running with the land, it was enforceable by C. as the assignee of the reversion. The covenant was held not to be personal, and the term "assigns" being used without qualification, C. was entitled to step into the place of the lessors for all purposes of the covenant. In this respect the case was distinguished from Doe v. Reid (10 B. & C. 849), where the covenant was with the lessors or their assigns or their successors "in their late or present trade as brewers." In that case it was held that the covenant was not enforceable by an assign both of the brewery and of the demised premises who removed the brewery business to a different place. The words "or their successors in their late or present trade as brewers," COTTON, L.J., observed in Clegg v. Hands, though not in terms limiting the assigns to assigns in that position, afforded in that case a rule of construction. In the present case before BYRNE, J., the lessor, HooD, was a member of the firm of HOOD & Sons, brewers, and the lessee covenanted to take beer exclusively from "the lessor or his firm of Messrs. HOOD & SONS, or his or their successors in business"; and it was declared that, where the context allowed, the term "lessor" was to include HOOD, his executors, administrators, and assigns. The lessor assigned the reversion in the demised premises to a company, who assigned to the plaintiffs, but the business of his firm was not assigned, and it continued to be carried on. BYRNE, J., held that the term "assigns" was to be read into the covenant without qualification, and that, as in Clegg v. Hands, the right to enforce the covenant passed to the assignees. Apparently this is in direct opposition to Doe v. Reid for, even if "assigns" was not excluded by the context, the. term when introduced into the covenant should, according to that case, have been restricted to assigns who were successors in business of the lessor's firm. In fact, however, it would seem that the context of the covenant excluded the interpretation clause, especially as the introduction of two brewery firms into the covenant left it uncertain with which of them the lessee was to deal, a result obviously not contemplated by the parties. But in any case the decision shews that the lessee of a tied house, who wishes to avoid the possibility of having the benefit of the covenant transferred to a different business altogether, should see that the covenant binds him only to take from the original lessors or their successors in the particular business.

interfere with the performance of that duty by the vendor, and it is dealing only with the expenses of requisitions made on the footing of the abstract by the purchaser, so far as he requires verification or information as to the title shewn thereby, by the production of deeds or abstracts of or copies of documents which are not in possession of the vendor" (30 Ch. D., pp. 45, 46). ROMER, J., after explaining what would have been the duty of the vendors and the right of the purchaser if the mortgage had not been paid off, and saying that the fact of payment off of the mortgage before completion could not make any difference in the right of the purchaser to have the deeds relating to the security handed over, dealt with the special contract as follows: "The provision that the purchaser is to accept the best title that the vendors can give certainly does not take away the purchaser's right. So far as I can see, no question of title is involved. If the vendors had been unable to obtain the deeds because of some defect of title which, under the contract, they were not bound to cure, different considerations would apply. The mere fact that obtaining the deeds for the purpose of handing them over on completion may cause the vendors trouble and expense is no answer to the purchaser." The summons was accordingly dismissed with costs.

MR. CRACKANTHORPE, Q.C., looks forward, we are glad to see, to an early settlement of the question of the re-constitution of the University of London as a teaching university, and in an interesting paper contributed to the February number of the Law Magazine he gives some suggestions as to the nature of the teaching which the faculty of law in such a university should afford. That a faculty of law will be included may be taken as certain, but what part the Inns of Court will take in the scheme must depend very much upon themselves. The Council of Legal Education will naturally be looked to for guidance in the constitution of the faculty, and its success will depend upon their recognizing that it is possible to teach usefully and effectively the theoretical as well as the practical side of law. siderable extent Mr. CRACKANTHORPE's paper is occupied with an account of the facilities for the teaching of law existing in other countries. The most complete system is to be found in Germany, where the philosophical course is taken by way of introduction to the courses in professional law. The sub

terms.

To a con

IN THE CASE of Re Duthy and Jesson's Contract (reported else-jects of the former course, or "theoretical law," Mr. CRACKANwhere) the purchaser of a freehold house agreed in writing to THORPE defines as "that which forms a necessary part of a wide, accept the best title the vendors could give. Certain title-deeds liberal education, and without some knowledge of which a man of the property had been deposited with his mortgagees by a does not feel perfectly at home in the society of well-educated former owner, but though the debt had been paid off, the deeds people." By "professional law" he means such technical in question remained in the possession of the solicitors who had knowledge as no layman need blush to be without. Possibly acted for the mortgagees. The vendors' solicitors delivered an many laymen who regard themselves as well educated would abstract which did not contain these deeds or any recital of their cheerfully confess to ignorance of much that is comprised in the contents, and a requisition was made on behalf of the pur- philosophy of law. But it is not worth while to quarrel over chaser, to whom the above circumstances were disclosed prior to In Germany the authorities are as strict in requiring a the contract, to have the deeds in question handed over on long course of practical work as in insisting on the previous completion. The vendors applied to the solicitors who acted for theoretical training. France has followed suit since the Francothe mortgagees, and they declined to part with the deeds. The German war, and for the last quarter of a century she seems to vendors thereupon refused to comply with the purchaser's have been remodelling her educational system upon German request, and ultimately proceeded against the purchaser under lines. America is overrun with universities and law schools, the Vendor and Purchaser Act. ROMER, J., pointed out that and in some of them, as is well known, the teaching of law the purchaser did not ask to have the deeds in question pro- Mr. CRACKANTHORPE puts forward a series of suggestions which has reached a high standard. As a result of his comparison, duced for the verification of, or for information as to, the title, but called upon the vendors to fulfil the ordinary vendor's aim at the establishment in the teaching university of London, obligation to hand over on completion all title-deeds in their under the auspices of the Inns of Court and the Incorporated possession or power. Section 3, sub-section 6, of the Convey-Law Society, of a faculty of law for the teaching of both theoretiancing Act had therefore no application, that enactment con- cal and professional law, so far as the latter is capable of being cerning only the expenses of "production and inspection" and taught by lectures and classes; and at the introduction of a not affecting the ordinary right of a purchaser on completion to probationary system, modelled on the Continental plan, in have the title-deeds handed over to him. This appears to be in respect of so much of professional law as can only be learnt by conformity with the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re Johnson actual contact with business. and Tustin (33 W. R. 737, 30 Ch. D. 42), where the point whether a purchaser on an open contract was bound to pay the vendor the expense of abstracting a title-deed not in the vendor's possession was decided against the vendor, and COTTON, L.J., said: "Sub-section 6 is dealing with what is the duty of the parties in their respective positions. It is the duty of every person who sells property to shew a title This sub-section 6 assumes, and does not intend to

THE DECISION OF BYRNE, J., in Lyons & Sons v. Wilkins (ante, p. 253) terminates a litigation which has had an important effect upon one branch of trade union law, though its possible developments upon another point have been forestalled by the decision of the House of Lords in Allen v. Flood. The action was brought by a firm of manufacturers against the officers of

its stages by the same judge. It was further suggested that
until additional judges were appointed the judicial strength
necessary for carrying out the changes should be obtained by
the free appointment of commissioners to go on circuit.
The Council of the Incorporated Law Society agree generally
with the complaints of the existing arrangements made by the
Bar Council. They consider that unless some reforms such as
those just indicated are made, the regular civil tribunals will
continue to be avoided or neglected, and there will be an
increasing tendency, not only in commercial business, but in
other matters, to resort to arbitration in order to avoid the
uncertainty and other difficulties incident to litigation under the
existing procedure. The recommendation of the Bar Council
which the Incorporated Law Society most strongly support is
that for the grouping of actions in separate lists, but they add
that no reform will be satisfactory which does not radically
attack the difficulties which at present hamper all parties to a
cause. Particular stress is laid on the delay and uncertainty
as to the date of hearing, and as to the court in which, and the
judge before whom, any cause will be tried.

a trade union for an injunction to restrain the defendants from maliciously conspiring to induce persons not to enter into contracts with the plaintiffs. An interlocutory injunction to this effect was granted by NORTH, J., but the Court of Appeal (1896, 1 Ch. 811) preferred to rest the illegality of the conduct alleged against the defendants upon the specific provisions of the Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875 (38 & 39 Vict. c. 86). Section 7 (4) provides that every person who, with a view to compel any other person to abstain from doing or to do any act which such other person has a legal right to do or abstain from doing, watches or besets the house where such other person resides or carries on business, shall on conviction be subject to certain penalties; but it is added that attending at or near a house or place in order merely to obtain or communicate information is not a watching or besetting within the meaning of the section. The enactment is sufficiently clear without going into the niceties of the right of one man to interfere, whether maliciouely or otherwise, with the contracts, actual or potential, of another; and the Court of Appeal, considering that where an act is declared to be unlawful, the party injured ought not to be restricted to his In this connection the Council of the Incorporated Law remedy in a criminal court, granted an interlocutory injunction Society are able to point to the suggestions which ten years ago based carefully upon the words of the section. Upon the trial were made in the joint report of the Bar Committee and themof the action, BYRNE, J., has found that the allegations of selves, some of which have already borne fruit. These sugpicketing upon which the injunction was based have been borne gestions were the forerunners of the regulations of 1885, proout by the evidence, and hence it has been made perpetual inviding for the issue of weekly lists, and of the Judges' resolu the form, practically, in which it was granted by the Court of tions of 1894, which attempted to secure the regular sitting of Appeal. But the claim for an injunction based upon the the courts in London, the integrity of the weekly lists, and the allegation of malicious conspiracy to prevent the formation of publication of the daily list at an early hour in the previous contracts has, in view of the decision in Allen v. Flood, of course afternoon; and which established the Commercial Court. With failed. respect to the six courts which the Bar Council ask should sit continuously in London, the Council of the Incorporated Law Society are not prepared to fix any particular number. They are convinced that there always is and must be increasing business in London, and that it is essential that adequate measures should be taken to cope with the increase, but the exact extent of the remedy they do not undertake to specify. They demur to the appointment of Commissioners of Assize as being an undesirable way of supplementing the deficiency of the judicial bench. So long as the present circuit system continues, this deficiency will continue, and it is said that an addition to the number of the judges of the Queen's Bench Division is imperatively required. But the report of the Council of the Incorporated Law Society is not confined to indorsing or qualifying the proposals of the Bar Council. Some important independent suggestions are included in it. It is proposed that an official with practical experience of litigation should be appointed as "Master of the Lists" with the rank of a master of the Supreme Court. It would be the duty of this master to arrange the cause lists of the Queen's Bench Division under the direction of the Lord Chief Justice. In arranging the lists, causes of like character would, it is suggested, be grouped in separate lists, and each group assigned to a separate rota of judges selected for each sittings only, so that the work of each of the judges would, during each sittings, be connected with one or more of the groups into which the causes had been divided. It is further proposed that particular court-rooms should be fixed, in which the trials of each of such groups of causes should be conducted before one or other of the judges appointed on the rota for that group. And finally, the abolition of Divisional Courts is recommended.

IN THE case of Mander v. Ridgway, which recently came before the Queen's Bench Division, a question of some interest to county court suitors was determined. It was there held that there is no right of appeal from the decision of a county court judge as to the sufficiency of a stamp affixed to a document, notwithstanding that a general right of appeal is given by section 120 of the County Courts Act, 1888 (51 & 52 Vict. c. 43), with certain exceptions, of which this is not one. The ratio decidendi appears to be that, as in the High Court such a decision would certainly be final (Blewitt v. Tritton, 41 W. R. 36; 1892, 2 Q. B. 327), therefore it must also be final in the county courts, to which, by section 164 of the County Courts Act, 1888, the general principles of practice in the High Court are applied in any case not expressly provided for by the Act or in pursuance thereof.

THE BUSINESS OF THE QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION. THE recent report of the Legal Procedure Committee of the Council of the Incorporated Law Society, adopted by the Council on 21st of January, and the further report of the General Council of the Bar, enforce and supplement the suggestions for the rearrangement of the business of the Queen's Bench Division which were contained in the Bar Council's report of last August. The criticisms which the last-mentioned report made upon the existing arrangements were singularly outspoken. The constitution and procedure of the courts were said to be devoid of order or certainty; the keeping open of an adequate number of courts in London was rendered impossible by the perpetual absence of judges on circuit; and the Divisional Courts were irregular in their sittings and unsatisfactory in their constitution. The result, said the report, was muddle and confusion of a very serious character. The specific reforms which the report urged were that an addition should be made to the number of judges in the Queen's Bench Division, so as to insure that at least six courts should sit continuously in London throughout the legal year for the trial of actions in that division; and that all actions should be grouped in separate lists, each list to be assigned either to a separate judge, as in the Chancery Division, or to a small rota of judges, as in the Probate Division, and as is already done in the Queen's Bench Division in respect of the commercial list. The object to be aimed at in arranging the lists would be to secure, as far as possible, that each action should be dealt with throughout all

The further report of the Bar Council indorses these proposals for the appointment of a master of the lists, for the grouping of causes to be tried in particular courts, and for the abolition of Divisional Courts, and recent occurrences which have unexpectedly withdrawn judges from London to fill vacancies on circuit are made the occasion for renewing the demand for additional judicial strength. The Bar Council again emphatically express their conviction that the present staff of judges of the Queen's Bench Division is not sufficient to meet the contemporaneous demands of London and the circuits, and to provide for the accidents of illness and other contingencies which from time to time remove judges from active work.

It may be anticipated that this joint utterance of the bodies. entitled to speak on behalf of the two branches of the profession will receive careful attention from the authorities responsible for

Positive evidence of the truth of this assertion it is in the nature of things impossible to give. All that Sir HERBERT STEPHEN does is to assert the fact and to offer such explanation as he can. Even," he says, "if there were no assignable reason, I am quite satisfied of the fact, and so are a great many other people who are really in a position to judge by experience.' The reasons he assigns are twofold. First, a prisoner who gives evidence in his own behalf does not get the benefit of the doubt; and secondly, even though innocent, he frequently raises a presumption of guilt by giving false explanations of suspicious circumstances. The first point is very ingeniously put. Under the existing system the jury expect the prosecution to prove the prisoner's guilt beyond all reasonable doubt. If the proof does not come up to this standard the prisoner is acquitted. "It is this attitude of mind on the part of juries which is the real safeguard of innocent persons unfortunately-or through deliberate perjuryplaced in suspicious circumstances. A large number of prisoners are acquitted solely in consequence of this rule, because, though they are probably guilty, and the jury think they are guilty, their guilt is just not proved with the necessary degree of assurance. Of course the truth is that the great bulk of such persons are guilty, and are undeservedly fortunate in escaping. But a small proportion are not guilty. It may be roughly guessed that something like four or five out of a hundred persons acquitted on this ground are innocent. Juries cannot know by revelation which four or five out of the hundred are innocent, and they secure the acquittal of the four or five in the only possible manner, by acquitting all the hundred." But, continues Sir HERBERT STEPHEN, where prisoners are competent witnesses, and give evidence, the attitude of mind which now guides juries disappears. They no longer call for strict proof against the prisoner, but, taking his evidence with the other evidence before them, they strike a balance of probabilities. As a reason for their so doing it is suggested that when the prisoner's mouth is closed the jury assume that, if he could speak, he would give a clear contradiction to the charge. In other words, they allow him hypothetically the same benefit as though he were a perfectly good witness in his own behalf. "All this is quite changed when the prisoner has given evidence. There is no longer anything imaginary about it. They have heard the assertion of innocence, and very likely it has not impressed them much. There is no need to exact a standard of proof here, and they merely strike the balance." Upon the figures

It appears clear, therefore, that the Lord Chancellor, prompted THE COUNCIL OF THE INCORPORATED LAW SOCIETY AND by the registrar or assistant registrar, and an unknown judge, and three other " persons" to be appointed, may make almost rules they please as to solicitors' costs under the Act. Of course counsel's fees are not touched, but the poor solicitor may perhaps even envy the proverbial toad under a harrow.

The Finance Act, 1896 (Part 4), commenced on the 1st of July, 1896, and the expression "deceased person' means a person dying after that date (see section 24). Section 19 provides for the incidence of the above duty, making it payable out of the property settled by the will of the "deceased" (not, be it noted, "deceased person"). Some months ago the Controller courteously informed me that, in his opinion, the provisions of section 19 apply to settlement estate duty which, at the time of the Act coming into operation, was unpaid. Your readers will remember Re Webber, Gribble v. Webber (40 SOLICITORS' JOURNAL, p. 388; and referred to in "Current Topics,' p. 645), which was decided before the 1896 Act, and under which settlement estate duty was held to be payable out of the residuary personal estate. That decision would govern my case unless section 19 applies in the way the Controller thought it did, and, having regard especially to the grievance the Act was intended to remedy, I think, if I may presume to say so, that there would be some difficulty in maintaining an opinion contrary to the Controller's. I assume, of course, that the word "deceased" in section 19 does not mean the same as "deceased person in section 24.

I should be glad to know your opinion, or that of any of your readers, as to the proper incidence of the duty in the above circumstances. F. G. LING.

Framlingham, Feb. 14.

[Section 19 of the Finance Act, 1896, appears to be retrospective; the words "settled by the will of the deceased" being taken from section 5 (1) of the Act of 1894 and inserted in section 19 by way of description only. In Soward's Handbook of Estate Duty, 2nd ed., p. 96, it is stated that this interpretation is adopted by the Office with regard to all settlement estate duty not assessed prior to the 1st of July, 1896.-ED. S.J.]

CASES OF THE WEEK.
High Court-Chancery Division.

And

see as to the limited operation of that sub-section Re Johnson and Tustin (33 W. R. 737, 30 Ch. D. 42, at p. 46). The deeds in question here were deposited with certain mortgagees whose debt had since been paid off. If the debt had not been paid off, the vendors would have been bound on completion to obtain the concurrence of the mortgagees in the conveyance the mere fact that the debt had been previously paid off could make no to the purchaser, and the deeds would then have been handed over. difference in the right of the purchaser to have the deeds handed over. Nor would the provision in the contract that the purchaser was to accept the best title that the vendors could give take away the purchaser's right. No question of title was involved. The mere fact that obtaining the deeds might cause the vendors trouble and expense was no answer to the purchaser. The vendors had applied to the solicitors who acted for the mortgagees. The deeds did not belong to those solicitors, and they could not part with the deeds without the authority of the mortgagees or had been made by the vendors to obtain such authority to the solicitors. their representatives. So far as his lordship could ascertain no endeavour On the materials before the court the vendors were not now in a position to call upon the purchaser to waive his claim to have the deeds handed over on completion, and the summons must therefore be dismissed with costs.-COUNSEL, Farwell, Q.C., and Mark Romer; Neville, Q.C., and Sargant. SOLICITORS, Rowcliffes, Rawle, & Co., for Cousins & Burbridge, Portsmouth; Barlow & Barlow, for Stanton, Bassett, & Stanton, Southampton.

[Reported by J. F. WALEY, Barrister-at-Law.]

Motion This was a motion to stay proceedings and refer to arbitration made on behalf of the defendants in the action. The action had been brought by a partner against his co-partners for a declaration that a notice of expulsion from the partnership served on him by them was void, and for an injunction to restrain the defendants from publishing notice of dissolution of the partnership. The facts shortly were as follow: By paragraph 31 of the articles of partnership it was in effect provided that a power of expulsion by notice in writing was given against any partner who might inter alia be guilty of conduct detrimental to the partnership business. It was further provided that if any question should arise as to whether events had happened to authorize the exercise of this power, the same should be referred to arbitration. By paragraph 37 of the articles it was inter alia provided that any dispute or question between the parties touching the partnership or the dissolution thereof or the rights and liabilities of the partners under the articles should be referred to two arbitrators or their umpire pursuant to the Arbitration Act, 1889, or any statutory modification or re-enactment for the time being in force. Certain conduct of the plaintiff having been brought to the knowledge of the defendants, his co-partners, they without any warning, and without giving him an opportunity of explanation, served notice of expulsion on him as having committed a breach of the provisions of clause 31 giving a power of expulsion. Upon the plaintiff bringing a motion in his action to restrain the defendants from publishing notice of dissolution, it was directed to stand over, and in the meantime the defendants served the plaintiff with notice of this present motion to stay proceedings in the action and refer the matter to arbitration as provided for by the articles. It was contended on behalf of the plaintiff, the respondent to this motion, that the notice was void on the ground that he had been given no opportunity of explaining his conduct, that the notice had not been given bonâ fide, and that such questions were not adapted to be referred to arbitration. Reference particularly was made to Blissit v. Daniel (10 Hare 493), Wood v. Wood (L. R. 9 Ex. 190), Lyon v. Johnson (40 Ch. D. 579). Re Carlisle (44 Ch. D. 200), Wallis v. Hirsch (1 C. B. N. S. 316), Russell v. Russell (14 Ch. D. 471).

Re DUTHY AND JESSON'S CONTRACT. Romer, J. 12th Feb. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-VENDORS' DUTY TO HAND OVER ALL TITLE DEEDS ON COMPLETION-AGREEMENT TO ACCEPT "THE BEST TITLE THE VENDORS CAN GIVE"-DEEDS DEPOSITED WITH MORTGAGEES. Summons. This was an application under the Vendor and Purchaser Act, 1874, by Herbert A. Duthy, William R. Duthy, and F. E. Duthy, the vendors of a freehold house, No. 32, Paget-street, Southampton, for a declaration that a good title to the property had been shewn in accord ance with the contract for sale dated the 18th of January, 1897. The instrument containing the contract was in the following terms-viz., "Received the 18th day of January, 1897, of Mr. Robert Wm. Jesson the sum of £10 as a deposit and in part payment of the sum of £480 for the purchase of a freehold dwelling-house and premises, No. 32, Paget-street, Southampton. The purchaser to accept the best title the vendors can give. The purchase to be settled on or before the 1st day of February next. The vendors to give the purchasers a bond of indemnity against any claim of George Henry Duthy, who has not been heard of for the past thirty-two years, at their expense. (Signed) Herbert Duthy, William R. Duthy. I agree to purchase on the terms above mentioned, the 18th of January, 1897. (Signed) Robert W. Jesson." It appeared that George Henry Duthy, the elder, purchased the property in 1846. In 1847 he made a post-nuptial settlement of certain moneys in favour of ROMER, J., said that in his opinion the notice of expulsion was void on his wife and children, the trust of corpus (in default of appointment under the ground that no opportunity had been given to the respondent of certain powers contained in the settlement) being for the children of Mr. explaining his conduct. That persons in the position of co-partners with and Mrs. Duthy living at the death of the survivor of them in equal a power under certain conditions of giving a notice of expulsion were in a shares. In 1848 he mortgaged the property to the trustees of this settle- quasi-judicial position with regard to the exercise of this power, and ment, of whom there were two, to secure £300 and interest. In 1862, one therefore should give the other partner an opportunity of giving any of these trustees having died, another trustee was appointed in his place, explanation he might have to offer. Under the circumstances the quesbut the mortgage was not transferred to the new trustee, and would tion whether the notice of expulsion was valid or not was, in his opinion, seem to have remained vested in the survivor of the original trustees not one adapted to be referred to arbitration. His lordship, further, was until his death, which took place subsequent to this appointment. The of opinion that the allegation of the plaintiff that the notice was not settlor died in 1890, having by his will dated in 1847 in effect directed his given bond fide amounted to a charge of fraud against the defendants, his estate to be divided amongst all his children on their attaining the age of co-partners, and this was also a reason against referring the matter to twenty-one years, and his widow died in 1892. The vendors were the arbitration. On these grounds no order was made on the motion to refer. surviving children of the settlor (other than George Henry Duthy). On-COUNSEL, Neville, Q.C., and Micklem; Levett, Q.C., and T. Watson. the 21st of January, 1897, an abstract of title was delivered to the pur- SOLICITORS, Crowder, Vizard, & Co.; Collyer, Bristow, & Co. chaser, commencing with a conveyance dated the 5th of November, 1894, [Reported by RALEGH B. PHILLPOTTS, Barrister-at-Law.] by Wm. R. Duthy and F. E. Duthy of their respective interests in the property to Herbert A. Duthy, but the vendors declined to hand over the earlier title-deeds to the purchaser on the ground that the solicitors who had acted for the mortgagees declined to hand them over, and that the title abstracted was the best title that the vendors could give. The WILL-CONSTRUCTION-GIFT OVER AFTER ABSOLUTE Interest-Repugnancy. earlier title had been disclosed to the purchaser before the contract was entered into, and he was informed at the same time that the mortgage had been paid off, and that the earlier title-deeds were in the possession of the mortgagees' solicitors.

ROMER, J., said that the purchaser was calling upon the vendors to fulfil the ordinary obligation they were under of handing over on completion all title-deeds in their possession or power. The Conveyancing and Law of Property Act, 1881, s. 3, sub-section (6), had therefore no application:

Re JOHN JONES (Deceased), RICHARDS v. JONES. Byrne, J. 12th
Feb.

dated the 19th of April, 1893, gave, devised, and bequeathed all his real Summons. John Jones, of Penmaenmawr, Carnarvonshire, by his will and personal estate, of whatsoever kind, unto his wife, Jane Jones, for ber absolute use and benefit, so that during her lifetime, for the purpose of her maintenance and support, she should have the fullest power to sell and dispose of his real estate absolutely; and the will continued: "After her death as to such parts of my real and personal estate as she shall not have disposed of as aforesaid, subject to the payment of my wife's funeral