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mentioned, it seems that the real representative, after probate or administration (see rule as to probate, ants, p. 162) has been taken out, has the following powers : _ _
(1) A power to sell or mortgage for the purposes of administration, in aid of the personal estate, to the_like extent_a_s money could be raised by the sale of real estate in an administration action before the Act. ' _ _
(2) A power to assent to a devise or otherwise give effect to the rights of persons beneficially entitled by conveyance._ _
(3) The like general powers of management, composition of debts, and other powers with respect to real estate and the repts and profits thereof, as a legal personal representative has with respect to chattels real.
To these should be added : _
. (4) The power of appropriation conferred by section 4 of the Act, and the following powers which, though they seem to be conferred by the Act, should not, it is conceived, be exercised by a prudent executor or administrator until the Act has been judicially interpreted, namely :
(-5) A power to lease, subject to the question whether a lease is the best method of administering the assets.
(6) A power to sell or mortgage land not specifically devised for the payment of legacies.
The power of sale.—The power to sell or mortgage is paramount to the title of all persons claiming beneficially under the will or on the intestacy of the deceased, and a purchaser or mortgagee in good faith is not bound to inquire as to the necessity of a sale or mortgage; but as between the real representative and his beneficiaries, he must exercise his powers with due regard to their rights.
Estate (tut!/.—A purchaser of unregistered land from the real representative takes subject to estate duty, and will require a certificate of its payment to be produced. The question of estate duty raises some difliculty. Probably the real representative stands in the same position as regards payment of death duties as an executor does in the case of chattels real before the passing of the Act. There seems, however, to be some doubt whether the real representative may pay the proportion of estate duty which is a charge on the real estate, inasmuch as the Finance Act, 1894, s. 6 (2), in terms only enables an executor or administrator to pay it in respect of property which, by virtue of any testamentary disposition of the deceased, is under his control, or in respect of property not under his control, if the persons accountable for the duty request him to pay it. Now, the land is under the control of the real representative, but it is so notwithstanding any testamentary disposition, so that the provisions of the Finance Act, 1894, scarcely seem applicaable.
Real representative a trusteo.—Subject to his powers and obligations, the real representative is made a_ trustee for the persons beneficially interested (section 2 (1) ). This provision probably preserves the rights of all persons who would be interested in the real estate if the Act had not passed. It may, perhaps, be doubted, however, whether one effect of making the real representative a trustee is that on the death of a sole surviving executor intestate, the legal estate passes to his administrator or vests in the heir of the original testator, subject to be divested on the appointment of an administrator (Ie bonis non or on obtaining a vesting order.
Assent to a devisa.—The real representative will have a year before he can be compelled to assent to a devise, but the assent, when given, will relate back to the death of the testator, so that the devisee will be entitled to the rents and profits (if any) as from the death : Goodeve’s Personal Property, 2nd ed., p. 394 ; Wms. Exors., 9th ed., p. 1232.
Assmt should be in u:rz'ti'ri_q.—An assent to a devise may be verbal or implied (section 8 (1)) except, it is conceived, where the devise is in terms residuary. An assent should in practice, however, be in writing, whether the devise is specific or residuary, as a purchaser from the devisee must have evidence in writing of the assent to complete his title. An assent can onlly be gg~e ; a conveyance will be required in all ot er cases.
Assent when real rcprosontatz'z'c is beneficially antitle¢l.—An assent will be necessary even where the real representative is himself beneficially entitled: \Vms. Exors., 9th ed., p. 1283.
Doubt as to lwi'rshz'p.—In the case of intestacy where there is
any doubt as to the heirship, the real representative should refuse to convey, except puiguaiit to an order obtained unler section 3, sub-section 2, o t e ct.
Small sahs.—The Act does not relieve an administrator from responsibility in case he conveys to the -‘wrong person. In the case of small sales, therefore, a condition making his conveyance conclusive proof of heirship will be useful, and_v?ill not, itis conceived, be deterrent. '
Will of rral estate must be pi-oi-ed.—The title of a devisee will now depend to a great extent on the probate, for although an executor may assent to e. devise before probate, nevertheless the right to give the assent must be evidenced by the probate, hence a purchaser from a devisee will in all cases insist on probate being taken out, if it has not already been done.
The power of appropr1'ati'on.—The power of appropriation conferred by section 4 (1) of the Act is not applicable in the case of intestacy. The section provides that notice of an intended ‘appropriation is to be given to all persons interested in the residuary estate before the appropriation is effectual. This r would seem, in the case of unregistered land, to make the notice part of the title to the land appropriated. Moreover, the provision as to notice seems to render the section worse than useless, inasmuch as there is no method for serving the notice on persons not sui jurii, or who are not in essa or ascertained. i Before the Act an executor had power to appropriate with the ‘ consent of the person entitled to the legacy or " share ” : see Rt Lepine (1892, 1 Ch. 210). It may now be questioned whether the section has not rendered nptice necessary in all _cp_sp_s of appropriation in respect of a legacy or share, t us fet_terin_g:t'lie executor’s original power, and in some cases rendering it impossible for him to exercise it. The power may, however, be of some service where the legatee is an infant or lunatic and the other beneficiaries are all suijuris.
Right of appeal against an appropri'at1'on.—The Act gives the residuary devisees a right of appeal within the prescribed time against a valuation and appropriation by the real representative: section 4 (1). This will enable any unfair valuation to be contested. No time within which the appeal is to be made has, as yet, been prescribed.
THE LIABILITY OF TRUSTEES FOR DEBENTUREHOLDERS.
THE decision of the House of Lords in Gosling v. Gael-ell (1897, A. O. 57.5) is of great importance to trustees for debentureholders, inasmuch as it saves them from the personal liability with which, in certain not uncommon events, they were threatened by the judgments of Lord Russsnn, C.J., and the majority of the Court of Appeal. It is now settled that where, under the debenture trust deed, the trustees are empowered to appoint a receiver who shall be the agent of the company, the receiver is not turned into the agent of the trustees by virtue of special provisions in the instrument of appointment designed kee a check upon him in respect of moneys received and paid by Kim; nor does he become the agent of the trustees upon_the winding u of the company. Although, therefore, the receives‘ carries on business and incurs liabilities, these are not liabihties which attach personally upon the trustees as his principals. The circumstances which have given rise to this decision are as follows: Poole 8: White (Limited) borrowed the sum of £11,000 upon three series of debentures—£7,000 upon the first issue, £3,000 upon the second, and £1,000 upon the third. The second series were charged upon the whole assets of the company, and were secured by a trust deed dated the 18th of_ May, 1892, of which two members of the banking firm of G-oslings & Sharpe were trustees. By this deed certain powers were conferred upon the trustees in the event of the security becoming enforceable, and, even though it had not become enforceable, the trustees were authorized, upon certifying that in their opinion the security was endangered, to appoint a receiver who was to enter into possession of the mortgaged assets and 14° carry on the business of the company. It was expressly provided that any person so appointed was to be the agent of thfl com any, who alone were to be liable for his acts and defaults.
In .l)uly, l892, the trustees certified that the security was en
dangered, and appointed KELLY receiver. The instrument of appointment contained provisions which were not in the trust deed, to the effect that the receiver should open an account at the trustees’ bank into which all moneys received were to be forthwith paid, and that both receipts and cheques should be countersigned by a specified person. The company accepted the appointment by putting KELLY into possession of its assets and transferring to him the conduct of its business, and from that time till February, 1895, he carried on the business as the “ receiver of Poole 8: White (Limite;lt).” In September, 1892, a winding-up petition was present , and in the course of the same month an order was made, but neither the liquidator nor the first debenture-holders interfered with KELi.Y’s management of the business, and he continued to carry it on without any variation save that after September, 1893, the provision for the counter-signature of receipts and cheques was not insisted upon. Between December, 1893, and January, 1895, goods were supplied to KELLY in his capacity of receiver by GASKELL and another, and the action of Gakkell v. Gosling was brought against the trustees of the second debenture trust deed to recover £488, the balance of the price of the goods. It was held by Lord RussELL, C.J., that, in respect of the business carried on by KELLY after the winding up, he was the agent of the trustees. Hence, since all the goods in question were supplied after that date, they were liable to pay the plaintiffs’ claim, and judgment was given accordingly.
In the Court of Appeal this result was aflirmed by a majority (Lord Lanna, M.R., and Loi>Es, L.J.), though an elaborate disseutient judgment, which has practically been adopted by the House of Lords, was delivered by RIGBY, L.J. In the opinion of Lord ESHER the restraint upon the receiver with respect to receipts and cheques deprived him of the freedom in respect of the business of the company which was contemplated by the trust deed, with the result that he was not in fact a receiver under the deed, and so the trustees were not entitled to the benefit of the provision that he was to be the agent of the company. This point, however, was not, in fact, necessary for the ecision, both Lord ESHER and Lord Justice Lorss being of opinion that, whatever was KELLY’s position before the winding up, yet afterwards, since the company was precluded from carrying on business, he ceased to be agent for the company and became agent for the trustees.
To some extent, doubtless, this result was founded upon the special circumstances of the case. The trustees were cognizant of the winding up and of KELLY’s continuance as manager of the business, and the banking arrangements indicated a direct approval of such continuance. But these or similar circumstances are by no means uncommon, _and in any case where a winding up snperyenes upon the appointment of a receiver and manager of a business by trustees for the debenture-holders, it ls probable that there would be enough_to fix the trustees with liability for debts contracted after the winding up if the decision of the Lord Chief Justice and of the majority of the Court of Appeul_ had been correct. _Thus trustees would have been placed in_a more onei_-ous position than they contemplated when undertaking the duties of the oflice, and to a large extent they would have been deprived of the benefit of the settled practice that a_ mortgagee, in appointing a receiver, appoints him as agent of the mortgagor, and himself incurs no liability in consequence of the appointment. Such aresult, however, has been averted by the decision of the House of Lords. The two points upon which the judgment of Lord ESHER was based are both h_eld_ to be unsound. The provisions with respect to the countersigning of receipts and cheques were not intended, in the words of Lord HEiisoiiELL, “ to reserve to the trustees any control over the management of the business, but only to act as a check to prevent any improper use by the receiver of the moneys of the company and to insure that they should be properly applied.” While, even if these provisions went beyond the powers conferred upon the trustees by _the trust deed, so as to entitle the company to object to the_ appointment, yet no such objection was taken. The provision, indeed, were as much for the benefit of the company as of the debenture-holders, and, notwithstanding
the inclusion of the special provisions in the instrument of appointment, the appointment was accepted and acted upon by.
the company. Moreover, although after the winding up the company could no longer be the principal in the contracts entered into by KELLY, yet it did not thereby follow that the trustees forthwith became his principals. He was appointed by them expressly on the footing that they were not to be his principals, and the House of Lords declined to allow that they must necessarily step into a position which the company could no longer fill. “It is apparently assumed,” said Lord HALEBURY, C., “that immediately on the winding-up order Mr. KELLY, who, it is assumed, had been up to that time the agent for the company (as indeed he was so described, and as by the terms of the mortgage-deed he was bound to be), suddenly became the agent of the trustees. That no new authority was in fact given to Mr. KELLY is admitted, but why the making of the order to wind up the company should suddenly convert Mr. KELLY, who was there as the agent of the company, into the agent of the trustees is a problem that I have not been able to solve.”
Of course no express authority from the trustees to KELLY would have been necessary in order to convert him into their agent had it been possible to shew that under the circumstances of the case he was carrying on the business under an implied authority, but this could only be done by adopting a line of argument which since U02: v. Hiclcman (8 H. L. O. 268) has been untenable. Formerly it would have been possible to urge that KELLY was carrying on the business for the benefit of the trustees, and that consequently the business was theirs, and they were subject to its liabilities. But under the similar circumstances of Cox v. 1Tl'c/mzan, where a business was being carried on under the provisions of a trust deed by which the profits were to be applied, first in payment of creditors, and then the assets were to be re-transferred to the company, it was held that the business was not carried on on behalf of the creditors so as to impose upon them the liability of partners. The test of liability, it was pointed out, was not whether the creditors were entitled to participate in profits, but whether the business was carried on by persons acting on their ~ behalf, and this test was not satisfied by the fact that the creditors were to benefit by the business. “ The mere concurrence,” said Lord CRANWORTH, “ of creditors in an arrangement under which they permit their debtor, or trustees for their debtor, to continue his trade, applying the profits in discharge of their demands, does not make them partners with their debtor or the trustees. The debtor is still the person solely interested in the profits, save only that he has mortgaged them to his creditors. He receives the benefit of the profits as they accrue, though he has precluded himself from applying them to any other purpose than the discharge of his debts. The trade is not carried on by or on account of the creditors; though their consent is necessary in such a case, for without it all the property might be seized by them in execution. But the trade still remain the trade of the debtor or his trustees; the debtor or his trustees are the persons by or on behalf of whom it is carried on.” This principle is further illustrated by the judgment of the Privy Council in Mollwo, ll/la/rah, §s Co. v. T/w Court of Wards (L. R. 4 P. C. 419), and it conclusively shews that in such a case as Gosling v. Gaskell the mere right of the debenture trustees as creditors to participate in the profits of the business does not make them the principals of the person by whom it is being carried on. There being thus neither an express nor an implie authority for KELLY to carry on the business on behalf of the trustees for the debentureholders, no liability for the debts contracted by him attached upon the trustees, and the decision of the Court of Appeal was reversed. A difierent result would have made the position of debenture trustees one of much difliculty. As the law now stands, they can safely rely upon the usual provision that a receiver appointed by them shall be the agent of the company without the necessity of at once stopping the business in the event of the company being wound up.
It is arran ed that the annual dinner of the Hastings and St. Leonards Law %tudents’ Society, at which the Lord Chief Justice, who is president. will take the chair, will be held on Friday, January 21, at the Queen's Hotel. Lord Russell will propose the toast of the evening:
The present volume of the New Abridgmeut shews no falling off in the care with which the articles are prepared. Some of them, indeed, are admirable specimens of the manner in which the essence of the law and the authorities upon a complicated and diificult subject can be given within a comparatively small compass. Among the more important articles are those by Mr. Foa on Covenants in Leases and on Distress; by Mr. D. M. Kerby on Custom; by Mr. Blake Odgers, Q.C., on Damages; by Mr. Frank Evans on Debentures; by Mr. T. Cyprian Williams on Deeds; and by Mr. Justice Phillirnore and Mr. G. G. Phillimore on Demurrage. The subject of Easements is shortly treated by Mr. J . L. Goddard, and the practice with reference to the summons for directions is very well brought up to date by an article by Mr. F. A. Stringer. “Employers and Workmen " looks like a promising title, but it is dismissed in a page, the subject being really scattered among a number of separate articles, references to which are given. It is curious that the subject of covenants in general, as distinguished from covenants in leases, should not be accorded the honour of a separate title, and there does not seem to be any reference, except perhaps at p. 25 in the course of the article on Covenants in Leases, to guide the reader to a statement of the law of covenants running with the land. The half-page on Egypt, to which attention is called as one of the pnnci al articles, is disappointing, and the New Abridgment need hardly have prefaced this meagre in
formation with the remark that Egypt is “a country at the northeastern extremity of Africa.” The subject, if it was to be introduced at all, deserved better treatment.
There is an interesting note by Mr. C. Fisk Beach, jun.. of the New York bar, on Eminent Domain, a phrase well known in American law, although hardly acclimatized with us ; and the article on Death Duties, by Mr. W. F. Craies, with its clearly-arranged account of the various duties now payable, will be found useful.
The statutes of 1897 do not afford much scope for editorial explanation aud comment. The Session produced only two Acts of first importance —- the Workmen’s Compensation Act and the Land Transfer Act. Mr. Cotton has prefaced the former with a full statement of the new principle which it introduces into the relation of employer and workman, and has furnished references which will shew tho changes it has effected in the Employers’ Liability Act, 1880. Annotations have also been added to the Land Transfer Act and other Acts, such as the Weights and Measures (Metric System) Act and the Infant Life Protection Act. The series gives the statutes in a very convenient form.
Ruling Cases. Arranged, Annotated, and Edited by ROBERT CAMPBELL, M.A., Barrister-at-Law, assisted by other Members of the Bar. With American Notes by IRVING BROWNE. Vol. XIII. : Infant—Insurance. Stevens & Sons (Limited). Price 25s. net.
A Treatise on the Law Relating to Debentures and Debenture Stock issued by Trading and Public Com anies and by Local Authorities, with Forms and Precedents. gy PAUL FREDERICK SIMONSON, M.A., Barrister-at Law. Etfingham Wilson; Sweet -S: Maxwell (Limited).
Hints to Young Valuers. A Practical Treatise on the Valuation of Property. By ANTHONY R101:-man Canon, F.G.S. With Explanations of the Legal Principles involved. By J smas Ronsar VERNAM MAROHANT, M.A., Barrister-at Law. The Land Agents’ Record (Limited).
Precedents of General Requisitions on Title, with Eplanatory Notes and Observations. By Hannmrr A. Dioxins, Solicitor. Second Edition. Stevens d; Sons (Limited). Price 5s.
CORRESPONDENCE. THE LAND TRANSFER ACT, I807. [To the Editor of the b‘ol1'citors’ Jam-nal.]
Sir,—If the selected area for the experimental trial of compulsory registration of title be limited to so much of the county of London as lies within the geographical county of Middlesex, there will be no necessity to increase the present staff at the Laud Registry, which has for some years performed also the duties of Registrar of Deeds for Middlesex. For whatever land is, as the result of sales, placed upon the register under the Land Transfer Acts will cease to be subject to the registration of deeds. Consequently, the work of the one oflice will be lightened in exact proportion to the increase in the other, and, if registration of title prove a failure and be repealed, the staff will simply resume their present duties and there will be no increased cost to bear.
If the compulsory area be elsewhere, a new otfice will have to be provided and a new stafl‘ organized, and, in the event of failure, provision will have to be made for these elsewhere.
This is one of the many arguments which have led me to advocate the restricted area.
The Act of 1897 (section 20, sub-section 10) contemplates the utilization of any existing land registry, and appears to point to Middlesex or Yorkshire as the area to be selected for experiment.
10, Lincoln’s-inn, London, Jan. 7. BENJ. G. LAKE.
[To the Editor qf the Solicitors’ Journal.]
Sir,—Mr. Fortescue-Brickdale, the deputy registrar, in a letter that has appeared in the press, states that the ordnance survey maps will be “used in registration under the Land Transfer Act.” As ordnance maps are not admitted as evidence in our courts, I would like to ask him what will be the value of a plan on a certificate or a deed which has been copied from the ordnance map if the certificate or deed has to be produced in court?
It does not seem to be sufiiciently known that the system of registration of title created by the English Acts is wholly ditferent to the systems, whether compulsory or permissive, in operation in our colonies or in any foreign country. The registries abroad recognize only an absolute title. As it was foimd to be practically impossible to register such a title in this country, provision is made for registering a title either as (a) absolute, (b) qualified, (c) possessory. It is admitted that if registration of title is made compulsory in the county of London, purchasers will only apply for possessory titles as being the cheapest and quickest obtainable. It is further admitted that possessory titles will have no present value, but itis suggested that in course of years they may grow into value. In the meantime the title will have to be investigated and deeds will have to be prepared under the present system. As resort will only be had to the registry after the deeds are completed, it is well the pnblm should lrnow what the additional costs are likely to be that they will have to ay for the problematical benefit, which is the most thatis promised) under the new Act. I enclose a table I have compiled. which gives the fees now payable on purchases between £75 and £1,000 and the additional amounts that will, at the least, be payable if registration is made compulsory. It will be noticed that the expenses will be increased some 30 per cent. To complete the calculations I have estimated the solicitor’s additional remuneration_ 11$ 6s. per cent., the same amount as is to be charged for registration fees. Anyone who has had any experience of the worry and delay _0f carrying technical matters through a Government departmen_t_w1ll admit that, in such cases as I am referring to, the solrcitorfl remuneration will be but a purely nominal one if limited in accordance with my estimate. J . S. RUBINSTEIN.
The following I8 the table referred to by our correspondent:
Table showing the charges at present payable on the purchase Of freehold property from £75 to £1,000 and the additional amounts that will, at the least, be payable if registration of title is madfl compulsory in London :
' These charges are made up of the scale charges allowed under the Solicitors’ Remuneration Act, 1881, and the ad valorem stamp duty of 10s. per cent. V
T These charges are made up as follows : 2s. 6d. the costs of an ordnance map, 6s. per cent. on the purchase-money for registration fees, and a like per centage, the estimated costs payable to the purchaser's solicitor of and incident to the work of carrying through and completing the registration.
TITLE OF ACTION IN WHICH THERE IS AN INFANT DEFENDANT.
[To the Editor of the Solicitors’ Journal]
Sir,—I am at present acting in two Chancery actions, in both of which there is an infant defendant who has appeared by his guardian ad Z-item. The first of these actions is in the Liverpool District Registry of the Chancery Division of the High Court of Justice, and Mr. Registrar Lowndes in all proceedings subsequent to such appearance adopts the course of adding in the heading or title of the action, after the name of the infant, the following words I “ By A. B., his guardian, ad litem.”
The other case is in the Liverpool District of the Palatine Court, and Mr. Registrar Taylor has declined to allow such words to be added in the title after the name of the infant, on the ground that there is no jurisdiction to alter the heading, and also that it is unnecessary, as an infant must necessarily appear by a guardian ad Iitem.
Which of these courses is correct ? My experience would tend to show that that adopted by Mr. Registrar Lowndes was preferable, as for many reasons it is much better to have on the face of the order or judgment a statement who is the guardian ad litem for the infant, and that is the course which I have alwaty: myself adopted in all cases in which I have been engaged, but I d the practice alters so much nowadays that I should like to be quite sure which is the more correct view. ARTHUR S. Msrnna.
Liverpool, Jan. 12.
This was an appeal from a decision of Kekewich, J . (reported ante, p. 115), who had granted an injunction to restrain the defendants from sell— ing or advertising for sale certain premises comprised in an indenture of mortgage dated the 15th of February, 1897, and made between the plaintifis of the one part and the defendants of the other part. The mortgage contained a proviso that “ it is hereby agreed that payment of the principal money hereby secured shall not be required by the mortgagees or any person claiming under them” within three years from the date of the mortgage ‘ if in the meantime every half-yearly payment of interest shall be punctual-y paid.” The first half-yearly payment of interest fell due on the 15th of August, 1897, and the money was not then paid. On the 16th the plaintiff Broadbent wrote to the secretary of the company asking for immediate payment, and on the 17th the secretary replied that be would submit the matter to the next meeting of directors. On the 20th Broadbent gave the secretary notice calling in the mortgage money. On the 2-lth one Musgrave, a director of the company, sent the defendants a cheque for the interest. The defendants accepted the cheque, but claimed to enforce their notice. In November, 1897, the plaintiff company issued a writ, claiming a declaration that the defendants were not entitled to require payment of the principal moneys under the mortgage. The plaintiff company contended that “punctual” payment meant only payment on or within a reasonable time after the day named, and that if the true construction of the mortgage was not in accordance with their contention the deed should be rectified. They moved for an injunction to restrain the sale threatened by the defendants. Kekewich, J ., held that “ punctual " meant at or within a reasonable time after the time named, and granted the injunction. The defendants appealtd. It was admitted that if a proper notice calling in the money had been given it had never been waived.
Tun Covar (Lrnnnnr, M.R., and Bren! and Vsuorum Wrnusus, L.JJ.) allowed the appeal.
Lr.\'nLa\', l\l.Lt., said: I do not think we need hear any reply in this case, which I think isa singularly plain one. In the first place, the question arises what documents we are to look at. Are we to treat this as a suit for rectification? Is there any even plausible ground for holding the mortgagees’ hands and telling them that they are not to call in their money? Mr. Warrington felt so little confidence in that argument that he did not even allude to it; but his junior has put it forward. So far as ‘we can judge from the materials before us, I think there is nothing in it
at all. Broadbent and Carpenter, the mortgagees, had entered into an agreement for a mortgage to secure £7,000, which agreement might, no doubt, have resulted in a draft mortgage framed differently from this one. The draft was submitted to the parties’ solicitors in the usual way, and was ultimately executed ; and all that we have to do is to look at the mortgage deed and see what it says. It contains a covenant to pay on the 15th of August, 1897, the principal sum of £7,000 with interest at 5 per cent. and afterwards to pay interest at 5 per cent. on the 15th of February and the 15th of August. Therefore, if the plaintiffs did not pay on the 15th of August an action could be brought on the 16th. That might have been rather sharp practice, but legally such an action would lie. Then there is this proviso [His lordship read the proviso above set out, and continued :] That moans if in the meantime every halt-yearly payment shall be paid on the day on which it becomes due. It cannot mean anything else. There is no authority to the contrary. I do not think we want any authority to show that “punctual1y" means punctually on the day fixed. There is no authority that it does not mean that. The money was not paid on the day named, or for several days after. Moreover, no provision at all was made for payment — the mortgagors being a limited company —0n the first 15th of August, and there being no payment, and no sign of payment, the mortgagees on the 20th served notice calling in their money, which they were justified in doing. Under the pressure of that notice the mortgagors paid. Can it, then, be right to say that the mortgagees are not entitled to call in the money on the terms of this mortgage? The mortgagors have only themselves to blame if they are put to any inconvenience in consequence of their neglect to discharge their debt according to the tenour of the deed. I think the learned judge has gone a great deal too far in granting this injunction. The appeal must be allowed, with costs here and below.
The following passed in Constitutional Law and Legal History only :
Lii~icor.ii's-ii~ir<.—Alfred L. Cohn, Shekoh Sahibzadah Mohamed Dara, Anthony de Freitas, Sam S. Kay, Alan C. Nesbitt, and Chaturbhai Bhailalbhai Patel.
Iruvaa Txxi>I.s.—Edward G. Bear, Henry R. Bramley, Charles VV. Cayzer, Edward Ii. Chapman, Isaac R. Davies, Richard Feethum, John E. Godfrey, George W. Graham, Alfred A. Hildesheimer, Vvilliam E. Hirst, Arthur G. J smiescn, Gerald E. Mills, James R. Mitchell, John J . O. Murphy. Jocelyn B. Pelham, Charles J . L. Rudd, Strangman, Henry O. K. Webber, and John Wilson.
Minors TRIPLE.-—Sh&lkl1 Saiduddin Ahmed, Syud Aminuddin Ahmed Asghur, Patrick J . Blair, Samuel E. Bray, Valentine Browne, \Villiam A. F. Balfour Browne, Stgphen O. Henn Collins, Sir John Keane, Vincent D. Knowles, Philip B. orle, John Pollen, and Michael P. Walsh.
GaAY’s-irm.——Surendra Nath Haldar, Ruttilal Brijlal Maj mudar, Noel Middleton, Mehar Chand Pcbra, Romes Chandra Sen, and Restamji Kharshedji Tarachand.
()f 62 examined -13 passed. Two candidates were ordered not to be admitted for examination again until the Trinity examination, 1898
The following passed in Roman Law and Constitutional Law and Legal History:
LiNooi.rz’s-nm.—Arthur H. Lemon and J ayavaut Dinannth Madgavkar.
Ixnsa Tsnri.a.—-Francis Bradley-Birt, David Maclvor, Andrew J . M'Ciilloch, and Frederick C. H. C. Sinclair.
Minnui Tsin>i.a.——James D. Pennington.
Gii.\r’s-i:m.—Charles O. Blagden, Bernard Campion, Shadi Lal, Walter M. Thorburn, and Joseph A. Vaz.
Of 29 examined 12 passed. Two candidates were postponed until the Trinity examination, 1898, and one candidate until the Michaelmas examination, 1898.
The following passed in Roman Law :
Lincor.ri’s-irm.—Merwanji Rustanjl Boyce, Everard \V. Fichardt, Chen Ivan, Abdul Ghafar Pirzado, Walter W. Renshaw, and Muhammed Abdullah Shah.
Irmsa '.[‘auPi.n.—Kingten Baker, Arthur G. Blake, Frederick W. Brambeer, John E. Clauson, \Villiam J. Dalzell-Burnyeat, Robert B. grabblle, John P. Foster, Richard B. Murphy, and Pestenjee Sorahjee
MIDDLE Tarn-Ls.—-Henry S. B. Buée, Sydney Davey, Thomas Fentem, Robert N. Green-Armytage, Joseph E. Lilley, Malcolm B Milne, John A. Moore, Julius E. Pitcher, George C. Whiteley, Walter S. Wilkinson, Frederick J . Willis, and Hugo Worthington.
Giulr’s-rNiv.—Percy E. Barton, Edward H. Coumbe, Raghubar Dayal, Martin O’Connor, Peter H. Roberts, Charles I’. Rorke, Laxmidap Rowjl Sapat, Barichand Nathubhai Shah, Carleton S. Smith, and Cullyanji Musanj i Thacker.
Of 58 examined 37 passed. Five candidates were postponed until the Trinity examination, 1898, and three candidates until the Michaelmas examination, 1898.
Mr. Justice Gorell Barnes, says the Times, on taking his seat at the commencement of the sittings, said that it might be convenient to mention that, in addition to summonses being in future taken on Saturdays, cases to be heard in camera and applications as to the custody of children and other matters of u similar nature might also be taken on that day Ill Chambers. Probate cases in which merely a “ notice to cross-examine" had been given would be taken in court on Mondays in addition to the other business. \Vith regard to the new regulations which had been issued to prevent the overcrowding of this court, they would be strictly enforced. The " new regulations” referred to are as follows, and M6 posted up in court: “Notice.—1. The passages of this court are to be kept clear, and no persons other than barristers in robes are allowed to remain standing about the court, except behind the last row of seats. 3The teats in court behind those allotted to counsel are exclusively reserved for persons engaged in the case which is being heard, and, if there _bB room, for other persons engaged in the remaining cases in the day’s 118?3. The daily lists of cases to be heard will be made out in the room of the clerk of the rules. Persons having applications to make to the registrar attcnding the court, or clerk of the rules, must. as far as possible, llJflk3 them at the rooms of these ofllcials, and not in court.—By order.”
The City Lands Committee of the Corporation have brought up 11 report to that body on the subject of renewable leases of the City's property. In 1888 the Corporation agreed to a scheme, in relation to the property belonging to the Corporation held on leases renewable for ever, by which lessees were enabled on certain terms to commute the future fi_fl@l payable by them. The persons interested were duly communicated Will!» and many had embraced the opportunity thus afforded them of relief from conditions which involved periodical expenses and impcrilled the perpetuity of their leases. The lessees on the Conduit Mead Estate were offered under the scheme a choice of two modes of commuting the flnes. T119 first provided for the granting of an eighty years’ lease, renewable for B further term of eighty years, and so on for ever, upon the payment of the present value of all future fines payable under existing leases calciflated on a 3 per cent. table plus one year’s rack-rent of the property. _ The other alternative provided for the granting of a similar lease for 8135*? years on payment of an increased annual rental, equivalent to the pmlfifll