the right to deliver a statement of claim depend upon a direction to that effect in the order for directions.

(b) The annulment of ord. 20, r. 1 (c) and (d), and the issue of a new rule making the time for statement of claim to be that limited by the order for directions, or, if no time be therein limited, then six weeks from the date of such order. 3.-Annul ord. 21, rr. 6 and 7, and in their place make rules fixing the time for defence with due regard to the fact that in some cases the order for directions fixes the time, and in some cases it does not do so. Where the order omits to fix a time it should be ten days from the delivery of the statement of claim. 4.-Alter ord. 30, r. 8, so as to allow the plaintiff at least twenty-one days or a month within which to issue his summons for directions. The effect of shortening this time is, in the great majority of cases, merely to compel the plaintiff to apply

before he knows what to ask for.

5. To annul Supreme Court Fee No. 10, which fixes the fee for a summons for directions at 10s., and in lieu thereof to prescribe a fee of 3s. for a summons for directions, and a further fee of 3s. for every fresh insertion of the summons in the list. It is very hard that a party who only uses his summons once should pay the same high fee as one who uses it many times. 6.-Make clear the intention of the court where a defendant has obtained leave to defend under order 14 and makes default; either imposing on the plaintiff the necessity of issuing a eummons for directions or empowering him to proceed with the action without doing so.

7.-Amend ord. 30, r. 8, by providing that where a plaintiff fails to issue a summons for directions within the time limited, the defendant may either apply to dismiss, or may himself issue a summons for directions. At present he can only apply to dismiss, and although the rule empowers the court to give directions on the application, there is no power to re-insert the summons in the list as in the case of a summons for directions.

The above suggestions will, we think, be found to contain the solution of most of the difficulties which have arisen in the working of order 30. We are bound to say, however, that in order to protect the operation of that order from future causes of friction all the existing rules governing the interlocutory steps in an action ought to be thoroughly examined by some person conversant with practice with the special object of adapting any of them which may require it to the newly, imported principle upon which order 30 is based.

BIAS IN A JUDGE.

IT is, no doubt, as was said by MELLOR, J., in The Queen v. Allan (4 B. & S. 915), highly desirable that justice should be administered by persons who cannot be suspected of improper motives, and hence any person holding a judicial office is rightly precluded from acting in a matter in which he can reasonably be suspected of being biassed; but the doctrine of judicial disqualification on this ground would have been carried to an absurd length had it been allowed to prevail in Reg. v. Burton (46 W. R. 127). In that case a person named YOUNG, who was not a solicitor, wrote the following letter: "I am instructed by Mr. SUMMERS, your late butler, to apply to you for a month's wages in lieu of notice, and if not forthcoming within seven days I shall take proceedings in the county court to recover the same." Proceedings were consequently taken against him at the instance of the Council of the Incorporated Law Society, and in April, 1897, he was summoned and appeared before two justices in petty sessions at Tunbridge Wells on a charge of pretending to be a solicitor. He was convicted of the offence, and a fine was inflicted upon him. One of the justices, the chairman, was Mr. JOHN BURTON, a practising solicitor. YOUNG's solicitor knew of this at the time and called attention to the fact before the case was heard, but he declined to make any formal objection. Subsequently he discovered that Mr. BURTON was also a member of the Incorporated Law Society, and a rule nisi was obtained to set aside the conviction on the ground that Mr. BURTON was an interested

person.

In applications of this kind there is, as a rule, very little substance, and the present was no exception. But the ways in

which judicial bias may be produced are so numerous that it was possible to make various more or less plausible suggestions why Mr. BURTON was disqualified from exercising jurisdiction. The most obvious objection lay in the fact that Mr. BURTON was himself a solicitor, and it would have been interesting to have obtained from the court a decision whether this was in itself a disqualification. Inasmuch, however, as the objection had been waived at the hearing of the summons, there was no need to pronounce upon its validity. The case most nearly in point is Reg. v. Huggins (43 W. R. 329; 1895, 1 Q. B. 563). There an unqualified pilot was charged before justices and convicted, under the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, of assuming and continuing in charge of a ship after a qualified pilot had offered to take charge of her. MARTIN, one of the justices, was a qualified pilot carrying on business in the same district as the defendant, although he did not in fact compete with him, being in the exclusive employ of the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Co., who never employ unqualified pilots in any of their ships. The court held, however, that he was disqualified on the ground of bias, and the conviction was quashed. "We have to determine," said WILLS, J., "whether there was any actual bias, or a reasonable risk or apprehension of bias such as a fair man might reasonably entertain." And after pointing out that the facts of the case did not suggest any actual bias in MARTIN, he proceeded: "But he does belong to a small class of privileged persons for whose protection these proceedings against an unprivileged person were taken, and that seems to me to be a very important consideration."

In the present case LAWRANCE, J., pointed out that the solicitors for whose protection the proceedings were taken could not be described as a "small class," and he intimated that upon this ground Reg. v. Huggins was distinguishable. As already observed, the question did not require to be decided, and COLLINS, J., refrained from expressing any opinion. But it may be doubted whether the distinction is in fact maintainable. Doubtless solicitors as a whole are a large class, but in any particular place they are a small class, and the reasoning in Reg. v. Huggins seems to be applicable. The bench there consisted of six justices. "Suppose," said WILLS, J., "that all these six justices had been licensed pilots, or suppose, on the other hand, that they had all been unlicensed pilots, in neither case would anyone venture to say that the tribunal would have been a fair one? But if that be so, then the objection must equally exist when only one out of the six is a licensed pilot"; and he added: "It is far safer to enlarge the area of this class of objections to the qualifications of justices than to restrict it." It is difficult to find fault with this reasoning or to see how it does not equally apply whenever one of a privileged class exercises jurisdiction in a case where the privileges of the class have been invaded. In a clear case it may be obvious that no wrong is done by the concurrence of such a person in a conviction, but there cannot be the same confidence where the alleged invasion raises questions of difficulty.

Had it been possible, therefore, to rest the case of Reg. v. Burton, before the Divisional Court, on the fact of one of the justices being a solicitor, there would have been a good argument for setting aside the conviction. But when it was necessary to rely only upon the ground that Mr. BURTON was a member of the Incorporated Law Society, the case became much weaker. Two objections were suggested that he had a pecuniary interest in the result of the proceedings, and that he was in effect both prosecutor and judge. But the objection of pecuniary interest, although it requires little enough substance to support it, must still be based upon some semblance of reality. In Reg. v. Gaisford (1892, 1Q. B. 381) a magistrate was pecuniarly interested as a ratepayer in the result of proceedings before him, and there was no statute applicable to the case relieving him from disqualification. It was held that his pecuniary interest disqualified him. "It is well-known law," said A. L. SMITH, J., "that a man shall not act as a judge in a case in the decision of which he has a pecuniary interest unless relieved by statute; the fact that a man has even the slightest pecuniary interest operates to disqualify him from adjudicating

upon a case."

A ratepayer undoubtedly has an interest, however small, in proceedings which may have the result of increasing or diminish

ing the funds of the local authority. It is otherwise, however, with a member of a society who pays his subscription, but has no reasonable chance of ever participating in the funds of the society. The case is covered by the decision of FIELD and CAVE, JJ., in The Queen v. Justices of Deal (30 W. R. 154), where, in a prosecution at the instance of the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, it was objected that justices were disqualified who were subscribers to the local branch of the society. It appeared that the local branch had no control over the central society or its officers, nor could it interfere in any way with prosecutions by the society. It was held that the mere fact of subscribing to the local branch did not give the justices a pecuniary interest in the result of the proceedings. They would neither gain in the event of the society benefiting by the fine, nor would they lose in the event of its having to pay costs. The position of a member of the Incorporated Law Society is precisely the same, save that, in the event of the society being dissolved, he might possibly have a claim to participate in its assets. But this possibility is too remote to be taken into account. 'Although," said COLLINS, J., "I fully agree that actual pecuniary interest, however slight, will defeat the right of justices to sit in judgment, I think that interest must be actual-it must not be purely speculative and imaginary, based upon conditions barely conceivable, and certainly not conceivable as likely to exist within the lifetime of the person who is said to be interested in the funds of the society." The suggestion that Mr. BURTON was pecuniarily interested in the funds of the Incorporated Law Society certainly did not satisfy this test, and it afforded no ground for setting aside the conviction in which he had taken part.

There was equally little substance in the objection that Mr. BURTON had an interest in the matter as prosecutor. Such an objection is met both by The Queen v. Justices of Deal (supra) and Allinson v. General Medical Council (42 W. R. 289; 1894, 1 Q. B. 750). From the former case it appears that mere membership of the prosecuting society does not give a man an interest as prosecutor, if he has in fact no control over the prosecution. Although in a case of pecuniary interest, any interest, however small, is sufficient for disqualification, yet in other cases the question is whether the justice is substantially interested so as to have a real bias. In Allinson v. General Medical Council, where the impugned member of a court of inquiry might possibly in a technical sense be said to have taken part in the prosecution, Lord ESHER put the question thus: "Is the person in substance and in fact to be suspected of bias or improper motive?" In both these cases there was no reasonable ground of suspicion and the court decided against disqualification. There is equally no ground for suspicion that a solicitor will be biassed as a prosecutor in proceedings touching the privileges of the profession simply because he is a member of the Incorporated Law Society. To be a prosecutor he must also have some actual control over the prosecution. However important it may be to keep judicial proceedings from all semblance of unfairness, it is also important to base the allegation of partiality upon some substantial ground.

Handbook to the Estate Duty (Finance Acts, 1894 and 1896). A Manual of Law and Practice. By ALFRED W. SOWARD, of the Legacy and Succession Duty Office, Somerset House. Supplement to the Second Edition, comprising the New Matter of a Third Edition. Waterlow & Sons (Limited).

The Magistrates' Annual Practice, 1898. Being a Compendium of the Law and Practice relating to Matters Occupying the Attention of Courts of Summary Jurisdiction. With an Appendix of Statutes and Rules, List of Punishments, Diary for Magistrates, &c. By CHARLES MILNER ATKINSON, M.A., LL.M., Stipendiary Magistrate

for the City of Leeds. Stevens & Sons (Limited); Sweet & Maxwell (Limited). Price 18s.

The Law relating to the Friendly Societies Act, 1896, and the Collecting Societies and Industrial Assurance Companies Act, 1896. Together with an Appendix containing Model Rules and the Forms appended to the Treasury Regulations. By FRANK BADEN FULLER, Second Edition. William Clowes B.A. (Oxon), Barrister-at-Law. & Sons (Limited).

CORRESPONDENCE.

THE LAND TRANSFER ACT, 1897.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.]

Sir, The question in dispute between Mr. Lake and myself is a very simple one. One reason why I contend that compulsory registration should not be experimentally adopted in the county of London is, that the body of officials that the system would bring into existence would make it practically impossible ever to put an end to the system however unsuccessful it might be. Mr. Lake replies that if the selected area be limited to the county of Middlesex the present staff at the Land Registry need not be increased, as the substitution that in the event of failure the staff "will simply resume their of registration of title will, he asserts, not increase the work, and present duties and there will be no increased costs to bear." Assuming that the area could be limited in accordance with Mr. Lake's views, a moment's consideration of the work to be done under each of the systems respectively will, I submit, prove conclusively that Mr. Lake is mistaken.

The registration of a deed at the Middlesex Registry is a very simple process indeed compared to what registration of title will be, even if only a certificate of possessory title is required. Under the form. This memorial, after being examined at the office with the present practice the solicitor brings in a memorial in a recognized deed, is indexed and filed, and registration is then complete. The whole is merely routine work which any clerk can do in a very short time.

Very different, however, is the work that has to be done to register a title. We are told that "fraud and error are rendered extremely verifying the signatures, and perhaps of investigating the right of difficult." This involves some, as yet, unexplained method of the grantor to convey. A plan has to be provided which Mr. Lake has himself spoken of as "a fertile source of difficulty and expense.' Then the office" will draw up draft entries for the registrar, and in a few days the deed will be returned to the applicant and the draft entries will be settled with him." The worry, difficulty, and delay thus foreshadowed, especially if the matter is at all complicated, can only be imagined. Mr. Lake himself, in his paper which was read at Sheffield so recently as October last, said: "Every transaction will require more time and attention than is required for the regisof 1875 and 1897 is executive and not merely ministerial." tration of deeds, inasmuch as the act of the registrar under the Acts

There is another point. At present a uniform fee of 58. is payable on the registration of a memorial, but under the new Act ad valorem charges are substituted. Up to £1,000 this charge (in the case of possessory titles) is 6s. per cent. Thus, on a purchase of £1,000, the fee of 5s. now payable is increased to £3. If the new work is, as Mr. Lake suggests, no greater than the present work, will he kindly explain why the fees are to be so enormously increased? I think I am justified in asking again what is to be done with the officials that the new system will bring existence, if compulsory registration should turn out a failure? J. S. RUBINSTEIN.

5, Raymond-buildings, Gray's-inn, Jan. 18.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir, Mr. B. G. Lake, in his letter appearing in your issue of the 15th inst., says the Act of 1897 "contemplates the utilization of any existing land registry, and appears to point to Middlesex or Yorkshire as the area to be selected for experiment."

It does point to Middlesex, where there is an existing land registry (the only one in England), but not to Yorkshire, which has no land registry, but registers of deeds only for each of the three ridings. EDWARD BRAMLEY. 6, Paradise-square, Sheffield, Jan. 18.

A MATRIMONIAL DISASTER. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir, I am acting for a client who married on the 1st day of December last, and on the 14th of December a child was born to his wife which was not his child, which child is admitted by the wife to be another person's other than her husband's child.

Jan. 18.

LEX.

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CASES OF THE WEEK.
Court of Appeal.

GOWER v. COULDRIDGE AND OTHERS. No. I. 17th Jan. PRACTICE-PARTIES - JOINDER OF DEFENDANTS

CAUSES OF ACTION AGAINST SEVERAL DEFENDANTS-ORD. 16, RR. 4, 5; ORD. 18, R. 1. This was an appeal from an order of Day, J. The action was brought to recover damages from three defendants, C. V. Couldridge, A. Maw, and F. Newman, who were the promoters of a company called Richard Spurgeon (Limited), Couldridge and Maw being directors, and Newman the secretary. The plaintiff had applied for 500 preference shares in the company and had paid £500 in respect thereof. The plaintiff in his statement of claim alleged that the defendants Newman and Couldridge fraudulently conspired to promote and form the company for the purpose of buying and taking over a worthless business and to get the public, including the plaintiff, to take and pay for shares therein, their object being to receive for themselves large profits and emoluments and to shift the burden of the business on to those members of the public who might be induced to take shares. The plaintiff further alleged that the three defendants issued to the public, including the plaintiff, a prospectus containing untrue statements, which they knew to be untrue, and that he had been induced thereby to apply for the 500 shares. He further alleged that the three defendants were liable under the Directors' Liability Act, 1890. An order was made by the master that the plaintiff should elect whether he would discontinue the action against the defendant Maw or against the defendants Couldridge and Newman. On appeal Day, J., reversed this order. The defendant Maw appealed.

THE COURT (CHITTY and COLLINS, L.JJ.) allowed the appeal. CHITTY, L.J., said the action was founded on three distinct torts committed- as to the second and third, by all three defendants, and, as to the first, by two only. In his opinion the case was entirely governed by the decision of the House of Lords in Sadler v. Great Western Railway Co. (45 W. R. 51; 1896, A. C. 450), where it was held that claims for damages against two or more defendants in respect of their several liability for separate torts could not be combined in one action. An attempt had been made in vain to distinguish that case from the present. The plaintiff's counsel having elected, if the court should consider that the judge's order could not be sustained, to have all the allegations relating to the fraudulent conspiracy struck out of the statement of claim, an order would be made to that effect. COLLINS, L.J., Concurred.-COUNSEL, M. M. Macnaghten; Arthur Powell. SOLICITORS, Learoyd, James, & Mellor; T. Durant, for E. Cecil Durant, Windsor. [Reported by F. G. RUCKER, Barrister-at-Law.]

JAMIESON & CO. v. JAMIESON. No. 2. 12th, 13th, and 14th Jan. INJUNCTION-LABEL-PROBABILITY OF DECEPTION-DEFENDANT A TRADER CARRYING ON BUSINESS IN HIS OWN NAME-PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT ENGAGED IN SAME BUSINESS, AND OF SAME NAME-PASSING Off Goods as THOSE OF PLAintiff.

This was an appeal from a decision of Byrne, J., who had granted an injunction restraining the defendant, George Jamieson, from using in his business as a manufacturer and seller of harness composition certain labels which, the plaintiffs alleged, were calculated and intended to lead the public to believe that his harness composition was that of the plaintiffs, Jamieson & Co. It appeared that Aberdeen, where both the plaintiffs and the defendants wholly or partly carried on their business, was an important centre of the harness composition trade, and that all the makers there-of whom at least two besides the parties to the action traded under the name of Jamieson-sent their goods to the London market. The defendant sold his composition in boxes generally resembling the plaintiffs' boxes, but distinguished by having his full name on the lid. He appealed against the injunction granted by Byrne, J. THE COURT (LINDLEY, M.R., and RIGBY and VAUGHAN WILLIAMS, L.JJ.)

allowed the appeal.

LINDLEY, M.R., said: I do not think anything would be gained by taking further time, because the case has lasted some time, and Mr. Daldy, with his leader, has said everything that can possibly be said in

it must be made out that the defendant is selling his own goods as those of another."" What we have to satisfy ourselves of is this: that the defendant has been selling his own goods as the goods of the plaintiffs. That is the real point. Let us see how that works out. Of course it is true that it is very difficult for a plaintiff to make out such a case as this when he is dealing with a man carrying on business in his own name. I say nothing about the conduct of the present plaintiffs. I will assume that they are bona fide traders, trading in the name of Jamieson & Co., and carrying on business as manufacturers of harness composition in London as well as in Aberdeen. The form in which they have been in the habit of doing up their goods-whether you take the small shilling boxes or the larger flat boxes-is common to the sellers and makers of harness composition in Aberdeen and everywhere else. That is to say, such harness composition is generally sold by everybody in plain white tin boxes of the same size and general appearance, surrounded by a paper wrapper. That get-up is not at all peculiar to the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs were not the first to engage in this harness composition business in Aberdeen. There was a prior manufacturer, one Peter Jamieson, and he also sold his composition in plain white tin boxes of much the same size and shape. At one time Peter Jamieson complained of the mode in which the plaintiffs made up their boxes as being calculated to deceive, and the result was that a change was made to distinguish the plaintiffs' boxes. But so far as the paper wrapper and the general look of the thing are concerned, there is nothing to distinguish those boxes from Peter Jamieson's or any other manufacturer's. In consequence of the complaints which were made, the plaintiff's put diagonally across their boxes their own name, Jamieson & Co., in writing, and a trade-mark of a horse. Now, what the plaintiff's have to make out-and the mere fact that they are only one of several Jamiesons carrying on this trade in Aberdeen increases their difficulty-is that the defendant is passing off his goods as theirs. That is, in the circumstances, a very difficult thing to prove. As regards the real thing which distinguishes the plaintiffs' goods-their name-it seems to me there is no similarity at all; the similarity is only in those things which are common to the trade. Nobody contends that by customers who attend to that which distinguishes the plaintiffs' goods from other people's the defendant's can be, or ever are, mistaken for the plaintiffs'. The plaintiffs. say that, notwithstanding the name "George Jamieson," which is printed in full on the lid of the defendant's boxes, his white tin boxes are not so dissimilar to the plaintiffs' as to prevent them from being mistaken for the plaintiffs'; and they gave evidence of actual mistakes having been made. Now, we must assume that there is nothing mala fide on the defendant's part, and that he is really for his own purposes, in his own interest and not as the dummy of anybody else. endeavouring to create a business for himself in a manufacture for which he has the recipe, and to sell the goods in his own name. It is said that because, the defendant being of the same surname as the plaintiffs, his goods may be mistaken for the plaintiffs', he is bound to take special precautions to prevent confusion. I am not aware of any case which goes so far as that. Neither Burgess v. Burgess (ubi supra) nor any other case seems to me to be an authority for that proposition. In all the cases in which a person has been restrained from carrying on a business in his own name, he has done something more: actually copied some part of his get-up from somebody else, or somehow gone out of his way to make his goods look like those of a rival in the same trade. Assuming that the defendant is honestly carrying on business in his own name, and is selling his goods with the "George Jamieson " fairly and conspicuously printed the boxes, and seeing used by the plaintiffs consists in the features common to the whole trade, that the only resemblance between the get-up he has adopted and that interfered with. But then it is said that the defendant is not acting I am not aware of any authority which shews that he can properly be honestly, and that what he has done shews that he is scheming to get the

on

name

are also given as respects highways "all the powers, duties, and liabilities of an urban sanitary authority under sections 144-148 of the Public Health Act, 1875." Under section 144 of the Act last referred to an urban authority are within their district to execute the office of and be surveyors of highways and have exercise and be subject to all the powers, authorities, duties, and liabilities of surveyors of highways. A rural district council is thus in the same position with regard to highways in their rural district as an urban district council with regard to highways in their urban district. By section 46 of the Local Government Act, 1894, a person is disqualified for being a member of a district council if he is concerned in any bargain or contract entered into with the council; but by sub-section (2) (a) of that section the disqualification is not to apply where the contract by the member is "for the supply from land of which he is owner or occupier of stone, gravel, or other materials for making or repairing highways or bridges or in the transport of materials for the repair of roads or bridges in his own immediate neighbourhood." It was admitted that the roads upon which the respondent's team was to be used were in his own immediate neighbourhood; but it was contended on behalf of the appellant that the effect of the legislation referred to was to make each member of a rural district council a surveyor of highways and so liable to a penalty for an infringement of section 46 of the Act of 1835, which is unrepealed. Barton v. Piggott (44 L. J. M. C. 4) was cited.

THE COURT (DAY and LawRANCE, JJ.) held that the individual members of a district council are not surveyors of highways, and that the responIdent was not liable. Appeal dismissed.-COUNSEL, Macmorran, Q.C., and Harper; C. A. Russell, Q.C., and Mallinson. SOLICITORS, Learoyd, James, & Mellor, for Meller, Huddersfield; Busk & Co., for J. Bradbury, Ashton-under-Lyne.

[Reported by T. R. C. DILL, Barrister-at-Law.]

M'LEAN v. MONKS. Div. Court. 14th Jan.

DISEASES OF ANIMALS-SALE OF SWINE-DISEASES OF ANIMALS ACT, 1894 (57 & 58 VICT. c. 57)—MARKETS AND FAIRS (SWINE-FEVER) Order of 1896. Case stated by justices. The respondent, a farmer, who had sold two pigs but had not delivered them to the purchaser, placed these animals, together with other pigs, in a cart and drove them within a district to which the Markets and Fairs (Swine Fever) Order, 1896, applied, delivering the two sold pigs to the purchaser and offering the other pigs for sale and selling them at various farms. The question was whether by so doing he had "held a sale" within the meaning of the order referred to. That order was made by the Board of Agriculture on the 11th of December, 1896, under section 32 (19) of the Diseases of Animals Act, 1894. Clause 2 of the order provides that "no market, fair, sale, or exhibition of swine shall be held in a district to which the order applies except as expressly authorized by this order." Clause 4 provides for the holding of sales of swine in certain cases and with the licence of the local authority. Clause 15 provides that if a sale is held in contravention of the order the owner or consignee of each pig exposed thereat, and the person exposing the same thereat (and certain other persons), shall each, according to his own acts and defaults, be deemed guilty of an offence against the Act of 1894. The justices declined to convict the respondent. In support of the appeal it was argued that the action of the respondent in driving the pigs in search of purchasers was as much holding a sale as if the purchasers had been invited to come to his farm to purchase the animals. THE COURT (DAY and LAWRANCE, JJ.) held that the acts of the respondent did not amount to holding a sale, and that the justices were right in dismissing the case. Appeal dismissed.-COUNSEL, Pickford, Q.C., and Clay; Ogle. SOLICITORS, Ridsdale & Son, for F. C. Hulton, Preston; W. W. Comins, for Henry N. Bryan, Hindley.

[Reported by T. R. C. DILL, Barrister-at-Law.]

Solicitors' Cases.

Re DAVIES (A SOLICITOR) and Re "THE SOLICITORS ACT, 1888."
Div. Court. 14th Jan.
SOLICITOR-PROFESSIONAL MISCONDUCT-CONCEALMENT OF WILL-PREPARING
INACCURATE AFFIDAVIT.

In this case, an important one owing to the peculiar description of facts, an application was made by Meryck M. Williams, a surgeon, residing at Dalbeattie, N.B., that William Robert Davies, of Dolgelly, Merioneth, might be struck off the roll on the ground of professional misconduct. In October, 1897, there was an inquiry before the statutory committee. The charges then made were that the respondent conspired with Robert N. Williams and Sarah Williams to fraudulently suppress the will of one Ann Hartley, which came into his hands in July, 1893, by virtue of which the complainant was entitled (inter alia) to a moiety of certain estates, of which the respondent's clients were in possession, and that the respondent assisted the said R. N. Williams and S. Williams to deal with the estates as if they were solely entitled to them from July, 1893, until March, 1896, when the facts were disclosed. The committee reported that the charges of fraud and conspiracy on the part of the respondent had not been made out, but that his conduct was extremely reprehensible, and they came to the conclusion that he had acted bond fide though very unwisely and improperly, and they therefore did not find him guilty of professional misconduct. The more important facts of the case are as follows: The respondent was admitted a solicitor in 1869, and practices at Dolgelly, Barmouth, and Towyn, in North Wales. Robert N. Hartley (who was the complainant's grandfather on his mother's side) was possessed of two estates near Dolgelly known as the Llwyn and Hendreinan

estates. He died intestate on the 6th of April, 1860. One-half of his estates went to his daughter, Ann Hartley, and the other to the heir of his second daughter-namely, Thomas H. Williams, the eldest brother of the complainant. Ann Hartley died on the 24th of February, 1886, as it was supposed, intestate. Thomas H. Williams then entered into possession of her moiety as her heir-at-law, and remained in possession of both estates during his life. He died on the 18th of March, 1891, without issue, having by his will devised the Hendreinan estate to his wife, Sarah Williams, and the Llywn estate to his brother, Robert N. Williams. They each entered into possession. On the 26th of March, 1896, the complainant received a telegram from the respondent summoning him to the death-bed of Robert N. Williams. On arriving he was informed by his brother's wife that a will made by Ann Hartley had been discovered On the following day the complainant called on the respondent, who informed him that a will of Ann Hartley had been found, but that he could not say whether it was a valid one, to which the complainant replied that he would give it a trial. The respondent said that he could not act for the complainant, as he was acting for the other side, but that his advice would be to have a settlement. Robert N. Williams died on the 2nd of April, 1896. On the 9th of April, 1896, an interview took place between the complainant, Mr. Adams, his solicitor, and the respondent, at which the respondent produced the will, and said that he had known about it since 1893. By this will it appeared that the complainant was entitled to a legacy of £1,000 and to the testatrix's estate after the life interest of her eldest brother, Thomas H. Williams, who had died in 1891. The will was prepared by Griffith J. Williams, a solicitor, of Dolgelly, and was dated the 19th of November, 1868. Probate in solemn form was decreed, and the complainant entered into possession under the will of the undivided moiety of the estates. The circumstances under which Ann Hartley's will came to the knowledge of the respondent were as follows: Upon the 21st of January, 1892, Charles Millard, who was a solicitor Sarah Williams, died, and the respondent acted for his widow in the winding at Dolgelly, and who had acted for Robert N. Williams and up of his affairs and eventually bought his practice. Among his papers was a sealed packet containing the will made by Ann Hartley, of the existence of which Millard had told his wife. Robert N. Williams told Mrs. Millard that he did not wish this packet to be given to any local solicitor. In July, 1893, Mrs. Millard had occasion to open the parcel which contained this packet and after consulting a Mr. Lloyd, a solicitor, she opened the packet containing the will and saw the name of Dr J. E. Jones, the attesting witness. She then went to see the respondent and told him what she had done, whereupon he asked to see the will and said that as he acted for Sarah Williams, who was the executrix to the executor named in the will, he was the proper person to take it, to which she assented on condition that he should make it known to Sarah Williams. The document was kept in the respondent's safe from that time until 1896. The respondent's explanation before the committee was as follows: He said that Robert N. Williams and Sarah Williams had been clients of Griffith J. Williams and afterwards of Millard; that in July, 1893, Mrs. Millard called on him and said that she had a bundle of papers belonging to the Llywn estate, which she wished to hand over to him. A few days after she called with a parcel containing the will which she had been advised by David Lloyd to hand over to the executor. The respondent opened it, found two wills and a codicil, and saw that the executor named was T. Humphrey Williams, who had died in 1891, having appointed Sarah Williams his executrix. He glanced through it and found that it made a difference in the devolution of the estate. He put it in his safe and told Mrs. Millard that he would consult Mrs. Williams, shew it to her, and follow her instructions. He obtained an authority from Robert N. Williams to Mrs. Millard that the papers should be handed to himself. The respondent said that he frequently asked Mrs. Williams and Robert N. Williams for permission to disclose the will but they refused to consent. The respondent said that in his opinion he had no right to disclose the existence or nature of the will without his client's consent. Several transactions with reference to the property took place between July, 1893, when the respondent received respondent continuing to act as solicitor for Robert N. Williams and Mrs. the will, and its disclosure to the complainant in March, 1896, the Williams. In September, 1894, the respondent at the request of Robert N. Williams prepared a lease by him to Mrs. Anne Jones of a house on the Llwyn estate. The lease recited that under the will of T. H. Williams Robert N. Williams was beneficially entitled to the possession of the premises therein demised for his life, and it was executed by him. The respondent in cross-examination said that he was of opinion that Ann Hartley's will could not stand, and that when the probate suit was over the recital would be an accurate description of the lessor's title. Upon the 9th of November, 1894, an originating summons was issued by a creditor to administer the estate of T. H. Williams. The defendants were Sarah Williams, the executrix, and Messrs. Willams and Grosholz, the trustees. The respondent acted as solicitor for all the defendants, and on the 15th of January, 1895, an order was made directing Sarah Williams to file an affidavit of the testator's real and personal estate, and after a motion for her attachment had been made, she, on the 23rd of May, 1895, filed an affidavit which had been prepared by the respondent's London agent and approved by him, paragraph 8 of which is as follows: tion, and belief, set forth in the third schedule written hereunder the par"I have, according to the best of my knowledge, remembrance, informaticulars of all the real estates which the said testator was seised of or entitled to at the time of his death." The third schedule referred to The responincluded the whole of the Llwyn and Hendreinan estates.

dent pointed out to Mrs. Williams that this was not correct, but she said that the affidavit must say that he died possessed of all. Subsequently, the respondent consulted counsel as to his position, and was advised that