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apply the language of Bowen, L.J., it is enough to show that this was, within the meaning of the law, “malicious.” If the representative of the men had, in good faith and without indirect motive, pointed out the inconvenience that might result from having two sets of men working together on the same ship, whose views upon the particular question were so diverse that it would be inexpedient to bring them together, no one could have complained; but if his object was to punish the men belonging to another union because on some former occasion they had worked on an iron ship, it seems to me that the difference of motive may make the whole difference between the lawfulness or unlawfulness of what he did. And, after considering the form of the pleading and the evidence, his lordship concluded: If concerted collective action to enforce, by ruining the men's employment, the will of a large number of men upon a minority, whether the minority consists of a small or of a largo number, be a cause of action where the actual damage is produced, it would seem to be a very singular result that the action of an individual who falsely assumes the character of representing a large body, uses the name of that large body to give force and support to the threat which he utters, and so produces the injury to the individual, or to the minority, could shield himself from responsibility by proving that the body whose power and influence he had falsely invoked as his supporters had given him no authority for his threats ; so that, if they in truth authorized him, he and they might all have been responsible, while the false statement that he made, though acting upon the employer by some pressure because it was believed and producing the same mischief to the person against whom it was directed, could establish no cause of action against himself because it was false. I regret that I am compelled to differ so widely with some of your lordships, but my difference is founded on the belief that in denying this plaintiff a remedy we are departing from the principles which have hitherto guided our courts in the preservation of individual liberty to all. I am encouraged, however, by the consideration that the adverse views appear to me to overrule the views of most distinguished judges, going back now for certainly 200 years, and that up to the period when this case reached your lordships' House there was s. unanimous consensus of opinion; and that of eight judges who have given us the benefit of their opinions six have concurred in the judgments which your lordships are now asked to overrule.

Lord Wsrsorr, after going through the facts, in the course of his judgment said: Although the rule may be otherwise with regard to crimes, the law of England does not, according to my apprehension, take into account motive as constituting an element of civil wrong. Any invasion of the civil rights of another person is in itself a legal wrong, carrying with it liability to repair its necessary or natural consequences, in so far as these are injurious to the person whose right is infringed, whether the motive which prompted it be good, bad, or indifferent. But the existence of a bad motive, in the case of an act which is not in itself illegal, will not convert that act into a civil wrong, for which reparation is due. A wrongful act done knowingly and with a view to its injurious consequences may, in the sense of law, be malicious; but such malice derives its essential character from the circumstance that the act done constitutes a violation of the law. There is aclass of cases which have sometimes been referred to as evidencing that n bad motive may be an element in the composition of civil wrong; but in these cases the wrong must have its rootin an act which the law generally regards as illegal, but excuses its perpetration in certain exceptional circumstances, from considerations of public policy. These are well known as cases of privilege, in which the protection which the law gives to an individual who is within the scope of these considerations consists in this, that he may with immunity commit an act which is a legal wrong, and but for his privilege would aiford a good cause of action against him; all that is required in order to raise the privilege and entitle him to protection being that he shall act honestly in the discharge of some duty which the law recognizes, and shall not be prompted by a desire to injure the person who is affected by his act. Accordingly, in a suit brought by that person, it is necessary for him to prove an mtent to injure in order to destroy the privilege of the defendant. But none of these cases tend to establish that an act which does not amount to a legal wrong, and therefore needs no protection, can have privilege attached to it, and still less that an act in itself lawful is converted iuto a legal wrong, if it was done from a bad motive. [And after dealing with the cases including Temperton v. Russell (41 W. R. 565 ; I893, 1 Q. B. 715) and particularly Lumley v. Gye, and the statement of Erie, C.J., therein, continued :] These statements embody an intelligible and a salutary principle, and they contain a full explanation of the law upon which the case was decided. He who wilfully induces another to do an unlawful act, which, but for his persuasion, would or might never have been committed is rightly held to be responsible for the wrong which he procured. [And after further examination of the authorities his lordship, in conclusion, said :] I am quite alive to the fact that the question which we have to decide is one of importance, and also that it has never been previously considered by this House. Having come to the conclusion, with the majority of your lcrdships who have heard the appeal, that the doctrine advanced by the respondents is neither sound in principle nor supported by authority, I move that the orders appealed from be reversed and judgment entered for the appellant, that the appellant have his costs rzftpis appeal, and costs in both courts below, including the costs of the

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Lord lisirscirsrt, in tho course of a long judgment, said: It is to be observed, in the first place, that the company in declining to employ the plaintiffs were violating no contract; they were doing nothing wrongful in the eye of the law. The course which they took was dict-ited by selfmterest; they were anxious to avoid the inconvenience to their business which would ensue from a cessation of work on behalf of the ironworkers. It was not contended at the bar that merely to induce them to take this

course would constitute a legal wrong, but it was said to do so because the person inducing them acted maliciously. The Master of the Rolls declined in the present case to define what was meant by “ maliciously ” ; he considered this a question to be determined by a jury. But if acts are, or are not, unlawful and actionable, according as this element of malice be present or absent, I think it is essential to determine what is meant by it. I can imagine no greater danger to the community than that a jury should be at liberty to impose the penalty of paying damages for acts which are otherwise lawful because they choose, without any legal definition of the term, to say that they are malicious. No one would know what his rights were. The result would be to put all our actions at the mercy of a particular tribunal whose view of their propriety might difier from our own. However malice may be defined, if motive be an ingredient of it, my sense of the danger would not be diminished. The danger is, I think, emphasized by the opinions of some of the learned judges. [His lordship then considered several of the cases, and proceeded as follows :] If the judgment under appeal is to stand, and the fact that the act procured was unlawful as being a breach of contract be immaterial, it follows that every person who persuades another not to enter into any contract with a third person may be sued by that third person if the object were to benefit himself at the expense of such person. I understood it to be admitted at the bar, and it was indeed stated by one of the learned judges in the Court of Appeal, that it would have been perfectly lawful for all the ironworkers to leave their employment and not to accept a subsequent engagement to work in the company of the plaintiffs. At all events, I cannot doubt that this would have been so. I cannot doubt either that the appellant or the authorities of the union would equally have acted within his or their rights if he or they h id “called the men cut." They were members of the union. It was for them to determine whether they would become so or not, and whclher they would follow or not follow the instructions of its authorities, though no doubt if they had refused to obefy any instructions which under_the rules of the union it was competent or the authorities to give, they might have lost the benefits they derived from membership. It is not for your lordships to express any opinion on thc policy of trade unions, membership of which may undoubtedly influence theaction of those whohave joined them. They are now recognized by law; there are combinations of employers as well as of em(ployed. The members of these unions, of whichever class they are compose , act in the interest of their class. If they resort to unlawful acts they may be indicted or sued. If they do not resort to unlawful acts they are entitled to further their interests in the manner which seems to them best and most likely to be eifectual. I now proceed to consider on principle the proposition advanced by the respondents,‘ the alleged authorities for which I have been discussing. I do not doubt that everyone has a right to pursue his trade or employment without “molestation” or “ obstruction ” if those terms are used to imply some act in itself wrongful. This is only abranch of a much wider proposition—n~iuiely, that everyone has a right to do any lawful act he pleases without molestation or obstruction. If it be intended to assert that an act not otherwise wrongful always becomes so if it interferes with another-’s trade or employment, and needs to be excused or justified, I say that such a proposition in my opinion has no solid foundation in reason to re-t uponA man's right not to work or not to pursue a particular trade or calling, or to determine when or where or with whom he will work is in law B right of precisely the same nature, and entitled to just the same protection as a man’s right to trade or work. They are but examples of that wldfif right of which I have already spoken. That wider right embraces also the right of free speech. A man has a right to say what he pleases, to induce, to advise, to exhort, to command, provided he does not sla11d€t_0l‘ deceive or commit any other of the wrongs known to the law of which speech may be the medium. Unless he is thus_she_wn to have abused hffl right, why is he to be called upon to excuse ogdgstify himself because hli words may interfere with someone else in his ng?

Lords Asunornxs and Mourns agreed with the Lord Chancellor, but the other lords taking the same view as Lords Wsrsox and Himscrisnn,

THE lzlorss (Lord I'IALSllL'1{\’, 0., Lord Wsrsou, Lord Asi-rnouiml. Lflfd Hsusci-inns, Lord llfncxscmss, Lord Mouuis, Lord SIIAND, Lord DAVEY! and Lord J AMBS or Ilsssi-can) allowed the a.ppeal.—Goi:ssiir., Cohen, Q-(3-, Robson, Q.C., E. Mortm; Lawson Walton, Q,.C., and R. Isaaca. Soucrrous, Sham, Roscoe, Massey, §- Co. ,' Smith 5- Gofton.

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Summons. By his will, dated tho 17th of October, 1871, Alvin‘; Powell, after certain specific devises and bequests, gave, (1eVlS0"|,> Mt bequeathed all the residue of his real and personal estate and effefl 9 whatsoever and whsrcsoever unto his trustee upon trust to pay certain 108"’ cies and an annuity, and as to all the residue of his personal estate, “Pm; trust to divide the interest, dividends, and annual profits into three 611"“ portions, and to pay one of such portions “ unto the children of my Bléter Elizabeth Holmes, and to divide the same equally among them duruiili their lives, and after their death to divide one-third part of my persona’: estate equally between their children, but if theyshall llll.dlB _with0I1t leaving any children, then I direct my trustee to divide the said third Plllfd of my personal estate equally among the children of my nephew Ed"


, Orosland, share and share alike," The testator died on the l'ltli Oi J!-'1

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1879, and his will was duly proved. Elizabeth Holmes was married once only-—viz., to Charles Holmes—on the 15th of August, 1820. There were seven children of the marriage, three of whom predeceased the testator without having been married; of the remaining four, two were still alive but had never been married, another had married and she and her only two children were alive, and the fourth had died on the 26th of November, 1895, leaving her only children surviving her, and they were still living. Elizabeth Holmes died on the 9th of November, 1888. This was a summons by the present trustees of the will for the determination, inter alia, of the question whether the trust by the said will declared of one-third of the testator's residuary personal estate in favour of the children ot the children of the testator's sister Elizabeth Holmes was valid, or void as trausgressing the rule against perpetuities. It was argued on behalf of the next-of-kin that this being a bequest of income, the rule of convenience in Re Wenmot/1's Estate (36 W. B. 409, 37 Oh. D. 266) did not apply, and that as children born after the testator's death might participate, therefore the gift to the grandchildren was void. The following cases were also referred to: Hill v. Oliapman (1 Ves. jun. 405) and Re Stone, Baker v. Stone (44 W. R. 235; 1895, 2 Ch. 196).

Ksxawicu, J .—On the question whether on the language of the will the gift to the children must be confined to the children living at the death of the testator or not, I entertain no doubt. The argument which was urged to the contrary is founded upon an application, which I call a misapplication, of Re Wen1n0th’s Estate. It was said that Chitty, J ., was there dealing with a case similar to the present, but in my opinion that is not so; Ohitty, J . , was not dealing with the rule with which I am asked to deal here. I venture with respect to Mr. Theobald‘s book to say that the ruleis better stated in Mr. Vaughan Hawkins’ book, where in his chapter devoted to "children, &c., when ascertained,” he says, on p. 68, "It might be supposed that a gift to the children of a person simpliciter would include all the children he might have, whenever coming into existence ; but the testator is considered to intend the objects of his bounty to be ascertained at as early a period as possible, and it may be laid down as u general rule ( ualified by the other rules which follow in this chapter) that a devise orclaequest to the children of A., or of the testator, means, primrt facie, the children in existence at the testator’s death,” and he cites Viner v. Francis ('2 Cox 190), a case which is more than one hundred years old. Further on, on p, T5, he deals with the further question which arose in Wen//wth's Estate, and he gives the rule thus, “ Where there is a bequest of an aggregate fund to children as a class, and the share of each child is made payable on attaining a given age, or marriage, the period of distribution is the time when the first child becomes entitled to receive his share, and children coming into existence after that period are excluded.” In Re WmtMth’a Estate (Jhitty, J ., was only dealing with this latter rule—viz., the rule fixing the period of distribution at the time when the first child becomes entitled. The present case, however, in my opinion, depends upon the ordinary application of the ordinary rule, and only those children who survived the testator became entitled ; the trust, therefore, in favour of the children of Elizabeth Holmes’ children is valid.—~Gousssr., Henry Terrell, Q,.C.; Dibdin ; Wafiirlglon, Q.C., and Buckmaater,‘ Renrhaw, Q.C., and Rowdcn. Soucrrons, Pitman 5- Sons, for Emrley, Son, §- Smith, Leeds; Peacock Q Goddard; Ernest Bevir.

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This was a case stated by the Income Tax Commissioners. Messrs. Squire &: Co., provision dealers in America, exported their surplus stock of provisions to this country. They consigned the goods to Messrs. Sandie & Hull, the respondents, who were commission merchants. The respondents received no remuneration beyond their usual charges and commission. The mode of dealing between Messrs. Squire 8: Co. and the respondents was that Messrs. Squire & Co. with each consignment sent forward documents comprising consignment notes, shewing in detail the amount drawn against each lot of goods making up the consignment. Bills of luding, with the draft attached, were sent forward through a bank by the same mail. The respondents took up the drafts and realized the goods. Sometimes the drafts exceeded the prices realized, and sometimes the prices realized exceeded the drafts. The risk of profit or loss rested with Messrs. Squire & Co. The respondents had full discretion as to the prices at which the goods were sold. They invoiced the goods in their own name, received the proceeds of sales, assumed all responsibility of payment by the purchasers, and from time to time rendered statements to Messrs. Squire & Co , showing full receipts, and debiting the account with their charges and commission. They remitted to or drew upon Messrs. Squire & Co. for the credit or debit balance, as the case might be. Assessments were made for the year ended the 5th of April, 1895, and for the year ended the 5th of April, 1896, of £500 and £1,000 respectively, on the respondents as estimates on the annual profits arising from the trade thus exercised. The commissioners disallowed the assessments. The question was whether Messrs. Squire & Co. were persons exercising a trade within

the United Kingdom within the terms of Schedule D. of the Income Tax Act, 1853 (16 dc 17 Vict. o. 34), and within the Income Tax Act, 1842 (5 & 6Vict. c. 35), s. 41. On behalf of the Crown the following cases were died: Erickson v. Last (8 Q. B. D. 414), Tiachler v. Apt/wrpe (52 L. T.

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814), 1’ommer_1/ v. Apthorpa (35 W. R. 307), Werle v. Colqrtltomi ('20 Q. B. D. 753), Grainger v. Gouyh (1896, A. C. 325), and Sully v. Attorney/-Genm'aZ (9 H. & N. 340). On behalf of the respondents it was contended that no case had gone so far as the present. In all cases where the tax was allowed the merchant charged was ostensibly carrying on his business in the United Kingdom. But here the only profit which Squire & Co. made was upon the price of the goods as between themselves and the respondents, a price which was ultimately settled by means of the price obtained by the respondents. Squire & Co. did not, therefore, make a profit upon sales in this country. Inland v. Livingston (5 H. L. C. 408) was cited.

Tris Oonar (GRANTHAM and Cnsxustt, JJ.) allowed the appeal.

Gaaurnan, J , said that the goods though consigned to the respondents remained the property of Messrs. Squire & Co. until sole. All the trading in the goods took place in England, but the trading was not by the respondents, whose powers in respect of the goods were very limited. The trading in them was therefore a trading by a foreign principal in the United Kingdom through the intervention of agents in the persons of the respondents, so that the profits arising from the trading was taxable under section 2, Schedule D, of the Act of 1853.

CHANNEL!-, J., said that the argument for the respondents was not supported by the case. The only fact in support of the argument was that the ultimate sales were made in the name of the respondents. But the presumption that in such a case credit was given to the agent and not to the foreign principal did not apply in all cases and did not prevent the court from dealing with the matter on the footing that Squire 8: Co. were really the principals. That being the case, the question was settled by the authorities.—CoUNssL, Sir Richard Webster, A.G., and Vauyhan Hawkins; A. T. Lawrence, Q C., and James For. SOLICITORS, Solicitor of Inland Itwemte.

[Reported by C. G. Winsasusx, Barrister-at-Law.)

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Further consideration by Lord Russell of Killowen, C.J. The action was tried before a special jury, and on the findings of the jury it was reserved for further consideration. The case was argued on the 4th of December, when the Lord Chief Justice took time to consider his judgment.

Dec.18. The following written judgment was deiveretl, in which the facts and arguments are fully stated, by_ _

Loni) Russam. or KiLi.owaN, C.J.—Th1s is an action brought by the plaintiff as payee against the defendant to recover from him, as one of two makers, the amount of two joint and several promissory notes, dated respectively the 15th of Juno, 1896, one for £3,113 15s., payable threo months after date, and the other for £8,000, payable six months after date. The name of the other joint and several maker on each promissory noto is that of Lord William Nevill. It is admitted that the genuine signature of the defendant appears as malnr on each of the promissory notes, which had been prepared in the plaintill"s oilico, and also that his genuine signature appear: on two letters, one dated the 15th of June, refer ring ti the note of smaller amount, and one dated the 21st of Juno, 1896, referring to the note of larger amount, authorising the plaintiff to pay the prozeods to Lord William Nevill. The latter brought the promissory notes and letters to tho plaintiff, who, it is admitted, gave value for them, and who is found by the jury to have taken them in good faith. The defendant contended that ho was not liable on the ground that he had never been asked, and that he never intended to put his name to a_ny bill or promissory note, or to take upon himself any contractual obligation or lega liability of any kind. He explained that he had just come of age in J une, 1896; that he had known Lord William Nevill intimately for some years ; that ho and Lord William Novill were members of the same Ascot party in that month; and that on Sunday, the 21st of J unc, Lord \Villlavu N evill had come to his bed-room and asked him to witness some deed or document; that he produced a roll of pipers covered up by blotting or other_paper, in which there were four openings; that upon the defendant asking what the document was about, Lord \Vil1iam Novill said he would shew it if the defendant insisted, but he would rather not, for that it was a private matter, that he wanted a owcr of attorney, and that it had to do with his sister, Lady Oowiiiy's, marriage settlement, and with certain divorce proceedings then pending; that he (tho defendant) did not insist on seeing the document, trusting to Lord William Nevill; that upon this the defendant signed his name, he believed, four times, and he thought Lord William Nevill signed twice in the openings. Ho said he had signed his name with the single intention of witnessing the signature of Lord William Nevill. He added that up to that time he had had no reason to doubt the honour of Lord lVilliam Nevill, and that, so far as he knew, no one who _knev Lord William had. The follawing questions were put_ to the jury, who_ gave the answer app~nded to each:—(l) Did the plaintiff take the promissory notes in good faith? [It is admitted he took them for value] if.nswer.—_Yes. (2) ls the defendant's account of the circumstances under which he signed his name substantially true? Answer.-—Yes. (3) Vila: the defendant, in signing his name as he did, recklessly careless, and did he thereby enable Lord William Nevill to perpetrate the fraud? Answer.—No3 not under the circumstances. “(:3 Were the signatures to the documents given lg the defendant in mispl confidence in the statements of Lord WiUmm_ evill as to their nature? Answer.—Yes. (5) Did the defendant sign his name to be used by Lord William Nevill for any purpose he chose ? Ansv_vcr.— N0. (6) Did the defendant attach his signature to the documents without duo care? Answer.—No; not under the circumstaueos._ I _havo_now to consider in the light of these findings which of the parties is entitled to


judgment. It is clear that the proof of the signature of the defendant to the promissory notes, coupled with proof of their delivery to the plaintiff‘ under the apparent authority of the defendant, makes out a primri faoic case for the plaintiff. Is it a conclusive case ? Here two questions arise—(1) Is the defendant precluded or estopped from setting up the true circnmstancs under which his name came to appear on the documents in question ? (2) If not, do those true circumstances afford an answer in point of law to the plaintifi"’s claim? As to the first question the defendant is not, in my judgment, estopped or precluded from setting up the actual facts upon any principle of law. Apart from statute such preclusion or estoppel can only arise (in circumstances like the present) where the defendant had so conducted himself that it would be contrary to natural justice to permit him to assume a position inconsistent with that which ho had ostensibly occupied, or which he led others to believe ho occupied, and upon which others had, misled by his conduct, been suffered to act. In the present case the suggestion on the part of the plaintiff is that the defendant had not use duo care in signing his name, and that he had signed in misplaced confidence in Lord \Villiam N evill. The jury have found. that there was, in fact, no want of due care in the circumstances in signing his name as he did; but it was urged that the finding as to misplaced confidence was sufficient, and the authority of a distinguished American j udgo in the case of Putnam v. Sullivan (4 Mass. Repts., p. 45), (1808) was cited. What does misplaced confidence mean? It may mean confidence placed where you know or ought to know it is not safe, or confidence placed where you have every right to believe it is safe, but where it is afterwards betrayed. The former, I think, is the case the learned judge had in his mind, and the facts there may afford evidence of want of due care ; but that clearly ii not here the meaning attributed b the jury to misplaced confidence, for they have found that there was in the circumstances no want of due care on the part of the defendant. Taking the findings together they amount to this—that the defendant was in the circumstances guilty of no want of due care in placing confidence in the statement made b Lord William Nevill, and accordingly in signing his name as he did; and I decline to hold that the placing of confidence as here shewn, which is afterwards betrayed, where it is not recklessly or negligently so placed. in any way precludes the defendant from setting up the true facts as a defence. I conclude, therefore, the defendant is not, upon any principle of law, estopped or precluded from setting up the true facts. How, then, is tho plaintiff's case put? It was argued that whatever was the law before or apart from the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882, the facts here did not under that Act afford a defence as against a “ holder in due course," which, it was said, the plaintiff was within section 29, and that the question must be determined by reference to that Act alone. I think this argument involves a misconception both of the plaintiff's position and of the scope and effect of the Act of 1882. It will be apparent

rom a consideration of the facts ct‘ the case that the plaintiff was not a “holder in due course ” at all, but that he was, in fact, simply the named payee of two promissory notes. Further, an examination of sections 20, 21, 29, 30, and 38, relating expressly to bills, and sections 83, 84, 88, and 89, relating to promissory notes, will make it quite clear that “a holder in due coursc " is a person to whom, after its completion by and as between the immediate parties, thc bill or note has been negotiated. In the present case the plaintiff is named as payee on the face of the promissory note, and therefore is one of the immediate parties. The promissory notes have, in fact, never been negotiated within the meanin of the Act. I desire to say here that, evon if the plaintifi‘ were “ holder in due course," it would, in my judgment, make no difference in the result. But is the contention right that the Act of 1882 must alone be looked to? I think not. That Act was intended to be mainly a codification of the existing law, but it is not merely a codification Act, for some alterations of the law are clearly effected by it and it does not purport to be exhaustive, for by section 97 the rules of the Common Law (including the Law Merchant), save in so far as they are inconsistent with the express provisions of the Act, continue to apply. But I agree that in determining questions of liability on bills or notes it is proper to examine the Act before turning to the cases declaratory of the Common Law decided before that Act. It is unnecessary to set out the provisions of the Act and to comment in detail upon them. It is enough to say that there is nothing in the Act which prevents the defendant from setting up the defence that he never made the promissory note in questionwhich is the real defence here. It would, indeed, be strange if it did. For the purposes of the present case the question is precisely the same as if any other contract than one by promissory note had been written on tho documents, to which the defendant was induced to sign his name—for instance, if it had been a contract of guarantee or suretyship. Then the question would have been—Did the defendant make the contract of guarantee or suretyship? Here it is—Did he make the promissory notes sued upon? The question, then, is, on the facts as they are now found to be—Did the defendant make the promissory notes in question? If he did not, then the finding of the jury that the defendant was not guilty of any want of due care establishes that he is not precluded from sa ing so. That there is a primd facie case on the plaintiff‘ ’s evidence that he did, 1 have already said ; but is that primd fuck case rebutted and displaced by the defendant's evidence f' According to that evidence it must, after the findings of the 'ury, be taken to be the fact that he was witnessing a deed or document ; that he was so told ; that he had no idea of signing and was not asked to sign any bill or promissory note, or to undertake any contractual obligation of any kind. A promissory note is a contract by the maker to pay the payee. Can it be said that in this case the defendant contracted to pay the plaintiff ? His mind never went with such a transaction; for all that appears, he had never heard of the plaintiff, and his mind was fraudulently directed into a different channel by the statement that ho was merely witnessing a deed or other document. He had no contracting mind, and his signature obtained, by untrue statements fraudulently made, to a document of the existence of which he had no


knowledge cannot bind him. It is as if he had written his name for an autograph collector, or in an album. The case differs in no material respect from one in which a genuine signature is deftly transferred by delicate contrivance from one document to another, and so skilfully as to escape notice under ordinary examination. Or, again, if the body of the promissory notes had been fraudulently writ! en above, and after his signature had been made, it would have been forgery, and in such case it is clear no recourse could be had upon it. Can it make any difference as to resulting contractual obligation that the body of the note was without his kno wlcdge filled up before he was fraudulently induced to put his mine in the belief that it was something wholly different? I think not. In plain reason it must be said that the use to which the defendant's signature was applied was in substance and effect forgery, whether or not it amounted tothc criminal offence of forgery? I think it well to point out that cases like the present differ widely from those in which the party sought to be charged has agreed and intende to enter into contractual obligation by bill or note, but has been defrauded into reeing, or been defrauded in the manner in which the bill or note has becnagealt with. In such cases he is liable on principle and authority, to any one who has dealt with the bill or note in good faith and for value. It was in argument admitted that the case of Foster v. Mackinnon (17 W. R. 1105, 4 L. R. C. P. 704) is in point, and is an authority binding on me if the Bills of Exchange Act of 1882 has not alt/ered the law as there declared. I find that the law has not been so altered. I see nothing in the Act to warrant the suggestion that it has been altered, and it is noteworthy that all the text-writers dealing with the Bills of Exchange Act, 1882 (including, indeed, the draftsman of the Act), treat that case as an existing authority. The facts in Foster v. Jlackimmn were that an old man of feeble sight was induced-without, as the jury found, any negligence on his part—to sign his name on the back of a bill by the fraudulent statement that it was a guarantee which, in fact, he had undertaken to sign. The Court of Common Pleas ’consis!ing of Bovill C.J., and Byles, Keating, and Montzigu Snith, JJ.) held that he was not liable, and this in an action by what was then called a baud fide holder for value and without notice, of which “holder in due course," is now the legal equivalent. In these islands, cases in litigation of frauds such as that here practised are of rare occurrence, partly because of the existence and character of our stamp la ws, but in the United States of America, where no such laws exist, there are many authorities dealing with points similar to that in the present case : Douglas v. Mdlftflfl (4 Amer. R-ip. 238, 1870) ; Taylor v. Alcbison (5 Amer. Rep. 118, 1870); Whitney v. Snydrr (2 Lana. 477, 1870); Walker v. Egbert (9 Amer. Rep. 548, 1871); and Griflitha v. Kellogg (20 Amer. Rep. 48, 1876). The great weight of United States authoiities supports the view of the common law expressed by the English judges. I have thought it right to say so much, but m truth these authorities are not necessary for the purposes of this case. They are all cases where the bills or notes had been negotiated to persons now called “holders in due course." It follows, if such a holder cannot in a case like the present recover, a forliori that the plaintifi-who, as named payee, is one of t e immediate parties—-cannot recover. In the result, therefore, my judgment must be for the defendant, and the plaintiff must be en'0iI16d from in any way dealing with the notes, and the same must be cancelled so far as they purport to be the notes of the defendant.

A stay of execution for costs was granted, and an injunction against dealing with the promissory notes until the hearing of the appeal.COUi\'saL, Lawson Walton, Q,.C., and Pollard; Sir E. Clarke, Q.C., 0(lI'.90ll, Q..C., T. Alkimon, and Home Williams. SoLic1roiis,A. Sydney; Rerwhaw, .lL'e‘/t'610f¢/I, if Smith.

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Mr. CHARLES HARRISON, M.P. for Plymouth and a prominent member of the London County Council, died on Friday, the 24th ult., from a very sudden attack of laryngitis and failure of the heart. Mr. Harrison WM born in 1835, the third son of the late Frederick Harrison, of Suttonplace, Guildford. He was a brother of Mr. Frederic Harrison. _He WEBB educated at King's College School, and was admitted a solicitor in 18n8. He became the senior partner in the firm of C. 8: S. Harrison & Co., Of Bedford-row, and has been for many years solicitor to the London. Ohatham, and Dover Railway and other large public companies, including the Law Fire Insurance Society. Mr. Harrison was from the first 8 member of the London County Council, being elected for South-West Bethnal-green at the election in 1889 and re-elected in 1892 and 1895He took a considerable share in the proceedings of the‘-council M F


member of the Progressive party, and became one of the representatives of the council on the Thames Conservancy Board. His zeal and energy were recognized in 1895 by his election to be vice-chairman. He also served u term of office as chairman of the Parliamentary Committee of the council. Mr. Harrison was greatly interested in the subjects of leasehold enfranchisement and the taxation of land values, and he was a strong advocate for applying the “ betterment ” principle in cases where public improvements were carried out by the London County Council. After unsuccessfully contesting the Holborn Parliamentary division in 1880 and Plymouth in 1892, he was returned for the latter constituency in 1895 as a Radical, his colleague in tho representation of the borough being Sir Edward Clarke. Mr. Harrison had many pursuits apart from business and municipal affairs and politics. He was fond of yachting, and had travelled extensively in Europe, interesting himself in following the routes of the famous campaigns of modern wars. He was also an expert in the history of the various parishes and estates that make up the county of London, and had a large collection of old maps, books, and documents hearing on the subject. Some of the maps he presented to the London County Council, in the Committee Room of which they are now hung. Mr. Harrison married, in 1886, the Lady Harriet, sister of the present Earl of Lanesborough and widow of the late Mr. Francis Barlow. e leaves no family.

Sir Jenn Roosas Jmmrnos, who died at his residence, Minster Lea, lteigatc, on the 24th of December, was the posthumous son of David Jennings, Esq, Master of the Drapers Company in 1810, an office which was filled by Sir John in the Jubilee year, 1887, when he received the honour of hiighthood. He was admitted a solicitor in 1846, and resided for many years at 1.1/anstead, where he held the offices of clerk to the Local Board of Health and vestry clerk, and he also practised as a solicitor in the city until within a few years of his death. In connection with the Drapers Company Sir John took a prominent part in furthering the cause of education.

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Mr. George Whale, clerk to the Board of Works for the Lee district, has presented a report to the board, dated the 22nd of December, with regard to the Land Transfer Act, 1897. He points out, with regard to the letter from the London County Council of the 25th of November, that Parliament has left to the county council to decide whether the Act shall be first tried in London. Before deciding the matter the council had invited the opinion of the board, and the clerk points out, with regard to the registration required of any transaction affecting land or houses, that for the following reasons the first experiment of compulsory registration under the Act should not be made in London: Registration wouldbc expensive, cause delay, would not prevent fraud; that it had been tried and found wanting; that the new Ordnance maps should be awaited; and, finally, that London is not the best place for the experiment. The board, after considering the report, passed the following resolution: “ That the clerk's report of this date be approved, and that the London County Council be informed that, in the opinion of this board, compulsory registration is not at present desirable in London, and that the CO11llCl.l be urged to object thereto, and that tho clerk is instructed to write to the council accordingly, and to enclose a copy of his said report.”

On re-assembling after the Christmas recess, says the Times, the London County Council will be asked by their Public Control Committee to adopt a revised schedule of disbursements and fees which may be allowed by a coroner in the county of London, so as to include a payment to jurors. The matter has bccn for a long time before the committee, who have already reported upon the matter ; but whcn their recommendations came before the council they were referred back. In their report upon the new scheme they state that on previous occasions they had felt it to be their duty to report against the payment of coroner’s jurors, but in deference to the views of the council in favour of jurymeu being allowed a sum sufficient to compensate a workman for actual loss of time incurred in serving at an inquest when summoned by rota, they had reconsidered the matter. They had, however, come to the conclusion that any scheme that attempted to make a distinction between workmen and other classes of lurors would be unworkable. As there were a large number of cases in which the 181116 jury acted in a succession of inquests at the same place on the same day, they also thought it would be simpler and more economical 14 pay a fee in respect of each time of attendance rather than in respect


of each inquest. \Vith reference to the rate of payment, they considered that, having due regard to economy, 2s. per attendance could be fairly fixed for the service and would be sufiicient to meet the majority of cases. They estimated the average attendance of jurors at fifteen, and that the annual cost of payment, at the rate proposed, would not exceed £7,500.

Foa Tunes-r IRRITATION sun Conan.-—“ Epps's Glycerine J uj ubes ” always prove effective. They soften and clear the voice, and are invaluable to all suffering from cough, soreness, or dryness of the throat. Sold only in labelled tins, price 7§d. and ls. 1§d.—Jamcs Epps 8»: Co., Ltd., Homoeopathic Chemists, London.-[Anv'r.]

Wsrmmo ro rnrsunmo Hones Pvacnsssns sun Lsssnss.—Before purchasing or rentpeig a house, have the Sanitary Arrangements thoroughly Examined, Tes , and Reported Upon by an Expert from Messrs. Carter Bros., 65, Victoria-street, Westminster. Fm quot/ed on receipt of full particulars. (Established 21 years.)—[Anvr.]

Jan. 6.—-Messrs. H. E. Fosrza & Casnrrsnn, at the Mart, at 2 p.m.

To one-fifth of £1,049 21 per cent. Console; lady aged 57. Solicitor, Arthur
Tyler, Esq., London.

To one-fourth of aTrust Estate valued at £66,C.'); two ladies aged 60 and 67,
provided alady aged 65 predeceases one of them and a gen eman aged 26
survives both; with pohcy. Solicitor, H. Stanle -Jones, 1kq., London.

To one-seventh and other Shares of West-end Fréolds producing £2,750 per annum, and to £11,(.)0 in Stocks, &c. ; lady aged 47, wit the income arising grzua one-half of above during her life. bolicitor, C. W. Brown, ]§;q.,

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Asnsoau Gas AND Cons Co, Lnr1'rsn—Creditor_n are on or before Jan 22, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Mr Frank Hyland, 81, Cannon st. Hallett & Co, Ashford, solors to liqurdator

CLUTHA Gone Mrsxs, L|mrsi>—Cred1tors are required, on or before March 5, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to J. T. Somervail, 23, College hill. Kimber fir Co, Lombard st, solors _w lrqrudator

Hsxrurfls Gonnarr PIBBLBS Lnrrrsn —Cred1tors are required, _on or before March 17, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Mr Arthur F. Wlrinney, 8, Old Jewry. Snell 62 Co., 1 and 2, George st, Mansion House, solors for liquidator I _

Hor.r.own' er Sinai-s, Luursr>—Creditors are required, on or before Jan 3_l, to send their names and addresses, and ‘he particulars of therrdebts or claims, to William Nicholson, 12, Wood st. Morley, Cheapside, solor for liqurdator _

Hrrna sun Drsraicr AND Co, Linrrsn—Petn for winding up, presented Dec 22, directed to be heard Jan 12. A. R. and H. Steele, 21, College hill, solors for petner. Notice of appearing must reach the above-named not lstcr than 6 o'clock in the afternoon of Jan 11

Isrsarurrossn I-‘mas Cnulors Co, Lnuran—Petn for windingl up, presented Dec 24, directed to be heard on Jan 12. Ingle & Co, 20, Threadneez e st, solors for petners. Notice of appearing must reach the above-named not later than 6 o'clock in the

ft f ll

a ernoon o an Joan Wsosrsrrr 6: Co, Linr-rnn—I3y an order made by Wright, J., dated Dec 8, it was

ordered that the voluntary winding up of the company be continued. Innes, Man

chester, solor for petners _ _ _

Lucwsrmrs, Lrni'rsn—Cred1tors are required, on or beforc Jan 10, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Mr Horace Stanley 1l1)euc(p:!, St. Stephen's chmbrs, Telegraph st. Miller & Co, Telegraph st, solors to

'qui tor _

Rrcr-nan Trroursos 6: Co, LlIl1'BD-—Cred.it0rs are required, on or before Feb 18, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Randolph Dodgeon, Bright st Mill, Blackbu. J _ _

Scsasonouorr Psrsrvr Tinao Fnooa Cco-ru Co, Ln|r'ran—Cred1tors are rcqrnrcd, on or before -lan 18, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Andrew Orr, 13, Huutross row, Scarborough. Turnbull & Son, Scarborough, solorn for liquidators

Scorn Armour Loss, Mos-roses, /mo Msacsnrisa Aonor, Llnrrsn —(7reditors are

Ian 1 F8

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Giir.<i.n\' Bnuwaar, Liiiirln—Creditors are required, on or before Wednesday, Feb 23, to ‘ send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Sidney Frederick Isitt, 8, Old Jewry. Monday, March 14, at 2.15, at the chambers of the

EABTLAKE, Winusu, Plymouth, Solicitor Feb 17 Wilson, Plymouth

I ‘ ER\\'lN, WinLi.\u Harm’, Bedminster Jan 18 Tarr & Arkell, Bristol
Fsnasa, Ciisauus, Chatteris, Cambridge, Physician Jan 31 Buston, Chatteris
1 Giiaooiw, Reese, Westhoughton, Lanes Jan 31 Ramwell, Hindley

~r of Companies, is appointed for hearing and adj udicating upon the debts and


HOLLOWAY HALL Co, Liuirnn-Creditors are required, on or before I-‘eh S, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to Ernest G. Palmer, 54, Gresham st. Wood, Chcspsidc, solor _

Livniirooi. Psnsos or VABIETIEB, Linirso Co—Petn for winding up), presented Dec 18, directed to be heard on Jan 12. Nowell, 27, Chancery lane, solor or petner. Notice of appearing mustreachthe above-named not later than 6 o'clock in the afternoon of

an 11

Misss Co, Liui-i-si>—Cred_itors are required, on or before Jan 12, to send their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to C. J . Cooke, 42, Gresham House, Old Broad st. Harries & Co, Nicholas lane, solors to liquidator

Onimsu Csnu CLOTHING Co,!Lini'rao—Crediters are required, on or before Jan 81, to send in their names and addresses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to the liquidators of the comlpuny, Primrose Bank, Oldham. Booth, Oldhain solor for liquidators

Bii\\v’s PATINTB ii|irim—Creditors are required, _on or before flan 12, to send their panipls and addruses, and the particulars of their debts or claims, to A. J . Milne,

iqui a r

US1\'EBfiAL Cssu Rsmsrim Co, Liim-i:i>—Creditors are required, on or before Jan 28, to send their names and addresses, and the particulan of their debts or claims, to Mr George Henry Gibbs, 16, St Helen's place. Beck. East India avenue, solor for liqui



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