trail around the enemy's right flank, and he succeeded so far that when the advance was made on the 11th one battalion of his regiment was conducted by himself as a flanking party and two battalions occupied the high hill in front of the right of their line, and which his attack of the 9th had cleared of the enemy. The morning of the 11th the main line was formed and deployed under cover at a distance of 1,000 yards from the enemy, and in continuation of the line formed by the two battalions of the Thirty-sixth Infantry on the high hills. The action was opened at 9 a. m. by a gun of the light artillery. This was the signal for the Thirtysixth Infantry to open fire from their commanding position, the plan being that a frontal fire should be delivered at long range to occupy the enemy until Colonel Bell should appear with his flanking party, when the whole line would advance. The plan was entirely a success. After about an hour of firing the flanking party appeared, but the enemy at once ceased all opposition and fled precipitately to the rear through Bamban, where many of them were able to embark under cover on a train standing on the track waiting for them. The enemy had entirely disappeared and our troops occupied Bamban by 12 o'clock. These operations had also been considerably influenced by the operations of the right wing under Colonel Smith at Magalang, which had advanced on the 10th on the road to Concepcion and on that date had driven back a force of the enemy, killing 29 of their number. On the 11th Colonel Smith continued his advance through Concepcion to Capas, meeting considerable resistance. He arrived at Capas about 2 p. m., too late to intercept the insurgent train from Bamban, but he cut off and dispersed a small force of the enemy marching along the railroad track. This stand at Bamban was the last made by the enemy to resist our advance along the railroad. From Bamban to Dagupan many difficulties had to be overcome, but they were mostly such obstacles as nature offered in a country of heavy rains and swollen rivers and impassable roads. The rolling stock of the railroad was all burned and wrecked, stations destroyed, and one bad break divided the road north of Bamban in two sections. Just north of Tarlac the Tarlac River had left its bed and swept across the railroad track, carrying the latter entirely away for a mile or more. The night of November 11 the advanced forces occupied Capas, and the night of the 12th Tarlac was entered without resistance. The roads were so bad that the transportation, with supplies, did not reach Tarlac until the 14th. The four days from the 13th to the 16th, inclusive, were occupied in bringing up supplies, clearing the railroad wreck at Tarlac station, and rescuing a wrecked engine and repairing it for use. On the 16th an engine and a number of trucks of cars were in condition for service, and a supply of rations was guaranteed as far as Tarlac. It had been the intention to continue the advance on the 16th, but the heavy rains made the Tarlac River impassable. On the morning of the 17th the river was low enough to be forded, but the ford was a mile in width at the crossing, and impracticable for all transportation except pack mules. This day the advance reached Gerona, from which Lieutenant Slavens, with the division scouts, made a reconnoissance to Panique. He returned before midnight to report that two engines and a number of cars were wrecked at Panicue and that prompt action would probably render them of service. A company of the Thirty-Sixth Infantry, with Captains Stone and Hegeman, were sent at once to Panique, and by noon the next day, the 18th, an engine and enough trucks had been gotten in condition for use, and one battalion of the Seventeenth Infantry and two battalions of the Thirty-Sixth Infantry were entrained and proceeded to Moncada, where a wreck of 2 engines and 54 cars blocked the track. This wreck was cleared by noon on the 19th, and the advance continued to Beautista and Bayamban, the latter place reached at 5.30 p. m. Colonel Bell with one battalion of his regiment continued on up the railroad until further advance was stopped by finding the track removed 1 mile from Calisao and 5 miles from Dagupan. The next day the commanding general went over the same course and the division scouts were sent into Dagupan in an effort to communicate with General Wheaton at San Fabian. It is important to note that every town north, to and including Tarlac, was completely abandoned by their inhabitants upon the approach of our troops. This fact had an important bearing upon the comfort of our troops; the vacated houses furnished ample and most excellent quarters. North of Tarlac a large proportion of the people remained in their houses and showed all possible evidence of being glad to see us. As the troops were advanced along the railroad, detachments of considerable strength were left at all the stations and at the important bridges. From this time on the line of the railroad was used as a long base of operations, and from it the troops operated to and occupied the country to the east and west-east to the country occupied by the troops of General Lawton's line of operations, and west, first to the mountains, and thence by three columns penetrating the mountains to the China Sea. One of these columns penetrated the mountain chain south at Dinaloupijan to Subig; one at O'Donnell to Iba; one passed around the north end through Alaminso to Dazol and Santa Cruz. Previous to the movement of the last column, under Colonel Bell, the enemy had been overtaken by the latter officer in the mountains near Mangatarem, and all their artillery had been captured by him. During the advance along the railroad, and until the two serious breaks at Bamban and Tarlac could be repaired, the matter of transportation was the most serious problem. Enough of the rolling stock between breaks was recovered to operate the road in these separate sections, and by the 20th of December the engineers had repaired the breaks and the road was in operation from Manila to Dagupan. About the middle of December the whole of the country east to the mountains, with the troops along the Arayat, San Isidro, San José line, were transferred to the second division. This included the troops left behind by General Lawton when he went south and the troops under General Wheaton from San Fabian to Tayug, Early in January the division commander sent me on a visit of observation along the line from San Fernando, Arayat, San Isidro, Cabanatuan, San José, Humingan. Rosales, to Bayamban. North of Arayat the troops were short of supplies and were in need of nearly everything. My full report of the situation enabled the division commander to promptly remedy the matters needing attention. General Funston, assigned to the troops along the line and in this territory as the fourth brigade of the division, soon had a line of supplies well organized, and fresh frozen meat was regularly supplied along the line to San José, 75 miles from the railroad station at San Fernando, where it was taken from the car. About the middle of January I wished to commence the regular annual inspection of the troops in the division, but the circumstances were such that the division commander considered it advisable to defer the inspection until a later date, when the troops would be more nearly fixed in the station to which he wished to assign them. During the months of December, 1899, January, February, and March, 1900, there was constant guerrilla warfare throughout pretty much the whole division. At first the troops were arranged by battalions in the more important towns, as centers from which they operated; but later it was found much better to occupy every town of any importance by a company, which kept the town and vicinity clear, and operate with a movable column from some central point occupied by the regiment. The greatest possible activity prevailed among the troops of the whole division. The regiment reached a degree of effectiveness in the work that would be hard to excel. In the numerous encounters that occurred our troops were nearly always on the aggressive. The effects of the excellent work done were very evident. There was a steady improvement of the general conditions, and by the middle of April all organized guerrilla bands throughout the division had been destoyed or dispersed, with the single exception of the territory to the east of San Isidro and San Miguel de Mayumo. The country in this section especially favored the flight and concealment of the insurgent guerrilla forces, and although repeatedly routed in engagements they continued to be able to keep together in some organization. During these four months I was occupied with numerous investigations, and visited 26 different towns, stations of troops, under special instructions from the division commander. March 21 I went on a visit to Bayambong, the round trip occupying two weeks. I inclose a copy of my report of this journey, showing the nature of the duty performed on this as well as many of my other journeys much shorter and less important. Upon my return from Bayambong I began arranging for the regular inspection of the troops of the division. The Division of the Philippines was organized April 7, and the Department of Northern Luzon, to which I was assigned by this order, included all the island of Luzon north of Manila. I had completed the inspection of two battalions of the Seventeenth Infantry, when on April 19, I was ordered to accompany General MacArthur to Manila and on the tour of the southern islands of the archipelago. While I had been unable to make complete regular inspections of the troops of the division up to the date I was relieved, I had been among all the troops of the division from time to time making special inspections and investigations pursuant to verbal or written instructions of the division commander. Such visits I utilized to observe the condition of the troops in regard to sanitation, discipline, supplies, and general efficiency. Many officers would invite me to look around the quarters of their troops, noting the condition of kitchen sinks, water supply, and general state of the command and its surroundings. Other times I would express a wish to see certain features of the command, and in this manner I was quite familiar with the conditions of nearly the whole division, and where deficiencies existed or irregularities were noted I endeavored to secure proper remedial action. APPENDIX E. REPORT OF A RECONNOISSANCE MADE BY MAJ. R. A. BBOWN, INSPECTOR-GENERAL, U. S. VOLUNTEERS. HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, EIGHTH ARMY CORPS, SIR: In compliance with verbal instructions from the division commander I left these headquarters March 21, 1900, and accompanied by Troop K, Fourth Cavalry, Capt. H. C. Benson commanding, proceeded to Bayambong and Solano, province of Nueva Viscaya. The journey occupied seven days. One day was spent in Solano, and then the march to Bautista was made in six days. ROADS. First day, Bautista to Rosales, 13 miles.-This road is good at present, but it is flat and of the same level in most places as the adjacent fields, with no ditching or draining and with little or no gravel on roadway. When rainy season comes it will be impracticable as a road for regular supplies. I would recommend that the reconstruction of these 13 miles of roadway be taken up, the road to be ditched, raised, and graveled. Second day, Rosales to Humingan, 14 miles.-This road is good and is constructed for use in rainy season. The roadway is well ditched, raised, and graveled. The bridges are in fair condition. With little work from time to time I believe the road can be used for all purposes throughout the rainy season. Third day, Humingan to San Jose, 15 miles.-This road is good and is being still further improved by a large force of workmen. But as a result of careful examina tion on three journeys on the road I am of the opinion that this road will become impracticable for wheel transportation in the rainy season. The road from Bautista to San Jose, 42 miles, is practically without hills and at the present time transportation as far as San Jose is easy and simple. Fourth day, San Jose to Carranglan, 22 miles.—This distance is ordinarily divided into two marches: First, to Puncan, 14 miles; second, to Carranglan, 8 miles. Leaving San Jose the road for 4 miles passes over flat rice fields and over bottom lands to the Talavera River. The road then follows up the Talavera River 4 miles, crossing the stream six times, and most of the distance in bed of the stream. The road in bed of stream runs over dry gravel and sand, and would be under water only when river is high and the crossings impracticable. The road then leaves the Talavera River and follows a small branch river for 4 miles. In these 4 miles the road crosses the stream fourteen times. This portion of the road was in very bad condition on my outward journey. There were many short pitches and sharp turns, and rocks and bowlders in the crossings. This was being properly repaired when I passed through on my return. Repairs had been completed practically from San Jose to a point about half-way up the small branch river, a distance in all of 10 miles. The road this far was good for wagons carrying not more than 2,000 pounds. Leaving the small branch river the road pulls up a short but steep grade and then runs with slight grade into Puncan, 2 miles farther. Out of Puncan the road is good for 2 miles to Talavera River, which it crosses and then traverses a series of high rolling hills to the Rio Grande de la Pampanga, which it also crosses and enters Carranglan. There are two hard grades on these hills which will compel the wagons to carry loads of not more than 1,600 pounds. A passing examination did not disclose any means of correcting or repairing these grades, but from the excellent work and immense improvement made in the road where work had been completed on the section near San Jose, I do not doubt that the whole road from San Jose to Carranglan will, in a very few days, be in good condition for wheel transportation of all kinds. The road, however, between San Jose and Carranglan crosses the Talavera River seven times and the Rio Grande once. In time of flood these rivers are impassable, and this is a condition of affairs which can not be remedied. The current is swift, the channel full of rocks and bowlders, and the depth of water at deepest places in crossings now, in time of low water, is about 2 feet. A rise of 2 feet would make the crossings dangerous. Pablo Palad, presidente of Carranglan, stated that the people of Carranglan were usually shut in from the 1st of June until the 1st of December. Sometimes the rainy season started a little later and the road was used for a couple of weeks in June. I do not believe it is safe to count on using this road for supplies after June 1. Fifth day, Carranglan to Salaza, 11 miles.-The road from Carranglan to Salaza follows up the valley of the Rio Grande, crosses a number of small streams, and crosses the Rio Grande from east to west bank, and then back again from west to east bank. The road is good and wagons can be used to Salaza, and for 2 or 3 miles beyond if necessary or expedient. Salaza is nothing-two deserted shacks used by camping parties for shelter; no shelter available for stores. The road 3 miles beyond Salaza crosses the Rio Grande again, here a small mountain stream, and then starts up a steep grade to the pass. The fifth day out I camped at this point, 14 miles from Carranglan. Sixth day, foot of pass on south side to Aritao, 21 miles.—From the foot of the pass to the top was a walk of one hour and ten minutes. The road is cut through heavy forests and is perhaps two hundred years old. It is in good condition and plenty wide enough, but the grades make it impracticable for wagons. In several places the team could not pull up an empty wagon. The slope on the north side is longer and more difficult in places. On the return trip it took one hour and thirty minutes to make the ascent from the north side. The road runs down the course of the Caraballo River, which it crosses about 4 miles from the top of the pass. The river is here a good size mountain stream. Four miles farther down the stream is Santa Clara, a place containing a single structure like a barracks, and large enough to shelter 50 men. For temporary purposes it might be used for shelter for both men and stores. As far as Santa Clara there are a number of up and down grades, and the road is impracticable for wagons. From Santa Clata on to Aritao is 12 miles over a good road that is entirely practicable for wagons. At Aritao the road crosses the Anix River at a good crossing. This is the line of the telegraph, but ordinary travel into the Bayambong Valley does not follow this road through Aritao. Four miles below Santa Clara a trail turns to the right from the telegraph road and runs across the hills to Dupax. Aritao is a small place, not more than 500 inhabitants, while Dupax has a population of about 3,000; and the trail across the hills gives a short cut to Dupax and to Bayambong and the valley below. The trail, however, is a very bad one, up and down short, steep hills, across the Caraballo River at a bad crossing, and there are several boggy crossings of small streams. The road from Aritao to Dupax is good and the crossing of the Magat River is good. The distance is about 4 miles greater, but the road is so much better than the direct trail that loaded pack mules can best be sent by way of Aritao. Seventh day, Aritao to Solaño, Bambang, and Bayambong, 21 miles. From Aritao to Bambang there are two roads, one direct and one via Dupax. The telegraph line follows the direct road, but this road is not in good condition. There are two very bad crossings, one across the Magat River and another over a branch of this river, and there are numerous crossings over small streams that are in bad shape. The best road, then, is that via Dupax, the largest and most important town in the southern end of the valley. The wire from Carranglan to Aritao is intact almost the entire distance, but between Aritao and Bambang there are several stretches where the wire is missing and others where it is broken down. It would be a great advantage to run the wire from Aritao via Dupax to Bambang. Dupax is at present not on the wire, and it is there that supplies are proposed to be delivered for the troops to be stationed in the Bayambong Valley. Aritao to Dupax is 4 miles; Dupax or Aritao direct, distance either to Bambang is 10 miles. The road from Dupax to Bambang is good and practicable for wagons. From Bambang to Bayambong the road is good and practicable for wagons. The battalion of the Sixteenth Infantry have four wagons that they propose to use between Dupax and Bayambong. At Bayambong the road crosses the Magat River, which is the most serious obstacle on the line between Carranglan and Bayambong. The Magat River has a very swift current, and at low water the deepest places in the ford are over 2 feet deep. During floods the river is absolutely impassable. At favorable times during the rainy season the river can be crossed in a small boat, but this method is always attended with more or less risk to supplies and stores so transported. This will be the condition of affairs after June 1, and all supplies possible should be across the Magat River by that date. From Bayambong to Solano is a broad, well-built macadamized road WAR 1900-VOL 1, PT III- -12 in excellent condition. The map herewith shows the position of the roads, towns, and river above described from Carranglan to Bayambong. TRANSPORTATION OF SUPPLIES. My itinerary of the road from Bautista to Solano makes the distance 120 miles, divided into three sections: (1) Bautista to Carranglan, 64 miles, over which all supplies can be hauled by carts and wagons. (2) Carranglan to Dupax, 35 miles, over which supplies must be carried by pack animals. When supplies are in Carranglan in sufficient quantity the wagons can be used in conjunction with pack animals, the wagons to carry supplies as far as Salaza and to meet the pack train with fresh loads of supplies at this point at a fixed day and hour as required. The round trip from Carranglan to Dupax can be made in four days. One hundred pack mules, at 200 pounds per pack, would carry 20,000 pounds per trip. At 6 trips in thirty days this would give 120,000 pounds per month. (3) From Dupax to Solano, 21 miles, the supplies to be hauled by the four wagons of the Sixteenth Infantry Battalion and carried by ponies and caraboa as pack animals, with the assistance later of about 20 pack mules. This schedule if commenced from Carranglan by the middle of April would give 180,000 pounds as the amount that could be carried to Dupax by June 1, and on the same date a very large and sufficient portion of this amount would be carried to Bayambong and Solano. Supplies are moving in large quantities as far as Carranglan, and this far the problem seems already solved; but no certain system of supply is as yet in operation beyond Carranglan. Ponies for pack animals are not in sufficient numbers in the Bayambong Valley. In the whole valley there may be 500 ponies as a maximum, but I believe 300 would be nearer the correct number. The ponies, however, are of the very poorest quality, very small and thin, and in very poor condition. The work required by their owners for their own purposes taxes their capacity to the utmost. A demand for 300 ponies gave a train of 80, and these after one trip to San Jose and return could not make another trip until they had had a week's rest. A second call for 200 ponies gave a train of 42, and from what I saw of these I am sure that they can not make a second trip without a rest. A pack train from this side is therefore essential, and the resources of the Bayambong Valley for pack animals can be depended on only for work between Dupax and Solano. The headquarters Third Battalion, Sixteenth Infantry, are at Solano, Capt. William Lassiter, Sixteenth Infantry, commanding. Officers on duty with the battalion are as follows: 1. First Lieut. John F. Preston, jr., adjutant, quartermaster and commissary, Solano. 2. First Lieut. James B. Gowan, commanding Company K, Solano. 3. Second Lieut. Jack Hayes, commanding Company I, Bayambong. 4. Second Lieut. William E. Mould, commanding Company L, Solano, with detachment at Bayambong and Dupax. This officer came to San Jose with telegrams, was ordered to Second Division headquarters at Bautista, taken sick en route, and sent to base hospital, Dagupan. 5. Capt. Walter A. Thurston, commanding Company M, Cordon. 6. Second Lieut. D. B. Lyon has been on duty with Company M carrying supplies; is to be stationed at Carranglan to receive and forward supplies. 7. Acting Asst. Surg. W. A. Dade, U. S. A. Great difficulty has been experienced thus far in getting in supplies. The command has been living on three-fourths rations since January 15; the men are without a change of clothing, and many are entirely without shoes and barefooted. The command has been almost prostrated during the past month by an epidemic of pernicious malarial fever. Fifteen deaths have occurred since March 4, 2 of these at Cordon, 2 at Bagabag, and 11 at Solano. Those 11 were from 3 companies of the battalion. One case of smallpox has just developed. The case was in severe form, and the man was not expected to live when I left Solano March 29. Captain Lassiter showed me a letter which he wrote March 23 to the adjutant-general of the district, setting forth the situation, and from which I made the following extract: "The several reports from this province have disclosed the unhealthfulness of the region. The principal disease is pernicious malarial fever, of which ugly rumors were made to us during our journey into it, and the true state is now shown by a record of 15 deaths and 38 per cent sick. The men have behaved well, abstaining from drink and endeavoring to conform to sanitary rules. An improvement has begun, but a heavy sick list will always exist, and for this reason the number of troops held in this province should be reduced to the minimum. The military necessity for them can be met by a command of 3 officers and 125 men, stationed as follows: Twenty-five men at Bagabag; 60 men and 3 officers at Solano; 40 men at Dupax. The Iggorrotes |