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of the judges of the King's Bench-only YATES, J., dissenting upon any living principle. "I shall ever," said WILLES, J., -took the latter view. FEARNE and HARGRAVE took the former. "discountenance as much as I can anything which savours of The decision of the King's Bench was reversed in the Exchequer ancient strictness and policy, and where I can possibly depart Chamber by a majority of six to two. An appeal was brought with justice from an old maxim, the policy of which has now to the House of Lords, but was not proceeded with. The result ceased, I certainly will." But in the opinion of the real thus left the matter doubtful, and the ordinary reporters did not property lawyers of the time this liberal policy was calculated think it worth while to report conflicting judgments which were to bring the law into uncertainty and to confound the titles to of great length. Those in the King's Bench occupied five hours property. The rule in Shelley's case, whether based upon the in delivery (4 Burr., p. 2582). But HARGRAVE was unwilling requirements of feudal policy or upon other considerations, had, that the arguments which he had undertaken to refute should | indeed, lost its original meaning, but as long as it was remain inaccessible to the profession, and he published a report of the case in the King's Bench (1 Coll. Jur. 283), and also the judgment of BLACKSTONE, J., in the Exchequer Chamber (Hargrave's Law Tracts, 489). The last-named judge, although he concurred with the majority in reversing the decision below, did so in terms which, in HARGRAVE's opinion, left his orthodoxy as to the rule open to doubt.

Perrin v. Blake was a case which strongly invited attack upon the rule in Shelley's case at the hands of judges who were anxious to break with antiquity and to subordinate everything to the testator's intention, for in the will which there came in question the intention to confer only a life estate on the first taker was indicated in the most unmistakeable manner. The will may for the present purpose be stated with sufficient accuracy by saying that the testator declared it to be his intent that his son JOHN should not sell or dispose of the estate for a longer time than his own life, and to that intent he devised his real estate to his son for life with remainder to the heirs of his body. Lord MANSFIELD held that the rule in Shelley's case, which was prima facie applicable so as to vest an estate tail in the son, was subject to the general intention of the will, and that the son accordingly took only an estate for life. But this did not represent the full extent of Lord MANSFIELD's offending. "There is," he is reported to have said, "no sound distinction between the devise of a legal estate and of a trust, and between an executory trust and one executed; all trusts are executory, and in every shape that a will appears the intention must govern.' "And if," he said further on, "courts of law will adhere to the mere letter of law, the great men who preside in Chancery will ever devise new ways to creep out of the lines of law, and temper with equity." In fact, however, this eminent judge, in his desire to bring law into a line with equity, went beyond the doctrines of the Court of Chancery, for there the distinction between trusts executed and trusts executory was well established, and only in trusts of the latter class did the court hold itself at liberty to depart from the regular legal effect of the limitations.

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BLACKSTONE, J., did not go as far as Lord MANSFIELD in allowing the declared intention of the testator to override altogether the rule in Shelley's case. He saw clearly enough that the intention of the testator was always contrary to the rule. "I believe," he said, 66 there never was an instance, when an estate for life was expressly devised to the first taker, that the devisor intended he should have anything more." If to this estate there is added a limitation with words of inheritance, the estate of the first taker is thereupon necessarily enlarged notwithstanding the contrary intention of the devisor. But Sir W. BLACKSTONE left himself open to misconstruction when he brought the question of intention to bear upon the estate taken by the heirs of the first taker. "The true question of intent will turn," he said, "not upon the quantity of estate intended to be given to John, the ancestor; but upon the nature of the estate intended to be given to the heirs of his body. That the ancestor was intended to take an estate for life is certain; that his heirs were intended to take after him is equally certain; but how those heirs were intended to take, whether as descendants or as purchasers is the question." He thought, therefore, that the testator, although using words of inheritance, might attach such an explanation to them as to deprive them of their effect as words of descent and make them available as words of purchase.

It is unnecessary to enter into the arguments by which FEARNE and HARGRAVE attacked Lord MANSFIELD's position, for these arguments have long been admitted to be victorious. The object of the King's Bench was to get rid of a rule, the origin of which was lost in antiquity and which had ceased to be based

accepted as an inflexible rule it at least allowed an ascertainable construction to be placed upon limitations. "Unless," said HARGRAVE, "an effort shall be speedily made to disembarrass the rule from the perplexities with which it has been latterly overrun, it will degenerate from a plain direction for discriminating titles to property into a downright enigma for disturbing them."

Other decisions beside that of the King's Bench in Perrin v. Blake shewed a disposition to depart from the strict application of the rule. In Doe v. Goff (11 East 668) there was a devise to the testator's daughter for life, with remainder to the heirs of her body as tenants in common, and it was held that these latter words were sufficient to shew that "heirs of the body" were intended to be words of purchase. This, in effect, was following the argument in the judgment of BLACKSTONE, J., quoted above, and the case was treated as an authority by SUGDEN, L.C., in Montgomery v. Mongomery (3 Jo. & Lat. p. 54). But in fact it had been then overruled by Jesson v. Wright (2 Bli. 1), and any further laxity in the application of the rule was checked both by this latter case and by Roddy v. Fitzgerald (6 H. L. C. 823). In Jesson v. Wright the limitations of the devise were to W. for life and after his death to the heirs of his body as he should appoint, in default of appointment to the heirs of his body as tenants in common. These latter words were now rejected as being inconsistent with the limitation to the heirs of the body, and, notwithstanding their insertion, the rule in Shelley's case was applied so as to vest an estate tail in W. It is possible for a testator so to explain words of inheritance which he has used as to show that he did not intend them to have their ordinary legal effect, but it is for him to shew this clearly. "The rule is," said Lord REDESDALE, "that technical words shall have their legal effect, unless, from subsequent inconsistent words, it is very clear that the testator meant otherwise." In Roddy v. Fitzgerald this was carried by Lord WENSLEYDALE a step further: "To deprive the technical words of their appropriate sense there must be sufficient to satisfy a judicial mind that they were meant by the testator to be used in some other sense, and to shew what that sense is." In that case the limitations were to W. for life and after his death to his lawful issue in such shares as he should appoint, and in default of appointment to the issue equally, with a gift over on failure of issue. It was held that "issue was used as "heirs of the body," and that W. took an estate tail.

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Lord MACNAGHTEN intimates that perhaps BLACKSTONE, J., did not, in his judgment in Perrin v. Blake, really go beyond the correct view, and that, in speaking of the rule in Shelley's case as a flexible rule, and as one yielding to the testator's intention in the manner above described, he simply meant that the testator could himself explain the sense in which he had used words of inheritance. But however this may be, it is clear that no declaration of the testator's intention will do unless the words used are so defined as to designate specific persons, and not to extend to all persons filling the character of heir. So long as the words used are thus extensive, it is impossible for the testator, by any expression of intention, or by the addition of any inconsistent provisions, to deprive them of their proper legal effect, and to qualify the estate of inheritance which vests in the first taker. Lord THURLOW, C., was as sound on this as any subsequent judge. "I take," said he, in Jones v. Morgan (1 Bro. C. C. 205), "the rule in Shelley's case never to have been shaken at all. I take that rule to be that, where the heir takes in the character of heir, he must take in the quality of heir.

. . All possible heirs must take as heirs and not as purchasers." The testator may himself put a narrower meaning on the word, but, short of this, he cannot prevent the operation of the rule. The aberration of the King's Bench in Perrin

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v. Blake is interesting for the controversy it aroused, but it left no permanent mark upon the law. Lord DAVEY in Van Grutten v. Foxwell lays down as clearly as HARGRAVE could have desired the principle for which that learned lawyer contended. "The rule in Shelley's case is a rule of law and not a mere rule of construction—that is, one laid down for the purpose of giving effect to the testator's expressed or presumed intention." Van Grutten v. Foxwell the limitations were somewhat elaborate and it is needless to reproduce them here, but in effect they gave estates for life to the children of the testator who survived him -only one answered this requirement-followed by estates to the heirs of the bodies of the children. In the various provisions annexed to these limitations the House of Lords saw

no indication that the testator had placed any meaning on "heirs of the body" to rob the expression of its ordinary force, and consequently the child who survived the testator took an estate tail. The decisions of the House of Lords in the present century have amply atoned for the slight put upon the venerable rule in question in the last.

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CORRESPONDENCE.

THE LAND TRANSFER ACT, 1897.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-Mr. Lake, in his letter to the SOLICITORS' JOURNAL of the 25th ult., expresses the view that the selected area for the experimental trial of compulsory registration should be limited to so much of the county of London as lies within the county of Middlesex, so that the experiment should, "in the event of failure, be as little permanently injurious as possible."

In the discussion that took place at the meeting of the United Law Society on the 15th of November, when Mr. Lake and I were the principal speakers, I objected to the experiment being tried at all in any part of the county of London, and I asked Mr. Lake to say how the experiment was to be brought to an end if it should turn out a failure, and how in that event he would deal with the large staff of officials that compulsory registration in London would call into existence. Mr. Lake did not answer my question then. Perhaps he will do so now. J. S. RUBINSTEIN.

5, Raymond-buildings, Gray's-inn, London, Jan. 5.

The Publishers' Circular says that the number of new books on law, jurisprudence, &c., issued during 1897 was 93, and of new editions, 47. The numbers for 1896 were 132 and 50.

The retirement of Mr. Justice Bewley, says the Westminster Gazette, was accompanied with incidents of a somewhat dramatic character. His resignation and the appointment of his successor were "officially" announced in the papers on Wednesday morning. Till late in the afternoon of Tuesday the learned judge presided in the Land Commission Court, when he delivered an elaborate judgment dissenting from the views of Mr. Justice Ross, the Land Judge, and using the significant expression," I, too, am a judge of the Supreme Court."

NEW ORDERS, &c.

LAND REGISTRY.

LAND TRANSFER ACTS, 1875 AND 1897.

NOTICE.

Attention is directed to the Land Transfer Act, 1897, and the Provisional Land Transfer Rules, 1897, which come into operation on the 1st of January, 1898. The following are the most important provisions of the Act and Rules as regards the practice of the Land Registry.

1.-AS TO PRODUCTION OF LAND AND CHARGE CERTIFICATES. Section 8 requires the Land Certificate or Charge Certificate to be produced and endorsed on every registration affecting registered land or a charge. This applies to every transfer of a portion of a registered estate, or part release of a charge, as well as to dealings with the whole. The Registrar has no power to waive this regulation, and it applies to certificates issued before as well as after the commencement of the Act. The Registrar has power to compel production of a certificate. On a sale by a mortgagee, under a power of sale contained in a registered charge, the Charge Certificate only need be produced.

2.-AS TO JOINT PROPRIETORS.

Schedule I. of the Act, amendment of Section 83 (3), requires an entry to be made (subject to general rules) on every registration of two or more joint proprietors, that when their number is reduced below a specified number, no disposition is to be made without a special order. This entry can be omitted on production of satisfactory evidence that the proprietors are entitled for their own benefit, or that the survivor has power to dispose of the land or charge affected. See Rules 34 to 37; also paragraph 9 below.

3.-AS TO TRANSMISSIONS OF FREEHOLD LAND ON DEATH. and Rules 14 to 22, should be carefully studied before making any The provisions of Part I. of the Act, and of Section 6 (4) and (5), application to register on a death occurring on or after 1st January, 1898.

4.-VENDORS AND PURCHASERS.

Section 16 prescribes the evidence which a purchaser of registered land may require, and regulates the incidence of certain costs, and the obligation to enter into covenants for title on sales of registered land. 5.-SUCCESSION DUTY AND ESTATE DUTY.

Certain doubts having been expressed as to the incidence of Succession Duty and Estate Duty under Section 18 of the Land Transfer Act, 1875, Section 13 of the new Act provides for the registration of notices of claims for these duties in all proper cases, and for the complete exoneration of purchasers where such notices are not registered. See also Rules 30 to 33.

6.-CHARGES-LIENS BY DEPOSIT.

Section 9 enables annuities and mortgages in Building Society forms to be registered, and applies the provisions of Sections 19 to 24 of the Conveyancing Act to registered charges. See also Rules 12 and 13.

Section 8, last paragraph, and Rules 38 to 40, specially provide for liens by deposit of Land or Charge Certificates; Section 81 of the Land Transfer Act, 1875, being repealed.

7.-SETTLED LAND.

Section 6, and Rules 2 to 11 and 16 to 22, should be studied before making applications or drawing instruments relating to settled land. 8.-BOUNDARIES AND DESCRIPTIONS OF LAND.

Section 83 (5) and (6) of the Land Transfer Act, 1875, declaring that registration is not to be conclusive as to boundaries, is repealed, and replaced by Section 14 (2) of the new Act.

9.-NUMBER OF PROPRIETORS-TENANTS IN COMMON. Section 83 (2) of the Land Transfer Act, 1875, limiting the possible number of joint registered proprietors, and prohibiting the registration of undivided shares, is repealed by Section 14 (1) of the new Act, 10. INDEMNITY FOR ERRORS. from fraud or error in a registered transaction. Sections 7 and 21 provide indemnity for any loss that may result

11.-MINES AND MINERALS.

Certain doubts that have been expressed as to the effect of registered transfers under Sections 30-33 and 35-38 of the Land Transfer Act, 1875, in regard to mines and minerals, are dealt with by explanatory amendments in the first schedule of the new Act.

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Special case stated by order of a judge. The facts appear from the judgment of the court. The following cases were cited during the argument before Hawkins and Channell, JJ., on the 6th of December: Overseers of the Savoy v. Art Union of London (1896, A. C. 296), Mayor of Manchester v. Macadam (1896, A. C. 500), Reg. v. Institution of Civil Engineers (5 Q. B. D. 48), Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Forrest (15 App. Cas. 334), Reg. v. Jones (8 Q. B. 719), and Reg. v. Overseers of Manchester (16 Q. B. 449). Judgment was reserved.

resolution duly passed on the 24th of February, 1896 (before the making
of this rate), that the Royal College of Music shall not make any
dividend, gift, division, or bonus in money unto or between any of its
members. The ground upon which it was contended by the respondents
that the college is not entitled to this exemption is very similar to that
upon which the exemption from rateability was resisted when claimed by
the Institution of Civil Engineers under the 6 & 7 Vict. c. 36, and on another
occasion, when exemption from liability to the duty imposed under section

11 of the Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1885, was claimed. The first
of these cases, Reg. v. Institution of Civil Engineers (5 Q. B. D. 48), in which
the defendants claimed exemption from parochial rates, was determined
by Wild and Manisty, JJ., against the institution substantially upon the
ground that as a matter of fact the primary object of the institution was
not the promotion of science exclusively, but the acquisition of scientific
knowledge for the purposes and in the interests of the members of the
institution. In the next case, Re Duty on Estate of Institution of Civil Engineers
(19 Q. B. D. 610), a claim for exemption from duty imposed by the
Customs and Inland Revenue Act, 1885, s. 11, sub-section (3), was
decided by Lord Coleridge, C.J., and Field, J., against the institution
upon substantially the same ground as in the case I have already cited.
That decision was, however, reversed on appeal (20 Q. B. D. 621) upon
the ground that upon the true construction of the charter its object was
the promotion of mechanical science by the activity of the body of civil
engineers. This decision of the Court of Appeal was affirmed by the
House of Lords in Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Forrest (15 App. Cas.
334). [His lordship then referred to the judgments in the House of Lords,
and continued:] The effect of this judgment is virtually to overrule
Reg. v. Institution of Civil Engineers. Assuming the objects of the society
as defined by the charter to be fully and faithfully carried out, could it
the fine art of music exclusively? The building was, and is, absolutely
be seriously doubted that the society was instituted for the purposes of
necessary for the transaction of the business of the institution and for the
accommodation of the teachers and pupils. Without such tuition as is
provided for in the charter it would be impossible to accomplish the
object. The fees received from pupils and candidates are reasonably
received from those who can afford to pay them, but they are all applied
exclusively to the declared purposes of the college. For those who are
poor and unable to pay necessary maintenance is provided; the larger
the number of apt pupils, whether rich or poor, receiving tuition at the
college, the more will musical art be disseminated throughout the empire,
the more encouragement to those who strive to acquire distinction in
such art, the greater the prospect of the advancement of it. The build-
ing and the funds, whether derived partly or entirely from voluntary contri-
butions, are entirely and wholly applied to the objects of the charter
without any surplus profit to the corporation, and no member of the
college derives any benefit from such funds. It may be that many of the
pupils and scholars may by means of the instruction afforded them become
80 proficient in the art of music that they may be eminently fitted for and
devote themselves to the profession of teachers of music as the means of
competent livelihood; the more who do so the more extensively and
effectively will the art of music be promoted. This, however, is only a
fortunate result of the goodness of the tuition afforded, but not a result
which it was the purpose of the society or part of its business to bring
about; it would only be an incidental advantage to both the pupils and
the institution. There will be judgment for the appellants with
costs.
CHANNELL, J., concurred. Judgment for the appellants.-COUNSEL,
Danckwerts; R. C. Glen. SOLICITORS, H. T. Boodle; Cates.
[Reported by T. R. C. DILL, Barrister-at-Law.]

THE COURT (HAWKINS and CHANNELL, JJ.) allowed the appeal. HAWKINS, J., in the course of a written judgment, said: The question raised for our opinion is whether the Royal College of Music is exempt from being assessed or rated to the parochial rate of the respondent parishes, within which the buildings of the Royal College are situated, by reason of the exemption contained in the statute 6 & 7 Vict, c. 36, s. 1. That section enacts that "from and after the 1st of October, 1843, no person or persons shall be assessed or rated, or liable to be assessed or rated to, or liable to pay any county, borough, parochial, or other local rates, or cesses in respect of any land, houses, or buildings belonging to any society instituted for purposes of science, literature, or the fine arts exclusively, and occupied by it for the transaction of its business and for carrying into effect its purposes; provided that such society shall be supported wholly or in part by annual voluntary contributions and shall not, and by its laws may not, make any dividend, gift, division, or bonus in money unto or between any of its members." The college was constituted a body corporate by letters patent on the 23rd of May, 1884, with power to hold lands for the purposes of the corporation, which were described to be: "First, the advancement of the art of music by means of a central teaching and examining body charged with the duty of providing musical instruction of the highest class and of rewarding with academical CITY OF LONDON BREWERIES CO. (LIM.) AND THE COMMISdegrees and certificates of proficiency and otherwise persons whether educated or not at the college, who, on examination, may prove themselves worthy of such distinctions and evidences of attainment; and secondly, the promotion and supervision

of such musical instruction in schools and elsewhere as may be thought most conducive to the cultivation and dissemination of the art of music in the United Kingdom; and lastly, generally the encouragement and promotion of the cultivation of music as an art throughout our dominions." It is difficult to imagine an institution more exclusively devoted to any of the fine arts than is the Royal College of Music. [His lordship then referred to the acquisition by the Royal College of the buildings sought to be rated upon a long lease, which contained a stipulation that they should be used for the purposes of the charter only,] The case expressly finds that the building has been occupied exclusively by the Royal College of Music for the transaction of its business, and for carrying into effect the aforesaid purposes of the college, and that the college has carried out no purpose other than the purposes of the corporation as defined in the charter. What more is required to entitle the building to the exemption given by the statute? I am at a loss to understand upon what ground it can be contended that the first requirement of the proviso-namely, that the corporate society shall be supported wholly or partly by annual voluntary contributions has not been fulfilled. The case expressly finds that it has. It is true that of the revenue for the year ending April, 1896, a small proportion only, £1,632, was derived from annual contributions of a purely voluntary character; but that is a substantial sum, and, in my opinion, quite sufficient to satisfy the requirement of the proviso that the support shall be partly by voluntary contributions. hardly be said that the interest and dividends, amounting to £4,639, were annual voluntary contributions, for they were interest and dividends of money and securities already belonging to the society. The second requirement of the proviso seems to have been overlooked when the original charter was prepared; this defect was remedied by a special

It can

SIONERS OF INLAND REVENUE. Div. Court. 14th Dec. REVENUE-STAMP-INSTRUMENT TO SECURE PAYMENT-MORTGAGE-"TOTAL RECOVERABLE "-AMOUNT AMOUNT OF SECURITY TO BE ULTIMATELY LIMITED-STAMP ACT, 1891 (54 & 55 VICT. c. 39), ss. 86 (1.) 88 (1.). Case stated by Commissioners of Inland Revenue. On the 21st of May, 1897, an instrument was presented on behalf of the brewery company to the commissioners for their opinion as to what stamp duty the instrument in question was chargeable under sections 86 and 88 of the Stamp Act, 1891. By section 88 it is provided that any security for the payment or repayment of money to be lent, advanced, or paid, or which may become due upon an account current either with or without money previously due, shall be charged, where the total amount secured or to be ultimately recoverable is in any way limited, with the same duty as a security for the amount so limited. The instrument purported to be a trust deed for securing debenture stock, and was dated the 6th of May. 1897, and after reciting that there was outstanding at that time £500,000 debenture stock of the company constituted and secured by a trust deed dated the 20th of February, 1892, recited the intention of the appellants to issue further irredeemable debentures, bearing interest at 3 per cent, ranking after the former stock and to be issued only in the place of the former debentures. By clause 7 of the instrument in question it was provided that in the first instance the stock was limited to £300,000, but that the company should be at liberty to issue further irredeemable 3 per cent. debenture stock, entitled pari passu to the benefit thereof, subject to the following provisions: (a) That this 3 per cent. stock should not exceed £540,000 in amount, making with the £300,000 a total charge of £840,000; (b) that such further stock should only be issued for the purpose of redeeming or paying off the 4 per cent. debenture stock of £500,000; (c) that the company must give notice in writing to the trustees of the amount of the proposed further issue, and providing for the value at which the old stock was to be assessed for the purpose of substituting for it the new deben

ture stock; (d) that the company must, before any such further debenture stock was issued or offered for subscription, execute and deliver to the trustees an acknowledgment of indebtedness for the amount of the further proposed issue, and until such acknowledgment was executed, no part of such further stock was to be entitled to the benefit thereof. No such acknowledgment of indebtedness had been executed. The Commissioners were of opinion that the sum of £840,000 mentioned was the limit of the total amount secured by, or to be ultimately recoverable under, the trust deed within the meaning of section 88 (i.) of the Stamp Act, 1891. They accordingly gave it as their opinion that the instrument was chargeable with duty under the head of Mortgage, Bond, Debenture Covenant, &c., under the first schedule of the Act, and they assessed such duty at £1,050 being 2s. 6d. for every £100 of the amount secured as "being the only cr principal or primary security (other than an equitable mortgage) for the payment or repayment of money." The questions for the consideration of the court were first, whether the instrument was chargeable with the duty of £1,050; and secondly, if not, with what duty was it chargeable? For the appellants, counsel contended that the deed was only liable to be taxed as a security for the £300,000 already issued, and they admitted that to that amount the duty to be charged was at the rate of 2s. 6d. for every £100. If in any sense any tax could be charged on the balance of £540,000 either now or hereafter it should only be at the lesser rate of 6d. in the place of 2s. 6d. as the commissioners had decided. For the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, it was submitted that their decision was right, because this was a trust deed to secure an amount limited—namely, £840,000. The acknowledgment of indebtedness proposed would not be in any sense a mortgage whenever executed, and when the further amount of £540,000 was raised it would be raised on the security of this deed. The Act contemplated such a case, and provided for it by the words in section 88 (i.) referring to any security for payment to be hereafter lent or paid.

THE COURT decided in favour of the company. GRANTHAM, J., said they were of opinion that with respect to the further advance of £540,000, that was but a substituted security to be given by the company at some future date, and in respect of that amount the duty of 6d. instead of 2s. 6d. was alone chargeable. The Crown, therefore, must repay the difference to the appellants. That being the substantial dispute between the appellants and the Crown, the appeal would be allowed with

costs.

CHANNELL, J., concurred, but on somewhat different grounds. He thought that a security was none the less a security for money because something else had to be done before the money could be raised. He agreed that under the deed in question the sum of £540,000 was in fact a substituted security, and before it became perfected an acknowledgment of indebtedness was a condition precedent, which so far the company had not executed. The lower rate of duty, therefore, alone ought to be charged. It was never disputed that 2s. 6d. for every £100 was the proper rate of duty to be paid on the sum of £300,000. Appeal accordingly allowed.-COUNSEL, Bosanquet, Q.C., and M. M. Macnaghten; Finlay, S.G., and Danckwerts. SOLICITORS, Western & Sons; The Solicitor for Inland Revenue. [Reported by ERSKINE REID, Barrister-at-Law.]

Ex parte WILLIAM MORRIS. Div. Court. 14th Dec. MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS-LEAVE TO PAY BILLS INADVERTENTLY OMITTED FROM CANDIDATES' RETURN OF EXPENSES-MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS ACT, 1884, s. 21 (7).

In this case counsel moved on behalf of Mr. William Morris, a candidate at the election of councillors for the Morriston Ward of the county borough of Swansea, for exemption for not having made a complete return of his expenses of the election. Mr. Morris had unsuccessfully contested the election, and shortly afterwards his agent, to whom the expenses in question had been sent for the purpose of being checked, had become seriously ill and had not been able to look into the matter. During his illness the return had been made and the amount accidentally omitted from the account rendered. All Mr. Morris now asked for was leave to be allowed to pay the bills which were for expenses he was entitled legally to incur, and would not when added to the return made bring the costs incurred up to the maximum allowed by the statute.

THE COURT (GRANTHAM and CHANNELL, JJ.) granted the relief sought.-
COUNSEL, C. Willoughby Williams. SOLICITOR, Richard White, for H. W.
Paton, Swansea.
[Reported by ERSKINE REID, Barrister-at-Law.]

Ex parte HUGHES. Div. Court. 14th Dec.
MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS-LEAVE TO PAY EXPENSES INCURRED IN EXCESS OF
STATUTORY MAXIMUM-INCOMPLETE RETURN BY ELECTION AGENT-
MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS (CORRUPT AND ILLEGAL PRACTICES) ACT, 1884 (47 &
48 VICT. c. 70) s. 21 (1.).

allowed, and had not realized how the expenses of printing had run up
[GRANTHAM, J.-Has this application been opposed in any way ?-No. Al1
the papers and receipts are in order and in court.]
THE COURT (GRANTHAM and CHANNELL, JJ.) granted the application.-
COUNSEL, Lewis Coward. SOLICITORS, Rowcliffes, Rawle, & Co. for Needham
& Co., Manchester.
[Reported by ERSKINE REID, Barrister-at-Law.]

Judge's Chambers.

HALL. LAUNSPACH. Ridley, J. 29th December.

LORD MAYOR'S COURT-PROHIBITION-LIBEL-COSTS.

This was an application for a writ of prohibition to prohibit the Lord Mayor's Court and the Judge and Registrar thereof from taxing the plaintiff's costs in an action for libel, and from allowing any proceeding to be taken in such court for enforcing payment of such costs, on the ground that the Mayor's Court had no jurisdiction to tax costs in an action for libel where less than £10 damages are recovered. It was stated that this was a novel point which had never been decided nor even raised before. The circumstances were as follows:-The plaintiff brought an action in the Mayor's Court for damages for libel, and recovered £2 10s. damages. The action was tried before the Common Serjeant, who certified for counsel, and the postea directed judgment to be signed, together "with costs to be taxed." The plaintiff carried in his costs for taxation, which were taxed upon the scale applicable to actions where under £20 is recovered. The plaintiff then applied for a writ of prohibition, on the ground that there was no scale of costs in the Mayor's Court applicable to actions for libel where less than £10 is recovered, and therefore the Registrar had no power to tax them. On the hearing of the application,

Swepstone (Swepstone & Stone) argued: Rule 1 of the Mayor's Court Rules, 1890, directed that "all" costs in actions and matters in the Mayor's Court were directed to be taxed according to the scales and fees in the schedules annexed. The first part of Schedule B related to actions where the amount recovered exceeded £5 and was under £10 and the action could have been brought in a County Court, and was not applicable. The second part of the schedule bore the headnote that "the following costs only shall be allowed where the amount recovered is £10, and upwards." There was no other scale, and inasmuch as the plaintiff had not recovered £10 and no scale of costs was provided for actions which could not be brought in a County Court, it was a casus omissus, and there was no power for the court to frame another scale of costs applicable to this case. Garnett v. Bradley, 3 App. Cas. 944, 26 W. R. 698, decided that a plaintiff was entitled to costs in the High Court where only a farthing damages was recovered in an action of slander unless the judge certified to deprive him of them, and such costs were taxed on the High Court scale, because there was only one scale of costs applicable to actions of whatever amount, but in the Mayor's Court the scale was limited to actions in which £10 and upwards was recovered, and the scale under £10 only referred to actions which could have been brought in the County Court. There was, therefore, no scale of costs applicable to this case, and the court could not frame one. The anomaly existed that in the High Court a verdict of one farthing damages in an action for libel would carry costs; but no verdict in an action for libel where under £10 was recovered in the Mayor's Court could carry costs.

Joel Emanuel (Emanuel, Round, & Nathan), for the plaintiff, contended: 1st, that the scale in Schedule B applied; 2nd, that if it did not apply the old scale of costs prior to the rules of 1890 applied; 3rd, if the old scale of costs did not apply, the court had power to grant costs outside the hibition. 1st, that Schedule B applied; he argued that the headnote to the schedule under ord. 8; 4th, that this was not a matter for proscale did not form part of the scale itself, and might have been better placed at the end of the schedule. The schedule was not governed by the headnote. It was true the headnote stated that the costs were only to be allowed where the amount recovered was £10 and upwards. That applied the scale to those instances, but it did not exclude its operation to other matters. That appeared clear from items in the schedule, such as drawing pleadings in equity, which might be for rectification of a deed, dissolution of partnership, or other matter where no money at all was claimed or recovered, instructions for petition, which might be for appointment of new trustees or for a charging order; instruction for brief on an interim, injunction where no money at all was in dispute. If, therefore, the scale applied to matters outside the headnote it was clearly applicable to the outside matter of an action for libel where the costs had not otherwise been provided for. 2nd, if the scale did not apply, then the old scale of costs prior to the rules should be in the discretion of the court, and ord. 10, rule 5, directed that of 1890 applied. Ord. 8, rule 1, directed that the costs of all proceedings so far as those orders and rules were inconsistent therewith, the practice and procedure then in use in the court should be in force. Those orders were passed in 1892, and if rule 8 directing costs to be in the discretion of the court introduced a new practice as to costs not provided by the rules of 1890, the old schedule of costs became applicable. 3rd, if the old scale of costs did not apply, the court under ord. 8, rule 1, or under its inherent jurisdiction, had power to deal with costs as it pleased, either by awarding a lump sum or otherwise. If the defendant's contention were correct, in a motion to commit a person for publishing comments on judicial proceedings by any party, because there was nothing in the schedules providing for the costs of such a motion, and a solicitor could not sue his own client for the costs of an action for libel if less than £10 were recovered, because the same objection would arise as to the scale of costs upon which a solicitor was entitled to be paid. When he sued for his bill, directly it was referred to taxation, the question would arise, Where was the scale upon which the

Counsel moved ex parte on behalf of Mr. Hughes, a candidate at the recent municipal election for the Exchange Ward of the City of Manchester, for leave to pay the sum of £8 11s. 6d., which had been incurred by him over and above the maximum of £33 14s. 9d. allowed under the statute to such a candidate for election expenses. The facts stated were these: Mr. Hughes had consulted Mr. Cooper, the secretary of the local Conservative Association, and on his advice had employed a Mr. Hans-sub judice, the judge could not order the costs of a motion to be paid or borne lander as his agent, who had negligently incurred the extra costs for which leave to pay was now applied for. The agent in his affidavit stated that he was a person experienced in election law and that the excess arose from the fact that he had forgotten to include the sum paid by one of the committee men for the use of the committee rooms, and that he had been in the habit of acting at elections where there was a larger maximum

costs could be taxed? 4th, this was not a matter for prohibition; the parts of the costs relating to fees of the court and allowances to witnesses were contained in separate schedules to which the head note to the second part of Schedule B did not apply. A prohibition would not lie in regard to particular items in a bill of costs. The court could not restrain the taxation where certain costs were clearly within its jurisdiction, and if other items in the bill were in excess of its jurisdiction, that might be matter for appeal, but not for prohibition.

RIDLEY, J.-I have carefully considered this case and the arguments addressed to me. In my opinion, the headnote to the second part of Schedule B must be taken to be part of the schedule itself, and the whole schedule being subject to such headnote, it cannot apply to any actions in which less than £10 is recovered. Such being the case, I look in vain for any schedule applicable to an action for libel in which less than £10 is recovered. There being none, I cannot see upon what scale these costs can be taxed. If taxed upon a scale which does not exist, I think the court is exceeding its jurisdiction, and ought to be prohibited. With regard to the court fees and allowances to witnesses, these seem to be included in scales to which the headnote is not applicable, and must therefore be allowed. The prohibition will therefore be granted as to all costs, except the costs of witnesses and court fees.

[We are favoured with the above report.]

LAW SOCIETIES.

LAW ASSOCIATION.

At a meeting of the directors held at the hall of the Incorporated Law Society on Thursday, the 6th inst., the following being present-viz., Mr. R. J. Peid (chairman), Messrs. C. Burt, T. D. Bolton, M.P., A. C. Cronin, S. J. Daw, L. Desborough, H. C. Nisbet, R. H. Peacock, Sidney Smith, Arthur Toovey, J. Vallance, and Arthur Carpenter (secretary), a grant of £50 was made to a non-member. A further investment in Consols was

directed to be made. Thirty new members were admitted to the association, and other general business was transacted.

LEGAL NEWS.

APPOINTMENTS.

Mr. Justice Byrne will preside at the third of the series of law lectures inaugurated by the Solicitors' Managing Clerks' Association, which will take place in the Old-hall, Lincoln's-inn, on Tuesday, the 18th inst., when Mr. Astbury, Q C., will deliver a lecture (in place of Mr. A. Hopkinson, Q.C., M.P., who has been appointed Principal of Owens College, Manchester) on the subject of "Privileged Communications." A correspondent writes to the Times: "In to-day's issue of the Times you note the ninety-sixth birthday of the Right Hon. C. P. Villiers, designating him the 'Father of the Bar,' as having been called in 1827. In the last Law List Mr. William Parrott Carter is given as having been been called in 1821. If that gentleman is still alive, and I have seen no notice of his death, should not he, and not Mr. Villiers, be considered as the Father of the Bar'?''

The Estates Gazette says that in the aggregate the dealings in land and property during the year just closed have been of a very satisfactory character. The total amount of the sales which have taken place at the London Auction Mart, £5,257,723, is considerably in advance of the total of £4,476,801 for 1896. In addition, considerable transactions have been effected in the provinces, whilst numerous important sales have been concluded by private treaty. The most notable feature in the year's business has been the facility with which brewing concerns and licensed properties, both in London and the provinces, have been sold at remarkably high prices. Ground-rents have again been eagerly sought after, principally by societies and trustees with funds to invest. The general price has averaged about thirty-two years' purchase, but now and again a much higher value has been obtained. The year has seen a considerable increase in the demand for small freehold properties; building sites, both in the metropolis and chief provincial centres, have been readily sold at good prices. Farms and agricultural land have not sold very readily, but in many cases prices have been secured which, as things now are, may be considered fairly good.

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The compulsory provisions of the Land Transfer Act, 1897, are to be applied to one county as an experiment and cannot be applied to any other county for three years. The Privy Council are to select the county by sending to the county council a draft of the proposed order to come into force at the end of six months unless the county council shall,

Mr. GEORGE WILLIAM BURTON, Chief Justice of the Province of Ontario, within three months, at a special meeting at which two-thirds of the Canada, has received the honour of Knighthood.

Mr. WILLIAM BRANDFORD GRIFFITH, Chief Justice of the Gold Coast Colony, has received the honour of Knighthood.

Mr. EDWARD JAMES ACKROYD, late Puisne Judge of the Supreme Court, Hong-Kong, has received the honour of Knighthood.

Mr. ARTHUR WILSON, barrister, Legal Adviser and Solicitor, India Office, has been appointed a Knight Commander of the Order of the Indian Empire.

CHANGES IN PARTNERSHIPS.

Mr. ROLAND ELLIS DE VESIAN, Solicitor, has made arrangements to join Mr. Richard Cattarns in partnership as from the 1st of January, 1898, and will after that date practise at 104, Leadenhall-street, E.C. The style of the new firm will be Cattarns & De Vesian.

In consequence of the death of Mr. Charles Harrison, Mr. William Sidney Harrison is the only surviving partner in the firm of C. & S. Harrison & Co., of 19, Bedford-row, W.C., and he has admitted into partnership_Mr. ARTHUR CASSON LEWIS and Mr. CHARLES FREDERICK POLLOCK. The style of the firm will be as hitherto, C. & S. Harrison & Co. Messrs. Clapham, Fitch, & Co., of 15, Devonshire-square, Bishopsgate, City, solicitors, have taken Mr. PERCIVAL ALFRED CLAPHAM, the eldest son of the late senior partner, and Mr. NATHANIEL BARRETT WARNER BROMLEY into partnership. The style of the firm remains unaltered.

DISSOLUTIONS.

JOHN CHARLES HARDY, LEWIS JOHN OATWAY, and ALFRED PERCY DOULTON, solicitors, 23, Bush-lane, London (Vandercom, Hardy, Oatway, & Doulton). Dec. 31.

HERBERT JOHN WAKEMAN and CHARLES ALBERT Warminster (Wakeman & Bleeck). Dec. 31.

INFORMATION WANTED.

BLEECK, solicitors, [Gazette, Jan. 4.

THE REV. JOHN BROWN BRUNESSON, deceased.-The Rev. John Brown Brunesson, deceased, made a will on the 24th of February, 1897, the contents of which are known, but the original will cannot be found. Any person who can give information as to its whereabouts is requested to communicate with Messrs. Mear & Fowler, solicitors, No. 2, Old Serjeants'-inn, Chancery-lane, London.

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whole number of the members are present, resolve, and communicate to the Privy Council the resolution that in their opinion compulsory registration of title would not be desirable in their county.

On the 4th of August, when the Bill was being hurried through the House of Commons at the fag end of the Session, it was first stated that compulsory registration was to be first tried as an experiment in the the evening it was stated that it was to be tried first in the county of county of Middlesex, which has its own registration office; but later in London, and I thereupon moved an amendment to prevent this for various reasons, with only one of which will I trouble you now. I urged that there was nothing in the Bill to prevent the Privy Council from provisions into issuing an order immediately after the Act passed, bringing its months from operation in the county, unless within three that time it held such a meeting and passed such a resolution, and that the power of objecting ought to be given not to the moribund county council, but to the new council, which would be elected next March. The Attorney-General, who was then in charge of the Bill, declared on behalf of the Government that "the provisions of the Bill were not to come into operation until the 1st of January, 1898, before which time no steps whatever could be taken towards putting these provisions into force." This statement was equivalent to an undertaking on the part of the Government that no notice of a draft order should be issued by the Privy Council until the 1st of January, and, this being so, the London County Council would have until the 1st of April to hold its meeting and object, and this could be done either by the dying council or by the newly-elected council. Having this undertaking, I allowed my amendment to be negatived without a division, and a few minutes afterwards, on its being pointed out that the Bill contained the Royal Assent, it was struck out by the Government as being incona clause enabling such a notice to be issued as soon as the Act received sistent with the Attorney-General's statement.

Notwithstanding this distinct pledge, the London Gazette of the 26th of November contains an official announcement of a draft order sent to the London County Council to the effect that on and after the 1st of July The effect is that the time for objecting will expire on the 26th of registration of title to land is to be compulsory in sales in that county. February, and the new council will be deprived of any voice in the matter. I find that this is done by virtue of the 37th section of the Interpretation Act, 1889, which provides that "where an Act is not to come into operation immediately on its passing, and confers power to make, grant, or issue any order in council, &c., that power may, unless the contrary intention appears, be exercised at any time after the passing of the Act, so far as may be expedient for the purpose of bringing the Act into operation at the day of the commencement thereof." Both the AttorneyGeneral and I were members of the House of Commons when this Act was passed, but he clearly, as well as I, had forgotten this section, otherwise I am sure that he would not have allowed the House to believe that by striking out this clause the course objected to was rendered impossible.

That course, for which I believe the Lord Chancellor is responsible, is a direct violation of the undertaking given by the Government, and though,

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