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thing without that defect. Here the evidence was all one way; i.f the orchid had been what it was warranted to be- it would have been worth robably £100, certainly more than £20, and if the county court judge had jurisdiction to give damages exceeding £50 he did not see why the plainiiiI’s claim should not exceed that figure. It was admitted that tho description in the catalogue was a warranty that it was an Alba, and that the warranty was not true. Appeal allowed with costs. Counsel for the appellant asked that the appeal should carry the costs of the action also.

Dar, J ., said that the appeal being allowed costs followed as a matter of course. The costs of the action must depend on the result of the new trial. Counsel for the defendant said this was a test action, and therefore of great importance to his client. Unless the county court judge decided against the expression of opinion of that court as to the basis upon which the quantum of damages was to be calculated, his client would inevitably have to pay the costs of both trials. He pressed, therefore, for leave to appeal. The court decided that leave to appeal ought to be granted.—Coi'.\'sai., C. A. Russell, Q,.C., and Twnedale; Montague Lush. SOLICITORS, Ohuter §~ 00., for Boddington §' Ball, Manchester; Grimdy, Ifershaw, Saxon, §- Samson, Manchester and London.

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This wasa case stated by justices. The respondent was summoned under the Public Health Act, 1875, s. 95, for non-compliance with a notice served on him by the local authority under section 94, requiring him to abate a nuisance of black smoke. The preliminary objection was taken to the proceedings that the notice omitted to state what works or things were necessary iii order to abate the nuisance. The justices before whom the proceedings were taken thereupon dismissed the summons. Section 04 provides : " On the receipt of any information respecting the existence of a nuisance the local authority shall, if satisfied of the existence of a nuisance, serve a notice on the person by whose act or default or suiferance the nuisance arises or continues . . . requiring him to abate the same within a time to be specified in the notice, and to execute such works and do such things as may be necessary for that purpose.

Tiir: Cora": (DAY and Lxwnsucs, JJ.) dismissed the appeal. They were of opinion that it was unnecessary for the local authority in their notice to suggest works to be done where the nuisance complained of was nnuisance of black smoke. Courses, F. Low. Soucirous, Meredith 5' Co., for Hubbard, Ramsgate.

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This was an appeal from Mr. Registrar Gifiard. In this case application for an order to issue a bankruptcy notice was made. Mr. Registrar Gifiard had refused to make the order. The application was originally made ea: parts, when the court, thinking the point was an important one, ordered the other side to be served with notice. The facts of the case shortly are as follows: The applicant obtained a decreet or judgment in Scotland last year for upwards of £1,000 against the debtor. On the 11th of December this was, under section 3 of the Judgments Extension Act, 1868 (31 & 32 Vict. c. 54), registered in England. On the 14th of December the applicant lodged the papers and applied under section 4, sub-section 1 (g),of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, for the issue of a bankruptcy notice founded upon the Scotch decreet. The registrar refused to make the order, holding that he was bound by the case of Re Watson, E1: parts Johnston (41 W. B. 34 ; 1893, 1 Q. B. 21). By section 3 of the Judgments Extension Act, 1868, it was provided that where a decreet has been obtained in the Scotch “ Court of Session ” for the payment of any debt, damages, or expenses, a certificate of an extract thereof registered in the Court of Common Pleas at \Vestminster shall have the effect of a judgment of that court. Section 4, sub-section 1 (g), of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, provides that a debtor commits an act of bankruptcy it a creditor has obtained “ final judgment ” against him, and has served on him a bankruptcy notice under this Act requiring him to pay the judgment debt, and he does not within seven days after service of the notice either comply with the requirements of the notice or satisfy the court he has a counter-claim, set-ofi, or cross-demand which equals or exceeds the amount of the judgment debt, and which he could not set up in the action in which the judgment was obtained. For the applicant it was contended that the effect of registering the Scotch decreet in England was to place it in the same position as a judgment in England, and the applicant was therefore entitled to an order to issue a bankruptcy notice. Re Watson must be taken to be overruled by Re Low, Bland v. Low (38 Soucrroas’ JOURNAL 78; 1894, 1 Ch. 1»lT). If the effect of registering a decreet under the Judgments Extension Act was intended only toapply to executions the Act would ihave said so. For the debtor it was contended that Re Watson was binding on the court.

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Tniil Coca-r (A. L. Sin-i-ii, Cuirrv, and Connms, L.JJ.) dismissed the appea .

A. L. Suirii, L.J., in delivering judgment, said the question here was whether the learned registrar was right in refusing to make an order for the issue of a bankruptcy notice. The registrar had decided rightly. Ho was bound by the decision of Re Watson. That case was quite clear. The learned judge then read section 3 of the J udgmsnts Extension Act, 1868, and section 4, sub-section 1 (g), of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883. The latter Act did not extend to Scotland, and it was quite clear to him that the words “final judgment" in section 4 only applied to a judgment obtained within the area to which the Act applied, and not to a judgment obtained in Scotland. The applicant, therefore, could not bring himself within that Act. Then it was said_on his behalf that he was not confined to that Act but could fall back on the Judgments Extension Act, and it was contended that section 3 gave power to issue a bankruptcy notice. However, it was impossible to read that section without reading section 4 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1883, and in so reading it it was clear that its scope was limited and that it extended “in so far only as relates to execution under this Act."

Giirrrr, L J ., in his judgment, said that the words “ final judgment " in section 4 of the Bankruptcy Act meant only final judgments in courts having jurisdiction in England. This section cut down the scope of section 3 of the Judgments Extension Act, and limited it only to executions under the Bankruptcy Act. Re Walwrz was a clear gsithority on this point, and there was no conflict between that case and

a Low.

Conuus, L.J., concurred. Appeal dismissed with costs.—Coc.\'si;i., F. Cooper Willis and 0. Tindale Davis; Carrington. SOLICITORS, G. .11. Folkharrl ,' Hicks, Arnold, Q Jllozle/.

[Reported by E. G. S-rii.i.\viu.i., Barrister-at-Law.l_

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This was an appeal from an order made by Mr. Registrar Brougham, setting aside a bankruptcy notice. Sir Charles M. Palmer, the debtor, was in partnership with one Martinez Rivas, a Spaniard. In 1889 this firm entered into a contract for the construction of certain docks in Spain. Whilst this work was being carried out the firm was turned into a Spams‘ h company. Money became due to the contractor, Brims, and he n September, 1892, issued awrit against Palmer S: Rivas to recover the sum of £16,273. Judgment in default was signed against Rivas, but Palmer entered an appearance and made a counter-claim ; but he subsequently, in November, 1893, allowed judgment to be signed for the amount claimed, part of which he subsequently paid. Palmer then requested Brims to go to Spain and see what money e could obtain from Rivas and the company, it being agreed between Brims and Palmer that any money the former might succeed in obtaining there should not affect the latter's liability to pay the balaiicc. Brims proceeded to Spain, and an arrangement was concluded whereby all the creditors, whether of the old firm or the new company, were to receive bills of the company as security for their debts. In March, 1890, the company gave Brims a bill for £10,866, dated October, 1894, payable two years after date. Just before this bill became due Rivas offered to pay all his creditors seven shillings in the pound, and, Palmer consenting, Brims received that composition. Brims thereupon gave a receipt stating that he had received ii certain sum in full for the purchase of all his claims, whether ascertained or unasoertained, against the late firm and the company or either of them, and, in consideration of the said payment, Brims undertook, if and when called upon, to execute a due assignment of all his claims, as above, to Martinez Rivas or his nominee. It was stated that Palmer was not aware of the form of this receipt. Brims then served a bankruptcy notice on Palmer in respect of the judgment debt. This notice tho registrar sot aside on the ground that Brims, by virtue of the document containing the above receipt, had assigned the debt to Rivas. Brims appcaied, and the main question for the court was whether Brims was in such a position that he could issue a bankruptcy notice. For the appellant, Brims, it was contended that there had been no assignment, and that even if there had been it was only an equitable assignment, and that therefore he had a right of action against the debtor, and a bankruptcy notice could be issued. The case of Ea: partc Daarlc, Re Hosting: (33 \V. R. 440, ll Q. B. D. 184) was cited. For the respondent it was contended that this case was distinguishable from that one. Though the assignment here might only be an equitable one, yet Brims was not the person for the time being who was entitled to enforce the judgment within the meaning of section 1 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1890, and consequently he could not within section 4, sub-section 1 (y), of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883. Section l of the Bankruptcy Act of 1890 provides (inter alia) that “ any person who is for the time being entitled to enforce a final judgment shall be deemed a creditor who has obtained a final judgment within the meaning of section four of the principal Act” (the Act of 1883).

Tue Cocar (A. L. Sim-ii, Curr-rr, and Connius, L.JJ.) allowed the a peal.

PA. L. SMITH, L.J., after stating the facts of the case at length, said: I am not going to-day to decide whether there has been an assignment of the judgment debt. It seems to me that Brims is a judgment creditor of the debtor, and he is entitled to issue a bankruptcy notice. In my opinion the judgments in the case of Ea: parts Dam-la shew this. In my judgment he is entitled to do so whether you lock at the case under sectioplggosub-section 1 (g), of the Act of 1883 or under section 1 of tho Act o . _

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_ Cl-lI’1'I‘Y, L.J., in concurring with the above, said: Sir Charles Palmer is undoubtedly a judgment debtor. Brims is the judgment creditor, and he has a perfect legal right to issue a bankruptcy notice and enforce his judgment. The legal document which has been referred to is at most, in my opinion, an equitable assignment of the judgment debt, and the estate remains vested in Brims. Even assuming it to be a good equitable assignment then Brims would be a trustee, and I cannot say he does not come within section 4, sub-section 1 (g), of the Bankruptcy Act of 1883. I am content to rest my judgment on this short statement. Section 1 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1890, does not cut down the rights of Brims under section_4, sub-section 1 (y), of the Act of 1883. There is nothing in the words in section 1 of the Act of 1890 to show that Brims, who has obtained judgment and who is trustee of it for another person, in any way has his rights under section 4, sub-section l (g), of the Act cut down.

Coi.i.iivs, L.J.—Agreed. Appeal 8l10WQd..—-COUNSEL, Pickford, Q.C., and Macintosh,‘ Marshall Hall and R. E. Moore. Souciroas, J. E. Q-H. Scott ; Baker, Folder, 4- Upportrm.

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A solicitor neglected to take out his certificate on the 15th of November, 1896, and during the period before he again obtained a certificate (which he did in March, 1897) did work as a solicitor for the client. A common order for delivery of the bill was obtained by the client. On taxation the taxing-master a lowed costs for the work done while the solicitor had no certificate, following Re Jones (L. R 9 Eq. 63). This was an appeal from the taxing-master‘s decision, and it was said that 37 & 38 Vict. c. 68, s. 12, differed from 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, s. 26. For the solicitor it was said that the statute only prevented the solicitor from suing, but did not destroy the debt, and that the submission of the client to pay what was due upon taxation was a waiver of the statute. Kemp v. Ward (70 L. T. 614) and Re Simmons (15 Q. B. D. 348) were cited in addition to the cases referred to by North, J .

Nonrn, J .—During a period between the 15th of November, 1896, and March, 1897, the solicitor was disqualified. by not taking out a certificate. Ought charges in respect of this period to be struck out? Re Jones is relied upon, and the taxing-master said it was questionable if he could overrule the case. “ I think it is for the court to overrule it and not for mo, as it is an express decision upon the point." The question is, if that case has not been rendered inapplicable by the passing of a statute in different language? And I think that the effect of the statute of 1876 is to make the conclusion of the taxing-master wrong, as Ra Jams was a decision under 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73, s. 26. It was a case in which the client submitted to pay to the solicitor what was due to him. In another case, Re Hope (L. R. 7 Ch. 7 66), in which a plaintiff took successful proceedings, an attempt was made by the defendant, who was ordered to pay costs, to avoid payment upon the ground that during dpart of the time the plaintii‘f’s solicitor was not duly qualified. It was hel , however, under the old law that he could recover. Then section 12 of the Act of 187-1 was passed. In a case under that Act (Fowler v. lllonmoutksliirs Railway and Canal Co., 4 Q. B. D. 334), where a successful plaintiff recovered costs, the defendant successfully objected to any costs being paid for the time during which the plaintiff's solicitor had no certificate. The summons asks for an order in the common form for a delivery of the bill. Whatever the client has to pay ought to be paid before papers are given up by the solicitor. Something is due to the solicitor for the time during which he acted while duly qualified, and the client has submitted to pay what is due. Reading the 12th section of the Act of 1874 I do not see how any costs whatever can be recovered for the period during which the solicitor was not qualified. The fact that before the Act such costs could be recovered from the opposite party, but that since the Act they could not, shews clearly that an alteration was made by the Act. It would be a curious state of the law if the solicitor could recover such costs from his client, but the client could not recover them from the opgpsite party. Re Hops (L. R. 7 Ch. 766) has not been overruled, but the 'fference made by the Act of 1876 is pointed out in Fowler v. lllonmouthshirs Railway and Canal 0o. (4 Q. B. D. 334). During the time the solicitor was not qualified he was not a solicitor at all, and a submission to pay the amount due to him on taxation is not a submission to pay the amount due to him for work done as a solicitor during the time he was not qualified. The client claims his papers, the solicitor claims his costs, but the solicitor is only entitled to receive costs which he can charge. I think that I must decide

that the Act of 1874 differs from tho former Act, and that the solicitor can recover nothing in respect of costs during his period of disqualification.—Coousi;i., Rowdm; Napier. SOLICITORS, Greig Q» Co.

[Reported by G. B. HAMILTON, Barrister-at-Iziw.]

J . J . Miller (says the Albany Law Journal) proposes to test the question in the courts of whether a railroad corporation is liable for damages by permitting a passenger to snore all night, and thus keep awake all the other passengers. The case grows out 0 the experience Miller had with Sheriff Bills, who, it is alleged, snored in such tones as to prevent all the other passengers on tho west-bound Santa Fe train from sleeping. Miller believes

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the railroad compaanies are liable for damages in thus rasping tho nerves of the travelling pu lic, and this test case, if he wins, will compo the companies to awaken snoring passengers. 1

THE LAND TRANSFER ACT, 1891.

Rnr-oar or run GENERAL Puiirosas Conuirraii or THE Lormorv Coimii COUNCIL.

21st January, 1898.

On the 30th of November a preliminary report was made to the Council on the Land Transfer Act, 1897, and in accordance with the intimation contained therein, we are now in a position to report more fully on the subject. Before dealing in detail with the Act of 1897, it may perhaps be well to refer to previous legislation in connection with the registration of titles to land—viz., (a) The Middlesex Registry Act (7 Anne, c. 20); (b) The Land Registry Act, 1862; (s) The Land Transfer Act, 1875.

_ (a) Tho llfiddlaea Registry Aot.] The register established under this Act is not a register of title, but a register of deeds and wills affecting hind. It does not apply to the City of London or to Serjeants' Inn, the Inns of Court, or the Inns of Chancery. With these exceptions, it applies to the whole administrative county of London north of the Thames, which formerly formed part of the county of Middlesex. Under it prior registration by a purchaser or mortgagee for valuable consideration might give a better title to the land than a person would have, claiming under s

eed of earlier date if he had delayed to register his deed, or had not registered it at all.

(b) The Land Registry Act, 1862.] This Act applied to England only. It provided for the registration of titles as indefeasible—that is, as good against the whole world; and the examination of the title was therefore necessarily severe and carried back a long way (it is believed sixty years) before registration of a title under it as indefeasible could be obtained. Registration under this Act was put an end to by section 125 of the Act of 1875, and, under section 126 of that Act some titles registered under the Act of 1862 have been registered under the Act of 1875. The Act oi 1862 has ceased to have any operation except as to titles remaining registered under it and the dealings with the properties so registered.

(r) The Land T1-an.gf‘er AM, 1875.—This Act applies to England and \Vii.les. It enables titles to be registered as absolute, qualified, or possessory only. It applies to freehold and leasehold land, but notto copyhold land. First registration under this Act of a person as proprietor of freehold land with an absolute title vests in such person (section 7) the fee simple, subject (a) to any incumbrances entered on the register, and (b) subject, unless the contrary is expressed on the register, tosuch liabilities, rights, and interests as are by the Act declared not to be incumbrances. such as (section 18) succession and estate duty, tithes, land tax, rights of common way, water, and other easements and leases, and tenancies not exceeding 21 years where there is occupation under such tenancies, and rights to the mines and minerals, and (c) also subject, where the first proprietor is not entitled for his own benefit as between himself and persons claiming under him, to any unregistered estates, rights, interests, or equities of such persons. First registration of a person as proprietor of freehold land, with a qualified title, has (section 9) the same effect as registration with an absolute title, except that it does not affect or prejudice the enforcement of any estate right or interest excepted on the register. This species of registration is made only where a person has applied to be registered with an absolute title, but the registrar considers that the title can only be established for a limited period or subjectto reservations. This appears to rest entirely with the registrar, and it follows that a person who believes he has an absolute title, and applies to be registered accordingly, may, though in the ordinary way he might have no difiiculty in selling under proper conditions as an absolute owns?» have a slur cast on his title by being registered, without his consent, as ii proprietor with a qualified title only. An applicant cannot (section 6) be registered as proprietor with an absolute title until his title is shewn to and approved by the registrar. First registration of a person as proprietbl of freehold land, with a possessory title only, does not (section 8) a ect 9! prejudice the enforcement of any estate right or interest adverse to or in derogation of the title of such proprietor, and subsisting or capable of arising at the time of registration, but, save as aforesaid (which practically amounts to subject to anyone else having a better title), has the same effect as registration with an absolute title. An applicant may be registered as proprietor, with a possessory title only, on giving (section 6) such evidence and serving such notices as may be prescribed. Under the present rules this seems to amount only to making a statutory declaration that he is entitled to the fee simple and producing his last document of title, if any. It is manifest, therefore, that no one can safely purchase from a person whose title is registered only as possessory, witbvllt insisting on an investigation of the title to as full an extent as would be required if he were not registered at all, at any rate until so long after the registration that by lapse of time the defect has been cured or modified. In the absence of conditions in a contract for sale and purchase of freehold land limiting the title to be shown, a purchaseris entitled to a forty yew title. As a rule, where the council is buying under compulsory p0WB1‘_9» it declines to allow limitations on the title to be shewn to be inserted 11! the contract fixing the price, and a forty years’ title is generally asked 1'0!’ and commonly obtained, though a shorter title has to be taken in s0H1_6 cases where there is dificulty in obtaining a full forty years’ title, and ll? is considered that a shorter title may safely be taken. In purchfllflf under the Housing of the Working Classes Act, 1890, a twenty yam title, or even a shorter title commencing with a conveyance on sslfii °"1Y is required in the first instance, because the Act so provides (prob!-b1_Y with a view to economy) in this class of cases, and the earlier title ll called for only where the abstract of this short title discloses matte" which appear to make this necessary for safety. The investigation of title by the Conveyancing Department of the Council is no doubt strict. and the fact that the Council in selling their superfluous lands acquired

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under compulsory powers shews no title to a purchaser renders it more imperative that it should be strict. It is chiefly because the investigation of title by the Conveyancing Department is believed, outside the oflice, to be strictly and carefully conducted, that the Council is able, without depreciating its property, to sell it without showing any title. With regard to the registration of title to leasehold land, the provisions of the Act of 1875 are of a simllar nature, having regard to the difference of tenure, to those with respect to freehold land, except that a possessory title cannot be registered. Where the title is registered under the Act of 1875, registration of deeds relating to it in the Middlesex Registry is now unnecessary. From a return presented to the House of Commons on the 3rd of September, 1895, and extending over the whole period the Acts had been in force down to the 3lst of December, 1894, it appears that—(a) Under the Act of 1862, out of the whole of England, 411 titles only were registered, and of these fifteen were subsequently withdrawn from the register, and 237 transferred to the register under the Act of 1875, leaving apparently 159 only of the original titles registered under the Act of 1862 remaining on the register under that Act. Of course the number of separate titles now appearing on that register may by sub-division have become much greater ; (6) under the Act of 1875, out of the whole of England and Wales, 299 titles only were registered. This of course does not include the titles originally registered under the Act of 1862, and transferred to the register under the Act of 1875. From the same return it appears that the number of deeds registered in the Middlesex Registry during the three years 1892, 1893, 1894, averaged 39,078 annually. It is not possible to estimate what proportion of this number represented conveyances on sale, or in what proportion the conveyances on sale were divided between freehold and leasehold properties.

The new Av! r»j'1897.—Whereas under the Acts of 1862 and 1875 registration of title was voluntary, under the new Act cmnpulsory registration is now as an experiment to be tried in some one county or part of a county. Tho other main feature of the Act is that an insurance fund is to be established for compensating persons who may suffer loss by reason of an error or omission in the register not capable of rectification. Under section 20 of the Act of 1897 power is given to Her Majesty by Order in Council to declare, as respects any county or part of a county that, after a specified day, registration of title to land is to be compulsory on sale, and thereupon a person shall not under any conveyance on sale executed on or after the day specified acquire the legal estate in any freehold land in that county or part of s. county unless or until he is registered as proprietor of the land. Six months before any order is made notice is to be given to the council of the county affected. A draft of the proposed order with the name of a place within, or conveniently near, the county where a district registry office will be established is to accompany the notice and to be published inthe Gazette. If within three months after receipt of the draft the county council, at a meeting specially called for the purpose, at which two-thirds of the whole number of members shall be present, resolve, and communicate to the Privy Council their resolution, that in their opinion compulsory registration of title would not be desirable in their county, the order is not to be made. An order when made must within 30 days from its date, if Parliament be then sitting, or within 20 days of the commencement of the next session if Parliament be not sitting, be laid on the table of both Houses of Parliament, and if, within 40 days of any order being so laid, an address in either House disapproving of such order be carried, such order is to be void. Any order is to be made with due regard to the utilization of any land registry existing in the county in which compulsory registration is to be applied, or in any adjoining county. Compulsion, however, is not to be extended by any further Order in Council to any other county or part of s. county for three years after t-he first order, and then only, in the case of each county, if the county council of that county, pursuant to a resolution passed at a meeting at which two-thirds of the whole number of members are present, signifies its desire that it shall be. As stated in the report to the Council on the 30th of November, the following notice and draft order have been received from the Privy Council Ofllce—

Privy Council Ofllce, Whitehall, 19th November, 1897.

Sir,—-I am directed by the Lord President of the Council to give notice to the County Council of London, iusuant to section 20, sub-section (5), of the Land Transfer Act, 1897, that it is proposed to make an order under that section applying part 3 of the Act to the c/ounty of London.

A draft of the proapose order is enclosed herewith, and it is intended that the existing Lan Registry in Lincoln's-inn-fields shall be the place where the registry shall be established, together with such other places as ma be thought proper, having regard to the convenience of the districts to he affected by the order.

The Lord President will be glad to receive and consider any suggestions which may be made by the County Council as to the final form of the proposed order.

A draft of proposed rules under the Act is in preparation; information on the subject can be obtained at the Land Registry, Lincoln's-inn-fields, and any suggestions as to the rules which the County Council may desire to offer wil be forwarded by the Lord President for the consideration of the Lord Chancellor and the other statutory authorities in relation to such rules.-I am, Sir, your obedient servant, (Signed) C. L. Past.

The Clerk to the London County Council, Spring-gardens.

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As respects the County of London, on and after the First day of July, 1898, registration of title to land is to be compulsory on sale.

This order may be amended or added to or repealed by Order in Council.

Although the lst of January was the date fixed for the Act to come into operation, the above not co was given before that dat/e, presumably under section 3'7 of the Interpretation Act, 1889, which authorizes the giving, at any time after the passing of an Act, of all notices necessary or expedient to be given to brmg such an Act into operation, unless the contrary intention appears therein. Assuming that that section applies to the Land Transfer Act, the notice having been given on the 19th of November, the three months during which the Council has the power of execising its veto will expire on the 19th of February. As stated in our previous report a communication has been addressed to the City Corporation and other bodies, asking them, should they desire to do so, to state their views on the question of the Act being applied to London. Communications were addressed to the following bodies— City Corporation, vestries and district boards, seventeen railway companies, Incorporated Law Society, Institute of Bankers, Surveyors’ Institution, Auctioneers’ Institute, School Board for London, Ecclesiastical Commissioners, Building Societies’ Association, Bridewell Royal Hospital, Lord Portman.

The replies received are tabulated below. The following bodies have on their own initiative sent in petitions and letters: Birlrbeck Freehold Land Society, British Land Co., Chelsea Permanent Building Society, Kensington Permanent Benefit Building Society, London ermanent Benefit Building Society, Property and Estates Co. (Limited), Royal Benefit Building Societ , Union of House and Land Investors (Limited). From the following tabulated statement of the communications received it will be seen that 13 are in favour of the Act being applied to London or part of London, and that 44 are against:

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,, Camberwell. ,, Clerkenwell. ,, Hampstead. ,, Fulham. ,, Shoreditch. ,, Hammersmith. ,, St. George, Hanover- ,, Isllngton. square. ,, Kens ug;on. Vestry of St. George-the-Martyr. ,, Lambet . ,, St. George-in-the-East. ,, Paddington. ,, St. Luke. ,, Plumstead. ,, St. Pancras. Rotherhithe.

Greenwich District Board. Limehouse District Board. St. 0lave’s District Board.

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John, Westminster. Vestry of St. Marylebone. ,, Stoke Newington. Holborn District Board. Lee District Board. St. Giles District Board. St. Saviour’s District Board. Strand District Board. Wandsworth District Board. Whitechapel District Board.

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The following have stated that they have no desire to express an opinion on the subject : West London Extension Railway Co., Bridewell Royal Hospital, Surveyors’ Institution, Vestry of St. Martin-in-theFields. Two only of the vestries and district boards which are in favour of the application of the Act to London have given reasons for their decisions. They are as follows :

(1.) Compulsory registration will act as a great safeguard, will make more easy and economical the transfer of land and property, and will also lessen the possibility of forged mortgages.

(2.) Vast number of properties which would be affected, and the immense value, complexity, and importance of the interests involved.

The following are shortly the chief reasons urged against the application of the Act to London:

(A) By vcstrics and district boards —

1. Large number of properties which would be affected and the value, complexity, and importance of the interests involved.

2. Compulsory registration would seriously add to the difldculty, expense, and d_elay of buying, selling, or mortgaging property.

3. Registration whilst optional has met with but little favour, and has involved great expense and delay.

4. If the Act should first be applied to a part of London, and failure ensue, considerable confusion would arise from one part of the country being dealt with differently to the rest.

(B) By Railway Cauzpanic-s— .

The railway companies from whom replies have been received appear to be satisfied with the existing law, and to see no necessity for compulsory registration, “ which to railway companies using compulsory powers would be an inconvenience and trouble rather than otherwise.” The companies are of opinion that if the experiment of compulsory registration is to be tried it should be restricted to as small an area as possible. It is pointed out that the position of a railway company is somewhat exceptional, as the bulk of their property is bought to hold permanently. Additional expense is also given as a reason.

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1. Act should first be applied to a county in which the dealings with land are less vast.

2. If applied to London at all, the Act should only ap ly to so much of one or other of the counties of Essex, Surrey, and) Kent as lies within the county of London, so as to leave undisturbed the Middlesex Registry,

(n) Building Societies’ Association

The great number of roperties which would be aifected and the immense value, complexity, and importance of the interests involved.

In addition to this reason, the eight building and land societies from whom, as mentioned above, petitions and letters have been received, urge the following

1. The present system of land transfer by deed has worked well, and has many advantages over compulsory registration.

2. The existing land registry has failed to attract, and has been a cause of delay and expense in transactions there registered.

'3. Compulsory resort to a Government oifice for carrying out private business transactions is undesirable.

4. Attention is called to a Bill introduced into the House of Lords, by Lord Davey, last session and read a second time, which it is understood will be re-introduced next session, and from any benefits which might arise therefrom London will be excluded if the Land Transfer Act is applied to that county.

5. A qualified certificate, which would cover b.th serious and trivial defects of title, could not fail to depreciate the value of the property to which it referred.

6. The Birkbeck Freehold Land Society and the British Land Co. (Limited) among other reasons point out that the vast number of transactions in the sale and purchase of property in the county of London could hardly fail to overwhelm the powers of a newlystarted organization, and for that reason alone a smaller area. for the initial trial should be selected.

(3) Ecclesiastical Commissioners

1. Expense.

2. Delay.

3. Purchasers will practically be precluded from accepting a marketable, although not perfect, title without considerable risk of having the title registered with some detrimental qualification.

4. Compulsory registration would probably impede the operation of many of the statutes administered by the Commissioners.

5. Act should first be applied to a more restricted area, and one presenting fewer difilculties than London.

(F) Incorporated Law Society

1. Volume and importance of the conveyancing business in London.

2. Uncertainty and error which would arise in that portion of Middlesex within the county of London owing to the existence of a dual system of registration—-viz., registration of deeds and the compulsory registration of title.

3. If compulsory registration is a plied under clause 6 (g) to leaseholds the result will be that compulsory registration will apply to all dealings with the leasehol title but not to dealings with the freehold, provided it remains unsold; and that if the system be not applied to leaseholds the reverse will happen.

(0) Institute of Bankin

As. compulsory registration isfadmittedly an experiment and one as to which there is considerable difference of opinion, the experiment should not be made in so largo an area as London.

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The draft order making registration of title to land compulsory on sale, affects the county of London—i.c., the whole county. The draft order states, however, that “ this order may be amended or added to or repealed by Order in Council.” In the letter from the Privy Council it is stated that “the Lord President will be glad to receive and consider any suggestions which may be made by the County Council as to the final form of the proposed order.” The questions for the decision of the Council are therefore (1) whether the Council should by resolution veto the ap lication of the Act to London; or (2) whether the Act should be applied) to the county of London, and, if so, whether it should be applied to the whole or only to part of the county. As the result of further communication with the Privy Council the following letter has been

receivedPrivy Council Oflice, Whitehall, 18th January, 1898. Sir,—I am directed by the Lord President of the Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 17th inst., with reference to thc draft of a proposed Order in Council for applying Part III. of the Lind Transfer Act, 1897, to the county of London. In reply, I am to state for the information of the London County Council that the form which the final Order in Council, for giving effect to the compulsory clauses of the Land Transfer Act, 1897, will take, will no doubt be settled with due regard to any suggestions which may be received from the County Council. But the intention at present is that the Order shall be made to take effect progressively according to a division of the county into convenient areas not less than four in number. The first area comprising one-fourth or less of the county would be selected with a view to the utilization of _the existing ofiices in Lincoln's-iiiu-flelds as the Land Registry of the district. This method of carrying the Order into effect will have the advantage of not throwing immediately a very heavy burden on the registry, and will also afford such an opportunity as the County Council appear to desire of estimating the value of the work as it proceeds, and of watching generally the progress of the Act. I am to add that any representations which their experience of the Act might lead the County Council to make, would undoubtedly receive careful consideration.—I am, Sir, your obedient servant, C. L. PastThe Clerk of the London County Council, Spring-gardens. S.W. Having regard to the above letter, we are not prepared to rec )l1111Bl1l the Council to veto the application of the Act to London, but in order that members of the Council may have an opportunity of discussing lht matter, we think that a date should be fixed for a special meeting in accordance with section 20 (6) of the Act, and we therefore recommendThat the meeting of the Council of the 15th February, 1898, be ll meeting specially called for the purpose of considering the questwll of the application of the Land Transfer Act, 1897, to London. R. Mnr.vrr.r. Bsacncuorr, Chairman.

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The Lord Chief Justice took the chair on the 21st inst. at the third annual dinner of this society.

Loni) Russann, in proposing the toast of the evening, glanced at the subjects debated by the society, and incidentally remarked that he could 11°l7 see why in counties as well as in towns the quarter sessions should 110$ always have a trained legal president. His lordship proceeded as followfli It will be seen that these questions which you have discussed are ing6!!l°'“ and might afford opportunities for the play of sharp wit. But after all H19)’ are within a very narrow area. One cannot forget what Edmund Burl" once said about the law, that there was no profession which had so great an influence in sharpening the wit of man but none which had a greater tendency to narrow the intellect unless it was counterbalanced by some other study. Therefore I would advise the society to widen the area 0_f_ll5 discussion. I suggest that the proper mode of doing so would be by invitws' papers upon, say, some branch of the law, or if you like upon the Fringe‘ meat of tho judiciary, or upon anything wider than a technical point. lfl ll great community such as you have here, it might be worth oonsiderulg whether the membership of persons other than those interested in the practico of the law our-rht not to be sought by the association. There are people who H0 inclined to that these debating societies serve no useful purpose In 5"‘ opinion I don't at all agree. The uses of such bodies I conceive to be thtlw —that they create in the minds of ambitious youths a desire to take plfl 1" discussions and with that view to set upon an inquiry in a field of inform!tion which,otherwise they might never have travelled. To my mind: “N first use of a society like this is its social use, its bringing together 0_f Y°‘“'§ men to rub off the sharp edges of their peculiarities and prejudloel, "-11 creatin among them a standard of opinion which is useful to each and lo all. Tie next use of a society is that it prompts a desire of information-tug place only in the third rank that which l see often placed orroneolllll’ 1“ hrst—namely, facility of speech. On that subject a great deal of hetar0d°! opinion prevails. I do not at all underrate the imp "rtance Of °l°'“' direct, incisive speech. Clearness above all things, with incisivenvhis and directness next, are qualities which stand by any men W °

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has to use his tongue. But while I have known. hundreds of men who could, with facility and elegance, not to say glibness, say nothing, I have never known a man who had anything worth saying, who was not in command of adequate language to say it. Therefore the central idea that I want to impress on young men in these societies is not to get up for the sake of talking, but to keep their seats unless they have something to say. These associations and others are but branches of our system of legal education, and I have never lost a legitimate opportunity of explaining my view that the stato of legal education in this country, whether for what is called the higher or what is called the lower branch of the profession is not what it ought tobe. I was asked by the present Master of the Rolls, one of the most admirable judges that ever adorned the English Bench-—to preside in 1895 at a meeting of the body charged in connection with the Inns of Court with the legal education of students for the Bar. On that occasion, while giving credit to that body for their efforts, I said,as I say now, that our legal education is absolutely unworthy of the community and of our great profession. It isa strange thing that the faculty of the law, the profession of the law, is less esteemed and holds in this country a less exalted position than in any other country of Europe, and one much below that which it holds in the United States. I do not think that any new scheme of legal education of this country will be successful until we have a great school of law, for which London would be an admirable centre; or a. great faculty of law in a teaching University for London which should be in some respects under the control of the Inns of Court. This is true as regards both branches of the profession. I don’t mean to say with reference to either that there are not adequate means of learning the ordinary hum-drum work respectably. That is learnt by solicitors as articled clerks practising in their employers’ ofiices. As far as young barristers are concerned it is learnt in the chambers of counsel. But I um looking for something broader, higher, wider than anything of that kind. I am looking for a state of things that would produce in time what this country lacks~a professional class of lawyers, 3 body of juriseonsults, who would be looked up to by foreigners as well as by ourselves, as we look up to the reat writers on law that belong to other lands—men who write not me-reIy for their own day or for some particular object, but for the sake of the science, and to elevate the views of those who profess that science. I am veriyioglad to see that a scheme for the establishment of a Teaching University for ndon is now being widely discussed. I hope that both branches of our profession will help forward that object, and will take their share in establishing in connection with it a great legal faculty properly supported by the Inns of Court and by other public institutions, which may fairly be expected to contribute to such a great national object. If the movement is carried out in the way I hope for, we shall have in London—tho place of all places in the world best for such an institution—a university where not only the youth of this land, but the youth of all lands may learn the profession of the law. In the great Empire of which England for-ms so important a part twenty different systems of law are administered. In some places there is French law, with modifications; in others, Hindoo and Mohammedan law, with modifications; in others, again, Dutch law; in some places Spanish law, and in Scotland to this day Roman law to s. large extent. Therefore, if ever there was a country which required such a school of law as I have described, this country requires it. If ever there was a place affording an adequate site for such a school, surely London affords it. I feel strongly on this subject for its own sake, and for the intrinsic needs and merits of the question. I confess also that from my standpoint as a member of the bar I take another and a strong view in relation to it. It is thi~J—-members of the bar possess to-day many privileges, they have exclusive audience in the High Court, they have pre-audience in other courts, and there are many posts for which a barrister of seven years’ standing is eligible, and for which no member of any other profession is eligible. A barrister of seven years’ standing may be made almost anything short of an Archbishop. But this world is an inquiring world. This age is an inquiring age. Every institution and every privilege is rightly brought to the test of experience and utility, and I want to know how the Bar of England can maintain these exclusive rights and privileges unless its members are able to show that they possess exclusive merits and exclusive attainments. But thisis by the way. The observations I am addressing to you cover this position, that the profession of the law is as high as any, that the proper administration of the sw is perhaps the greatest and highest permanent interest in any community, and that it behoves all concerned in the law to do what they can to make its professors worthy of the great system they seek to administer.

The toast having been duly honoured, Mr. Cochran, in responding, said the society had more members than ever before. At the instance of Mr. J . F. J . Rawlinson, Q.C., the toast of the President's health was drunk with great cordiality.

CALLS TO Tl-IE BAR.

The following gentlemen were called to the Bar on Wednesday :-

L1xcox.s's I1m.—Andrew Henry Withers, LL.B., London University; Gokal Chand Badhwar, B.A., LL.B., Christ's Colle e, Cambridge; Alfred Loosemore, Brasenose College, Oxford; Tribhovandas Manekchand Doshi, B.A., Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge; Frederick Richard Finch, Balliol College, Oxford; Charles John Asthury, Brasenose College, Oxford; Raghoonath Mahadewa Doye, Ahmed Hassen, Paul Peter Pillai, William Victor Degazon, \Valter Strachan, and Pandit Bishen Lal Kaul.

Imus T1zurr.s.—Henry Sulivan Hartnoll, Oxford; Godfrey Rathbone Benson, M.A., Oxford; Theodore Byrom Hope, B.A., Cambridge; John Cyril Bouverie Luxmoore, B.A., Cambrid e; Nalina Kanta Banerjee; Foster Machlahon Mahon, Oxford; gtrivalinga Chanbasappa Hosali, Oxford; Robert Stephan Vere O'Brien, B.A., LL.B., Cambri ge; Syed Hasan, Cambridge; Frederick Thomas Henry Henlé, B.A.,

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Oxford; Acheson Fitz Gerald Henderson, B.A., Cambridge; Larcelles Atkinson Lucas, B.A., Cambridge; the Hon. Anthony Morten Henley, B.A., Oxford; Harry Barnston, B.A., Oxford; Maurice Mills Baker, M.A., Oxford; Herbert Churchill Wrigley Grimshaw, B.A., Dublin; William North Symonds, B.A., Cambridge; Robert Anstruther Bullock Marsham, B.A., Oxford; John Hall Barron, B.A., Oxford; Raymund Cecil Edward Allen, M.A., Cambridge; George Camlpbell Deane, B.A., Oxford; Percy Merceron Burton, B.A., Cambridge; hurlow Richardson Ubsdell, B.A., bridge; and Nicolas Patrick Augustus Murphy.

MIDDLE Tsxr1.s.—Georg;a Turner, M.A., St. Catherine’s College, Cambridge; Gwyn Morris, LL. ., London University and University of \Vales; Sheikh Ahmed Hussian Khan; Deep Narayan Singh; \Villie Jack Trevor Turton, B.A., Cambridge; Manilal Motichand Doshi, B.A. , Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge; Charles Henrv Edwards, B.A., Oxford ; Gerald Philbrick Walker, B.A, Trinity Hall, Cambridge; George Percy Wamer Tor ; Ernest \Vrigly Perkins; George Francis Vlfontworth Luke Dillon; Chailias Alan Henry, B.A.; Frank \Valter Raffety ; George Addison-Smith, Advocate of the Scotch Bar; William Henry Owen, LL.B., London University.

Gnxfs Iuu.—Hemanta Kumar Mullick, Thomas Josiah Thompson (Durham University), Ali Akbar Hussanally, Robert Alfred Leach, Edwin Austin Sydney Charles Nichols Goodman, B.A. (London University), and Ernest Lewis Hopkins.

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Scan Scholarship.-—Edgar Nathan Richard Kahn being, in the opinion of the Council, the candidate best acquainted with the Theory, Principles, and Practice of Law, they have awarded to him the scholarship founded by Mr. James Scott, of Lincoln's-inn-fields. Mr. Kahn served his clerkship with Mr. William Moore Shirrelf, of London, and obtained the prize of the Honourable Society of Clernent.’s Inn, the Daniel Reardon Prize, :i.1§d7the John Mackrell Prize at the Honours Examination held in April,

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Broderip P1-i:e.—Edgar Nathan Richard Kahn being first in order of merit, and having shewn himself best acquainted with the Law of Real Property and the Practice of Conveyancing, passed a satisfactory examination, and attained honorary distinction, the Council have also awarded to him the prize, consisting of a gold medal, founded by Mr. Francis Broderip, of Lincoln’s-inn.

LOCAL Pmzss.

Timpron Martin Prize for Candidates from Liverpool.—Percy James Taylor, from among the candidates from Liverpool, having passed the best examination, and attained honorary distinction, the Council have awarded to him the prize, consisting of a gold medal, founded by Mr. Timpron Martin, of Liverpool. Mr. Taylor served his clerkship with Messrs. J . B. \Vilson, Dean, & Mcllastar, of Liverpool, and obtained a First Class certificate and prize of the Incorporated Law Society at the Honours Examination held in J une, 1897.

Atkinson Prize for Candidates from Liverpool or Pruton.—Percy James Taylor, from among the candidates from Liverpool or Preston, having shewn himself best acquainted with the Law of Real Property and the Practice of Conveyancing, otherwise passed a satisfactory examination, and attained honorary distinction, the Council have also awarded to him the prize, consisting of a gold medal, founded by Mr. John Atkinson, of Liverpool.

Birmingham Law Society’: Gold Medal.-The examiners reported that there was no one qualified to take this prize.

Birmingham Law Social}/'s Bronze 1l[vrial.—John William Cocks being first in order of merit among the candidates who are articled to members of the Birmingham Law Society, and attained honorary distinction, the Council have awarded to him the bronze medal of the Birmingham Law Society. Mr. Cocks served his clerkship with Mr. Henry John Osborne, of Shifnal and Birmingham, and Messrs. Robins, Hay, Waters, & Hay, of London, and obtained a Second Class certificate at the Honours Examination held in June, 1897.

Stephen Heelis Prize for Uafldirlates from Hanchestn or Sa{forrl.—I’ercy Hibbert, from among the candidates from Manchester or Salford, having passed the best examination, and attained honorary distinction, the Council have awarded to him the prize, consisting of a gold medal, founded in memory of the late Mr. Stephen Heelis, of Manchester. Mr. Hibbert served his clerkship with Mr. ohn Dendy, of the firm of Messrs. Dendy 8: Paterson, of Manchester, and obtained a Second Class certificate at the Honours Examination in June, 1897.

The Mellerah P1~i:e.—Henry Cane, from among candidates who have been articled in the counties of Surrey or Sussex, or who are the sons of solicitors who have resided or practised in either of those counties, having shewn himself best acquainted with the Law of Real Property and the Practice of Conveyancing, the Council have awarded to him the prize founded by the late Mr. Robert Edmund Mellersh, of Godalming. Mr. Cane served his clerkship with Mr. John Colbatch Clark, of the firm of Messrs. Colbatoh Clark & Son, of Brighton, and obtained a Third Class certificate at the Honours Examination held in November, 1897.

LAVV ST UDENIS’ SOCIETIES.

Law Srvosnrs’ Dsnsrrso Socrs'rr.—Jan. 25-Chairman, Mr. Neville Tebbutt.—Tho subject for debate was: “ That the law as laid down in Allen v. Flood requires amendment (see limes newspaper of the 15th of December, 1897).” Mr. Horace E. Miller opened in the affirmative;

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