CORRESPONDENCE.

THE LAND TRANSFER ACT, 1897. [To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,--The London County Council having invited the view of the City Corporation and the London Vestries on the proposal to select the County of London for experimentally enforcing compulsory registration of title on the sale of land, the Land Registry Office has sent to these bodies a paper headed "Statement of the Methods and Results of Registration of Title to Land." The following quotations from the official statement and observations thereon will indicate how misleading the statement is in many respects, and how dangerous the experiment is that the county council is asked to sanction.

A register of title is a book kept like the registers of stocks, shares in companies and ships, whereby the owners of property in land are enabled to transfer or charge it by a simple entry without any delay and at a very small expense."-No reference is made to the fact that the expense of getting on the register will be an addition to the charges at present payable for completing a transfer or charge. The reference to a register of stocks, &c., is not in point, as three different certificates of title are issuable in the case of land-(a) absolute, (b) qualified, (c) possessory. The expense and delay of obtaining an absolute title will be practically prohibitory. A qualified title appears to have been already criticized out of existence, as no reference whatever is made to it in the statement. A possessory title affords no guarantee, and consequently the certificate will, for many years at least, simply be an additional expense to the present costs of selling or mortgaging property.

expense."

"Fraud and error are rendered extremely difficult."-This cannot easily be reconciled with the statement that transfers can be made by a simple entry "without any delay and at a very small The system has been in successful operation for over thirty years in the Australian Colonies."-The system in the Colonies is essentially different. The Torrens Act is a permissive Act, and only absolute titles can be registered under it. "It has also been tried in this country. Many landowners have testified to the benefits they have obtained."The testimonials referred to have not been published. Many landowners have testified publicly to the contrary.

"There are between 4,000 and 5,000 estates now on the register of an aggregate value of over £14,000,000, and an extent of over 100,000 acres."-As each estate has a number, there is a suggestive vagueness in giving the numbers as "between 4,000 and 5,000." Assuming the numbers to be 4,500, the yearly average since 1962, when the office was first established, work out as follows: 130 estates, £371,430 value, and 2,850 acres. These figures only represent a small fraction of the yearly average of the transactions that have been carried out outside of the office. "In order to obtain registration the applicant or his solicitor will have to take or post the purchase deed after it is executed to the Land Registry with a copy and a tracing of the plan (if any) thereon. If no plan is on the deed a plan on the Ordnance map will be required instead. If the Ordnance map is not up to date a land registry surveyor will correct it without charge." These provisions will give some indication of the additional expense and delay that registration will involve, as it will be noticed that resort is only made to the office after the deed is executed. The large majority of London houses are at present transferred without a plan. The Ordnance map is not accepted in courts as evidence, so it is difficult to say what will be its value on a deed that has to be produced in court. The correcting of Ordnance maps by the land registry surveyors is not a light undertaking, and is calculated to prevent the registration being effected "by a simple entry without any delay."

The fee payable, which will include every incidental expense, will be as follows: Value of land not exceeding £1,000, 18. 6d. for every £25 or part of £25."-If a solicitor is employed his charges will obviously be in addition to the official fees. At the present time the ad valorem stamp duty on a purchase is 10s. per cent. Purchasers of small properties consider this a sufficiently heavy charge. It is doubtful if they will approve of the additional 6s. per cent., making the ad valorem duty 16s. per cent. It is assumed that the same fees will apply to mortgages. In this case, as the ad valorem stamp duty on a mortgage is 2s. 6d. per cent., the ad valorem duties will be increased to Ss. 6d. per cent.

"These fees have been carefully arranged so as to pay all expenses and to leave a sufficient surplus for safety."-As no experience has yet been gained of the results of compulsory registration it is conceivable that the fees may not prove sufficient. In that case the taxpayer will have to make up the deficiency-a somewhat serious liability to arise out of private transactions between individuals with which the taxpayer has no concern.

"The Land Registry will draw up draft entries for the register,

and in a few days the deed will be returned to the applicant, and the draft entries will be settled with him."-The few " days" may easily become a few weeks if the deed is at all complicated, or if there is any pressure of work in the office, or if the Ordnance maps have to be corrected. In any of these events it will not be possible to foretell when a matter will be completed.

"A landowner registered with absolute title can sell or mortgage dealings with unregistered land."-The experience of registration has without the delay and expense incidental to investigation of title or hitherto been the exact opposite of what is alleged. The many landowners who are known to have taken their titles off the register after incurring the trouble and expense of putting them on would not have done so without good reason.

"A landowner registered with possessory title can transfer and charge his land by the same instruments and with the same simplicity in point of form and for the same fees as if the title were absolute."-This statement is inexplicable. It seems to imply that an absolute and possessory title are identical. In practice, in the case of possessory certificates, the titles will have to be investigated and deeds will have to be prepared as they are at present.

The

If an absolute title is desired the applicant will have to prove the title to the Registrar in a similar manner to that used on sales and mortgages under the ordinary practice of conveyancing. Registrar has power under the Act of 1875 to accept a good "holding title,' though open to technical objection."-At the present time purchases are almost invariably completed under contracts which limit the length of title and restrict investigation. There is every tions. There are no statistics available to prove that he has ever reason to believe the Registrar will not accept such limits or restricavailed himself of the power given by the Act of 1875 to accept a title open to technical objection. The absence of figures that could have been given is significant. The fees that will be payable on registration of an absolute title are not given.

"Under the old system absolute simplicity and security are never obtainable, for as fast as old difficulties are cleared new ones arise to fill their places."-This statement is open to serious comment. Conveyancing has, in fact, been immensely simplified by the Conveyancing Act, 1881, and titles can now be investigated and the large majority of matters can be completed with an expedition with which the proposed system cannot compete.

"No person is allowed to inspect the register without the written present time the Middlesex Registry can be searched without any authority of the registered proprietor or of his solicitor."-At the restriction, and this right is of great value to creditors and others. The right of search should not, it is submitted, be taken away in the case of registered lands.

"Bankers and others will be enabled to make advances on deposit of land certificate with even greater ease and security than they can now on deposit of title deeds."-At the present time a customer deposits his deeds with a bank, and there and then he obtains an advance practically without expense. A mere assertion is not sufficient to prove that the present practice will be simplified. The new system may, on the contrary, greatly hamper such trans

actions.

natural claim of the metropolis to precedence in enjoying the benefit "In addition to the recent revision of the Ordnance map and the of the Act, one great practical reason for selecting London for the first compulsory district is that there is already a registry of deeds for the greater part of its area. "While it is a matter of the greatest difficulty to discover what the "benefit of the Act" will be, the metropolis may not be unwilling to waive its "natural claim to precedence." It may be the more willing to do so because it may not see the advantage of giving up its present system of registry of deeds for a system that has hitherto been an admitted failure. It is and will remain open to any London landowner to voluntarily register his title, and he may be excused if he prefers to retain this depreciate his property. option to being compelled to adopt a system which may gravely J. S. RUBINSTEIN. 5, Raymond-buildings, Gray's-inn, Dec. 24.

[To the Editor of the Solicitors' Journal.] Sir,-Mr. Lake's letter in your issue of 25th inst. is disappointing. Nor does it, I am convinced, represent the views of the legal profession. The President of 1888-9 was much more in accord with these, and one regrets the "falling off."

Mr. Lake states that the London County Council is not likely to wholly veto the application of the Act to the County of London, and he urges the limitation of the order to that part of the county served by the Middlesex Deeds Registry.

Is he aware that this is the very part of the county most strongly opposed to the Act, and in which many of the local authorities have pronounced against the proposed experiment? Will Mr. Lake contend that it is right to force the Act upon this district in the face of these pronouncements?

It has been my duty to explain the provisions of the Act in more than one quarter and I have been surprised at the unanimity of the condemnation elicited as soon as the question was understood.

The London County Council may have its faults. It must be recognized, however, that most of its members are practical business men who would scarcely ask the local authorities for an opinion merely to disregard it.

Have we not had sufficient preaching of the gospel of expediency? Is not the question still what it was when Mr. Brickdale stated it in the following words: "No system really beneficial to landowners would require to be forced upon them, and, of course, to apply compulsion to any system not really beneficial would be a wild injustice ?"

London, Dec. 29th.

NEW ORDERS, &c.

A SOLICITOR.

LAND TRANSFER ACTS, 1875 AND 1897. PROVISIONAL LAND TRANSFER RULES, 1897.

Interpretation.

1. In these Rules "the Act of 1875" and "the Act of 1897" mean the Land Transfer Acts of those years respectively, and "the Acts has a corresponding meaning.

First Registration of Settled Land.

2. Application for registration of settled land may be made by any person capable of being registered as proprietor, with the consent of the other persons (if any) whose consent or concurrence is necessary to a sale by that person.

3. In the case of possessory title the proper restriction shall be left with the application, or the Registrar shall be furnished with the information necessary to enable him to draw the proper

restriction.

4. In framing restrictions and inhibitions for the protection of settled land, it shall not be the duty of the trustees or of the Registrar to protect the interests of any person who would not have been a necessary party to a sale or mortgage thereof if the land had been unregistered; but it shall be the duty of the trustees, or, if there are no trustees, of the Registrar, to give notice of the restrictions and inhibitions to such of the beneficiaries (if any) as the Registrar shall direct; and any such person can, if he wishes, lodge a caution or apply for an inhibition.

5. The restrictions and inhibitions given in Forms 1 to 5 in the Schedule hereto shall apply respectively to the various cases in the Schedule set forth.

6. The settlement, whether consisting of one or of several documents, or a copy or abstract thereof, may be left in the Registry for reference and safe custody. It shall not be referred to on the register, but shall be filed in a separate place under the number of the title to which it relates.

Transfers of Land into Settlement.

7. An instrument of transfer of land to the uses of a settlement may be in one of the Forms 6 to 12 in the Schedule hereto, and shall contain the proper restrictions or inhibitions to be entered on the register, according to the principles stated in Rule 4 of these Rules. The transfer shall be signed by the tenant for life (if any, and if of full age), as well as by the transferor and transferee, and all signatures 8. On receipt of an instrument of transfer in such form as aforesaid, the Registrar shall register the transferee named therein as the proprietor of the land, and shall enter on the Register the inhibitions

shall be verified.

and restrictions contained in the transfer.

9. If it appears to the Registrar that any restriction or inhibition contained in the transfer thus applied for is unreasonable or contrary to the principle on which the register is kept, or calculated to cause unnecessary inconvenience, he may require the production of the settlement and an abstract or copy thereof, and any further evidence that may be necessary for the purpose of determining, and he shall determine (subject to an appeal to the Court), what restrictions and inhibitions, if any, ought to be registered, and the form

thereof.

10. It shall not otherwise be the duty of the Registrar to inquire into the terms of the settlement, but, if the parties desire it, the settlement, or a copy or abstract thereof, may be deposited in the Registry for safe custody and future reference.

11. Where registered land has been brought into settlement, and the existing registered proprietor is the tenant for life under the settlement, and he elects to remain the registered proprietor thereof, it will only be necessary for him to apply for the registration of a restriction and inhibition in Form 1 in the Schedule hereto, or such other restriction or inhibition as may be required, having regard to to the terms of the settlement and the Settled Land Acts.

Charges.

12. A charge to secure an annuity may be in Form 13 in the Schedule hereto.

13. An application to alter the terms of a registered charge under section 9 (5) of the Act of 1897 may be in Form 14 in the Schedule hereto, and shall be signed by the registered proprietor of the charge of equal or inferior priority prejudicially affected by it, and charge, and by the registered proprietor of the land, and of every the signatures shall be verified.

Transmissions of Land on Death.

14. On production of the probate or letters of administration of a sole (or sole surviving) registered proprietor of land, dying after 1897, the personal representative named therein shall be registered as proprietor in the place of the deceased proprietor, with the addition of the words, "Executor (or Administrator) of deceased."

15. On production of the probate, or letters of administration with will annexed, and of an assent or appropriation in either of the Forms 15 or 16 in the Schedule hereto, or of an instrument of transfer by the personal representative in the usual prescribed Form, and of the probate or letters of administration, the devisee or legatee named in the assent or appropriation or the transferee named in the instrument of transfer shall be registered as proprietor of the land in place of the deceased proprietor. The signatures of the executor or administrator to the assent, appropriation, or transfer shall be verified.

16. Where a settlement is created by the will, or otherwise arises in consequence of the death, of a sole registered proprietor, the personal representative shall, at the proper time, and with the consent of the tenant for life (if of full age) leave in the Registry, together with the probate or letters of administration, a written application for the registration of a proprietor, with the proper section 6 of the Act of 1897 and Rule 4 of these Rules. restrictions and inhibitions, according to the principles stated in

17. On receipt of such an application, the Registrar shall register the proprietor and the inhibitions and restrictions therein named and applied for. 18. If it appears to the Registrar that any restriction or inhibition contained in the application is unreasonable or contrary to the principle on which the register is kept, or calculated to cause unnecessary inconvenience, he may require the production of the probate (if any) or an abstract of copy thereof, and any further evidence that may be necessary for the purpose of determining, and he shall determine (subject to an appeal to the Court), what restrictions and inhibitions, if any, ought to be registered, and the form thereof.

19. It shall not otherwise be the duty of the Registrar to inquire into the terms of the will, but, if the parties desire it, the probate, or a copy or abstract thereof, may be deposited in the Registry for safe custody and future reference.

20. Where the trustees of a settlement apply, on the death of a tenant for life, for the registration of a successor under the settlement, they and their solicitor shall make a statutory declaration to the effect that the deceased proprietor was tenant for life, and that they are the trustees of the settlement, and that the person for whose registration they are applying is the successor under the settlement, and that the restrictions and inhibitions (if any) applied for are the proper ones to be entered, or that no restrictions or inhibitions are required. In any case in which the Registrar may deem it desirable counsel to the like effect, a certificate to his satisfaction shall be that the declaration shall be accompanied by a certificate of produced.

21. Where such a declaration (and certificate, if required), are produced, the Registrar need not require production of the settlement or any further evidence, but where not produced he shall inquire into the terms of the settlement, and shall satisfy himself that the proper entries are made on the register.

land, the trustees of the settlement neglect to apply for the 22. If, on the death of a tenant for life, registered as proprietor of registration of the new proprietor in his place, or if there are no such trustees, any person interested under the settlement may apply for the registration of a new proprietor. The Registrar shall thereupon inquire into the terms of the settlement, and shall settle draft entries for the register on the principles stated in section 6 of the Act of 1897 and Rule 4 of these Rules in regard to settled land, and shall give notice thereof to the trustees of the settlement (if any) and to the new tenant for life, and to such other persons (if any) as he may think fit; and if no valid objection is new proprietor or proprietors made thereto shall enter the accordingly.

Transmissions on Bankruptcy.

23. On production to the Registrar of an order of a court having jurisdiction in bankruptcy declaring a proprietor a bankrupt, together with a certificate signed by the official receiver that any registered land or charge is part of the property of the bankrupt, divisible

(Head and begin as in Form 6 down to "under which") the land comprised in the title above referred to is limited to such uses as I, A. B. of &c., and C. D. of &c., shall jointly appoint, and subject thereto to various uses by virtue of which I am (or have the powers of) tenant for life under the Settled Land Acts, 1882 to 1890, I hereby transfer to myself and the said C. D. all the said land, and apply for the entry on the Register of the following inhibition (fill in Form 5).

Form 8.

Instrument of Transfer by the representative of a deceased settlor, transferring the land to the Tenant for Life or to the Trustees. (Head and begin as in Form 6 down to "under which ") A. B. of &c. is (or has the powers of) tenant for life under the Settled Land Acts, 1882 to 1890, and C. D. of &c., and E. F. of &c., are the trustees for the purposes of the same Acts, I, G. H. of &c., with the consent of the said A. B. as tenant for life, hereby transfer to him (or to the said C. D. and E. F.) the land comprised in the title above referred to, and apply for the registration of the following restriction and inhibition (fill in Form 1 or 3, as the case may be).

Form 9.

The like, where there is an overriding power of appointment." (Head and begin as in Form 6 down to "under which") the land comprised in the title above referred to is limited to such uses as A. B. of &c., and C. D. of &c., shall jointly appoint, and subject thereto to various uses, by virtue of which the said A. B. is (or has the powers of) tenant for life under the Settled Land Acts, 1882 to 1890, I, E. F. of &c., with the consent of the said A. B. as tenant for life, hereby transfer to him and the said C. D. all the said land, and hereby apply for the entry on the Register of the following inhibition (fill in Form 5).

Form 10.

Instrument of Transfer where registered land is purchased with capital moneys liable to be laid out in the purchase of land to be settled to the uses of a Settlement, the Tenant for Life being registered as Proprietor. (Heading as in Form 6.)

(Date) In consideration of £ paid out of capital moneys arising under a settlement (&c. as in Form 6 down to "under which ") A. B. of &c. is (or has the powers of) tenant for life under the Settled Land Acts, 1882 to 1890, and C. D. of &c. and E. F. of &c. are the trustees for the purposes of the same Acts, I, G. H. of &c. [the vendor], with the consent of the said A. B., hereby transfer to him all the land comprised in the title above referred to, and we, the said C. D. and E. F. hereby apply for the registration of the following restriction and inhibition (fill in Form 1).

Form 11.

The like-Trustees being registered as Proprietors.
(Heading as in Form 6.)

(Date) In consideration (&c. as in last form down to and including consent of A. B.) hereby transfer to the said C. D. and E. F. all the land (&c. as in last form, substituting restriction as in Form 3).

Form 12.

The like, where there is an overriding power of appointment.
(Heading as in Form 6.)

(Date) In consideration (&c., as in Form 10 down to "under which" and continue as in Form 9).

Form 13.

Instrument of Charge by way of Annuity.
(Heading as in Form 6.)

(Date) I, A. B. of &c., hereby charge the land (a) comprised in the title above referred to with the payment to C. D. of &c., of an annuity of £ for years (or during his life, &c.) payable (halfyearly, quarterly, &c.), on the &c., in every year.

of

NOTE. If there is any consideration, it can be stated at the commencement, as :-"To secure £ part of the purchase money of the land comprised in the title above referred to or "In consideration of an instrument of transfer of even date herewith of the land comprised in the title above referred to," &c., &c.

(a) If only part of the land comprised in the title is charged, add here" shown and edged with red in the accompanying plan, signed by me, being part of the land."

Assent to a devise of land under Section 3 of the Act of 1897.
(Heading as in Form 6.)

(Date) I, A. B. of &c., as Executor of the late C. D. of &c., hereby assent to the devise contained in the Will of the said C. D. to E. F. of the land comprised in the title above referred to.

(To be signed by A. B. and verified.)

NOTE. If the assent is to be subject to a charge for payment of money which the Executor is liable to pay, the form may be varied accordingly. See also Note (a) to Form 13.

Form 16.

Appropriation of Land in satisfaction of a Legacy or share in Residuary Estate under Section 4 of the Act of 1897.

Heading and commencement as in last Form down to "hereby," and then :

With the consent of E. F. of &c., who is entitled to a legacy (or share in residuary estate) under the will of the said C. D., appropriate to the said E. F. the land comprised in the title above referred to, and certify that all proper notices under the 4th section of the Land Transfer Act, 1897, have been given and the requirements of the rules of Court in respect of the matter duly complied with. (To be signed by A. B. and E. F. and verified.) See also Note (a) to Form 13.

Form 17.

Notice of Liability to Death Duty.

The land is liable to such death duties as may be payable or arise of by reason of the death of A. B. of &c., who died on the 18 or by reason of a settlement created by deed dated, &c., or by reason of the determination of a lease dated, &c., or as the case may be. Form 18.

Certificate of Non-Liability to Death Duty. This is to certify that the land (or, if so, shewn and edged with red on the accompanying plan marked being part of the land) comprised in the title No. may be registered without notice of any liability to death duty by reason of the death of A. B. of &c., and that any such notice already registered may be cancelled.

Form 19.

Entry of no Survivorship of Joint Proprietors.

When the number of joint proprietors has been reduced to (one, two, &c.,) no registered disposition of the land (or charge) shall be made except under an order of the Court or an order of the Registrar, after an enquiry into title, subject to an appeal to the Court.

TRANSFER OF ACTIONS.

ORDER OF COURT.

Monday, the 20th day of December, 1897. I, Hardinge Stanley, Baron Halsbury, Lord High Chancellor of Great Britain, do hereby Order that the Action mentioned in the Schedule hereto shall be transferred to the Honourable Mr. Justice Wright.

SCHEDULE.

Mr. Justice North (1897-H.-No. 4,010).

In re Harrisons, ld, John Burnet Geake v Harrisons, ld.

HALSBURY, C.

It is stated that Mr. Henry George Smallman, solicitor, of Queenstreet, Cheapside, who is this year chairman of the City Commission of Sewers, will come forward as a candidate for the position of Alderman of Cheap Ward, rendered vacant by the death of Mr. Alderman Halse. The names of Mr. ex-Sheriff Hand and Mr. ex-Sheriff Cooper, who both preented themselves at the last vacancy in 1895, are also mentioned.

A Bill has been lodged for next Session, the preamble of which sets out

that great difficulty is experienced by electric lighting companies in providing sufficient electrical energy to enable them to meet the demands of consumers at certain times of the day, whilst the production by each separate company of sufficient energy to meet the maximum demands involves the expenditure of large sums of practically unproductive capital and results in the consequent enhancement of the price that has to paid for the electric light. To surmount these difficulties the Bill proposes to confer on one company power to erect generating stations on one central spot in Marylebone on the banks of the Regent's Canal, and from this point to supply electrical energy in bulk to any "company, body, or person," at such price and on such terms as may be agreed.

CASES OF LAST SITTINGS.

House of Lords.

ALLEN v. FLOOD. 14th Dec.

MASTER AND SERVANT-TRADE UNION-PROCURING DISMISSAL OF SERVANTMALICE-INDUCING THIRD Person not to CONTRACT WITH PLAINTIFF. This was an appeal from an order of the Court of Appeal (Lord Esher, M R., Lopes and Rigby, L.JJ.), reported under the name of Flood v. Jackson (43 W. R. 453; 1895, 2 Q. B. 21), affirming the decision of Kennedy, J. The action was brought by two members of the Shipwrights' Union against three members of the United Society of Boilermakers and Iron Ship Builders. The plaintiffs (the present respondents) alleged that the defendants maliciously and wrongfully, and with intent to injure the plaintiffs, procured and induced the Glengall Iron Co. to dismiss the plaintiffs from their employment, and not to engage or employ them in future. The respondents Flood and Taylor were workmen engaged by the day to do wood-work at the Glengall Iron Co.'s works, and were recognized as being men who had some time previously been doing ironwork in another yard. The boilermakers in the yard reported this, and finally Allen, the local delegate of their union and present appellant, went to the managing director of the Glengall Iron Co. and stated, in effect, that, unless the respondents were discharged, all the members of the Boilermakers' Union then being employed by the company would be called out and cease to work. The respondents were therefore discharged. At the trial of the action before Kennedy, J., and a jury, the latter, in answer to certain questions, found that Allen maliciously induced the company to discharge the respondents, and also not to reengage them, and they gave £20 damages to each respondent. Upon further consideration the learned judge gave judgment for the respondents for £40 against Allen, and his judgment was sustained by the Court of Appeal. Thereupon Allen appealed to this House. The case was set down for re-argument and reheard in March last, when the judges were in attendance. The judges, having given their advice to the House some time back in answer to the question put to them, their lordships now gave judgment, reversing the decision of the Court of Appeal.

Lord HALSBURY, C., in the course of a long judgment, after stating the facts, said: The first objection made to the plaintiffs' right to recover for the loss which they thus undoubtedly suffered is that no right of the plaintiffs was infringed, and that the right contended for on their behalf is not a right recognized by law, or at all events only such a right as everyone else is entitled to deprive them of if they stop short of physical violence or obstruction. I think the right to employ their labour as they will is a right both recognized by the law and sufficiently guarded by its provisions to make any undue interference with that right an actionable wrong. Very early authorities in the law have recognized the right, and in my view no authority can be found which questions or qualifies it. The schoolmaster who complained that his scholars were being assaulted and brought an action; the quarry-owner who complained that his servants were being menaced and molested, were both held to have a right of action. And it appears to me that the importance of those cases, and the principle established by them, has not been sufficiently considered. It is said that threats of violence or of actual violence were unlawful means; the lawfulness of the means I will discuss hereafter. But the point on which these cases are important is the existence of the right. It was not the schoolmaster who was assaulted, it was not the quarry-owner who was assaulted or threatened; but, nevertheless, the schoolmaster was held entitled to bring an action in respect of the loss of scholars attending his school, and the quarry-owner in respect of the loss of workmen to his quarry. They were third persons; no violence or threats were applied to them, and the cause of action, which they had a right to insist on, was the indirect effect upon themselves by violence and threats applied to others. [And, after saying that the plaintiffs had a right to pursue their calling unmolested and referring to the history of the action upon the case, continued:] It is said that the company were acting within their legal rights in discharging the plaintiffs. So they were, but does that affect the question of the responsibility of the person who caused them so to act by the means he used? The question must be whether what was done in fact, and what did in fact procure the dismissal of the plaintiff, was an actionable wrong or not. I have never heard that a man who was dismissed from his service by reason of some slander could not maintain an action against the slanderer because the master had a legal right to discharge him. In treating this question I can desire no more apt exposition of the law than that which is contained in Bowen, L.J.'s, admirablyreasoned judgment in the Mogul case in the Court of Appeal. "Intimidation, obstruction, and molestation are forbidden; so is the intentional procurement of a violation of individual rights, contractual or other, assuming always that there is no just cause for it. The intentional driving away of customers by show of violence: Tarleton v. M'Gawley (Peake N. P. C. 270); the obstruction of actors on the stage by preconcerted hissing: Clifford v. Brandon (2 Camp. 358), Gregory v. Brunswick (6 Man. & Gr. 205); the disturbance of wild fowl in decoys by the firing of guns: Carrington v. Taylor (11 East 571) and Keeble v. Hickeringill (11 East 574 m.); the impeding or threatening servants or workmen: Garret v. Taylor (Cro. Jac. 567); the inducing persons under personal contracts to break their contracts: Bowen v. Hall (29 W. R. 367, 6 Q. B. D. 333), Lumley v. Gye (1 W. R. 432, 2 Ell. & Bl. 216), all are instances of such It will be observed that in what Bowen, L.J., says, if there be intimidation, obstruction, or molestation, or if there be intentional procurement of a violation of individual rights, contractual or other (always assuming that there is no just cause for it), are each of them, where damage has been caused, actionable wrongs. And sc Sir William

forbidden acts."

Erle, in a passage quoted by the late Master of the Rolls (Lord Esher), points out that every person has a right under the law, as between himself and his fellow-subjects, to full freedom in disposing of his own labour or his own capital according to his own will. It follows that every other person is subject to the correlative duty arising therefrom, and is prohibited from any obstruction to the fullest exercise of this right which can be made compatible with the exercise of similar rights by others. Every act causing an obstruction to another in the exercise of the right comprised within this description, done, not in the exercise of the actor's own right, but for the purpose of obstruction, would, if damage should be caused thereby to the party obstructed, be a violation of this prohibition." The Lord Justice was too keen a reasoner not to observe that the words "without just cause or excuse," "which he had used, required exposition to render his reasoning complete, and accordingly he explains in another part of his judgment what his view was of malice. His lordship thus describes the state of mind which in his view would negative just cause or excuse: Mogul Steamship Co. v. M'Gregor, Gow, & Co. (37 W. R. 760, 23 Q. B. D. 613). "Now, intentionally to do that which is calculated in the ordinary course of events to damage, and which does, in fact, damage another in that other person's property or trade, is actionable if done without just cause or excuse. [His lordship then considered several of the cases, particularly the Mogul case (40 W. R. 337; 1892, A. C. 25) and Keeble v. Hickeringill (11 East 574n), and after referring to several American cases, said:] I now revert to that part of the case which, I admit, has to be carefully considered-whether in what the defendant did in order to procure the dismissal of the plaintiffs he came within any of the rules which have been laid down in the cases quoted. Now, to my mind, he was guilty of intimidation and coercion from that intimidation-though in using that phrase, "of intimidation," I am not using it in the technical sense which mean. I the statutes upon the subject have been construed to will explain in what sense I do understand the words, but in passing I must deprecate the language which has been used to minimize the effect inconvenience." That of what Allen said. I observe it is described as is not how it is described by the witness. Edmonds, the foreman of the Glengall Co., thus described what would have been the effect upon the business of the firm. He said: "They were rather busy just then with boilermakers; that they employed three times as many boilermakers as shipwrights; and if the boilermakers had knocked off work or struck, it would have stopped the business of the company altogether-entirely -at that time, and that it was a very serious matter to the firm, and that the discharge of the men was in order to prevent their having to stop their business." It seems to me very obvious to ask whether the threat to do that which will have such an effect as the witness described is a coercion of the will or not. The men were good workmen and of good character; they were working, even according to Allen's own view, at their own trade as shipwrights, but they had worked upon a former occasion for a different employer upon an iron ship. And now it is important to call attention to the exact question which was left to the jury. Kennedy, J., said: "The question that I want you to answer is that, if you find he induced the Glengall Iron Co. by the threat which is suggested by the plaintiffs of calling out all the men on strike" (observe the phrase used, "the threat suggested by the plaintiffs of calling out all the men on strike,' ," and that that induced the Glengall Iron Co. to discharge the plaintiffs, and yet it is to be said Allen's threat had nothing to do "and he continued in that course of with the discharge of the plaintiffs), conduct if there was any attempt to employ them again, did he do that with the malicious intention which I have endeavoured to explain-that is merely, not for the purpose of forwarding that which he believed to be his interest as a delegate of his union in the fair consideration of that interest, but for the purpose of injuring these plaintiffs and preventing them doing that which they were each of them entitled to do." It appears to me that that is a direction of which the defendants cannot complain, since it puts what is to my mind an alternative more favourable to them. In my view his belief that what he was doing was for his interest as a delegate of his union would not justify the doing of what he did do. It is alleged-and to my mind and to the mind of the jury proved-that the employers were compelled under pressure of the threats that he used to discharge the plaintiffs. The objection made by the defendants appears to be that the word "malicious" adds nothing; that if the thing was lawful it was lawful absolutely; if it was not lawful it was unlawful-the addition of the word "malicious" can make no difference. The fallacy appears to me to reside in the assumption that everything must be absolutely lawful or absolutely unlawful. There are many things which may become lawful or unlawful according to circumstances. In a decision of this House (Corporation of Bradford v. Pickles, 44 W. R. 190) it has undoubtedly been held that, whatever a man's motives may be, he may dig into his own land and divert subterranean water which, but for his so treating his own land, But that is because the neighmight have reached his neighbour's land. bour had no right to the flow of the subterranean water in that direction, and he had an absolute right to do what he would with his own property. But what analogy has such a case with the intentional inflicting of injury upon another person's property, reputation, or lawful occupation? To dig into one's own land under the circumstances stated requires no cause or excuse. He may act from mere caprice, but his right on his own land is absolute so long as he does not interfere with the rights of others. Referring to Bowen, L.J.'s, observation-which, to my mind, is exactly accurate "in order to justify the intentional doing of that which is calculated, in the ordinary course of events, to damage, and which does in fact damage, another in that other person's property or trade," must have some just cause or excuse. Now, the word "malicious" appears to exhaustive exposition of the word itself, it appears to me that, if Į me to negative just cause or excuse; and, without attempting an

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