropriate

titles, while nearly each title comprises two or more chapters. _

The subjects of Guardian and Ward, Parent and Child, Divorce, and the old forms of action, are, in the present edition, kept within narrow limits. On the other hand, numerous additions to the work have been found necessary, especially in connection with the law of toi-ts. We notice, too, that the chapter on Sale of Goods, which embodies the provisions of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 71), has been entirely rewritten, while a new chapter on Corporations has been added, and the chapter on Evidence has been enlarged. Many new statutes and cases concerning the various topics dealt with have been inserted, though we do not find any reference made to the following recent cases—namely, Pearce v. Gardner (45 W. R. 518; 1897, 1 Q. B. 688 C. A.); Plant v. Bourne (1897, 2 Ch. 281 C. A.); Re Macdomzld, Dick v. Fraser

45 W. R. 628; 1897, 2 Ch. 181), Bank of Australasia v. Palmer 1897, A. C. 640$, Simpson v. Hughes (45 W. R. 221). At p. 394 of the work, the e itor cites section 4 of the Mercantile L_aw Amend

ment Act, 1856 (19 & 20 Vict. c. 97), as though it were still operative, ' h' A t, 1890 (53 & 54

whereas it has been repealed by the Partners ip c

Vict. o. 39), and is now replaced by section 18 of the last-named Act. In a work mainly intended for students (as this is) such errors should be avoided. Speaking generally, however, the editor has exhibited great care and discernment in the accomplishment of his task.

There is only one appendix we are glad to observe, which consists of two statutes-namely, the Employers’ Liability Act, 1880 (43 & 44 Vict c 42 and the Workmen's Compensation Act 1897 (60 & 61

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Vict: cl 37): An index of over fifty pages has beeh added, giving

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Outlines of the Law of Torts. By Rrcnsnn Rmowoon, Esq., M.A., Barrister-at-Law. Third Edition. Stevens & Haynes.

The.Law Relating to Electric Lighting. By Jenn Snranss WILL, Q.C. Butterworth & Co.

The Law and Practice Relating to Workmen’s Compensation and Employers’ Liability, being a Practical Guide to the Employers’ Liability Act, 1880, the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1897, the Material Sections of the Factory and Workshop Acts, 1878 to 1895, and Lord Campbell’s Act.L By W5 ELr.rs HILL, M.A., Barrister-atLaw. Water ow & Sons ( imited .

Gibson and Weldon’s Student’s Statute Law, being Specially Intended for the Use of Candidates at the Final and Honours Examinations of the Law Society. Third Edition. By the Authors. The “ Law Notes” Publishing Oflices.

The Judicial Trustees Act, 1896 (59 & G0 Vict. c. 35), and the Rules Made Thereunder. A Short Explanatory and Critical Handbook for grofessionaé and other Readers. By a Solicitor. Eflingham Wilson.

rice 2s. 6 .

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE INCORPORATED LA\V SOCIETY AND LEGAL EDUCATION.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors’ JournoI.]

Sir,——The Lord Chief Justice is reported to have said at Birmingham, at the annual dinner of the Birmingham Law Students’ Society, in speaking of legal education, “ In London at one time the Incorporated Law Society had a number of lecturers who had classes, more or less considerably attended, and periodical examinations in relation to the teaching of those classes. All that was done away with, and absolutely the education which led up to the final examination of those who desired to become solicitors of the Supreme Court was, as regarded London, and in the main the rest of the country, carried on by a system of cramming, and not by a system of liberal and enlightened study, instruction, and education.”

The lectures referred to were many years ago well attended, but the attendance fell ofl' almost to vanishing point, and the Council naturally thought it a waste of money to continue the old system. Accordingly the present system was adopted as a tentative measure.

It is not, as is suggested in the Lord Chief Justice’s speech, “a system of cramming." It was intended to be (to use his lordship’s expression) “ a system of liberal and enlightened study, instruction, and education.” The idea was that as soon as a young man was articled he should, with the assistance of a tutor, commence a regular course of reading, and that he should be questioned at short intervals on what he had read, and that he should be prepared, without any cramming, for the examinations he has to pass.

One circumstance which retards the progress of the experiment is that many men will not read until compelled to do so, and the assistance of the “professional “ coach ” is invoked at the last moment.

Another diflic ty is that the largest number of men entering the solicitor branch of the legal profession are articlcd in the country, and they cannot during the whole of their articles attend classes in London. The Council have endeavoured to supply their wants by a system of postal instruction, which a most eminent instructor at one of our universities adopted with success, and I have a strong conviction that if arlicled clerks would avail themselves of this opportunity of being taught, then with the knowledge they should acquire in the ofiice they would become really educated solicitors, and would pass their examinations without having recourse to the pernicious system of cramming. R. PENNINGTON.

64, Linco n’s-inn-fields, London, W.C., March 29.

A clever piece of mensural cross-examination was effected at a Parliamentary committee on Tuesday, says the Daily Tale;/rapli, by the Duke of Richmond and Gordon, who is presiding over an inquiry respecting aBill. One of the counsel engaged was Mr. Lewis Coward, who is exceedingly tall in stature. Bis exact height has hitherto been a subject of much speculation in committee rooms, and many bets have been made respecting it. During an interval in the proceedings, when the official roporttr was not on duty, the venerable chairman, having apparently madc an effort to take the learned counsel's measure with his eye, and being, perhaps, anxious to know how nearly he had hit the mark, observed, in almost apologetic tones, “ Mr. Coward, may I ask you how tall you are P ” “Six feet six, your Grace," romptly replied the counsel. "In your boots ?” further inquired the Duke. “ N 0, your Grace,” was the answer, " out of my boots."

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CASES OF THE \'VEEK.

Court of Appeal.

PAGE’! v. PAGET. No. 2. 22nd and 25th February; lst and 24th March.

Msrmrsn Wesrm—SsrAa.4réH Paoranrr-i)-Rasraamr cg Anrrc.rsrrosREMOVAL or Rnsraurrr— ARGE non AYMBNT8 or nsnA1vn’s Dam-sWmn's Rronr re an Irvnmnvrrmn nr Husnsun, wnsar: no sucn Rioar Exranssna Rxsnnvnn—CozwxvnIcnvo AND Law or Paorxarr Acr, 1881 (44 & 45 m. 0. 41), s. 39.

This was an appeal by Mrs. Puget, the plaintiff in the action, from s gecisiofnhof Kekewich, J agile, p. 63, and 46 F8V7.7R£h232j. At the atoo or marria wit e e en ant, in anuary,1 , epaintitfwas entitled, under thgewill of her grandfather, to receive for her sole and separate use, and without power of anticipation, the net residue of the annual income of a moiety of certain freehold land consisting of warehouse property in Manchester, ainddoé a sum of £l00,gi)0. The réetétlement msdfe an

the marriage secure to t e e en ant an annu income o . 2,000 out o t e

property brought into settlement by the plaintiff. The defendant and the

plaintiff lived extravagantly and got intrpk debt, and it bgcame necessary flip

raise large sums of money to avert ba ruptcy proccs ings against e

defendant. Application rmder section 39 of the Conveyancing and Law of

Property Act, 1881, was accordingly made to the Court; and two orders,

dated respectively, 28tlfi Juno, 1882, anid gliioflllth hof Aaugugt, l1?8T, were

made b Ohitt . .,w ereb it was or er at t e inti ‘s isinterost under hgr grandfathefls willysheuld, notwithstanding the restraint on anticipation, be charged for the purpose of raising two sums of £23,000 and £22,000. fhesc sums were expended in freeing the defendant of debt. Afterwards the defendant and the plnintifi separated, and ever since May, 1893, they had been living apart. In the present action, the plaintiff, who sued in respect of her separate estate, claimed a declaration that the defendant was liable to indemnify her against the two mortgpgos for the sums of £23,000 and £22,000 already mentioned. Kekewic , J., proceeding to a great extent upon the fact that the orders of the 28th of June, 1882, and the llth of

August, 18317, did not reserve 11:0 the plaintighanylsuchfiright of ilrfienriuity,

dismissed e action, but wit out costs. e p ainti ap e , an ts

reserved judgment of the Court of Appeal was delivcregeaon the 24th of March.

Tm; (ioglnr (Lnvnmsr, M.R., and Rronv and Vsuonnv Wmums, L.JJ.), dismissc e appeal.

Lrrmnzr, M.R., read the judgment of the Court as follows : This is an

a peal by the plaintifl‘, Mrs. Paget, against a judgment of Mr. Justice

lgekewich dismissing an action brought by her against the defendant, her

husband. The ob'ect of the action was to obtain a declaration that the plaintiff's husband was liable to indemnify hcr against two charges for £28,000 and £22,000 created by her on her separate property for the payment of his debts. The case is reported in (1898) l Ch., 47. The material facts arc there set out, and it is unnecessary to repeat them at length here.

It is suflicient to state that Mr. and Mrs. Puget were married in anusry,

_l877. The husband was entitled to some reyersionary property. His

(rlnteggst in this wa%hsettl_<;d on thehrgarr1z;gp,rz1l1t this

uc no mcome o rm. owl swasa o o ne an re

her property was settled on her for hcr lifoy for her sepiirate use without

power of anticipation. The sum of £2,000 a-year derived from her property

was, however, scttlcd on her husband for life, but so that if he attelmptedhitlg alienate it or if he became bankru t this annuit became abs ta

wife. The other provisions of the dhttlernent necdlhot be rcfzizcd to. T110 husband and wife moved in good society and, large as their income was, they lived far beyond it. So recklessly extravagant were they that five years after their marriage £23,000 was sorely neodcd to relieve thrim from the pressure elf debts for whiclgedthe hgsband gas legally lia"le, but which debts ad been contrac to efra t o ex uses of the extravagant mode of living which they bdth appalfzntly enjoyed. It is impossible, in our opinion, to read the evidence in the case without coming to the above conclusion. The aflidavits filed in support of the laintifl"s application in June, 1882, for the order to which we willprefer resently, lcave no doubt, in our minds, that these debts had been contracted) not for the purposes of the husband with which the wife had little to do, but in order to enable them both to live is the style they both thought suitable and perhaps necessary to enable them to maintain and enjoy that high social position which they both so greatly desired. We attach more importance to what the wife said in these aflidavirs than we do to what she said some fifteen years later when examined in this action and when she was endeavouring to support her present claim. In the affidavits swom by her and her solicitor in 1882 there is nothing to lead to the inference that any of the debts which then had to be met were incurred by her husband for purposes of his own as distinguished from the purlpossi of himself and his wife as already stated. In her aflidavit of rm’,

1882, the plaintifi referred to the debts as contracted by her husband

and herself as “ our debts." It is true she said that until 1330

her attention was not called to the fact that she and her liusband

were getting into difliculties ; but her atlidnvit shows that after she knew of those difliculties all that she really cared about was to increase the net income of herself and her husband, and to maintain their position in society

Her solicitor's aflidavit leads to the same conclusion. On June 28th, 1332»

the plaintiff applied for and obtained an order rmder section 39 of the Con

veyancing Act, 18Sl, enabling her to mortgage her life interest to secure £23,000 and interest and the remiums of a policy on her life. We do not

think it necessary to refer in detail to the arrangements made for raising f-111!

sum, nor to its a plication when raised. It is sufficient to say that the m0l{°Y

was raised as auaorised by the order, and, except as to £3,600, was app]-W4

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in paying the debts intended to be paid ofi‘ by its means. The £8,600 not so applied was misappropriated by the solicitor who raised the money. Five years afterwards another sum of £22,000 was wanted for similar purposes. Another application was made to the Court, supported by further affidavits by the plaintifi and her then solicitor, and on August llth, 1887, another order was made enabling the plaintifi to mortgage her lifc interest for £22,000 and interest, and for the premiums on another policy. This sum was accordingly raised, and applied as authorised by tho order. The plaintiff's aitidavit, filed on this occasion—July 28th, 18S7—referred to what had been done in 1882, and to the misappropriation of £3,600, and to the fact that debts had been contracted to pay off the creditors who ought to have been aid ofi with that sum, and to the impossibility of avoiding bankruptcy and loss of social position if the arrangements then contemplated were not carried out. The plaintiff stated her desire to raise this sum of £22,000, and she s oko of the debts as “ our debts" as she had done in 1882. She represented) the debts to be hers quite as much as her husband's, and she treated his income and hers as one which it was desirable to maintain as far as possible. These transactions of 1882 and 1887 having been completed, the question arises whether Mrs. Puget is entitled to be indemnified by her husband against these sums of £23,000 and £22,000 when called in, and in the meantime against the interest and premiums charged on her life interest by the above orders. The fact that the plaintiff and her husband were separated in 1893 explains how this controversy has arisen, but does not, in our opinion, afiect the question of law which has to be considered. The plaintifi“s rights, whatever they arc, were not created in 1893, but arose in 1882 and 1887, although she mi ht not care to enforce them whilst she and her husband lived happily togctdier. What, then, were her rights in 1882 and 1887? In this action she has given evidence and has stated that nothing was ever said about her giving anything to her husband, that he managed all her affairs, and she did not understand them and did not want to do so; that in making her former affidavit in 1882 she ought not to have used such expressions as “ our debts” and “my debts " ; that she herself was not living beyond her income ; that some of the debts which had to be paid were not for money spcnt for her and her hu.sband’s joint benefit. But when pressed on this point it sccms tolerably plain that there is no reason for saying that the statement contained in her afidavit of 1882 did not disclose the true state of things, and ought not now to be believed, although she evidently wishes to minimise the effect of it. What she now says, however, is that all she knew was that her husband was in danger of being made bankrupt, and that she wished _to save him from such a disaster. Her attempt to dissociate herself from her husband’s racing debts was not successful. As regards the transaction of 1887, she admitted that the financial situation which needed treatment then was very much the same as in 1882, and arose from the same cause. She also stated that in 1887 her husband was in America, and that Chitty, J .,wh0 made both orders, saw her in his private room, and was told by her how these new difliculties had arisen, what the debts were, what the money was wanted for, and so on. The learned Judge was, no doubt, greatly influenced on both occasions by her own statements as to her own indebtedness. Bearing in mind this evidence, we have to consider the effect in equity of the transactions in 1882 and 1887, to which we have alluded. Tho authorities bearing on the subject, beginning with Hlmtingdon v. Hmatinydon (‘Z “Th. and Tud., 915), and coming down to Hudsoaz v. Carmichael (Kay, 613), show that if a married woman charges her property with money for the purpose of paying her husband's debts, and the money raised by er is so applied, she is prime facie regarded in equity, and as between herself and him, as lending him and not giving him the money raised on her property, and as entitled to have her property exonerated by him from the charge she has created. This doctrine is purely equitable, and the authorities which establish it show that it is based on an inference to be drawn from the circumstances of each particular case ; the prima frwie inference being in such a case as that supposed that both parties intended that the wife's assistance should be limited to the necessity of the case, and should not go beyond such necessity. But even where the wife charges her property with money to pay her husband's debts incurred without reference to her, there may be circumstances which prevent any inference from arising in her favour. Thus, if a settlement is made by the husband on his wife at the time she charges her estate he is regarded as purchasing her assistance ; and the inference that the parties intended that the wife's property should be exonerated by the husband does not arise (see Lewis v. 1l'rm_r]le,A1nb., 150). Clinton v. Hooper (1 Ves. J., 178, and 3 Bro. C.C., 201) is thcleadingauthority to show that the doctrine in question is based on an inference to be drawn in each case from all the facts of that particular case. It was long ago settled that, although under the old law a husband became liable for the anti-nuptial debts of the wife, she had no right in equity to compel him to exonerate property of hers charged with those debts, even although ho had expressly covenanted to pay them ; see Lewis v. Nangls (ubi supra) and Earl of Kinnoull v. Honey (3 Sw., 202n.). This shows the importance of not confounding the wife's debts with the husband's debts when considering such cases as those to which I am alluding. To say that in all such cases there isa preemption in favour of the wife, and that it is for the husband to rebut it, is, in our opinion, to go too far and to use language calculated to mislead. The circumstancesof each case must all be weighed in order to sec what inference ought to bedrawn; and until an inference in favour of the wife arises there is no presumption or the husband to rebut. If tbisis forgotten, error may creep in. The circumstances here we take to be those disclosed by the plaintifi in her aflidavits, especially her representations of her own indebtedness, as well as of her husband's; and we will add to these her recent statement that nothing was ever said abcutmving anything to her husband. Neither was anything said about lending him anything. She had a large income, and, although restrained from anticipation, she might have accrued income in respect of which she could contract debts. There is no reason to suppose that she had no debts and could contract n' n;>. She represented

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herself as pressed by her creditors, and we sec no reason to doubt the truth of her statements. The plaintiff was as extravagant and reckless as her husband, and was quite as desirous as he of maintaining her position in society. This object, so dear to both of them, might have been entirely frustrated if she had the right against him which she now asserts. That right would, in oint of law, have been her separate estate, and she might under pressure have assigned it, and her assignee might have enforced it against her husband whether she liked it or not. She had plenty of debts enforceable against any separate estate she had or might have, besides income which she could not anticipate. Those circumstances, and the peculiar position of hcr husband with respect to his £2,000 a year, lead us to the conclusion that no inference ought in this case to be drawn in her favour of any right to be indemnified by her husband. This conclusion is arrived at apart from the orders of the Court to which Kekewich, J ., attached so much importance, and the effect of which we will now consider. They are based on section 39 of the Conveyancing Act, 1881. [His Lordship read it and continucd.] Unless the wording of the section is attended to, there is danger of regarding the section as merely auvhorising the Court to remove the restraint against alienation which is so frequently imposed on married women when property is settled on them for their separate use. But it is to be observed that what binds the esta‘e of a married woman is not what she does when the restraint is removed, but the order made by the Court. The language of the section is that the Court may, by judgment or order, bind her interest. The Court is empowered to do this where it appears to the Court for her benefit so to do, and with her consent. A question at once arists whether the doctrine which is applicable to charges created by a. wife to pay her husband's debts is to be applied to charges created not by her, but by an order of the Court. The learned Judge in the Court below has l1e‘.d that the doctrine in question has no application to such a case, and that where orders are obtained under that section charging her property with money to be applied in paying her husband’s debts the order should show on the face of it that her husband is to be liablc to indemnify her if he is to be under any such liability. It certainly might be convenient if such orders were so drawn as to show what was intended in this respect. But these orders are usually made without hearing the husband, and we are not prepared to say, as a matter of law, that an order silent as to the wife’s rights against her husband is fatal to the existence of such rights. The circumstance under which the order was made might show that a right on her part to be indemnified by her husband ought to be inferred, although the order did not allude to it-. The absence of all allusion to such right is, however, a circumstance to be considered, and in this particular case tho form of the orders of 1882 and 1887 tells against the plaintiff when regard is had to the statements made by her in order to obtain them. It was urged that it could not be for her benefit that she should be deprived of her right to indemnity, but the force of this observation depends on the tacit assumption that she had the right. The question comes back to the proper inference to be drawn from all the

Ifactshincluding the orders themselves. And bearing in mind that the

plaintiff s paramount object was to save her and her husband’s ]01DlJ income, and thus, as far as possible, to preserve her and his position in society, and that this object might have been defeated if she reserved a right _to be indemnified by him, the proper inference to be drawn is, in our opinion, adverse to the evidence of such right. In our opinion, therefore, the appeal fails, and must be dismissed with 0OBt5.—-COUNSEL, Renshaw, Q.C., and A. mi Beckett .’l'un-ll; Cozenr-Hhrdy, Q..C., lVarrington, Q,.C., and John Hendemon. Somcrroas, Lyman 5- Co. ; Dawes <§- Sam. [Reported by R. C. M\cxI:<zu:, Barrister-at-Law.

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This case raised u question as to whether the settlement estate duty imposed by the Finance Act of 1894 was, in the case of property settlel by the will of a person who died after the commencement of the Finance Act, 1894, but before the commencement of the Finance Act, 1896, payable out of the settled property or out of the general residue of the testator’s estate. The question arose under the following circumstances. By section 5 of the Act of 189-1 it is enacted (1) that where property in respect of which estate duty is leviable is settled by the will of the deceased, or, having been settled by some other disposition, passes under that disposition on the death of the deceased to some person not competent to dispose of the property, a further estate duty (callcd settlement estate duty) on the principal value of the settled property shall be levied. By section 22 (1) (rm) of the same Act the expressions “ deceased person ” and “ the deceased ” mean aperson dying after the commencement _of that part of that Act. The said sections 5 and 22 are both comprised in Part I. of the Act of 1894, and by section 24 of the same Act the 1st of August, 1894, was defined as the commencement of Part I. of that Act. On the 26th of March, 1896, it was decided by North, J., in Ra Wrbbar (44 W. R. 489; 1896, 1 Ch. 914) that in the case ofa testutor who died on the 7th of March, 1895, the settlement estate duty payable in respect of personal property settled by _t11c will of the testator ought to be borne and paid out oi the general residue of his estate and not out of the settled property. On the 7t-h of August, 1896, the Finance Act, 1896, was passed. Part IV. of such Act comprises section: 14 to 24, both iu<lu=ive; and by section 19 it is enacted (l) that the settlement estate duty lcviable in respect of a legacy or other personal property setled by the will of the deceased shall (unless the will contains

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