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WHY WOMEN ARE ATTRACTIVE.
Why is one woman attractive uucl another not l It isii’t entire y a question of age, or features, or intellect. The most admirable and attractive thing about an attractive woman is her womanliness. Everybody admires s womanly woman, She must have health, of course, because without it she would lose the brightness oi her eyes, the fulness of her cheeks, and her vivacity. Health brings all these things, but health means more than most peep e think of. If pale, nervous, and weak, il. woman
acks good health. Women who are pale and wiin should not resort to iron, drugs, and tonics, except by the advice of :i properly qualified medical man. They should try instead to nourish and build up their blood by the vital nourishment imparted by Dr. Tibbles’ Vi-Cocoa. Andre rosy cheeks and comeliness may be attained. Surely the road is pleasanter than the thorny and nasty path paved with drug.
Nurse 'llotson, Alexander Hotel, St. Leonnrd‘s4)n_-Semi, writes: " I have tried Dr. Tibbles Vi-Cocoa, and hke_ it very much. I shall have much pleasure in recommending it to my patients."
llfiss S. Percival, Post Oflice, Burgh, writes :—“ I do not think any other can equal ‘guru. My father has been taking ordinary cocoa, but I 'nk Dr. Tibbles' Vi-Cocoa is better. I will tell my friendsof $11! Vi-Cocoa."
Mrs. King, Linden Cottage, imhledon Hill, Surrey, writes :—“1 think Dr. Tibbles' Vi-Cocos is delicious, and quite fulfils all said about it."
Mrs. Budden, Brndwnrdine, Bournemouth, writes:-—"I am pleased with Dr. Tibblui’ Vi-Cocoa, and like it, and will certainly use it in future."
Merit, and merit alone, is what we claim for Dr. Tibblc-s' Vi-Cocoa, and we are prepared to send to any reader who nama the Boi.1ci'rous' J OUBNAL a dainty sample tin of Di-. Tibbles' Vi-Cocoa free and post-paid. There is no magic in all this. It is a plain, honest, straightforward Dflcr. It is done to introduce the merits of Vi-Cocoa into every home. Dr. Tibbles' Vi-Cocoa, as a concentrated form of nourishment and vitality, is invaluable; nay, more than this, for to all who wis to face the strife and battle oi life with greater endurance and more sustained exertion, it is absolutelv indispensable. _
Dr. Tibblcsl Vi-Cocoa can be obtained from all chemists, grocers, and stores, or from Dr. Tihbles’ Vi-Cocoa, Limited, 60, 611, and 62, Bunhill-row, London, E.C. Write for free sump e.
Annsuonsrnsrs have been made for expediting the trial of actions set down for trial under order 14. When practicable, the judge who takes the chamber business of the Queen's Bench Division will sit in court to try these actions on every day when a suflicient number come into the list.
Ir IS PROPOSED to hold an exhibition of sketches and drawings by the late Sir FRANK LOCKWOOD at an early date, and to devote the proceeds to the augmentation of the funds of the Barristers’ Benevolent Association. We understand that the judges and leading counsel, and several other possessors of sketches, have agreed to lend them for the purposes of the exhibition; but there are believed to be many amusing cartoons (d rawn on the backs of ‘briefs or other papers) in the possession of solicitors which are difficult to trace. Many solicitors have already promised contributions, and it is hoped that all who have any sketches by Sir FRANK will kindly send them to Mr. E. MACnonr, Q.C., 7, Figtree-court, Temple, 13.0., when a. receipt will be given forthem, as well as an undertaking to return them at the close of the proposed exhibition.
ON W1-:1)1vnsn.rY LAST Mr. Justice Wmonr, referred to an observation made by his predecessor in R0 lVew Werykirzg Jllaclrfne Co. N. 1896, p. 48) to the effect that, although there is no express rule requiring notice to be given to the company of the filing of the statutory affidavit in support of s. winding-up petition, the practice of giving notice of filing is n convenient one, and must in future be followel. He said he had spoken to Lord Justice WILLIAMS on the subject, and the Lord Justice said he never intended to lay down such a rule as to statutory aflidavit-s, but only to require that when an additional or supplemental affidavit was filed, notice of filing should be given in order to avoid unnecessary applications for adjournmonts being made in order to answer such affidavits. In future it would be unnecessary to give notice oi the filing of the statutory sflidsvit.
Tun srnncn of Sir Mrcrrsnr. HICKS-BEACH at Swansea on Monday is the first intimation of the dissstisfsction of the Government with the dilatory manner in which the House of Lords Committee has, for the past two sessions, been dealing
192 p A H THE SOLICITORS’ JOURNAL. p Ian. 22,1898.
with the Companies Bill. In 1896 the inquiry was largely taken up with the question whether a director of a company should, as the Bill proposed, be under an obligation to use reasonable care and prudence in the exercise of his powers. Obviously a director who will not use this care is not worth his salt. Last session the inquiry was practically at a standstill. The Chancellor of the Exchequer intimates, in pretty plain language, that the House of Lords is too friendly to “ guineapigs.” The Committee, he says, are so timid and careful, that nothing shall be done to prevent responsible men from becoming directors of companies that the inquiry is likely to last an indefinite number of years unless it is accelerated by the pressure of opinion in the commercial world. Possibly this next session it will be conducted with a little more activity. It would be better still if the Government would revise their Bill, and carry only such a measure as will meet the evils which admittedly exist. The greatest is the facility, to which Sir M. HICKS-BEACH refers, with which a person forming his business into a “one-man company” can pay himself what price he pleases for the business in debentures, and then set up the debentures against the creditors of the company. Good service might, without any inquiry, be done by making a process of this kind impossible, and there are other admitted defects in the Companies Acts which could readily be dealt with. The Board of Trade would be well advised to substitute for the present Bill a measure less ambitious but more practical.
In THE case of Ra Fetlierstanhaug/h’s EstateNonri1, J., has declined to exercise the power of the court under section 37 of the Settled Land Act, 1882, by authorizing a sale of heirlooms. By that section it is provided that, where chattels are settled so as to devolve with a settled estate, the tenant for life may sell them, but such a sale is not to be made without an order of the court. This is a power which, as was laid down by Cnrrry, J., in Re Earl of Radnor’a flusts (-15 Oh. D. 402), in a passage quoted with approval by Lord Esnnn, M.R., in the same case (p. 418), cannot be exercised according to any fixed rules. “I say emphatically,” observed Cnirrv, J ., “ that this discretion ought not to be crystallized, as it would become in course of time, by one judge attempting to prescribe definite rules with a view to bind other judges in the exercise of the discretion which the Legislature has committed to them.” Undoubtedly this is a principle which should always prevail where a discretion has been vested in the court, though there is no harm in following such indication as the decided cases give. In the case just mentioned Lord Esnnn observed that if the tenant for lite could not live in the family house without some assistance from the sale of the heirlooms, that is a fact which ought to be taken very much into consideration. Clearly, in any such case, the beneficial occupation of the family estate by the owner for the time being is of more importance than the preservation of heirlooms for the benefit of future generations. In the present case, however, NORTH, J., seems to have leaned against any interference, on such grounds, with the settled property. The heirlooms in question consisted of a collection of china, pictures, and furniture, valued altogether at £18,000. Apparently the income immediately available from the settled estate was not sufficient to enable the tenant for life to reside there, and it was proposed to sell the chattels to the extent of £15,000. But this was opposed by the next tenant for life, and Nonrn, J., refused to sanction it. To a certain extent the immediate incumbrances on the estate consisted of annual instalments of succession duty, which in the course of eight years would cease. In such cases it is difficult to decide between the wishes of the present and of future owners, and it is the misfortune of the present owner of the property that he has to forfeit the income derivable from the sale of the chattels, and apparently to forego residence in the mansion, for the problematical benefit of future owners.
To JUDGE by the cases which have actually occurred hitherto, section 8 of the Judicial Trustees Act, 1896, will do very little to relieve trustees of the responsibilities which the law has
imposed upon them. The section provides that where a trustee is liable for a breach of trust, but has acted honestly and reasonably, and ought fairly to be excused for the breach of trust and for omitting to obtain the directions of the court, then the court may relieve him, either wholly or partly, from liability. In applications under the section it will probably be easy to shew that the trustee acted honestly, and the burden of the case lies in the proof that he has acted reasonably. This is a proof, it seems, which he can rarely furnish. In Barker v. Ihim-ey (45 W. R. 495) one trustee had, upon the recommendetion of his solicitor co-trustee, made a mortgage investment without proper inquiry as to the nature and value of the security. Brawn, J ., declined to lay down any general rule with respect to the application of the section, but he found nothing in the case to assist to the conclusion that the trustee had acted reasonably, and he refused him relief. In Jfiislvy v. Keg/u'or(/1 (~11 Sonicirons’ JOURNAL 722) an application to Roman, J., was partially successful, and an executor obtained relief in respect of payments made to legatees while he was ignorant of a claim against the estate which ultimately appears to have left it insolvent. But relief was refused in respect of sums applied for the maintenance of the testator’s family after an action to enforce the claim had been commenced, although its extent was then unascertained. The latest case is Razwzslzaar v. Bar/rcr, decided by Nonrn, J., last Saturday. Here the executrix, who was the widow of the testator, had retained as part of the trust estate several investments which should have been converted within a year of the testator’s death. On some of them there had been a loss, amounting altogether to £1,593. On others there had been a gain, so that if '_ the gain could be set against the loss the net deficit would be only £349, It appeared that the widow had acted on the advice of a business man that the securities would increase in value. But NORTH, J., declined to allow that her conduct was reasonable, and he refused relief. To retain the securities, he said, might have been a very reasonable thing for a man to do with his own property, but not for a trustee. According to the ordinary rule that the trustee cannot take advantage of an appreciationcf some of the securities, the widow was held liable for the entire loss of £1,593. Section 3 of the Judicial Trustees Act can hardly be said, so far, to have produced any amelioration in the position of trustees. The practical outcome appears to be that sound reason requires a trustee to follow the ordinary technical rules, and if he fails to do so heacts unreasonably, and cannot have relief—a conclusion which the Legislature hardly intended.
Two ciisns have, within the last few days, been before a Divisional Court in which section 51 of the Public Health Acts Amendment Act, 1890, has been considered. The section provides that in districts where the Act has been adopted “a house, room, garden, or other place . . . shall 11015 be kept or used for public dancing, singing, music, 01' other public entertainment of the like kind without a_ licence for the purpose” being first obtained from the licensing justices of the district, and that “any house, room, garden, or other place kept or used” for any of such purpoflel without such licence shall be deemed a disorderly house» and the occupier shall be liable to a penalty. In one of these cases, Farndalc v. Bainbridgr, it appeared that the respondent had hired a piece of waste land on the cliff at Margatei and had allowed persons to give entertainments thereon by dancing, singing, music, &c. The performers had a tent for their own use, and performed in a small space which was roped off. No money was charged for admission to the piece of ground, but a hat was sent round amongst the audience at short intervals for such donations as persons might choose to giveThe justices of Margate dismissed a summons against the respondent for a penalty under this section, but stated a case. Now the High Court has remitted the case to the magistrates, with an e;\'pression of opinion that the piece of ground was a “place” Wlfillm the meaning of the Act, and a licence was required if the plfl-06 was to be used in the manner proved. This does not seem to be o case within the mischief of the Act, although it certainly dofifi seem to come within the letter of it. Surely Parliament never intended to interfere with persons like the respondents, who are
foimd at every popular seaside place in the country. We seem to have here yet another case of an Act having a far wider application than was intended, and perhaps working injustice in consequence. Like the famous Kempton Park Racecourse case, this case turned on the meaning of the word “place.” Probably if the word “ garden ” were not used in the Act, the High Court would have decided differently and more on the lines of the Court of Appeal in the betting house case, but the use of this word evidently points to other open spaces being within the Act. It is submitted, however, that the Legislature only contemplated those gardens or other such places which are kept for public entertainment and for admission to which the public have to pay.
Tnr: ornsn case, Maloncy v. Lz'n_qa-rd and Others, was a case stated by the justices of Cheshire in quarter sessions. The respondents were the owners of a hall or room, which they let to some gentlemen for the purposes of a subscription ball. The ball committee applied to the justices for an occasional licence for the sale of liquor on the premises up to 3 a.m. on the night of the ball. This was granted to them under section 20 of 26 & 27 Vict. c. 33, which empowers justices to grant such a licence “upon the occasion of any public dinner or ball.” The committee did not, however, apply for any licence under the Act of 1890, and the respondents were proceeded against accordingly. They were convicted, but on appeal toj quarter sessions, the conviction was quashed subject to a case stated, on the ground that the ball was not a public one. The High Court held that it was a question of fact whether or not the ball was public; and that that question had been finally decided by the court of quarter sessions, and the appeal was dismissed. This decision was clearly right, in spite of the inconsistency that the respondents obtained one licence because the ball was public, and escaped from the consequences of not obtaining the other because the ball was not public. If the ball was not public they could hardly make themselves liable by taking out an unnecessary licence. It must be a question of fact whether or not a subscription ball is public. Such a ball may be promoted to raise money for some charitable or other object, in which case any person who pays his or her money is admitted. Of course, even in this case the committee generally reserves power to refuse tickets to improper persons, but such power could hardly be said to detract from the publicity of the ball. On the other hand, as is very common, and as seems to have been the case here, persons may get up a ball solely for the amusement of themselves and of such of their friends as are willing to subscribe to the expenses, and to which the general public are in no way invited. A ball of this sort is obviously a private one, and the facts of each case can alone determine whether or not any such entertainment is public or not.
IT Is a well-known device oi’ the large retail dealer to sell some articles at a very small profit, or even at no profit at all, in order to attract the public to the wares on which he mainly relies, and if such conduct were actionable, there would be an opening for an abundant crop of litigation. The experiment has been tried, though without success, in the case of Ajal/0 v. 7Vorale_z/ before STIRLING, J., this week. The plaintiffs are piano manufacturers, who supply to their customers various classes of pianos, among others, “ Glass 6a ” at the trade price of £23 10s., and the “Britannia Model” at £15 15s. The defendant is a retail piano dealer in Manchester, and early in 1896 he advertised a sale of pianos in a local paper. The advertisement included new instruments “by AJELLO " at £15 15s., described in such a way as to point either to instruments of Class Ga or of the Britannia Model. According to the defendant, the advertisement was meant to refer to the latter class, and at the time when it first appeared he had one piano of that kind in stock, though the advertisement was continued after he had disposed of that piano, and when the plaintiffs had refused to supply him with any more. The plaintiffs alleged that the advertisement injured their trade, inasmuch as other piano dealers could not afford to sell their goods on the terms of the advertisement, and in the action they sought for an injunction
to restrain the defendant from advertising their pianos for sale at less than cost price without in fact having any of such pianos in their possession. It is, of course, clear that the defendant was entitled to sell the plaintifis’ pianos at any price he chose. However annoying it may be to a manufacturer to find his goods going cheap, he has himself got for them the stipulated price, and he has nothing to do with the re-sale. It is equally clear that a man’s right to sell goods does not depend upon having the goods in stock. It is matter of common knowledge that a vendor frequently sells goods before he has acquired them, and, as STIRLING, J., pointed out, such a sale is expressly recognized by section 5 of the Sale of Goods Act, 1893, where the goods are described as “future goods.” The case had to rest, therefore, solely on the misleading character of the advertisement in intimating that the defendant had the goods in stock, when, in fact, had any customer asked for them, they would have had to be purchased. Why it was worth while for the defendant to continue the advertisement under these circumstances is not apparent, but here again, so Srmnmo, J., held, the action was ill-conceived. The damage to the plaintiffs did not follow from the misleading nature of the advertisement, but would have been just the same had the defendant put the advertisement in a proper form; had he advertised, that is, that the pianos in question would be procured and sold for fifteen guineas. The cause of the injury to the plaintiffs’ business was the offer to sell their pianos at cost price, and for this, as already observed, no action would lie. Underselling is, as the Mogul case (40 W. R. 337; 1892, A. C. 25) shews, not an actionable wrong, and manufacturers cannot prevent their retail customers from dealing as they like with the wares supplied to them.
As A RULE it is the right of a mortgagee to realize his security in such manner as he thinks best, but when the security consists of goods or chattels, and these have been seized in execution at the instance of another creditor, this right is by rule 12 of R. S. C., ord. 57, placed at the mercy of the court. Instead of restoring the goods to the mortgagee, the court may order a sale, and may direct the application of the proceeds in such manner and upon such terms as may be just. In Forster v. Clowser (1897, 2 Q. B. 362) the Court of Appeal (Lord Esnsn, M.R., and A. L. SMITH, L.J.; RIGBY, L.J., rliss.) pressed this rule somewhat far against a mortgagee by compelling him to submit to a sale before the mortgage money was due and then awarding him out of the proceeds interest only up to the date of payment. The interest, indeed, was at the rate of 60 per cent., but this circumstance was, perhaps, hardly enough to justify an interference with the terms of the security. Whether, however, such a decision will be repeated or not, it is clear from the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the recent case of Stern v. Tcgnrr (46 W. R. 82) that no further interference with the rights of the mortgagee will be permitted, and that a sale under rule 12 will not be ordered where the mortgage security would thereby be in any way imperilled. The rule is intended to meet the case where the goods are clearly adequate in value to pay off the mortgagee, and the postponement of a sale would simply have the effect of depriving the execution creditor of the fruit of his j udgment; But if the proceeds of a sale by the sheriff will be inadequate to pay off the mortgagee, so that the execution creditor cannot derive any benefit from the sale, or even if it is doubtful whether there will be any surplus, the proper course is to direct the sheriff to withdraw and to leave the goods at the disposal of the mortgagee. Or, as it was put by CIIITTY, L.J., the jurisdiction conferred by rule 12 ought not to be exercised against the mortgagee unless there is a reasonable ground for holding that the sale will produce more than sufficient to answer the just claims of the mortgagee, so as to leave a surplus available for the execution creditor.
The Lord Chancellor has accepted an invitation to dine with the Hardwicke Society on Thursday, February 17.
The members of the Oxford Circuit entertained Mr. Justice Darling at a complimentary dinner on Monday at the Cafe Royal, Regent-street, in cele ration of his elevation to the bench, when a considerable number Of both past and present members of the circuit were present.
THE WORKING OF THE NEW RULES AS TO DIRECTIONS.
Iris now nearly three months since the rule came into operation by which the issue of a summons for directions was made compulsory in all cases. It ought, therefore, to be possible to form some estimate of its workability when applied to the ordinary requirements of an action. That it is a powerful weapon in the hands of the court for the purpose of preventing delay and unnecessary expense may be readily conceded. But that it is as well designed for its purpose as it might be, cannot be contended for a moment. If we venture to point out some of its defects in operation, we hope we shall not be accused of indulging in carping criticism, but rather be credited with a desire to pave the way for improvement, for which there is at present ample room. It is always dangerous to suggest, but we will even venture to accompany our criticism with suggestion.
The main cause of friction in the working of the new order 30 is the absence of any comprehensive attempt to adapt existing rules to its peremptory and overriding provisions. The Rules of the Supreme Court affecting all interlocutory proceedings are based upon a principle of procedure which is entirely opposed to that upon which order 30 is based, and the conflict between the two becomes apparent at many points. In the rules as to procedure, other than order 80, the court has prescribed certain steps to be taken and fixed the times for taking them and the penalties for not taking them within the proper time. In order 30 the court has talren all its actions out of the operation of those rules prescribing interlocutory proceedings and the times for them, and placed them, as to their whole course, in the discretion of the judge or master. \Ve are not now considering which is the better plan of the two, but it is obvious that the two plans cinnot be in operation separately and concurrently without creating confusion at many points. It is clear that one principle or the other—either definite prescription by rule or undefined discretionary direction by order—iniist prevail, and it is highly desirable that the working code of rules governing procedure should shew clearly in all its parts which of the two is the governing principle. Or, if the rules regulating procedure are ti be based upon a compromise between the two, then the code of rules as a whole ought to reflect in all its parts the effect and limits of the compromise. The existing code needed revision badly before the new order 30 was made. That need has become infinitely greater since.
We will give a few practical illustrations of our meaning :
Statvmmt of clm'm.—0rd. 20, r. 1 (d), expressly empowers a plaintiff to_ deliver a statement of claim, either before appearance or at any time afterwards within six weeks from the appearance. Order 30 expressly forbids him to deliver that statement of claim. He must first issue a summons for directions within fourteen days from appearance. If on that summons he is ordered to deliver a statement of claim, within what time must he deliver it? Neither in order 30 nor in the form of order under it is there anything to shew that an order for directions must fix the time for delivery of the statement of claim. The plaintiff, _il! he waits for defence, cannot get his order for directions until nearly three weeks after appearance. Therefore the time fixture in ord. 20, r. 1 (:1), obviously does not apply, and if no time is fixed by the order for directions, there is nothing to fix the_ time anywhere. The whole of the sub-rule (ord. 20, r. _l (rl) ) is overruled by rule 30, and yet it remains as if it were in force, and gives the practitioner definite instruction which is all wrong.
I_)q/2’nce.—The conflict between order 30 and the rules as to delivery _of defence is not only direct, but has complicated ramifications which are not apparent at first sight, and have occasioned considerable friction. The times fixed for delivery of defence are as follows: (a) If the writ is specially indorsed, ten_days from the time limited for appearance (ord. 21, r. 6); (b) if a separate statement of claim is delivered, ten days from the _dehvery thereof ((6.); (c) where defendant has neither received nor required a statement of claim, ten days from the entry of appearance (ord. 21, r. 7); (d) where leave to defend
gven g;1d01' order 14, ten days from the date of the order (ord. , r. .
Prior to the new order 80 those time fixtures were perfectly clear and well understood. Now they are confused by the overriding provisions of order 30. Perhaps the best way to illustrate this will be by restating the time fixtures affected as they actually stand when order 27 is read as ancillary to order 30. (a) If the writ is specially indorsed, the time for defence is ten days from the time limited for appearance (ord. 21, r._6); but this time only applies compulsorily when the claim is for a liquidated demand only within ord. 27, r. _2 tsee ord._ .3_0, r. 1 (b) ). If the claim is for recovery of land it is not within ord. 27, r. 2, and therefore, not being an exception to ord_. 30,_ r. 1, the plaintiff cannot proceed in default. I no defence is delivered within the time he must apply for directions. Ord. 27,r.7, therefore is in direct conflict with ord. 30, r. 1: (0) Where defendant has neither received nor required a statement of claim, defence is to be delivered within ten days from entry_of appearance (ord. 21, r. 7). This time-fixture is (partly set aside by order 30, so far as default process is concerne : _ _
If the claim is liquidated, but not specially indorsed, it is within ord. 27, r. 2, and ord. 30, r. 1 (Ii), and the defendant must defend within the time limited, otherwise the plaintiff may enter judgment. If, however, the claim is for damages or detention of goods, the plaintiff cannot enter judgment 111 default, but must apply for directions. Ord. 27, rr. 4, 5,_and 6, are in direct conflict with ord. 30, r. 1. The f0rmer_ give the plaintiff the right to enter judgment in certain contingencies. The latter takes that right away, and imposes quite another procedure. _ _
The sum total of all this is that the old simple provisions as to default of defence have been rendered complicated and confused by the new order 30.
Orr/¢'r l4.—Order 14 was not intended to be affected by the new rule, for it is excepted from its operation by ord. 30, r. I (b). But we will endeavour to shew how it is in fact affected. plaintifl suing by specially-indorsed writ wishes to aniendhis statement of claim indorsed on the writ before issuing his summons under order 14. He is expressly empowered to do so without order by ord. 28, r. 2. It is a very common need, and ord. 28, r. 2 is a most helpful rule. But now the plaintiff cannot amend before issuing his summons under order 14. _He is barred by ord 30, r. 1, which prohibits him from taking “any fresh step” after appearance until he has issued his summons for directions. Nor can he apply for an order to amend, for that also is a “fresh step." He must either give up order 14 altogether or issue a summons for directions under order 30 solely in order to get leave to do that which ord. 28, r. 2, expressly tells him he may do without order. _
Again, when leave to defend is given under order 14, as it usually is, without directions, the defendant's time for defence is fixed by ord. 21, r. 8, but if no defence is delivered what is the plaintiff to do? If the claim is within ord. 27, r. 2, he can enter judgment by default, but if his claim is not liquidated,_ is he to issue a summons for directions, or can he proceed to trial without doing so? This question awaits an authoritative answer. _
The above are the main points at which order 30 is in conflict with existing rules. It is probable that as time goes on others will be disclosed. There are difficulties of other kinds in the working of order 30 which, for our present purpose, will best be referred to in the form of suggestions.
Su_q_qvstod ihizprovrmwnts of ordrr 30.
l.—-(a) That ord. 30, r. 1, be altered so as to permit amendment of the writ either by order or without order under ord. 28, r. 2, after appearance and before issuing a summons for directions, or summons under order 14.
(6) To alter ord. 30, r. 1 (6), as follows: In lieu of the words “or to enter judgment in default of defence under ord. 27, r. 2,” to insert, “or the entry of judgment in default of defence under order 27.”
The object of this is twofold. It removes the doubt as to whether an application is necessary to enter judgment in default of defence; and it excepts all judgments in default of defence, and not merely those under ord. 27, r. 2. There is no reason why judgments under ord. 27, rr. 4 to 9, should not also be excepted.
2.-—(a). The amendment of ord. 20, r. 1 (6), so as to make